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ABSTRACT 
Richard David Keen 
Half a Million Tons and a Goat: A Study of British Participation in the 
Berlin Airlift 25 June 1948 - 12 May 1949 
The Soviet blockade of western Berlin between the 23 June 1948 and 12 May 
1949 - and the airlift that was organized to defeat it - was the first major 
confrontation between the Soviet Bloc on the one side and the United States 
and its allies on the other.  It was at the point where the shared cooperation 
arising from common interests during the Second World War finally dissolved 
and became the Cold War with the potential to develop into a hot war.  Yet for 
all its acknowledged importance in the history of the Cold War, no historian 
has hitherto investigated the British component of the Berlin Airlift to discover 
how it worked in practice and if British involvement was actually necessary to 
the success of the Allied operation as a whole, or whether the Airlift could 
have been undertaken more effectively by different approach.   
Given its acknowledged importance, the Airlift has been poorly served by its 
historiography.  It forms a very minor part in the post-war histories of 
Germany; and even in the more specialist scholarly literature on the early 
stages of the Cold War, it receives scant attention.  Insofar as it has received 
any detailed scrutiny, the Airlift of 1948-9 is presented regularly as a sub-plot 
in the wider drama of the Berlin Blockade, and it is the US dimension of the 
Airlift which has produced the best historiography.  The American aspect, 
Operation VITTLES, predominates in the current literature and there is no 
equivalent on the RAF side to the USAF professional historians' output.  
Beyond this US dimension, there is a general dearth of academic papers in 
journals and of scholarly monographs.  Popular books exist in quantity 
providing narrative overviews for the general public but this literature can be 
based on assumptions about the British dimension to the Airlift that do not 
stand up when tested against the surviving evidence.   
This study seeks to address its principal questions - examining the scale and 
extent of the British participation, and gauging its utility and significance in 
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relation to the broader multi-national endeavour to defeat the Blockade - by a 
close study of the rich and plentiful primary archival sources held in Britain, 
the United States and elsewhere using the combined methodologies of the 
historian and the logistician.  The thesis evaluates British participation in the 
Berlin Airlift and reveals that her aircraft were demonstrably indispensable 
logistically.  However, performance - and that of the Royal Air Force 
especially - was substantially lower than that of the American task force.  At 
the time, the official explanation given to the public was that the USA operated 
more and larger aircraft.  The thesis reveals that there were additional causes.  
It examines how the Americans might have replaced the British, as was feared 
within the Foreign Office and the RAF and as they had the French.  
Redistribution of the whole American task force to bases nearer to Berlin in the 
British Zone of Germany would have increased the tonnage delivered but the 
thesis finds it would not have been sufficient.  Deploying more US resources is 
the other possibility investigated and the limitations of American capability to 
do so are revealed and the potential impact on the plans to continue the Airlift 
into 1951 identified.
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ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY 
This section provides an abbreviations index and a glossary of terms.   
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
1
st
 ALTF:  First [US] Airlift Task Force.  The American component of the 
Berlin Airlift - Operation VITTLES.  
AATO:  [British] Army Air Transport Organization.  The American equivalent 
in the Airlift was the United States Army Airlift Support Command 
[USAASC]. 
ACAS(Ops):  Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Operations) - RAF 
appointment. 
ACC:  Allied Control Council of Germany. 
ACSEA:  Air Command South East Asia. 
ACM:  Air Chief Marshal - "4 star" rank. 
AFB:  [US] Air Force Base. 
AFHRA:  [US] Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force 
Base [AFB]. 
AHB:  Air Historical Branch.  To ease tracking in the Bibliography there will 
be no differentiation between when the branch was a component of the Air 
Ministry and when of the Ministry of Defence.   
Air Cdre:  Air Commodore - "1 star" rank. 
Air Mshl:  Air Marshal - "3 star" rank. 
ALREP:  Daily Airlift Situation Report [SITREP] raised in Berlin. 
AM:  [British] Air Ministry, used in references. 
AMSO:  Air Member for Supply and Organization - RAF appointment but not 
filled by a supply specialist in spite of the title. 
AOC:  Air Officer Commanding - RAF appointment. 
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AOC-in-C:  Air Officer Commanding in Chief -RAF appointment. 
AOG:  Aircraft on the ground unserviceable awaiting spares 
AP:  Air Publication, RAF manual. 
App.:  Appendix, used in references. 
ATC:  [US] Air Transport Command. 
AVGAS:  Aviation gasoline. 
AVM:  Air Vice Marshal - "2 star" rank. 
BAFO:  British Air Forces of Occupation (Germany). 
BAOR:  British Army of the Rhine. 
BEA:  British European Airways. 
Brig:  Brigadier - "1 star" rank. 
Brig Gen:  Brigadier General - "1 star" rank. 
CAATO:  Commander Army Air Transport Organization. 
CALTF:  Combined Airlift Task Force. 
CCG:  Control Commission for Germany. 
CCTF:  Combat Cargo Task Force. 
CFM:  Council of Foreign Ministers. 
CG:  Commanding General - USAF and USAAF usage. 
C-in-C:  Commander in Chief. 
Col:  Colonel - rank. 
DCAS:  Deputy Chief of the Air Staff - RAF appointment. 
DDASTO:  Deputy Director of Air Support and Transport Operations - RAF 
appointment. 
EAC:  Eastern Air Command - Anglo-American Command in the SEAC 
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during the Second World War. 
FO:  Foreign Office. 
FY:  Fiscal Year. 
Gen:  General - "4 star" rank. 
GOC:  General Officer Commanding - British Army. 
Gp.:  RAF group as in No. 46 Gp. 
Gp Capt:  Group Captain - rank. 
HMG:  His or Her Majesty's Government. 
HMSO:  His or Her Majesty's Stationery Office. 
HQ:  Headquarters. 
IFR:  Instrument flight rules as opposed to Visual flight rules. 
IWM:  Imperial War Museum, used in references. 
JCS:  US Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
JSP:  Joint Service Publication, British Services manual. 
KPD:  Communist Party - German political party. 
LoC:  Library of Congress, used in references. 
Lt Col:  Lieutenant Colonel - rank. 
Lt Gen:  Lieutenant General - "3 star" rank. 
Maj:  Major - rank. 
Maj Gen:  Major General - "2 star" rank. 
MATS:  US Department of Defense Military Air Transport Service. 
MOD:  Ministry of Defence, used in references. 
MRAF:  Marshal of the Royal Air Force - "5 star" rank. 
NATO:  North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
 viii 
NHHC:  The [US] Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington Navy 
Yard DC, used in references.  
No.:  as in No. 229 Gp. 
ORB:  [RAF] Operation Record Book. 
PSP:  Pieced steel plank.   
RAAF:  Royal Australian Air Force. 
RAF:  Royal Air Force. 
RASO:  [AATO] Rear Airfield Supply Organization. 
RCAF:  Royal Canadian Air Force. 
RLC:  Royal Logistic Corps. 
RNAF:  Royal Netherlands Air Force. 
RNZAF:  Royal New Zealand Air Force. 
SAAF:  South African Air Force. 
SAC:  [US] Strategic Air Command. 
SASO:  Senior Air Staff Officer - RAF appointment. 
SEAC:  South East Asia Command. 
SITREP:  Situation Report. 
SMA:  Soviet Military Administration. 
SOPs:  Standard operating procedures.  Prescribed, detailed, written 
instructions to be followed to achieve uniform performance of a specific 
function.
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SPD:  Social Democrat Party - German political party. 
_________________________________________________________
____ 
1
  For example, in JCS, [US] Joint Publication 3-31, Command and Control for Joint 
Land Operations, 2014, Part II - Terms and Definitions. 
 ix 
Sqn:  Squadron.  
Sqn Ldr:  Squadron Leader - rank. 
TC:  Transport Command - RAF. 
TCC:  Specifically the EAC integrated Troop Carrier Command.  
TNA:  The [British] National Archives, used in references. 
USAAF:  United States Army Air Forces. 
USAF:  United States Air Force. 
USAFE:  United States Air Forces in Europe. 
USN:  United States Navy. 
USNA:  US National Archives and Records, used in references. 
VCAS:  Vice Chief of the Air Staff - RAF appointment. 
VHT:  Very heavy transport aircraft, essentially the planned US replacements 
for the Douglas Skymaster in the strategic role.
2
 
WO:  War Office, used in references. 
CONVENTIONS 
Where ranks and titles are used they are those which were held at the time of 
the event.   
The Joint Service military approach (JSP101) applies when abbreviations are 
used in the thesis rather than that pertaining at the time.  For example, HQ 
BAFO would have been written as H.Q. B.A.F.O.  German locations such as 
RAF Station Lubeck, Luebeck or Lübeck will conform wherever possible to 
the representation in AP3257 A Report on Operation PLAINFARE.  
Anglicization of less common Russian place names and transliteration of 
_________________________________________________________
____ 
2
  Abbreviation used by Tunner and Williams - TNA, AIR 2/10064, E.172 Williams 
21 April 1949 and E.174 Tunner undated. 
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Cyrillic script have also led to various spellings, for example Erickson used 
'Schlusselburg', Adams 'Schluesselburg' (in his translation of Pavlov) and 
Glantz 'Shlissel'burg'.  In each instance a single form is selected and employed 
throughout the thesis.   
"Blockade" and "Airlift" with a capital letter are used specifically for the 
Berlin Blockade and Berlin Airlift.  When used without a capital letter they 
apply to other blockades and airlifts.  Eastern, East, Western and West with a 
capital letter are used for political divisions whilst eastern, east, western and 
west without a capital letter describe geographic locations, for example West 
Germany is the Federal Republic but western Germany was the three zones 
occupied by the Western Powers.  Britain is employed rather than the United 
Kingdom as it is closer to Great Britain and England which were in common 
application in the late 1940s.  On the other hand, Soviet is employed rather 
than Russian although the latter was common at the time.  (After all, Stalin 
came from Georgia).   
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Airborne: US Field Manual 101-5-1 gave four definitions for the term: '1.  In 
relation to personnel, troops especially trained to effect, following transport by 
air, an assault debarkation, either by parachuting or touchdown.  2.  In relation 
to equipment, pieces of equipment that have been especially designed for use 
by airborne troops during or after an assault debarkation.  It also designates 
some aeronautical equipment used to accomplish a particular mission.  3.  
When applied to materiel, items that form an integral part of the aircraft.  4.  
The state of an aircraft, from the instant it becomes entirely sustained by air 
until it ceases to be so sustained.'
3
  In the thesis "Airborne" (with a capital A) 
will be used in relation to "Airborne assaults" - which are carried out by 
"Airborne Forces" such as the as the US 101
st
 Airborne Division.  "airborne" 
(with a lower case a) will be used when the meaning is that an aircraft or its 
_________________________________________________________
____ 
3
  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 101-5-1, Operational Terms 
and Graphics <www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/docs/fm101-5-1/f545-a.htm> 
[accessed 17 June 2013] (Chap. 1). 
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cargo is in the air.    
Halifax: The Handley Page Halifax was still being used by the RAF as well as 
by civilian companies as a transport when the Berlin Airlift started.  Large 
numbers had been disposed of and civilianized in varying degrees.  14 were 
modified extensively as passenger liners of which 12 had been used by BOAC 
and called Haltons.  Berlin Airlift primary and secondary sources interchanged 
the names.
4
  Halifax is used throughout the thesis. 
Logistics:  The meaning of the term logistics has changed during the last 140 
years and it now has both military and civilian applications.  Both Irving 
Holley and Martin Van Creveld cited Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini's definition 
in The Art of War: 'the practical art of moving armies'.
5
  The Royal Logistic 
Corps [RLC] describes its role as getting the 'right kit to the right people in the 
right place at the right time' and acknowledges that by so doing it boosts 
morale.
6
  The 2010 Oxford Dictionary of English included a civilian definition: 
'the commercial activity of transporting goods to customers'.
7
  The long 
processions of trucks running nose to tail found daily on Britain's motorways 
provides a similar picture to what the Americans and British wanted to achieve 
in the air corridors over eastern Germany during the Berlin Airlift.  However, 
like the RLC, timely delivery of what is needed in the quantities necessary is 
an imperative.  It is to encapsulate this concept of timely delivery of what is 
needed that the term "logistics" is used in the thesis. 
_________________________________________________________
____ 
4
  Anon, 'The Dropzone', Harrington Aviation Museum Society newsletter, Vol. 6 
Issue 2, July 2008, <www.harringtonmuseum.org.uk> [accessed 12 April 2012] (pp. 
14-16); John Provan and R.E.G. Davies, Berlin Airlift: The Effort and the Aircraft 
(McLean VA: Paladwr Press, 1998) p. 49. 
5
  I. B. Holley Jr., Ideas and Weapons, Air Force History and Museums Program 
(New York: Yale University Press, 1953, reprinted under Air Force History and 
Museums Program, 1997) p. 12; Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from 
Wallenstein to Patton, 2
nd
 edn. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004 [1
st
 
edn. published 1977]) p. 1. 
6
  British Army, 'Royal Logistic Corps', Corps and Regiments <www.army.mod.uk/ 
rlc/logistic.aspx> [accessed 7 Mar 2012]. 
7
  Angus Stevenson, ed., Oxford Dictionary of English, 3
rd
 edn. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
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Skymaster:  The Douglas DC-4 family included DC-4 civil transports and 
military ones termed by the US Air Force as C-54s and by the Navy, Marine 
Corps and Coast Guard as R5Ds.  The name Skymaster was also used for the 
military aircraft.  Skymaster is used in the thesis when it is not necessary to be 
specific. 
Wing:  In the United States Army Air Forces and United States Air Force 
application it was the headquarters organization commanding subordinate units 
which were mostly groups but sometimes squadrons and flights.  Normally 
flights were parts of a squadron and squadrons were allocated to groups.  In 
RAF parlance the hierarchy was in descending order: groups, wings, 
squadrons, flights.
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
The Soviet blockade of western Berlin between the 23 June 1948 and 12 May 1949 
was the first major confrontation between the Soviet Bloc on the one side and the 
United States and its allies on the other.  It was at the point where the shared 
cooperation that had arisen from mutual interest during the Second World War 
finally metamorphosed into the Cold War – a conflict which always had the potential 
of developing into a hot war.  As Alexander Solzhenitsyn would record sixty years 
later: 'You [the Western allies], in 1948, defended Berlin only by your firmness of 
spirit and there was no world conflict'.
1
  The threat posed to the stability of Europe 
by the Blockade was summed up at the time by Ernest Bevin: 'The Abandonment of 
Berlin would mean the Loss of Western Europe'
2
 whilst the importance of its 
counter, the Airlift, was encapsulated in 1949 by Dudley Barker writing on behalf of 
the Air Ministry and comparing the Airlift's significance with the Battle of Britain: 
The impact on history of that show of Anglo-American air power over 
Europe in the Summer of 1948 was probably as significant as that of the 
RAF's victory in the English skies in the summer of 1940.
3
 
In 1948, when faced with limited options that did not risk armed conflict or 
acquiescing to uncertain Soviet demands, the Western Powers elected to supply their 
sectors via the three air corridors that had been established in late 1945.  In reaching 
that decision, the British and American politicians and their senior military advisors 
_____________________________________________________________ 
1
  Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, Détente, Democracy, and Dictatorship (Piscataway, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 2009) p. 51. 
2
  Attributed to Bevin by Lew Douglas, American Ambassador in London and quoted by 
Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin - Foreign Secretary 1945-1951 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1985) pp. 576, 588; Peter Hennessy, Never Again: Britain 1945-1951 (London: 
Penguin, 2006) pp. 575-576; Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: the origins of the cold war and 
the national security state (London: Deutsch, 1978) p. 377.  The Bevin phraseology recorded 
by sources was slightly different and it is probable that the quotation provided the sense of 
Bevin's statement not the precise words. 
3
  Dudley Barker, [produced for the Air Ministry and the Central Office of Information] 
Berlin Airlift: An account of the British Contribution (London: HMSO, 1949) p. 6.  Barkers' 
Berlin Airlift was sold to the general public at the time for 1/6d. 
 2 
did not perceive an airbridge
4
 that could sustain the population of western Berlin 
indefinitely; rather it was to be the means to augment the stocks already held in the 
City thereby gaining time for Four-Power negotiations to lead speedily to the 
reopening of surface communications.  In the event, the Blockade was not lifted until 
0001 hours on 12 May 1949 by when the Airlift had been progressively reinforced 
by the Americans to a level where it was sustaining western Berlin, albeit at an 
austere level.
5
   
The possible implications of the Airlift's failure were regularly confronted on the 
Western allies' side by contemporary political leaders.  Had the Airlift not been 
mounted, or had it failed, the counter-factual possibilities which they contemplated 
could have included all of Berlin coming into the Soviet orbit and over time 
Germany becoming reunited under pro-Moscow communist rule.  Other eventualities 
that were contemplated included the possibility that the US might have withdrawn 
from Europe; NATO might not have been formed, and without a thriving West 
Germany the remainder of western Europe might not have recovered economically.
6
  
_____________________________________________________________ 
4
  In this case, aircraft flying over the Soviet Zone of occupation in eastern Germany between 
bases in the British and American Zones in western Germany and airfields in the British and 
American Sectors in Berlin.  During the Blockade, a further airfield was built in the French 
Sector. 
5
  Bullock, pp. 575, 577, 589; Sean Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War 1945-91 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000) p. 64; Daniel F. Harrington, Berlin on the Brink: the 
Blockade, the Airlift and the early Cold War (Lexington KY: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 2012) Chaps: 3-6, p. 295; Daniel F. Harrington, 'The Berlin Blockade Revisited', 
The International History Review, Vol. VI, No. 1, February 1984, p. 99; HQ BAFO, AP3257 
A Report on Operation PLAINFARE (The Berlin Airlift) 25
th
 June 1948 - 6
th
 October 1949 
(Bielefeld: Control Commission, 1950) pp. 4, 148; Roger G. Miller, To Save a City: The 
Berlin Airlift 1948-1949, Air Force History and Museums Program (Texas A&M University 
Press, 2000) pp. 32-34, 81-86; Helena P. Schrader, The Blockade Breakers: the Berlin Airlift 
(Stroud: The History Press, 2010) Chaps: 3-4; Avi Shlaim, 'Britain, the Berlin Blockade and 
the Cold War', International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) Vol. 60, 
No. 1, Winter 1983-1984, pp. 4-6; Ann and John Tusa, The Berlin Airlift (Staplehurst: 
Spellmount, 1998) Chaps. 13-14; Yergin, pp. 382-386. 
6
  Bullock, pp. 576-578, 584-6, 589; Hennessy, Never Again, pp. 252-254, 297, 348-349; 
Harrington, 'The Berlin Blockade Revisited', p. 108; Wilfried Loth, trans. Robert F. Hogg, 
Stalin's Unwanted Child: The Soviet Union, the German Question and the Founding of the 
GDR (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998) pp. 84-94; Frank Roberts, 'The Berlin Air Lift 
1948-1949', The Proceedings of the Royal Air Force Historical Society, Issue No. 6, 
September 1989 (Bristol: Top Copy, 1989) pp. 39-40, 42-43, 74-76;  Schrader, p. 254; 
Shlaim, 'Britain, the Berlin Blockade', pp. 13-14; TNA, FO 800/467, Private papers of Mr 
Ernest Bevin: Germany: 1948-1951; Tusas, p. 322; Yergin, p. 376; Vladislav M. Zubok, A 
Footnote continues on next page. 
 3 
Thus the Blockade was a watershed for Europe and the success of the Airlift became 
a symbol of hope for Western Europe - a practical manifestation of the West's 
resolve not to allow the Soviets to move beyond existing borders and areas of 
influence.
7
  Together the two events - the Blockade and the Airlift - formed an 
important geopolitical event.   
Authors appear to have had difficulty finding a single word to encapsulate the 
achievement of the Airlift.  'Victory'
8
 has Cold War connotations and 'success'
9
 is not 
entirely accurate either.  Norman Stone proposed that after the Blockade and until the 
Wall was built Berlin provided an escape route for East Germans and it was 'in that 
sense the West had won'.
10
  Helena Schrader wrote that 'the Berlin Airlift had played 
a critical role in keeping the US engaged in Europe and enabling West Germany to 
become a powerful and prosperous country. Without both these factors, especially 
West German economic recovery and the coveted DM, the revolution in East 
Germany would not have taken place.  Consequently, the Airlift was again perceived 
as being on the "right" side of history.'
11
  Certainly the events between 1989 and 
1994 could justify the view that eventually the West won but that was not the 
situation in 1949 when after the withdrawal of the Blockade (and really only the 
partial withdrawal) Berlin was not reunited and there remained no certainty of 
surface access.  It was more the case that the Anglo-Franco-American grouping and 
the western Berliners did not lose.  Moreover, as Chapters 5 and 6 will show, in the 
late spring and early summer of 1949, whilst the Anglo-American Airlift was 
delivering sufficient to sustain western Berlin at an austere level and displayed a 
potential to continue to do so, the situation was not truly certain.  A severe winter 
                                                                                                                           
Failed Empire: the Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill : 
University of North Carolina Press, 2007) pp. 76-77. 
7
  Daniel L. Haulman, Wings of Hope: The U.S. Air Force and Humanitarian Airlift 
Operations ([detail about publisher not provided] Air Force History and Museums Program, 
Air Force Fiftieth Anniversary Commemorative Edition: 1997) p. 4. 
8
  Arthur Pearcy, Berlin Airlift, (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1997) p. 111; Robert Rodrigo, Berlin 
Airlift (London: Cassell, 1960) p. 6. 
9
  Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) p. 6. 
10
  Norman Stone, The Atlantic and its Enemies: A History of the Cold War (London: 
Penguin, 2011) pp. 67, 192. 
11
  Schrader, p. 254. 
 4 
rather than the repeat of the mild one of 1948/9 might have changed the positive 
perception.  This, then, is what success meant and how it is used in the thesis. 
HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE AIRLIFT  
The Airlift inhabits a number of historiographies and in most of them is ill served or 
poorly served as will be now shown.  The Airlift is part of the 1948-1949 Blockade 
of Berlin which in turn forms an event in both the histories of Germany and the Cold 
War.  It attracts little attention in the German history where Mary Fulbrook's History 
of Germany 1918-2000: The Divided Nation, for example, gave it just four sentences 
in its 337 pages including incorrectly informing its readers that 'the Western powers 
flew supplies into Berlin by air routes, dropping food to Berliners from so-called 
"raisin bombers"'.  In fact, food was not dropped during the Airlift, although 
showering sweets for children became a successful publicity ploy.
12
  Wilfried Loth's 
1998 Stalin's Unwanted Child accorded the Blockade 14 pages out of a body of 185 
pages, but only one page to the Airlift.
13
  Likewise, Anthony Glees's 1996 
Reinventing Germany: German Political Development since 1945 allocated a total of 
one page out of a body of 279 to the Airlift.
14
  Eric Morris's 1973 Blockade: Berlin 
and the Cold War had a narrower agenda and shorter time span: 1942 to 1971.  In 31 
pages from a body of 247, ranging from less than a sentence per page to dedicated 
pages, it provided an overview of the Airlift but one which lacked source referencing 
and had only a one page bibliography of published secondary sources.
15
   
Emphasis, moreover, is on the American effort; indeed as the following examples 
show, British participation can be either overlooked or buried in the narrative.  The 
Oxford Handbook of the Cold War in 2013 accorded the Airlift eight sentences and 
in its 'Introduction' questionably attributed the Blockade to the currency reform in the 
_____________________________________________________________ 
12
  Mary Fulbrook, History of Germany 1918-2000: The Divided Nation, 2
nd
 edn. (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2002) p. 133; William H. Tunner, Over the Hump (Washington DC, 
US Government Printing Office, 1985 reprint [originally printed 1964]) pp. 207-208. 
13
  See footnote 6: Loth, Stalin's Unwanted Child: The Soviet Union, the German Question 
and the Founding of the GDR. 
14
  Anthony Glees, Reinventing Germany: German Political Development since 1945 
(Oxford: Berg, 1996). 
15
  Eric Morris, [lecturer in the Department of War Studies at the Royal Military Academy 
Sandhurst] Blockade: Berlin and the Cold War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1973). 
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western sectors of Berlin and wrote that 'the US Military responded with an airlift'.
16
  
It is only in the body of the Handbook that mention is made of British participation: 
'But American and British forces kept West Berlin going by airlifting in supplies.'
17
  
Similarly, in The Division of the World, Wilfried Loth stated that: 'the American 
fighting forces immediately improvised an airlift to West Berlin' although 
subsequently writing: 'When the Western air fighting forces withstood the test of the 
winter', whilst Gerald Kleinfeld in The Federal Republic of Germany at Forty 
accorded the Airlift one sentence: 'The United States defended the Western position 
by mounting a massive airlift'.
18
 
Of course, the Airlift has attracted the attentions of a number of writers, both popular 
and scholarly, in books about the Blockade and its subset the Airlift, spanning from 
Bennett's 1951 Berlin Bastion
19
 to Harrington's 2012 Berlin on the Brink: the 
Blockade, the Airlift and the early Cold War.  Popular books vary from those 
covering the Blockade or the Airlift broadly to others that emphasize aspects such as 
the aircraft, the aircrews, the personalities, politics, the western Berliners and even 
the humour.  They inform the general public.  Even where a bibliography is 
provided, it seldom contains primary sources and rarely archival references.
20
  Thus 
when a new fact or a different interpretation is presented, it is often not possible for 
the historical researcher to trace back to source which seriously limits the utility of 
_____________________________________________________________ 
16
  Immerman, and Goedde, pp. 5-6 (latter for quotation), 70, 161.  See Chaps. 2 and 4 
below. 
17
  Andreas Etges, 'Western Europe', in The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War, ed. by 
Richard H. Immerman, and Petra Goedde, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) p.161. 
18
  Gerald R. Kleinfeld, 'Chapter 1: The German Question, Yesterday and Tomorrow', in The 
Federal Republic of Germany at Forty, ed. by Peter H. Merkl (New York: New York 
University Press, 1989) p. 22; Wilfried Loth, The Division of the World, 1941-1955 
(London: Routledge, 1988) [no translator cited] pp. 203 and 209.  Coverage of the Blockade 
by Loth was spread across 8 pages which concentrated on the political implications not the 
airpower or logistics considerations, with the Airlift being mentioned in four sentences. 
19
  Lowell Bennett, Berlin Bastion (Frankfurt: Fred Rudl, 1951). 
20
  Robert Jackson, The Berlin Airlift (Wellingborough: Stephens, 1988) is an example of 
books which lacked both footnoting or endnoting and a bibliography. Jonathan Sutherland 
and Diane Canwell, The Berlin Airlift: The Salvation of a City (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 
2007) represented those without footnotes or endnotes but had a brief bibliography albeit 
without archival references.  Schrader's The Blockade Breakers (2010) was an example of a 
third group which was lightly endnoted, included primary source material but had no 
archival references. 
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these works. 
In the popular literature on the Airlift, and even in some of the scholarly work, 
mistakes of fact are repeated from one narrative to the next.  An example of this is to 
imply that the Royal Canadian Air Force [RCAF] participated in the Airlift.  In fact, 
the Canadian participation was confined to a number of Canadian nationals who 
served in the Royal Air Force [RAF] and possibly a few RCAF aircrew on exchange 
tours.
21
  The attempts to identify a single individual who conceived the Airlift 
provide a second example where errors have crept in.  The Airlift evolved from 
extant plans to supply the Western garrisons and, as discussed above, it was intended 
to be just a temporary augmentation.  Furthermore, the three Western powers were 
involved and multiple organizations - some with competence in air transportation - 
would have been exploring countermeasures to the Blockade.  The suggestion that 
the Airlift was the idea of a single individual is implausible.
22
  A third example lies 
in attempts to explain the differences in performance between the RAF and the US 
1
st
 Airlift Task Force [1
st
 ALTF] resulted from the former carrying freight that was 
more awkward to load rather than recognizing that by carrying such cargoes the 
Airlift was making best use of a known deficiency - the RAF's low rate of aircraft 
_____________________________________________________________ 
21
  RCAF, 'RCAF participates in the Berlin Airlift, providing West Berlin with food, 
medicine and essential goods' <www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/v2/hst/page-eng.asp?id=901> [last 
accessed 11 April 2013 and since removed].  See Brian Sutherland, [Canadian] Directorate 
of History and heritage, HistoryandHeritage-Histoireetpatrimoine@ forces.gc.ca 18 April 
2013 in Chap. 5 below.  [Jonathan] Sutherland and Canwell, p. 137, for example, coupled the 
RCAF with the RAAF, RNZAF and SAAF thereby implying 'personnel' were provided 
specifically for the Airlift in the same way as the other air forces.  They also wrote that the 
Commonwealth air forces provided unspecified 'equipment'.  No footnotes or endnotes were 
provided to substantiate of either assertion. 
22
  For example the sponsors of a British candidate, Air Cdre Reginald Waite, included 
Richard Collier, Bridge Across the Sky: The Berlin Airlift and Blockade, 1948-1949 (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1978) p. 55; Michael D. Haydock, City Under Siege: The Berlin 
Blockade and Airlift, 1948-1949 (Washington DC: Brassey Batsford, 1999) pp. 143-144 (and 
Lt Gen Albert Wedemeyer, another contender, at p. 167); Hennessy, Never Again, p. 354; 
Wolfgang J. Huschke, The Candy Bombers: The Berlin Airlift 1948/49: A History of the 
People and Planes (Berlin: Metropol, 1999) p. 84; Romilly Waite, 'Air Commodore R.N. 
(Rex) Waite C.B., C.B.E., R.A.F' (The British Berlin Airlift Association) <pdf download 
from www.bbaa-airlift.org.uk/page20.html> [accessed variously in February 2012]. 
See Chap. 3 below and Harrington's appraisal in Berlin on the Brink, Chap. 5. 
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utilization.
23
  
There are scholarly books.  Walter Phillips Davison's The Berlin Blockade: A Study 
in Cold War
24
 was a research study for RAND which gave detailed insight into the 
attitude of Berliners via contemporary and near-contemporaneous newspaper 
accounts, and Avi Shlaim's The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949 a 
Study in Crisis Decision-Making
25
 for the International Crisis Behaviour Project are 
early examples.  However, both Davison and Shlaim reinforce the limitations of 
studying the Airlift via existing monographs; they addressed the wider topic of the 
Blockade which limited the breadth and depth of the Airlift content, and were of 
American orientation which affects both their use of British archival material and the 
priority they accord to covering British participation.  Furthermore, they were 
produced during the Cold War and Daniel Harrington's caution that 'scholarly 
treatments of the Berlin blockade of 1948-9 have had difficulty escaping the shadow 
of the cold war' needs to be borne in mind throughout.
26
  Indeed he specifically 
challenges the portrayal by Avi Shlaim of Harry Truman's dynamic leadership at the 
onset of the Blockade.
27
   
The United States Air Force [USAF]'s commitment to recording its history and the 
resources allocated for doing so,
28
 together with the size and importance of its Air 
_____________________________________________________________ 
23
  Sebastian Cox, 'Britain and the Berlin Airlift', Royal Air Force Air Power Review, Vol. 7, 
No. 1, Spring 2004, pp. 37-38; Jackson, pp. 142-144; John Tusa, 'The Berlin Air Lift 1948-
1949', The Proceedings of the Royal Air Force Historical Society, Issue No. 6, September 
1989 (Bristol: Top Copy, 1989) p. 36; Paul R. Wood, 'The Berlin Airlift', Air Clues, Vol. 33, 
No. 5, May 1979, p. 172; Paul R. Wood, 'Berlin Airlift Reconsidered: Problems and 
Success', Air Clues, Vol. 41, No. 7, July 1987, p. 269.  See Chaps. 5 and 6 below. 
24
  Walter Phillips Davison, for the RAND Corporation, The Berlin Blockade: A Study in 
Cold War Politics (New York: Arno Press, 1980). 
25
  Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949 a Study in Crisis 
Decision-making (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1983). 
26
  Harrington, 'The Berlin Blockade Revisited', p. 88.  His full quotation was: 
Historical accounts tend to reflect the time in which they are written, and scholarly 
treatments of the Berlin blockade of 1948-9 have had difficulty escaping the shadow 
of the cold war. 
27
  Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, p. 102. 
28
  USAF, 'Air Force History and Museums' <www.airforcehistory.af.mil/> [accessed 
variously 2010-2013]. 
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Mobility Command - the Airlift's American descendant,
29
 have resulted in literature 
about the Airlift by its professional in-house historians which is rigorous and often 
fully referenced.
30
  The USAF History and Museums program 'is charged with the 
mission of preserving USAF history' which clearly sets out its priorities.
31
  
Consequently, the Airlift narratives have concentrated on the American aspect, 
Operation VITTLES.  That is not to say that the British component of the Airlift, 
Operation PLAINFARE, is not mentioned but it is in a subsidiary role.   
Besides the literature published via US Government Agencies, there is Daniel 
Harrington's 2012 Berlin on the Brink: the Blockade, the Airlift and the early Cold 
War which has re-appraised the 'standard accounts'.
32
  It is American-centric and its 
304 pages address much more than the Airlift; the 'Index' attributes 60 pages to the 
'Berlin Airlift'.  To emphasize succinctly its depth of research, the endnotes extend 
for a further 69 pages and its Bibliography for 21.  Detail is not recorded, however, 
about the individual documents that were accessed in British archives other than 
when cited as references and just 32 pages address the British component of the 
Airlift with their content ranging from the majority of a page to single sentences.   
_____________________________________________________________ 
29
  Christopher Bowie and James Ruehrmund, 'Arsenal of Airpower: USAF Aircraft 
Inventory 1950-2009', a Mitchell Institute Study November 2010 <www.afa.org/ 
mitchell/reports/MS_TAI_1110.pdf> [accessed 5 April 2013]; Suzann Chapman, ed., 'The 
Air Force in Facts and Figures: 2011 USAF Almanac', Air Force Magazine, Vol. 94, No. 5, 
May 2011 <www.airforcemag .com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2011/May %202011/ 
0511cover.aspx> [accessed 4 April 2013]; USAF, RefID: C-480AE32: United States Air 
Force FY 2013 Budget Overview, generated on '2012Feb03 1511' (<www.saffm.hq.af.mil/ 
shared/media/document/AFD-120209-052.pdf> [accessed 5 April 2013] ('Foreword' and pp. 
31, 32, 51-53). 
30
  Daniel F. Harrington, The Air Force Can Deliver Anything: A History of the Berlin Airlift 
(Ramstein AFB: USAFE History Office, 1998); Roger G. Miller, To Save a City: The Berlin 
Airlift 1948-1949, Air Force History and Museums Program (Washington DC: US 
Government, 1998) and in commercial version: Texas A&M University Press, 2000 (see 
footnote 5 above).  In addition some of the wider ranging USAF monographs and papers 
have sections on the Airlift, for example: Theodore Joseph Crackel, A History of the Civil 
Reserve Air Fleet, Air Force History & Museums Program (Washington DC: US 
Government, 1998); Daniel L. Haulman, The United States Air Force and Humanitarian 
Airlift Operations 1947-1994 (Washington DC: AFHRA, 1998). 
31
  USAF, 'Air Force History and Museums' <www.airforcehistory.af.mil/> [accessed 
variously 2010-2013]. 
32
  The quotation is taken from the dust jacket of Berlin on the Brink published by The 
University Press of Kentucky, 2012; see footnote 5 above.  At the time of publication Daniel 
Harrington was Deputy Command Historian at United States Strategic Command - a unified 
command not a USAF one. 
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The real puzzle is why the British involvement in the Berlin Airlift has attracted so 
little attention from British historians.  There is no RAF equivalent of Harrington's or 
Miller's work.  Ann and John Tusa's The Berlin Airlift covered the Blockade and its 
politics extensively and was well referenced.  It was written just before the Berlin 
Wall came down
33
 and therein lays a further potential limitation to studying the 
Airlift, which applies to both US and UK published sources, the absence of material 
giving a reliable rather than hypothesized Soviet perception.
34
   
However, whilst an accurate understanding of the Blockade from a Soviet 
perspective would be extremely advantageous, the Airlift historian seeks primarily 
the answer to one question: why was the response to the Airlift so muted.  The 
Russian historian Michail Narinskii in 'The Soviet Union and the Berlin Crisis' 
accorded the Airlift nine sentences emphasizing the Soviet expectation that the 
Airlift would fail and neither side wished the Blockade to degenerate into a hot 
war.
35
  He concluded that the Soviets failed to appreciate the Western powers' 
determination to create a West German state and 'the financial-economic and 
military-technical resources' they were prepared to commit.  Again the emphasis is 
on the Americans with Narinskii writing: 'The successful functioning of the 
American "air-bridge" resulted in the Soviet Union suffering a political and 
propaganda defeat'.
36
  Vladislav Zubok accorded the Blockade four pages from 344 
in A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev and 
submitted that 'Unexpectedly, the Soviet blockade of West Berlin became a 
propaganda fiasco and a strategic failure' because of the mild winter and 'Anglo-
American ingenuity in organizing the airlift'.
37
  Victor Gobarev was a Soviet Army 
officer and a historian in the Russian Federation Military Institute and yet in spite of 
this background, in 'Cold War Crises: Soviet Military Plans and Actions during the 
_____________________________________________________________ 
33
  First printed 1988 - Tusas, p. xii. 
34
  V. Vysotsky, 'Soviet view of Berlin Airlift', Air Power History, Vol. 36, No. 1, Spring 
1989 was extracted from V. Vysotsky, West Berlin (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974). 
35
  Michail M. Narinskii, 'The Soviet Union and the Berlin Crisis', in The Soviet Union and 
Europe in the Cold War, 1943-53, ed by Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 1996) pp. 67-74. 
36
  Narinskii, p. 73. 
37
  Zubok, pp. 74-77 (quotations at p. 76; the latter was the sole mention of the Airlift). 
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First Berlin Crisis, 1948-49' he recorded that because not all archives were 
accessible, he had to derive some of his findings rather than evidence them from 
specific documents.
38
  His contention was that Stalin did not wish to unleash a war 
over Berlin and instead sought to use his military power to blackmail the West.
39
  
Gobarev allocated two pages out of 24 to the Airlift, rather than the Blockade, and 
concluded that 'The ensuing airlift suited both sides in so far as that measure did not 
increase the risk of further and perhaps irrational military confrontation'.
40
  Thus 
these historians argue that the Soviets expected the Airlift to fail and degeneration 
into a hot war had to be avoided which, as will be seen in Chapters 2 and 5 below, 
matches with the position of western researchers. 
There is also an absence of autobiographies by the senior British Airlift officials (or 
collections of their private papers
41
).  The American Commanding General of the 
Combined Airlift Task Force [CG CALTF], Major General William Tunner's Over 
the Hump covered his whole career as did Memoirs of an Accidental Airman by 
Group Captain Frederick Rainsford.
42
  Although both helped expose air force 
thinking during the Airlift, it was just one incident in their lives.  Rainsford allocated 
18 pages to it out of 261 pages and Tunner 74 from 332.
43
   
_____________________________________________________________ 
38
  Victor Gobarev, 'Cold War Crises: Soviet Military Plans and Actions during the First 
Berlin Crisis, 1948-49', paper edited by David M. Glantz, The Journal of Slavic Military 
Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3, September 1997 pp. 1-4. 
39
  Gobarev, p. 7. 
40
  Gobarev, pp. 19-20, 22 (for quotation). 
41
  Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College London, Survey of the Papers 
of Senior UK Defence Personnel, 1900-1975 revealed no private paper collections for the 
senior British officers based in Germany during the Airlift. The private papers of Air Mshl 
Sir Thomas Williams, who died in 1956, held by RAF Museum, are of a social nature. 
42
  F. F. Rainsford, Memoirs of an Accidental Airman (London: Harmsworth, 1986).  
Rainford was Deputy Director of Air Support and Transport Operations [DDASTO] and 
focal point in the Air Ministry for the day-to-day Airlift operations by the RAF - "Freddie" 
Rainsford, 'The Berlin Air Lift 1948-1949', The Proceedings of the Royal Air Force 
Historical Society, Issue No. 6, September 1989 (Bristol: Top Copy, 1989) pp. 55-59. 
43
  Tunner's autobiography should be read in conjunction with Hanson's study into his style 
of leadership - David S. Hanson, 'When You Get a Job to Do, Do It: The Airpower 
Leadership of Lt Gen William H. Tunner', Drew Papers (Air Force Research Institute, Air 
University Maxwell AFB, 2008).  For example p. 62: 'He highlighted the important role his 
"old reliables" played in the airlift operations he commanded, but limited his praise for them 
to their ability to follow his instructions. Tunner never recognized another airlift leader 
within his commands, nor identified anyone capable of taking his place'. 
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Owing to the lack of autobiographies by senior officials, the papers presented at 
conferences and symposia by individuals increase in importance.  Air Commodore 
John Merer (Air Officer Commanding Number 46 Group)'s paper to the Royal 
Aeronautical Society reflected his October 1949 'Report on Operation PLAINFARE 
by No. 46 Group' contained in the Headquarters British Headquarters British Air 
Forces of Occupation (Germany) [HQ BAFO]'s 1950 Report on Operation 
PLAINFARE.
44
  Frank Roberts's recollections, expressed during a symposium, of his 
service as the Private Secretary to Bevin gave a first-hand insight into his minister's 
meeting with Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer; the early unsuccessful 
negotiations with Stalin, and the importance of the support of the Berliners living in 
the American, British and French Sectors [western Berliners] to the Airlift 
succeeding and the Blockade failing.
45
  Amongst the other participants in this 1989 
symposium were some who were either organizers of or participants in the Airlift: 
Kenneth Cross, Rupert Crowdy, John Dowling, Jack Holt, Cecil James, "Freddie" 
Rainsford, and Brian Stanbridge.
46
   
The scholarly coverage of the Airlift - and especially of the British dimension - in the 
learned journals is meagre.  In academic journals, Daniel Harrington's 1984 'The 
Berlin Blockade Revisited'
47
 is of interest historically because of the publication 
almost 30 years later of his Berlin on the Brink and Emma Peplow's 2010 'The Role 
of Britain in the Berlin Airlift'
48
 re-evaluated earlier accounts of Anglo-American 
harmony and British influence in the partnership.  However, she covered mainly the 
early period of the Airlift; drew principally on Foreign Office primary sources, and 
her paper was not a study of the airborne operations.  Articles in journals written by 
specialists for a particular audience - airpower and logistics in this case and often 
_____________________________________________________________ 
44
  AP3257, Appendix C; J. W. F. Merer, 'The Berlin Air Lift', Proceedings of Lecture to 
Royal Aeronautical Society, 13 April 1950.  Also Anon, 'Lessons of "PLAINFARE" A. Cdre 
Merer's R.Ae.S. Lecture on the Berlin Air Lift', Flight, 20 April 1950. 
45
  Frank Roberts, 'The Berlin Air Lift 1948-1949', The Proceedings of the Royal Air Force 
Historical Society, Issue No. 6, September 1989 (Bristol: Top Copy, 1989). 
46
  HMG, Third Supplement to The London Gazette No. 42998 of 11
th
 May 1963 (published 
21 May 1963) for spelling of Brig (Rtd) Crowdy. 
47
  See footnote 5. 
48
  Emma Peplow, 'The Role of Britain in the Berlin Airlift', History, Vol. 95, Issue 318, 
April 2010, p. 212. 
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termed professional journals - have also covered the Airlift but they tend to be 
narrative rather than analytical.  Examples for military audiences include several by a 
one-time Senior Historian at the Ministry of Defence Air Historical Branch, Paul 
Wood,
49
 and the near-contemporaneous ones in The Royal Army Service Corps 
Review
50
 addressing the significant role that the British Army had in the Airlift's 
success.   
Thus far the discussion has been about the Berlin Airlift as an historic application of 
airpower in response to a blockade in Germany during the Cold War.  In 1934 Major 
General John Fuller wrote:  
Surely one of the strangest things in military history is the almost complete 
silence upon the problem of supply.  Not in ten thousand books written on 
war is there to be found one on this subject.
51
  
In the interim since 1934, a relatively small number of works have examined this 
aspect of warfare, although rarely in any detail.  Martin Van Creveld published an 
influential study in 1977, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton; but 
this stretched, necessarily thinly, over four centuries, covering a series of campaigns 
stretching from 1560 to 1945.
52
  Other authors, Thomas Kane and Julian Thompson 
for example,
53
 have since addressed the topic, and the wider historical study of 
logistics is, thus, no longer entirely Fuller's 'cinderella' subject.   
_____________________________________________________________ 
49
  Paul R. Wood: 'The Berlin Airlift', Air Clues, Vol. 33, No. 5, May 1979, pp. 170-176 - 
with extensive photographs; 'Berlin Airlift Reconsidered: Origins and Stages', Air Clues, 
Vol. 41, No. 6, June 1987, pp. 227-230; 'Berlin Airlift Reconsidered: Problems and Success', 
Air Clues, Vol. 41, No. 7, July 1987, pp. 267-270. 
50
  T. H. Downes, 'The Berlin Airlift', The Royal Army Service Corps Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
1948 (Aldershot: The RASC School); K. W. McQueen, 'Use of Tanker Aircraft in Operation 
"Plainfare"', The Royal Army Service Corps Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 1948 (Aldershot: The 
RASC School).  Also relevant, D. J. Sutton, ed.-in-chief, The Story of the Royal Army 
Service Corps and Royal Corps of Transport 1945-1982 (London: Leo Cooper 1984). 
51
  Cited by MOD, AP3000 British Air and Space Power Doctrine <www.raf.mod.uk/ 
rafcms/mediafiles/374E9EFB_1143_EC82_2EC09693E342D3C7.pdf> [accessed 29 June 
2013] (Chap. 10 'Sustainability').  Reference was to Fuller's Preface to Colonel G. C. Shaw's, 
Supply in Modern War (London: Faber & Faber, 1934) p. 9. 
52
  Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, 2
nd
 edn. (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004,).  The postscript to the 2
nd
 edition extended the 
study until 2003. 
53
  T. M. Kane, Military Logistics and Strategic Performance (London: Cass, 2001); Julian 
Thompson, Lifeblood of War: Logistics on Armed Conflict (London: Brassey's, 1998). 
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To achieve the Airlift's targets, high aircraft utilization was necessary which 
demanded it had strong logistical support.  The importance of logistics in this 
maintenance role has been acknowledged by historians such as Daniel Harrington 
and Roger Miller, albeit again what has been published has not always been in detail 
and has been orientated towards the significant challenges of supporting 1
st
 ALTF 
across the Atlantic.  However, the Airlift's mission - to sustain over two million 
people - was a logistical one.
54
  Thus it also forms part of the study of logistics in its 
own right.   
Van Creveld concentrated on land-based, mobile, offensive campaigns where supply 
to the frontline troops was by surface means with an emphasis on its importance to 
military success and the trend across the genre is to write about hot wars.  The 
Airlift, on the other hand, involved unarmed transport aircraft flying along 
designated corridors during the Cold War.  As no literature has been published 
identifying how the application of logistics during the Airlift differed from hot wars 
up until the end of the Second World War, this is a further objective, albeit a 
subsidiary one, for the thesis. 
Thus the Airlift's historiography, and particularly the British component, is 
problematic.  The positioning of the Airlift in scholarly material within wider 
contexts such as the Blockade and the Cold War and the emphasis in what has been 
produced on the larger American participation means that the coverage given to the 
British involvement is small and content is constrained in both breadth and depth.  
With a few exceptions, there is an insufficiency of explanatory detail connecting 
sources and conclusions.  Furthermore, it is puzzling that the British part has not 
been investigated using archival sources to discover if it was actually logistically 
necessary within the total Anglo-American operation and what other options were 
potentially available.  An empirical study of the British involvement in the Berlin 
Airlift, one founded on a thorough examination of the archival sources, is thus 
overdue.   
Many archives containing relevant information exist in the United States, Australia, 
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Britain, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, and South Africa.  Overall, their holdings 
are rich and plentiful, for example, in the [UK] National Archives, Kew there are 600 
containers of documents, of varying relevance, and there are 400 in the [US] Air 
Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base [AFHRA].  Indeed it 
may well be that the sheer scale of the archival sources relating to the subject may 
have deterred historians hitherto.   
The documents in AFHRA address Operation VITTLES and then principally the 
USAF involvement.  This collection is extended by sources held in three other US 
archives: the Naval History and Heritage Command for naval aviation, and the 
Library of Congress and US National Archives and Records for Department of the 
Air Force documents.  Greater use was made of the National Archives at Kew given 
that the objectives of the study were primarily into the British involvement, 
Operation PLAINFARE.  Principal sources accessed were in the Air Ministry and 
RAF series (AIR) and in particular the pertinent papers of the Air Ministry, HQ 
BAFO and Headquarters Transport Command; the operation record books [ORBs] of 
the involved RAF organizations, and the several Airlift statistical repositories.  The 
need to hire civilian aircraft and the growing importance of the resultant Civil Lift 
extended the research into the archives of the Foreign Office especially, but also the 
Treasury and Ministries of Civil Aviation and Supply.  The role of the British in both 
cargo handling on the ground and maintaining airfield infrastructure added the War 
Office and Army files to the scope consulted. 
Over 2.3 million short tons were delivered to Berlin and in excess of 555,000 
American and British sorties were flown.
55
  Although each consignment would have 
been documented, the individual records no longer exist.
56
  There were 12 airfields 
and two flying boat bases despatching freight and in Germany alone, 16 
organizations were engaged in the Airlift.
57
  Thus at the time there were many sets of 
statistics.  Few survive now and those which do so are usually incomplete.  Daily 
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returns were circulated widely and British examples were apt to be stencilled onto 
poor quality paper which is now extremely fragile.  Individual daily returns were 
amalgamated by higher formations and weekly, fortnightly and monthly totals were 
also compiled and these tend to be better preserved.
58
   
Whilst operation record books of RAF squadrons are normally rich sources of 
information, because of the pooling arrangements when the individual RAF 
Transport Command squadrons arrived in Germany those covering the Airlift are 
generally unproductive.  Normal detailed sortie records were seldom recorded and in 
some cases, the ORBs themselves were not maintained.
59
  The Transport Command 
aircraft and personnel were based on BAFO stations that were commanded by local 
officers.  The details in many of these station ORBs are sparse with the best giving 
the total outbound sorties daily and the gross tonnage despatched.
60
  The information 
recorded in Command and Group ORBs lack detail or hold it intermittently in copies 
_____________________________________________________________ 
58
  Examples of sources for statistics: 
Daily: Anon, 'Hogozit Board', Task Force Times; TNA: AIR 8/1647 - 1649, Progress 
Reports; AIR19/621, AM Central Statistics Branch Statistical Information; AIR 20/7282 - 
7285, Berlin ALREPS; AIR 55/202 - 203, RASO Lubeck daily SITREPs; AIR 28/1034, 
RAF Gatow [copies of ALREPS and totals for aircraft and consignment movements]; WO 
267/497, RASO Wunstorf daily SITREP. 
Daily and weekly: TNA, FO 1032/1411, Airlift `Plainfare': statistical weekly summary. 
Weekly: TNA: AIR 20/7825 - 7826, Berlin Weekly Statistical Summary; FO 943/788, 
Control Commission for Germany Statistics. 
Fortnightly and monthly: BAFO compiled statistics held in TNA: AIR 55/106, AIR 55/107, 
AIR 55/109 and AIR 55/110. 
Monthly: AFHRA, IRISNUMS: 241489 - 241490, Statistical summaries; AP3257, Apps: C, 
D, and R; HQ USAFE, Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, 26 June 1948-30 September 1949 
(HQ Ramstein AFB: USAFE reproduction Centre, undated, circa 1950) pp. 12-20; 
Department of the [US] Air Force, Operations Statistics Division, United States Air Force 
Statistical Digest Jan 1949 - Jun 1950 Fifth Edition (Washington DC: US Government, 
1951) <www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc? Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf 
&AD=ADA551604> [accessed 22 January 2013] (USAF Airlift Data Table 207). 
59
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60
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RAF Wunstorf. 
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filed in the Appendices.
61
     
Whilst there are a number of contemporary or near-contemporaneous official reports 
available in archives, a potentially significant one is missing.  A Transport Command 
report was completed after the printing of BAFO's AP3257 A Report on Operation 
PLAINFARE and was sanctioned by the Air Ministry for only 'limited' circulation 
owing to a lack of newsprint in Great Britain.
62
  No copy of that report was located 
during the research.
63
  The Air Ministry stated that the report 'resembles in some 
aspects that produced by HQ BAFO'.
64
  Given the very substantial post-Airlift 
reduction in the transport force announced a mere six months after the Airlift ceased 
and the friction between the Air Ministry, HQ BAFO and Headquarters Transport 
Command during the Airlift, its disappearance is regrettable.
65
   
SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
Although contemporaries and subsequent historians have agreed that the Berlin 
Airlift was a tactical success in the early stages of the Cold War, and that the British 
participation contributed materially (although how materially has hitherto been a 
matter of conjecture), there is much about the British involvement in the Airlift that 
remains uncertain, both as to intentions and outcomes.  This thesis seeks to resolve a 
number of the mysteries surrounding both aspects of the British role.   
The first uncertainty concerns the motives for the British participation in the 
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campaign in the first place.  In opting to support the creation of an airbridge between 
western Germany and blockaded Berlin, were Britain's politicians acting upon a 
lingering (and arguably misplaced) perception that their country was still a Great 
Power or at least needed to behave as though it were, for reasons of maintaining 
national prestige.  After all, Britain was one of the victors of the Second World War; 
still had a large empire, and was a permanent member of the United Nations' 
Security Council.  Furthermore, with Germany and Japan defeated, and France 
recovering from its occupation, Britain was without competition as the third world 
power, after the US and the Soviet Union.
66
  To many, it was a matter of national 
self-esteem that it should take a prominent role in the maintenance of a free western 
Berlin, connected to and supplied by the West.
67
 
But if there were political reasons for Britain's involvement, as viewed from 
Whitehall, was British airborne participation in some demonstrable sense 
indispensable logistically to the operation's success?  To answer this question the 
relative size of the British contribution to the Airlift, as compared with that of the 
USA, has to be established.  This involves identifying the targets set; the numerical 
strength, size and capacity of the various types of American and British aircraft 
involved, and the number of sorties each actually flew.  In turn, this helps to resolve 
the related question: if British aircraft were needed logistically, could the US have 
replaced them with their own?  The latter consideration inevitably requires 
examination of the US forces available at the time and the options available to US 
commanders engaged in planning the Airlift.  Could the Americans, for instance, as 
an alternative to deploying more aircraft, have replaced the British by re-locating all 
of 1
st
 ALTF to the British Zone which was closer to Berlin?  Moreover, thorough 
assessment of the British and American contributions to the Airlift serves to identify 
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factors in addition to aircraft size and numbers that may have accounted for 
performance differences between the two nations, for example the traffic control 
policies - and the priorities inherent within them - imposed centrally by CALTF; the 
number of aircrews available; the reliability of each type of aircraft; the maintenance 
policies adopted by each force? 
In summary, then, four linked questions arise which can be expressed succinctly as: 
were British aircraft needed logistically; could the Americans have replaced the 
British by either deploying more resources or by locating all of 1
st
 ALTF to the 
Northern Zone, and fourth, did factors in addition to aircraft size and numbers 
account for performance differences between the Americans and the British?  None 
of these questions has been investigated fully until now even though they address the 
contemporaneous issues discussed in the next paragraphs.   
The size and usefulness of the British involvement in the Airlift was debated at the 
time.  There were recurrent fears, on the British side, that the increasing scale of 
American resources could eventually render British involvement sidelined, if not 
wholly redundant.  In November 1948, in the course of correspondence between 
General Sir Brian Robertson - the British Military Governor Germany - and the 
Foreign Office's German Section, it was recognized that increases in American 
capacity might result in British airborne involvement being limited to specialist 
tasks, such as the provision of bulk liquid fuel tankers by civilian contractors - the 
'Wet Lift'.
68
  Indeed, British military planners remained acutely sensitive to the 
implications for national and RAF prestige that flowed from the size and perceived 
utility of the British role, relative to that of the Americans.  In January 1949 the Air 
Staff at HQ BAFO concluded that: 'It is understood that the Americans have plans 
for increasing numbers and size of aircraft.  There may come a time when we will 
become an embarrassment rather than an asset'.  The inefficiency 'of our own modest 
effort' was tendered in explanation; the small RAF Douglas Dakota - numerically the 
largest asset in the British air fleet - was specifically singled out, and no date was 
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  TNA, AIR 2/10063, Es:151-152 Frankfurt 920 Basic 6 November 1948, Es:158-159 FO 
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speculated for when this might occur.
69
   
From an American perspective, in September 1948 Major General William Tunner 
(CG CALTF) - writing to the Commanding General United States Air Forces in 
Europe [CG USAFE] - argued that a force of 400 C-54 aircraft would limit British 
involvement to 'ground support'
70
 and although his subsequent claim that 'we can 
keep pouring it in for 20 years if we have to'
71
 may have been over stating the case, it 
remains true that by 1946 over 1,100 Douglas Skymaster aircraft had been delivered 
to the United States Army Air Forces.
72
  At the time of the Airlift, the Douglas 
Skymaster was the American military's principal heavy haulier
73
 and 225 had been 
deployed to 1
st
 ALTF by January 1949 - each with a capacity approaching ten short 
tons.
74
 
Whether British fears that their contribution was embarrassingly meagre or American 
boasts as to their self-sufficiency were justified will be considered in Chapters 5 and 
6 below.  Certainly, there were precedents for Western allies dropping out of the 
campaign.  In September 1948 the Americans had taken over French airborne 
participation, albeit that was far smaller than the British effort.
75
  Moreover, as 
William Tunner observed in the previous paragraph, it was the airborne contribution 
not the effective support by organizations such as the British Army Air Transport 
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Organization on the ground that was at risk. 
Chapter 6 also considers another scenario that could have led to British aircraft 
becoming unnecessary, the redistribution of 1
st
 ALTF.  In December 1948, for 
example, Lieutenant General John Cannon (Commanding General USAFE) and Air 
Marshal Thomas Williams (Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief BAFO) recognized 
that relocating aircraft from the Southern Zone to the Northern one should increase 
significantly the tonnage hauled.
76
  In his autobiography, William Tunner put the 
increase at 50%.
77
  Major General Edwin Herbert (General Officer Commanding 
British Troops Berlin) communicating with the British Military Governor
78
 and Air 
Commodore Reginald Waite (Head of Air Section, Combined Services Division of 
the Control Commission) with the Senior Air Staff Officer at HQ BAFO
79
 also 
appreciated that there were advantages to be gained in tonnage hauled from such a 
relocation.  The Chief Research Officer at BAFO (and Science 2 at the Air Ministry), 
Dr. Arthur Charlesby, went further in a report that was critical of British 
performance.  He suggested relocating the whole of the American task force to the 
North and if necessary concurrently transferring the British aircraft to airfields in the 
Southern Zone whilst airfield capacity in the Northern Zone was expanded.
80
 
The question about differences in performance investigates a statement by Dudley 
Barker in 1949 that the Americans had carried the major part of the tonnage because 
they had more and larger aircraft.
81
  Peter Hennessy wrote that 'Britain, [Maynard] 
Keynes knew, was to all intents and purposes, a bankrupt';
82
 Emma Peplow wrote 
that the British had to struggle to 'find the resources to contribute to the airlift' owing 
to its financial difficulties and 'the RAF simply did not have the resources to fulfil 
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Britain's share of the operation'.
83
  Resources rather than aircraft suggests there may 
have been causes beyond Barker's numbers and sizes which is a position also 
supported by Seb Cox, Head of the Ministry of Defence [MOD]'s Air Historical 
Branch, in an Royal Air Force Air Power Review article.
84
  Furthermore, it accords 
with AP3257 A Report on Operation PLAINFARE describing the marked difference 
in aircraft utilization between the USAF and the RAF.
85
   
Moreover, these research questions and their answers exist in a wider context: that of 
their recent precedents.  Those precedents existed both as material experiences from 
which detailed technical lessons could be learned and as impressions in the minds of 
the various participants in the Berlin Airlift.  The thesis, therefore, investigates the 
American World War II airbridge from India to China (the 'Hump') in which General 
Tunner had been a vital figure; the Anglo-American airbridge during the 'Siege of 
Imphal' and the air supply thereafter throughout the subsequent 1944/1945 advance 
to Rangoon, and for a Soviet perspective, which may help in deducing aspects of 
Soviet behaviour, the 1941/1944 air and ground sustainment of Leningrad; the 
1942/1943 German airbridge at Stalingrad, and the advance by the Sixth Guards 
Tank Army to Port Arthur in August 1945. 
METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
This is a thesis about air logistics as a sub-set of military history - and specifically 
the use of airpower, and particularly British airpower, to sustain a civilian population 
of over two million -
86
 which, as has been established above, is poorly served by 
existing historiography.  Examination of the four questions requires a combination of 
the skills of the historian (in the precise archival recovery of policy and practice), 
with the those of the logistician, able to bring the insights into the practice of supply 
to the understanding of the conundrums facing those who sought to prevent the 
Soviet strangulation of western Berlin in 1948/1949.  A combination of 
methodologies - from both disciplines - has been used to construct a hybrid one that 
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has been employed to analyse the rich archives of primary data.  It is an approach to 
the subject matter of the Berlin Airlift that is unique. 
The thesis is composed of seven chapters including this introduction.  Chapter 2, 
covers context.  It describes the path that led to the instigation of the Blockade; the 
factors which allowed the Soviets to do so, and why the Americans, British and 
French were permitted to fly over the Soviet Zone.  It gives a western Berliner 
perspective to the early years of the occupation and so serves to explain their stance 
during the Blockade.  Being scene-setters, these parts of the chapter do not analyse 
events and decisions nor do they consider what the alternative courses might have 
been.  The final part to Chapter 2 identifies Britain's financial position post-war - for 
example her large international debt; the priorities of her Government - such as post-
war recovery; her population's needs and expectations - a health service and adequate 
housing, and the cost to Britain of the Berlin Airlift.  This part of the chapter 
establishes the financial impact of the Airlift on the Nation.  It shows that the 
expenditure was relatively small with much of it being due to the chartering of 
civilian aircraft because the much-reduced post-war RAF was unable to deliver the 
tonnage that the Government aspired to. 
The American historian Frank Heck
87
 wrote that the Hump was a proving ground that 
'made it possible to conceive the Berlin airlift of 1948-49 and to operate it 
successfully'.
88
  His editors reinforced the operational aspect stating: 'in terms of the 
development of air-transport concepts and techniques the airlift to China was of first 
importance'.
89
  Chapter 3 reveals what these precedents were.  It explores the Anglo-
American airbridge during the 'Siege of Imphal' and subsequent air supply in the 
advance to Rangoon to establish whether similar statements could have been made about 
the British experience.  The chapter also explains why the German airbridge at 
Stalingrad failed.  The findings in Chapter 3 are useful in helping to judge the responses 
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of the parties in the analysis of the Airlift in Chapters 5 and 6.  The final area of 
precedent is the Soviet dimension and how their wartime experiences - and specifically 
the siege of Leningrad; the German airbridge at Stalingrad, and the advance by the Sixth 
Guards Tank Army to Port Arthur in August 1945 - may have influenced their response 
to the Airlift.
90
   
Chapter 4 is the first of three covering the Blockade and the Airlift.  It explains why 
the Airlift continued for 15 months and evolved from the short-term augmentation of 
stockpiles originally intended to a potentially permanent commitment.  It shows how 
the Blockade was lifted after 11 months through diplomacy, not by a military 
victory.
91
  The western Berliners were not passive observers whose loyalty had to be 
retained and their morale maintained; many were active participants.
92
  Tegel airfield 
was built using 17,000 labourers, over half of whom were women, and the 
'stevedores' off-loading the aircraft were western Berliners.
93
  On the other hand, the 
strike by western sectors railway workers after the lifting of the Blockade delayed the 
end of the Airlift.
94
  The retention of western Berliner support is a factor that has to 
be considered when exploring whether the Americans could have replaced the British 
in Chapter 6. The cost for this is shown in Chapter 4, for example the Airlift forecast 
for May 1949 allocated nearly 90% of the tonnage to be flown into the City to the 
indigenous population and who, in spite of this, were living under austere 
conditions.
95
   
Chapter 5 reveals how the precedents for success - identified at Chapter 3 - were 
applied during the Airlift to understand how it operated as a necessary pre-cursor to 
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Chapter 6.  Further, this groundwork identifies differences between the Americans 
and the British in the implementation of these success factors from the earlier 
operations and thereby starts to expose why the performances achieved by the two 
nations were dissimilar and to reveal causes for this beyond those of aircraft sizes 
and numbers.  The comparison of fundamental differences in the application of 
logistics between the Airlift and hot wars up until the end of the Second World War 
also draws on material in Chapters 5 and 6.  However, as this is a subsidiary 
consideration for the thesis and to avoid disrupting the main flow of the discussion in 
the thesis, it is addressed in a separate appendix, Appendix 7.   
Chapter 6 records the results of the air logistics statistical analysis of hitherto 
unexploited Airlift primary data.
96
  It shows that British aircraft were logistically 
necessary to the Airlift.  It reveals the capability of the Americans to replace them by 
deploying more aircraft; the implications on the USA of so doing, and the limitations 
on the Airlift, especially in the long-term, had this been necessary.  The implications 
of specialist tasks, such as the Wet Lift, are examined.  Chapter 6 acknowledges that 
locating all of 1
st
 ALTF on airfields in the Northern Zone of Germany would have 
increased the tonnage hauled but for reasons it explains, this would not have been by 
the amount expected contemporaneously.  By combining the understanding of how 
the Airlift operated - acquired in Chapter 5 - with statistical analyses, Chapter 6 
shows how replacing the British could have altered Airlift procedures, and would 
have required infrastructure development in the Northern Zone and enhancement to 
the American maintenance pipeline that stretched back across the Atlantic.  In 
addition, and as an outcome of the statistical study and evaluation of the other 
options, Chapter 6 continues to identify that the British performance arose for 
reasons in addition to Dudley Barker's explanation about having fewer, smaller 
aircraft. 
Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter summarizing the findings from the preceding 
chapters to answer the research questions about British performance, the logistical 
need for her aircraft, and the ability of American aircraft alone to have sustained 
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western Berlin both during the actual 1948-49 Blockade and for the airbridge's 
continuation into 1951 that was being planned.  The comparison between the 
application of logistics in the Airlift and in hot wars is also addressed to reveal that 
dissimilar circumstances allowed for different approaches.  Chapter 7 ends by 
identifying how the current Airlift historiography has been expanded by this research 
whilst considering areas that would benefit from future research. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
PRELUDE TO THE BERLIN BLOCKADE 
Chapter 2 provides context for the Blockade and its countermeasure the Airlift.  It is 
divided into three sections.  The first one outlines events leading to the Airlift and of 
especial relevance for this study, how the Soviets were able to mount the Blockade 
and the Western Powers to counter it with transport aircraft flying along designated 
air corridors.  The second section addresses the western Berliner perspective between 
the end of the war and June 1948.  Not only was their willingness to tolerate the 
conditions of the Blockade - such as lack of heating, monotonous rations and 
unemployment - essential but they were an intrinsic part of the Airlift and its success 
providing the additional, typically unskilled, workforce needed at the airfields to 
handle freight and to construct facilities.  The third section identifies Britain's post-
war financial position to help understand the Airlift performance deficiencies 
revealed in Chapters 5 and 6.   
EVENTS LEADING TO THE BERLIN AIRLIFT 
During the war the Americans, British and Soviets agreed in broad terms how 
occupied Germany would be administered.  The detail, however, was not ratified.  
The path from the wartime agreements to the June 1948 Blockade threaded through 
the development of the occupation structures; the access rights to the Berlin enclave 
in the Soviet Zone; communist expansion in Europe; the unilateral revision of the 
Polish borders; the refugees from eastern Europe; reparations and Germany's 
inability to feed itself or to pay for food imports forcing the Americans and the 
British to support their zones of occupation; the gradual recognition by the 
Americans that the Soviets had to be confronted not appeased; currency reform, and 
the emerging plans for western Germany.
1
 
The Chapter is contextual.  It is not intended to cover every issue that may have led 
to the eventual Blockade nor is it an analysis of why events occurred or what led 
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participants to make particular decisions.  It is not a criticism for example of Franklin 
Roosevelt's claim that he could 'handle' Joseph Stalin
2
 or Winston Churchill's 
pressurising of Stalin and Roosevelt to include France as an occupation power
3
.  The 
section does not consider what might have happened from alternative courses of 
action; for example if General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower had not stopped 
the 9
th
 [US] Army's advance on Berlin
4
 or General Lucius Clay - American Military 
Governor Germany - had been allowed to deploy armed convoys across the (Soviet) 
Eastern Zone
5
.   
AP 3257 recorded that 'the blockade of Berlin was the result of a situation which 
developed mainly as a consequence of decisions made during the war'.
6
  The 
American, British and Soviet leaders had met at Teheran in 1943; Yalta in February 
1945, and Potsdam between 17 July and 2 August 1945.
7
  From 13 December 1943 
they were supported by the European Advisory Commission (which France was 
invited to join on 24 October 1944)
8
 and at Potsdam a permanent Council of Foreign 
Ministers [CFM] was created
9
.  The Allied Control Council of Germany [ACC] 
consisting of the four military governors was tasked to govern occupied Germany.  It 
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was based in the American Sector of Berlin and first met in July 1945.
10
  A 
subordinate body specifically for Berlin, the Kommandatura, met formally for the 
first time on 11 July 1945.
11
  The ACC ceased to function on 20 March 1948 and on 
1 July 1948 the Soviets withdrew from the Kommandatura.
12
 
It was agreed that the decisions of the ACC and the Kommandatura had to be 
unanimous which with the regularly uncooperative membership of the French and 
the Soviets meant these bodies were doomed from the outset.
13
  Berlin was to be 
governed as a single unit and the western members unthinkingly signed a decree 
drafted by the Soviets: 'Until specific notice all existing regulations and ordinances 
issued by the Commander of the Soviet Army garrison and Military Commandant of 
the city of Berlin and by the German administration under Allied control regulating 
the order and conduct of the population of Berlin …… shall remain in force'.14  This 
lack of caution by the western members allowed the Soviet installed structures and 
nominees to remain in place until the final East-West split of Berlin's administration 
during 1948.  It also prevented Ernst Reuter assuming his elected post as 
Oberbürgermeister of Berlin until December 1948 and then only with a writ that 
applied in the western sectors.
15
 
At Teheran it was agreed in a general way to move the Soviet and Polish frontiers 
westwards.
16
  At Yalta, detailed discussions about the fundamental issues of post-war 
Germany were skirted around to avoid damaging the alliance.  Whilst the occupation 
zones, the ACC, and the sectors for Berlin were ratified, access to Berlin from the 
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western zones was not discussed.  Roosevelt, it is claimed unguardedly, accepted 
Stalin's reparation demand of US$10 billion as a 'basis of discussion'.
17
  Stalin, 
however, took the figure as a commitment.
18
  Yergin argued plausibly that the 
President knowingly backed the Soviet programme as relatively moderate and 
quoting Edward Stettinius, 'one that would not create economic disruption in 
Europe'.
19
  Whether Roosevelt fully understood its significance is uncertain but his 
announcement that US troops would remain in Europe for no more than two years 
after victory, with its implication of American return to isolationism and long-term 
disinterest, was undoubtedly one of the most dangerous statements made at Yalta.
20
  
Whilst not reaching Berlin, the British and especially the Americans had advanced 
beyond the agreed western boundaries of the Soviet zone of occupation at the war's 
end.  Ten weeks were to elapse before the Soviets advanced to their zonal boundaries 
in Germany and the British and U.S. forces were allowed to enter Berlin.
21
  In the 
summer of 1945 British and American ground and air power in Europe was at its 
peak; strategically they were well placed, and on 16 July 1945 the USA exploded the 
first atomic bomb.  Nevertheless, the US and Britain failed to use these advantages at 
the Potsdam conference to challenge the positions adopted by the Soviets in Eastern 
Europe and Berlin.  In part this may have been due to the Americans not wishing to 
jeopardize Soviet participation in defeating Japan.
22
   
The Soviets had clear aims and post-war they deployed diplomacy, mob violence, 
massive propaganda campaigns, and the actions of communists in representative and 
administrative bodies to achieve them.  They used international negotiations to cause 
delays, to conduct propaganda and to state demands and gain concessions.  Although 
the Soviets used propaganda to generate a fear of war, they appeared to set well-
defined limits to the risks they were prepared to take and seemed unwilling to go to 
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war over Berlin.
23
  The Blockade was implemented in stages allowing them to assess 
reactions, especially those of the Americans, and to ease back if the risks to 
themselves became too great.
24
  Sheila Kern argued that the traitor Donald Maclean's 
input made this a no risk strategy.  However, this assumed that his information was 
passed and acted on in real-time.  It also ignored the political rather than military 
ramifications of failure.
25
 
The Anglo-Americans, on the other hand, were too vague, indecisive, lacked 
planning, and failed to appreciate the threat posed by the USSR.  They were 
repeatedly outmanoeuvred by the Soviets.
26
  With the experience gained over time, 
the American view of the Soviets changed from that inherited from the Roosevelt 
administration.  President Harry S. Truman's Doctrine for example, which was 
revealed to Congress on 12 March 1947, stated: 'it must be the policy of the United 
States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or outside pressures'.
27
  George C. Marshall (US Secretary of State 21 
January 1947 to 20 January 1949) shared Truman's hard-line stance refusing at the 
1947 Moscow CFM to agree to Molotov's demand for the renewal of 'current 
production' reparations unless the Soviets agreed to an economically self-sufficient 
Germany and an account of everything removed so far.
28
  Eventually, when forced, 
the Anglo-American leaders were able to make rapid and firm decisions.
29
   
The diplomat John F. Dulles commented on his return from the CFM that: '[Soviet 
foreign policy] depends little on getting results by diplomatic negotiation.  It depends 
much on getting results by penetrating into the political parties and organizations of 
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other countries'.
30
  His quotation was remarkably similar to that cited by Hennessey 
which was made three years earlier by Christopher Warner
31
: 'she would be 
constantly manoeuvring to increase the strength of her own position in Europe by 
establishing her influence in European countries through Left-Wing Governments 
and by interfering in their internal affairs both through intrigue and through power 
politics.'  Hennessey considered that Warner represented the 'official mind' but 
Britain was no longer the major Western power and Roosevelt's assessment held 
sway.
32
 
Further examples of the change in the American Administration's attitude were 
Diplomat George F. Kennan's 'Long Telegram' with its analysis of the 'Soviet 
outlook' in February 1946
33
; the Clark Clifford/George Elsey (White House staff) 
Memorandum, presented in September 1946, advocating that all US international 
relations had to be evaluated against the overriding Soviet threat
34
, and the July 1947 
'Mr. X' article 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct' by Kennan in Foreign Affairs
35
.  
America was shifting to 'containment' of the Soviets and as Kennan is quoted as 
writing 'the Soviet Union is highly sensitive to the logic of force'.
36
 
Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin had a realistic appraisal of Stalin and the 
communists when the Labour Government came into office during the Potsdam 
meeting.  Attlee observed trenchantly that: 'yes or no, though you could only count 
on him if it was no'.
37
  Attlee granted Bevin his head as Foreign Secretary (Michael 
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 32 
Foot is quoted as saying: 'often enough Bevin was Attlee'
38
) and Bevin had 'an even 
deeper one [mistrust] of the Soviet Union'
39
, through his British Labour Party and 
trades union experiences
40
.  By then Britain was no longer one of the Super-powers 
and had always to cooperate with one of or both the USSR and USA to gain her 
objectives.
41
   
Germany was to be divided into three military occupation zones.  The eastern zone, 
containing Berlin and much of the farm land, was allocated to the Soviets whilst the 
southern zone, which had the more sophisticated industries, and the northern zone, 
which had much of the coal and the associated traditional heavy industries, was 
destined for the Americans and the British.
42
  The USA would have preferred the 
northern zone and unlike Britain she had the capital, management skills and technical 
expertise to achieve a quick German recovery which would have been beneficial to 
all.  However, the British wanted it too.  They hoped that its resources would help 
regenerate their own industries.  Actually, the two zones were complementary and no 
matter how the allocation went, separation would adversely affect their recovery.
43
  
At the 1944 Quebec Conference Britain's preference was met subject to the 
Americans gaining Bremen and Bremerhaven as supply ports.
44
  (France was 
subsequently given a zone cut out of the Anglo-American allocation).   
Stalin's unilateral repositioning of the western frontiers of the Soviet Union and 
Poland reduced '1937 Germany' by a quarter with the loss of much of the best 
agricultural land.  As pre-war Germany had needed to import 30% of its food this 
was serious enough but it also reduced the area from which raw materials and 
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 33 
reparations could come.
45
  Consequently, there was less German money to buy food 
from abroad.  Miller recorded that at Potsdam Churchill had argued 'that Poland and 
Russia were getting the food and fuel in the form of Silesian coal from a prostrate 
Germany, while the British and Americans were getting the mouths that had to be 
fed'.  He was further quoted by Miller as saying that: 'the Russians, pushing the Poles 
in front of them, wended on, driving the Germans before them and depopulating 
large areas of Germany, whose food supplies they seized, while chasing a multitude 
of mouths into the overcrowded British and American Zones.'
46
  Giangreco and 
Griffin cited Truman as saying that the USA 'could not agree to reparations if parts 
of Germany were given away'.
47
  Nevertheless, it was agreed at Potsdam that each 
country's reparations would come from that nation's zone of occupation with the 
American and British zones of occupation providing additional industrial equipment 
to the USSR.
48
   
The Potsdam communiqué explicitly stated that the occupying powers were to treat 
Germany as a single administrative and economic unit.
49
  However, the revision of 
the eastern frontiers provided the Soviets with a justification for its July 1945 
statements that its (now revised) zone was unable to supply food and hard coal to the 
western Berlin sectors as had traditionally occurred.
50
  Moreover, by the end of 1945, 
Britain and the USA had provided large quantities of food to their famished zones 
whilst the Soviets had taken tons from theirs.  By 1947 there were 34,000,000 
inhabitants and 7,000,000 refugees (Ann and John Tusa [Tusas] cited 12,000,000
51
) 
in the western zones needing to be fed.  Food had to be imported mainly from North 
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 34 
American sources and paid for in dollars.  The Anglo-Americans came to realize that 
they were now funding the USSR indirectly whilst meeting the costs of feeding their 
German populations.  Furthermore, as is discussed later, dollar expenditure was 
especially hard on Britain.
52
   
Reparations were a source of friction throughout the period and not entirely because 
of the food ramifications.
53
  Immediately after its capture the Soviets started stripping 
their own zone and doing so without maintaining accounts.
54
  Moreover, during the 
time the Soviets occupied the western sectors of Berlin, they officially and privately 
plundered much of it, including the most modern power station, Berlin West, in the 
British Sector.
55
  The Reparations Commission achieved little although it concluded 
that there was no justification for the Soviet claim for US$10 billion.
56
  Davison 
suggested that by the end of 1948 and including the parts of Germany transferred to 
the USSR and Poland, the Soviets (who were responsible for paying Poland's claims) 
had received far in excess of US$10 billion.
57
  Between 1945 to 1947 reparations 
may have added 10% to the Soviet national income.
58
 
On 25 July 1946 the British Cabinet agreed in principle to Bevin's proposal to halt 
reparations from the Northern Zone and to pool resources to restart German 
production as Britain could no longer afford the cost of keeping them alive.
59
  During 
1945-1946 the British expended £80 million supporting the 22 million Germans in its 
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 35 
zone and this sum had simply 'staved off disaster'.  The total Anglo-American cost 
was nearly US$600 million.
60
  By the summer of 1946 Soviet reparations from 
western Germany's capital equipment had been stopped.
61
  At the 1947 Moscow 
CFM Bevin said that the Soviets 'loot Germany at our expense'.
62
  Marshall's 
phraseology was less terse but contained the same message
63
, the USA was not 
prepared to pour resources into western Germany to satisfy Soviet demands for 
reparations and the priority had to be making Germany able to feed and support 
itself
64
.  A Foreign Office paper, reflecting Bevin, in August 1946 stated 'Russia 
hopes to get into the Ruhr while keeping us out of the Eastern Zone.' and Davison 
argued that reparation demands were really a means to gain the Soviets a major voice 
in western Germany.
65
  On 24 March 1947, Bevin told Stalin that the Ruhr would 
only be placed under four-power control if all of German industry was.  Given the 
hardening American position on Poland's unilaterally aligned boundaries and Bevin's 
personal view from the outset, Germany in this context probably would have meant 
'1937 Germany'.
66
  
In 1947 Marshall considered Europe to be in a desperate position.  Lord Franks 
(Chairman of the Committee of European Economic Co-operation) concurred to a 
considerable degree: 'in the spring of 1947 the economic and social state of western 
Europe was far graver than in the thirties'.
67
  Claims of dire conditions in Europe 
helped to ensure the European Recovery Program (The 'Marshall Plan') was pushed 
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 36 
through expeditiously.  Alan Milward, however, argued differently.  There was a 
severe fall in gold and foreign currency reserves and acute balance of payments 
difficulties, but investment profits and employment were high and aside from in 
Germany, no one was in danger of starving.  The weakness with his view is that 
because of the state of European agriculture post-war more food had to be imported 
from dollar sources and as he admitted, there were difficulties with balances of 
payments and accumulating dollars.
68
  Historians debate the precise American 
objectives behind the Marshall Plan but it cannot be denied that it assisted western 
European economic growth and avoided western European nations ending: 'their 
nascent booms in the pivotal year of 1947 when dollar famine and balance of 
payments problems caused nightmares in their finance ministries'.
69
 
European recovery required German recuperation and that involved currency reform 
as well as the revitalization of the Ruhr and the Marshall Plan.
70
  The western 
German "west mark"
71
 was introduced on 18 June 1948 to replace the hyper-inflated 
Reichmark.
72
  A successful upturn would mean that the challenges of feeding its 
population could then pass to Germans.  Resurgence also needed western Germany 
to have a place in Europe other than as its pariah.  It required the formation of a West 
German nation within the Western Bloc.  The Soviets also recognised Germany's 
importance in Europe but their view was that if it could not be united under 
communism, it should be divided into a strong communist east and a weak west.
73
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 37 
The Soviets prevented the new west marks circulating in their zone which they 
claimed to include Berlin
74
 and countered by introducing the 'tapetenmark' 
('wallpaper mark') as the sole currency for Berlin.  The Western Powers responded 
by releasing the Berlin mark ('B-mark') and set about trying to resolve the currency 
dispute as the way to end the Blockade.
75
  In fact as early as 3 July 1948 the Soviet 
Military Governor, Marshal Vasily Sokolovsky, made clear that the real issue was 
the Western Powers plans for western Germany, a point reiterated by Stalin on 23 
August 1948.
76
   
Thus the objective of the Blockade was not the local currency dispute.  It was to 
prevent the creation of a West German government and western German economic 
recovery.  If that could not be achieved, it was to include western Berlin in the 
eastern zone.
77
  The aim was not to evict the Americans and British from the city 
although there was always the hope that they would lose their nerve and pull out with 
the resultant possibility of the progressive collapse of western Germany and then 
western Europe.
78
  Had the Blockade succeeded it would undoubtedly have adversely 
affected the confidence of the newly created Western Union (Treaty of Brussels 17 
March 1948) and have impinged on the subsequent Atlantic Alliance (4 April 1949).  
Essentially the Soviet targets were, as Stalin said in August 1948, to reverse the 1948 
(Six-Power) London Recommendations (notably on control of the Ruhr and future 
German government).
79 
 
Warner's 1944 conclusion that the Soviets worked through left-wing governments 
and interference in a country's internal affairs to expand their influence has been 
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mentioned earlier.  France had many difficulties.  She had been defeated and 
occupied by Germany which she now wanted to keep weak; she had been included in 
the "Big-Four" under sufferance, and her democratic forums included substantial 
communist representation as well as right wing parties with near-xenophobic views 
about France's greatness.
80
  The Italian communist party was growing and was 
expected (wrongly) to win the April 1948 election and other countries were under 
threat.
81
  The communist coup in Czechoslovakia during February-March 1948 
emphasised even more the need for a firm stance across the West.
82
  Brookings 
Institute analysts stated that after the coup: 'little doubt remained in Western minds 
that communist ambitions could only be checked through the evidence of superior 
power'.
83
  Thus the US Congress speeded up approval of the 'Economic Cooperation 
Act of 1948' (sometimes termed the European Recovery Act to link with the 
European Recovery Plan) which was signed into law by the President on 3 April 
1948, with its appropriations approved in June 1948.
84
  The Benelux countries, 
France and Britain signed the Western Union mutual defence treaty on 17 March 
1948 and, more significantly, the Americans, Canadians and British started talks 
exploring an Atlantic pact on 22 March 1948.
85
  The threat of the spread of 
communism had stiffened American and British resolve which was reflected in their 
response to the Blockade (even if they were unclear about its precise cause). 
The final answer sought in this section concerns access rights to Berlin.  
Superficially, the Soviets were able to stop movement across their zone without risk 
of war because there was no written agreement.  The decision makers chose not to 
place it on the Yalta agenda and so three-Power formal agreement was not achieved 
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before the war's end.  During the war the Soviets had adopted the reassuring line that 
'Anglo-American presence in Berlin automatically carried with it the right of 
access'.
86
  During the 'Little Lift' in April 1948 Brigadier General Charles Gailey did 
try to resolve the access issue by writing to the Soviet Deputy Military Governor and 
contending that: 'The agreement under which we entered Berlin clearly provided for 
our free and unrestricted utilization of the established corridors.  This right was a 
condition precedent to our entry into Berlin and our final evacuation of Saxony and 
Thuringia'.  The Soviets rejected his contention.
87
 
There was a written arrangement for water transport.  The agreement was between 
the British and the Soviets which the latter persistently ignored.  The Soviets 
included water transport in the Blockade and given the importance of barge traffic in 
the supply of Berlin, it must be assumed that the situation would have been no 
different if the agreement had been an ACC one.
88
  Giangreco and Griffin cited a 
Clay statement made in 1950: 'that I doubt very much if anything in writing would 
have done any more to prevent events which took place than the verbal agreement 
which we made'.
89
  More than 30 years later Harrington also remained sceptical 
about what effect written agreements would have had pointing to the obvious 
deficiency that ground communications crossed Soviet controlled territory: '[zonal 
negotiations in 1944] could have provided at best written affirmations of Western 
transit.  Such accords, without Western control of access routes, would have afforded 
no greater protection against breach of faith than oral promises.  Western 
vulnerability in Berlin rested on geography, not on whether agreements with 
Moscow were written or oral.'
90
  As all surface transport was under tight Soviet 
control, it could be cut for technical reasons at any time without serious risk of 
escalation into war.  Even the most determined convoy, train or barge can be stopped 
by civil engineering.   
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AP3257 asserted that: 'The use of the air corridors to Berlin had been guaranteed in 
writing by quadripartite agreement in November 1945.'
91
  The ACC had approved 
three air corridors between Berlin and Hamburg, Buckeburg, and Frankfurt-on-Main 
in western Germany on 30 November 1945.  Each was 20 miles wide and allowed 
the use of all airspace up to 10,000 feet above mean sea level.  The corridors met in a 
Berlin control zone, a circle with a radius of twenty miles from the ACC building, 
within which all traffic movements were directed by the four-Power Berlin Air 
Safety Centre.  After initial Soviet objection, it was agreed that commercial aircraft 
might use the corridors and traffic should not be limited to those serving the 
occupation garrisons.  It too was a written approval but it was different.
92
  Rules for 
air safety within the corridors were codified October 1946 and then enforced by the 
Air Directorate.
93
  The Soviets could not breach it under the pretext of temporary 
administrative difficulties or engineering maintenance.
 
 
Most sources mentioned the 10,000 feet ceiling to the corridors.  However, 
Giangreco and Griffin wrote that the right to fly above that altitude had never been 
yielded and quoted Paul R. Voitti of the USAF Academy in 1984: 'The October 1946 
Flight Rules do address the possibility of imposing "airspace restriction", but the 
"appropriate authority" is left unspecified' and 'because the Western allies view use 
of the corridors as their right, they have been somewhat reluctant to take "privileges" 
offered by the Soviets (flying above 10,000 feet when, indeed, they have never 
conceded their right in principle to fly above that altitude)'.  In 1948-1949 the Airlift 
flight profiles and the aircraft deployed meant that flying above 10,000 feet was not 
of great advantage.
94
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When the three narrow air corridors were established, the Soviets would have 
believed they were making a goodwill gesture that cost them nothing and gained 
greater safety for their own aircraft and privacy for their military installations.
95
  The 
agreement was intended for flight safety purposes and gave the Soviets access to 
modern flight safety techniques and air navigation equipment.
96
  It is most unlikely 
that in 1945 anyone would have conceived how important the corridors would 
become three years later.  Indeed Davison cited an unnamed US diplomat's memory 
that in the early days of the occupation the Western powers had offered land on the 
eastern boundary of Tempelhof airport to the Soviets in return for territory in the 
north of the city.  Had this arrangement taken place, aircraft transits could have been 
blocked simply by erecting tall buildings.
97
  The Soviets attempted without success 
to amend the agreement subsequently.  In 1948, prior to the Blockade, they proposed 
that corridor air traffic should be limited to the needs of the occupation forces; 
instrument flying should be banned, and prior flight clearance should be obtained.  
They also suggested that the airport for western civilian aircraft was shifted to the 
Soviet Sector and even that all military aircraft be relocated to Dalgow in eastern 
Berlin.  The Western Powers sagely either rejected or ignored these proposals.
98
   
There had been instances of Soviet military aircraft flying close to western transport 
aircraft ("buzzing") in the corridors since late 1946.  This escalated on 5 April 1948 
when a British European Airways [BEA] Vickers Viking on landing approach to 
RAF Gatow was hit by a 'stunting' Soviet Yakovlev Yak-3 fighter.  Both planes 
crashed with total loss of life.
99
  The concern that the Viking incident and the 
concurrent 'Little Lift' caused was encapsulated by Cyril Falls.  He wrote that:  
This is an ugly and dangerous situation.  The Western Allies hold in their 
sectors only very small garrisons, which are surrounded by the vast forces 
still retained in the Russian Zone.  From the purely physical point of view the 
Russians could at any moment force their former Allies to quit Berlin 
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provided they were prepared to face the consequences of such action.  
Another consideration is that an itching finger on the trigger might cause 
bloodshed and bring about an international incident of the gravest kind.
100
 
Both the Soviets and the British produced reports blaming the other for the crash and 
the former reinstated their earlier proposals to curb air travel, even implying the 
corridors existed solely by Soviet grace and favour.  The Anglo-American response 
was the clear willingness by both military governors to allocate fighter protection to 
aircraft in transit which emphasized that USA and Britain would guard firmly their 
air passage rights and implied that war would be risked by bringing down unarmed 
transport aircraft flying legal routes.
101
  Miller cited two intelligence sources to 
support the view that the Soviets had intended to impose an air blockade but were 
deterred from doing so.
102
  It appears probable that the Soviets recognised attacks on 
aircraft could be a casus belli and thus accepted there was no way to impose an air 
embargo.
103
  As the subsequent chapters reveal, the Soviets may have harassed 
Airlift aircraft but they stopped short of seriously risking aircraft safety.
104
  This may 
have reflected a desire to avoid escalation but as later chapters explore, it might also 
suggest a belief that supply by air would not succeed.
105
   
Thus how the Blockade was imposed rested not on written agreements but on risk of 
war.  To return to Cyril Falls's quotation, whilst the Western garrisons were small, 
they were sufficient to deter the Soviets (and their Eastern Zone paramilitary forces) 
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from using force to achieve their aims in Berlin without the risk of war.
106
  By mid-
1948 the British, French and Americans were extremely weak numerically both in 
western Germany and globally.
107
  Only in the air did the Americans have some 
qualitative advantages and these declined when the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15, the 
new Soviet air superiority jet fighter, entered service in October 1948.  If a 
conventional war had started in 1948, it would have been disastrous for western 
Europe no matter what the global long-term outcome would have been.
108
   
America's atomic capability would have been less significant than might have been 
expected.  She had only a dozen useable atomic bombs in spring 1948 with an 
equally limited delivery capability none of which was based in Europe.
109
  She was 
undecided how to use the weapon and was 'unlikely' to deploy it to break the 
Blockade.
110
  Nevertheless, the positioning of (non-nuclear) B-29 bombers in 
England was an excellent propaganda ploy.
111
  It was a reminder about Western 
airpower potential and its ease of deployment which the Airlift and the parallel 
reinforcement of the air forces in the American and British zones further emphasized.  
It indicated to the Soviets and to the Germans that the Americans and the British 
were willing to defend their position in Berlin.
112
  However, given their spy network 
of American, British and French traitors, it may not have frightened the Soviets to 
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the extent that was hoped.
113
  
The Blockade was imposed gradually with surface communications between Berlin 
and the western zones becoming progressively more difficult possibly reflecting the 
highly dangerous "game of chicken" that both sides were playing.  AP3257 recorded 
the 24 January 1948 as the start when the Berlin-Bielefeld night train was detained 
for 11 hours in the Eastern Zone.  Numerous incidents continued until land 
movement of freight and passengers effectively ceased on 24 June 1948.  Waterway 
traffic was similarly harassed over the same period and the last barges reached 
western Berlin on the 27th.
114
  Harassment peaked temporarily on 1 April 1948.  The 
Americans responded by airlifting food, materiel and passengers into and out of 
Berlin in support of the western garrisons and occupation agencies.  In what was later 
termed the 'Little Lift', starting on 2 April, the United States Air Forces in Europe 
[USAFE] carried over 1000 tons in April compared with 310 tons in March.  
Although the April crisis ended on 10 April, Little Lift continued until Operation 
VITTLES started on 26 June 1948.
115
  USAFE deployed 25 Douglas C-47s whilst 
the RAF's effort was two Douglas Dakotas and an Avro Anson communication 
aircraft.
116
  
Little Lift gave the USAFE and the US Army Transport Corps a learning opportunity 
prior to the Berlin Airlift.  It also speeded up completion of the concrete runway at 
RAF Gatow.  In spite of ongoing but momentarily reduced traffic harassment, tens of 
thousands of tons of coal were shipped into Berlin by rail and barge and stocks of 
food staples were built up.  Work reconstructing the West Berlin Power Station in the 
British Sector at last started.  The Soviets concluded that the Little Lift had been 
futile which may have shaped their early reactions to the Airlift.
117
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The Little Lift triggered contingency planning.  Headquarters British Air Forces of 
Occupation (Germany) [HQ BAFO] and Headquarters Transport Command [HQ TC] 
formulated Operation KNICKER which intended to airlift into Berlin 65 tons per 
day.  It was not intended to supply the Berliners and there appears to have been no 
formal planning about supporting the civilian population.  Rainsford recorded: 
'Planning in 1947 included emergency supply of the small British garrison in Berlin 
but not the western Berliners'.
118
  Without the experience of German behaviour in the 
USSR during campaigns such as the 900 day siege of Leningrad, western officials 
did not believe the Soviets would cut off food from the civilians as a means to 
achieve their objectives (Chapter 3 and Appendixes 1and 2).   
The Blockade was unlikely to have been instigated by middle level officials raising 
the ante following a beneficial occurrence such as a bridge repair.  The Soviet 
approach to earlier traffic harassment, the inherent dangers in using initiative in 
Stalin's USSR and the elements involved point towards it being authorised and 
monitored at the highest levels.  Close control, moreover, would have reduced the 
risk of escalation into open warfare.  
THE WESTERN BERLINERS 
The previous section, "Events Leading to the Berlin Airlift", did not provide a picture 
of life for the Germans in western Berlin and it is too easy to take the view that their 
commitment was irrelevant to whether the Airlift failed or succeeded.  This section 
and Chapter 4 corrects that.  In July 1945 Berlin was a city of the old, the very 
young, women and cripples and this imbalance would continue into the Blockade.
119
  
Davison rightly argued that without the clear support of western Berlin's civilian 
population during the blockade, which was given in spite of Soviet threats and 
promises, the Anglo-Americans would have failed to break the blockade.
120
  The 
impact of two months' Soviet occupation in 1945 with its rapes and private and 
official plunder was effectively described at the time by an unnamed commissar as: 
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'This will cost us a million roubles a day - political roubles'
121
 or during the Airlift, 
and with the traditional black humour of the Berliners, 'Lieber POM als Frau 
komm'
122
.  (POM was dehydrated potato supplied in the Airlift and 'Lieber POM als 
Frau komm' liberally translates as better Airlift rations than being raped again by 
Soviet soldiers.
123
)   
The Soviet actions in the first years of occupation assured the Western powers of 
almost unanimous support from the Berliners in the western sectors and the co-
operation of most German political leaders in Berlin.
124
  Not that the Berliners were 
overly enamoured with the Western Powers.  Donovan's summary of their attitude 
seems most appropriate: neither the Soviets nor the Anglo-Saxons but if they must be 
occupied then better the latter.
125
  (The French, according to MacDonogh, were: 
'something of a joke, conquerors who had played no part in the conquest'.
126
)   
When the Anglo-Saxons arrived in Berlin in 1945 the Berliners were treated as all 
being defeated Nazis (even up to the Blockade as 'third or even fourth class citizens') 
and the rapes and plunder continued.  20% of the houses had been destroyed and a 
further 50% were uninhabitable.  The best of the rest were commandeered by the 
occupiers.  Housing and food remained a problem throughout.  The UN considered 
an adult needed 2,650 calories per day whereas in the western occupied parts its best 
was 1,500 and at times it fell below 1,000.  Clay was cited as saying 'There is no 
choice between being a communist on 1,500 calories per day and a believer in 
democracy on 1,000 calories'.
127
  Such were the conditions that a mythical story 
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about cannibalism was given credence and widely circulated.
128
  Table 2.1 displays 
the eastern and western Berliners' entitlements for the period before the Airlift.  
Heavy workers' rations were limited to 4% of the population and those for workers to 
30%.
129
  Food was not the only shortage.  There was little domestic fuel and 
electricity was limited.
130
  On the other hand, because unemployment was high there 
was time for queuing, foraging and trading in the black and swap markets.
131
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Table 2.1:   Daily Food Rations before the Blockade 
Non-communist German officials (and Western ones too) were subjected to 
marathon meetings, veiled threats and irritating surveillance to wear down their 
resistance to Soviet demands.
132
  The communists sought positions where authority 
could be exercised in the city's central municipal government and its borough 
administrations which they seldom surrendered until compelled to by one or more of 
the occupying powers.
133
  Eventually relocation of city government offices to the 
_____________________________________________________________ 
128
  Donovan, pp. 23-24. 
129
  Control Commission for Germany (British Element), Notes on the Blockade of Berlin 
1948: from a British viewpoint in Berlin (Berlin: Printing and Service Control Commission 
for Germany (BE), 1949) p. 18. 
130
  Davison, p. 38; Donovan, pp. 28-29; Tusas, p. 76. 
131
  Donovan, pp. 18-23; Tusas, p. 45. 
132
  Davison, pp. 114, 169-170. 
133
  Davison, pp. xi-xii, 51, 32-33, 205-207. 
 48 
western sectors became essential to ensure municipal administration by the 
democratically elected Magistrat continued.
134
   
The western Berlin political and trades union leaders and many of the municipal 
employees, were able and dedicated.  They were willing to run personal risks, and 
were not (sufficiently) intimidated by Soviet threats and actions, including 
kidnapping to the east.
135
  Progressively in the western sectors the democrats were 
able to take control of most of the civil administration, the police, political parties, 
and trade unions although sometimes only after the Blockade started.
136
  The 
democrats were able to prevent the communists interfering with the Airlift 
administratively or by initiating a general strike and they convinced the population 
that freedom was worth striving for.
137
  The latter was not an insignificant task given 
that the Anglo-American track record pointed to them either quitting the city or 
compromising unfavourably with the Soviets.
138
  
Whilst initially apathetic about their role in the Blockade, the western Berliners had 
shown early political self-confidence and opposition to the Soviets.
139
  On 31 March 
1946 in a 75% turnout, 90% of the western sectors' Social Democrat Party [SPD] 
members voted against its leadership's proposal to amalgamate with the Communist 
Party [KPD].
140
  On 20 October 1946, in a 92% turnout, 48.7% voted for SPD, 
31.5% for the other two democrat parties, and 19.8% for the Social Unity Party (the 
party resulting from the Soviet imposed merger of the Eastern Zone and Soviet 
Sector SPD with the KPD).
141
  As recorded above, citing the case of the 
Oberbürgermeister, the Berliners' electoral intentions could be overruled by one or 
more occupiers when it opposed their interests.
142
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Opposition to the Soviets extended beyond the ballot box.  On 18 March 1948 an 
independent democrat meeting was attended by 60,000 to 80,000 people and on 1 
May 1948 the democratic trades unions held their own May Day mass meeting.
143
  
The Independent Union Organization was formed on 26 May 1948 after the Soviet 
controlled, communist stacked, Free German Trade Union Association refused to 
respect the outcome of its May membership elections.
144
  On 22 June 1948 the 
Acting Mayor and her deputy rejected the Soviet directive to introduce the east mark 
as the sole currency in Berlin.  Next day the City Assembly supported this in spite of 
the efforts of a communist-orchestrated mob supported by the Soviet-controlled 
police.
145
  On 24 June Reuter spoke to a crowd of 70,000 people in the Hertha 
Stadium (in the French Sector) with a further 20,000 outside about Berlin issues 
including a plea for the world to aid the city 'in the decisive phase of the fight for 
freedom'.
146
  The essential part played by the western Berliners during the Blockade 
is addressed further in Chapters 4 and 5. 
BRITAIN 1945-1948 
Using the published works of Bullock, Hennessy, and Milward, augmented by 
Government publications, the British section addresses the Country's financial 
position.  The debts and other implications from six years of war; the wealth earning 
capability, and the needs and expectations of a population who believed they had 
won the war are considered.  The received wisdom that Britain was bankrupt is 
investigated.  Explanation is sought for the RAF's limitations during the Airlift 
(Chapters 5 and 6).  The cost to Britain of the Airlift is looked into and, although 
doubts are raised about the official figures, evaluated in terms of its impact on people 
seeking to restart their lives after six years of war.
147
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  Davison, pp. 84-87. 
144
  Davison, pp. 59-60. 
145
  Davison, pp. 93-98. 
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  Davison, pp. 100-102; Tusas, p. 142 (for quotation). 
147
  Milward observed that economic history studies in Britain were either 'parochial' or were 
made from the sidelines by scholars pursuing some other discipline.  To avoid this, selected 
secondary sources have been used - Alan S. Milward, Studies in Economic History: The 
Economic Effects of the World Wars on Britain (London: Macmillan, 1970) p. 49.  
 50 
Events in Germany in 1948-1949 did not occur in isolation from the political, 
economic and social challenges facing post-war Great Britain domestically and 
internationally.  There are many views about what Britain's position was financially, 
industrially and internationally between the end of the Second World War in 1945 
and the Berlin Blockade in 1948-1949.  Equally there are many opinions about what 
her options could have been.  Hennessy described Britain in 1945 as 'morally 
magnificent but economically bankrupt' and went on to quote Paul Kennedy: 'the 
blunt ………. fact that in securing a victorious outcome to the war the British had 
severely overstrained themselves, running down their gold and dollar reserves, 
wearing out their domestic machinery, and ……….. becoming increasingly 
dependent upon American munitions, shipping, foodstuffs, and other supplies to stay 
in the fighting'.
148
  
In 1942 Canada gave Britain a Can$1,000 million gift and an interest free loan of 
Can$700 million.  'Mutual Aid' was provided thereafter.
149
  The USA supplied Lend-
Lease.  When the latter was withdrawn suddenly, 'unilaterally, without prior 
negotiation' and it seems without warning in August 1945, Britain needed dollar 
loans from the USA and Canada.  She was 'a bankrupt and could not borrow on 
strictly commercial terms to fund a deficit which he [Keynes] believed would be 
about £1 billion in the first year of peace'.
150
  Both countries helped financially and 
so maintaining positive relationships with them became crucial.
151
  Repayment of the 
Canadian loan continued after the war but all other debts between Britain and Canada 
were cleared by a single payment of Can$150 million in the Anglo-Canadian post-
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150
  Hansard, 'Lend-Lease Contracts (Cancellation)', HC Deb 24 August 1945, Vol. 413, 
cc955-8;' Hennessy, Never Again, pp. 42, 90, 94-97 (for quotations pp. 94-95); Milward, 
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  Canada provided Can$1.25 billion and the USA US$4.34 billion (including a loan for the 
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1946, Vol. 139, cc1215-7; 'Anglo-American Financial and Economic Discussions', HC Deb 
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cc1258-9; Bullock, pp. 400, 718; Hennessy, Never Again, pp. 97-98. 
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war settlement.
152
  In 1945 Britain's final Lend-Lease bill was set at US$650 
million.
153
  This appears generous until what Britain gave the USA during the war is 
recalled (antibiotics, the cavity magnetron, nuclear research, jet and piston engine 
technology).  As Harold Wilson later wrote 'Had Churchill been able to insist on 
adequate royalties ……… our post-war balance of payments would have been very 
different'.
154
  (The Soviets refused to pay their Lend-Lease debts.
155
) 
British national income had been 62% of the USA's before the war but had fallen to 
just over 41% in 1948, albeit in part because of American wartime expansion.
156
  By 
1945, Britain had lost 25% of its pre-war wealth (£30,000 million) through internal 
disinvestment in non-essential wartime industries; selling overseas investments and 
the destruction of buildings, capital goods and shipping.  Although these figures may 
have over-estimated the reduction by about five percent, they serve as indicators.
157
  
The American Lend-Lease Acts were passed only after Britain's net gold and dollar 
reserves were almost exhausted and investments in the USA had been surrendered.
158
  
As Table 2.2 below shows, British national debt across the world, including to the 
colonies, rose and payments were used in part indigenously to buy British companies 
and investments.  The loss of overseas investments and merchant shipping meant that 
Britain's post-war invisible earnings were reduced substantially meaning that her 
exports now had to pay for much of her imports and for servicing her wartime debts.  
The net result was a shortage of US dollars; severe balance of payment crises, as 
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152
  Hansard: 'Financial Agreement with Canada', HL Deb 07 March 1946, Vol. 139, cc1215-
7; 'Canadian Loans', HC Deb 11 March 1952, Vol. 497, cc1258-9. 
153
  Hansard: 'War Debts', HC Deb 28 February 2002, Vol. 380, cc1439-41w and 7 October 
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  Geiger, p. 300. 
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  Geiger, p. 298. 
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  Geiger, p. 218. 
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Milward, The Economic Effects of the World Wars on Britain, pp. 47-49; Milward, War, 
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shown in Table 2.3, and the eventual devaluation of the pound in 1949.
159
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Table 2.3:  Balance of Payments - Current Account  
In July 1945 the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Orme Sargent, 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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  Hansard, 'Anglo-American Financial and Economic Discussions', HC Deb 12 December 
1945, Vol. 417 cc422-433; HMG, Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 
No. 88, 1938-1952 (London: HMSO, 1952) Tables: 217, 257, 269, 333-334; Hennessy, 
Never Again, pp. 93, 340, 366-376; Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, pp. 38-
40, 62; Milward, War, Economy and Society, pp. 334, 346, 349; OECD, 'Organisation for 
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organisationforeuropeaneconomicco-operation.htm> [accessed 14 May 2013]. 
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argued that Britain could only remain a superpower if it led both western Europe and 
the Commonwealth.
160
  However, because of her own economic difficulties she 
could not single-handedly ensure the defence of the Commonwealth and western 
Europe and the economic recovery of the latter.  Thus, Sargent's strategies were 
doomed.  Britain became involved in the creation of the Western Union and NATO 
but her principal energy in this area was expended persuading the USA to commit to 
the defence of Europe.  Moreover, given that Britain's objectives were the 
Commonwealth and partnership with America, she wanted to save Europe but not to 
join it as the USA advocated.
161
  It was thus imperative that she portrayed herself as 
America's greatest and most sure ally with all that that implied.
 
 
In the second half of the 1940s because the Government (and the Opposition) had a 
lingering belief that Britain was still a world power (albeit one temporarily fallen on 
hard times)
162
 she pursued far too expensive, grandiose and worldwide foreign 
policies which were dependant on resources and influence (especially an Anglo-
American relationship) which either did not exist or did so for a very short period.  
By 1945 her armed forces were far smaller than those of either the USA or the 
USSR, and none of her weapon systems were superior to those of the Americans and 
by 1947, as the defence votes were slashed, these weapons systems faded and their 
serviceability rates declined.
163
 
In her perceived post-war role as a great power, Britain expended her scarce 
resources on the Empire; occupying most of North Africa and the Levant, part of 
Austria, northwest Germany, Southern Persia, and Trieste; developing an indigenous 
atomic bomb (made more expensive by the USA reneging on the 1943 Quebec and 
1944 Hyde Park wartime agreements); supporting the Greek Government and giving 
economic aid to Turkey, and maintaining an army of 74 infantry battalions (or 
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  Fernando Guirao, Frances Lynch, Sigfrido M. Ramirez Perez, eds., Alan S. Milward and 
a Century of European Change (New York: Routledge 2012) p. 111; Milward, The United 
Kingdom and European Community, p. 16; Neville, p. 258. 
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  Hennessy, Never Again, pp. 91, 293, 342-343; Milward, The United Kingdom and 
European Community, pp. 5, 15-17, 21, 41.  
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  Hennessy, Muddling Through, pp. 179-181; Hennessy, Never Again, pp. 87, 90-91. 
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  Hennessy, Never Again, pp. 87, 90-94, 342-343; Milward, The United Kingdom and 
European Community, pp. X, 2-3. 
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equivalent) and 29 armoured regiments, much of it overseas.
164
  As Table 2.4 shows 
expenditure was substantially higher than pre-war and much of it was defence 
related.
165
  Hennessy indicated that the total expenditure for atomic energy 
(effectively the atomic bomb) was 1946/7 £4.78 million (m); 1947/48 £11.09m; 
1948/9 £17.03m, and 1949/50 £16.83 million.  (The whole cost of the atomic bomb 
programme was £100m).
166
  Hennessy cited Roy H. Jenkins which serves to sum up 
Britain's global position: 'The inheritance [by Clement Attlee in 1945] was bleak.  
Our nominal membership of the triumvirate of world power was guaranteed by our 
recent record.  But it was as unsustainable as it was temporarily incontestable.'
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Table 2.4:  Central Government Expenditure 
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Lorna Arnold, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945-1952: 
Volume 2 Policy Execution (London: Macmillan, 1974) pp. 36-45; Hennessy, Never Again, 
pp. 90-91, 93, 230, 236; Hennessy, Having it so Good, pp. 140-143, 149; Hennessy, 
Muddling Through, pp. 101-102; Milward, The Economic Effects of the Two World Wars on 
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229; Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, p. 41. 
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  Hennessy, Having it so Good, pp. 140-143; Hennessey, Never Again, pp. 268-269. 
167
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Whilst Hennessy quoted Albert Halsey that Attlee 'ruled a poverty-stricken country 
exhausted by war', his own 'audit of British industry' in the summer of 1945 
concluded: 'our industrial and financial platform [in 1945] represented a base not just 
for arresting decline or holding our own but for growth as a manufacturer and trader.  
It was the basis for large and sustained wealth creation.  The key question was and 
remains how much of a load could that [industrial and financial] base carry'.  Thus, 
what was the load and was it too great?
168
   
Domestically Britain needed urgently to renovate its infrastructure after its heavy 
wartime use; replace, renovate and extend its housing stock (some 500,000 houses 
had been destroyed and 250,000 severely damaged during the war); modernize those 
elements of its tired heavy and traditional industries which for a time had profitable 
life left; expand her existing successful high-tech industries, and civilianize her new 
electronics and computer industries.
169
  Her population sought improved social 
conditions whose objectives were encapsulated in the 'semi-official' Beveridge 
Report.
170
  Finally the left-wing of the Labour Government was committed to overly-
rapid and too extensive nationalization.
171
  Private investment was adversely affected 
by uncertainty over future property rights; demand trends in what could be a 
command economy; the structure of international trade; possible political instability, 
and how to settle the national debt.  This slowed recovery and complicated 
Government decision making.
172
 
In its aspirations to world power status, social improvement programmes and 
nationalization, the British Government chose policies and timeframes that 
overloaded its base.  Geiger cited Sir Alexander Cairncross when examining Britain's 
conversion process from a war to a peace economy and the role of defence 
expenditures but the quotation serves well to cover the whole post war situation: 
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  Hennessy, Never Again, pp. 116-118. 
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  Geiger, pp. 218, 222; Hennessy, Never Again, pp. 93, 99-111, 113-118, 163-174, 197.  
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  Hennessy, Muddling Through, pp. 179-180; Hennessy, Never Again, pp. 73, 77, 88, 118; 
HMG, Sir William Beveridge, 'Social Insurance and Allied Services Report', Command 6404 
(London: HMSO, November 1942) ; Milward, War, Economy and Society, pp. 340-341. 
171
  Hennessy, Muddling Through, pp. 172-173, 180-181; Hennessy, Never Again, pp. 79-80, 
103, 184, 197-208, 277, 337-338. 
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  Geiger, pp. 220-221. 
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'[t]he real problem for Britain was that the role she was asked to play was one 
beyond her strength'
173
 whilst Stone wrote, citing Truman, '[the British have] decided 
to go bankrupt and if they do that it will end our prosperity and probably all the 
world's too'
174
.  In summary, Britain was bankrupt but the court had not yet issued 
the bankruptcy order and with careful management she could have avoided that 
happening.  The right managers were missing and whilst Marshall Aid delayed final 
judgement, it became unavoidable in the 1970s.
175
 
Airlift Costs 
Given the state of Britain just outlined, what was the cost of the Berlin Airlift?  
Twice during October 1949 the Government gave the figure to Parliament as £10.25 
million.
176
  The Foreign Office (German Section) Weekly Estimates of Expenditure 
contained a handwritten unsigned note dated 24 May 1949 which gave the estimated 
gross costs, excluding those of RAF personnel, as £8,879,000 for the period up until 
31 March 1949, with weekly running costs at that point of £309,000 (making a figure 
of nearly £11,000,000 when the Blockade was lifted).
177
  At the 9
th
 Meeting of the 
British Gen.241 Committee it was recorded that the cost to the Exchequer was 
approaching £13 million per annum.
178
  The RAF Museum Cold War Exhibition 
gave the Airlift costs as £17 million, US$350 million and 150 million West German 
Deutschmarks.
179
  Tunner gave the American official estimate as $300m (which he 
considered was too high even allowing for it including the cost of running the special 
Airlift school at Great Falls and the reopening of depots in the USA and RAF 
Burtonwood).
180
  The Department of Defense figure (cited by the US Navy) was an 
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the Airlift', HC Deb 24 October 1949 Vol. 468 c1008. 
177
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  TNA, AIR 20/7148, extract of meeting 7 February 1949. 
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  RAF Museum, 'The Berlin Airlift - Facts & Figures' <www.nationalcoldwarex 
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American cost of US$265,448,000 for the period 26 June 1948 to 30 September 
1949,
181
 whilst on the 13 May 1949 the Office of Public Information gave a figure of 
US$190,108,100 made up of actual and estimated costs for the period 26 June 1948 
through to 12 May 1949
182
.  Both average out at approaching US$600,000 per day.   
The Air Ministry civil servant, T. C. G. James
183
 gave the extra cost to the RAF of 
the Airlift over and above what it would have been expending otherwise as an 
average of £22,000 per week for the period between 28 June 1948 and the start of 
April 1949 - a total approaching £900,000.  His figure comprised the additional miles 
flown, the increased aircraft depreciation, the greater spares consumed, the increased 
maintenance, and the larger vehicle running costs.
184
  The Foreign Office recorded 
the total cost of the civilian chartered airlift (the 'Civil Lift') as £5,491,000, rising 
from £113,000 in August 1948 to £914,000 in June 1949.
185
  In April 1949 the 
Treasury-set ceiling had been £185,000 per week.  In the same month, James 
recorded the current RAF "additional" running costs were £24,000 per week.
186
   
Although James's figures included additional vehicle running costs, they gave a 
broad identification of the premium the Government were to pay by electing to 
augment the RAF's capability with contactors.  The Foreign Office figures started in 
August 1948.  By the end of March 1949 they totalled nearly £2.7 million.  Over the 
same period, based on £22,000 per week, the RAF "additional" costs were £760,000.  
During those eight months the RAF hauled 209,579 short tons whilst the Civil Lift 
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figure was 64,066.5.
187
  An RAF ton cost the Government an additional £3.60, a 
Civil Lift one £42.
188
  However, the Civil Lift was improving and in May 1949 the 
cost had fallen to £31 per ton.
189
 
Tunner's remarks about Great Falls and RAF Burtonwood raise the issue of what 
figures were included and what not in this complex, multi-national, multiple 
department operation.  For example, the BAFO Director of Works reported that the 
"air-side" element of the civil engineering upgrades in the British Zone were DM25 
million (or £2.1 million).
190
  The US Government figures introduce the question of 
the period covered.  For example the British Airlift continued until 6 October 1949 
whilst the Berlin Blockade was lifted on 12 May 1949.
191
  A further challenge when 
comparing American, British and western German figures is whether to apply the 
post-18 September 1949 conversion rate of US$2.80 to the pound or the previous one 
of US$4 to £1.
192
  It is not possible, moreover, to use American figures to deduce 
British costs (or vice versa) as the former were operating much further from their 
USA mainland depots whilst the latter provided more of the infrastructure but its 
aircraft were less cost-effective.
193
  James's correspondence reveals a further point, 
whether the full costs or the additional ones should be used.  Ideally, it should be the 
latter and in the specific case of this research, just those for the RAF and the Civil 
Lift.
194
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In the absence of a full set of figures for the additional costs, the Parliamentary figure 
of £10.25m has been used in the remaining paragraphs of this section.  Using the data 
underlying Tables 2.2 and 2.4, £10.25m equated to 0.04% of the 1949 National Debt 
and 1.37% of 1948/9 Government expenditure on health, housing, National 
Insurance and pensions.  It was 60% of Hennessy's figure for atomic research during 
the same year. 
The British Gen.241 Committee recorded in February 1949 both the financial reality 
of the situation and the undoubted thinking of the Country's leaders: '[the cost which 
was approaching £13m per annum] was considerable but it had to be set against the 
much heavier cost that might have been required if we had failed to retain our 
position in Berlin.'
195
  As an example of 'heavier cost', when writing in the early 
1990s Joseph Nye Jr set the 20 year cost of American involvement in South Vietnam 
at US$600bn.
196
   
Finding somewhere to live in 1948 was a challenge.  One of the victorious 
Conservative party's election slogans as late as 1951 was to build 300,000 houses to 
help with the housing shortage.
197
  £10.25m would have bought a mere 7,800 prefabs 
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but not the land nor paid the erection costs.
198
  The H2S High Speed Rail project 
provides a modern topical comparison.  The Press cites the Government's intention to 
invest £32.7bn in the project.  £10.25m as an historic project opportunity cost would 
equate to £300m today or over 100 times less.
199
 
To conclude, Britain's finances were indeed in a poor state in 1948-1949.  She had 
large external debts, much of which were in dollars that she had to earn.  Her wealth 
creating ability had declined significantly.  She had expenditure related to her 
inherited position as head of a large empire; to still perceiving herself to be a world 
power, including occupation responsibilities, and the social and nationalization 
programmes of her Labour Government.  Unforeseen expenditure would have not 
been welcomed but the sums involved with the Airlift were not overwhelming.  What 
is likely to be more significant was that impoverished Britain lacked the hardware 
assets necessary to play the major role she aspired to in the Berlin Airlift and this is 
explored in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
AIRLIFT PRECEDENTS 
The Berlin Airlift did not happen in a vacuum. The people who ran it had in mind 
both their own past experiences and the lessons assimilated into their organization's 
consciousness from previous events.  Therefore Chapter 3 seeks to delve into 
previous operations in order to help assess behaviours, decisions and responses in the 
Airlift.  Chapter 3 investigates how earlier airlifts may have influenced the American 
and the British to initiate an airbridge in response to the Soviet Blockade and if 
Soviet wartime experiences explain why it may have reacted to the Berlin Airlift in 
the way it did.  It examines the precedents to determine the guidance they contained 
for those commanding the Airlift.  Third, in conjunction with Chapter 5, it 
determines how the appointments of senior officers during Operations VITTLES and 
PLAINFARE made best use of the air supply experience they had gained earlier. 
Prior to the Berlin Airlift there had been airlifts of passengers and cargo when 
surface means was impossible owing to climatic, geological, or political events.  The 
Second World War saw significant growth in air transport operations involving many 
different logistical models.  For example, "air drops" of troops and materiel by 
parachute do not involve aircraft landing at consignee airfields whilst airbridges, like 
the Berlin Airlift, deliver materiel and passengers to airfields.
1
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
1
  Air transport commitments before and during World War II included airbridges; casualty 
evacuation; invasion by parachute and glider; regular even scheduled flights to widely 
dispersed bases; supply to advancing or retreating armies; Chindit-type mobile operations 
behind enemy lines; support to partisans, and humanitarian air drop operations. 
Example sources: Camille Allaz, John Skilbeck, ed., in English George Grant, History of Air 
Cargo and Airmail from the 18th Century (London: Christopher Foyle in assoc. with the 
International Air Cargo Association, 2004) Part 4, Chap. 2; AM, AHB, AP3235: The Second 
World War 1939-1945 Air Support (1955) pp. 145, 172-178; AM, AHB, The Campaigns in 
the Far East: Volume V: Air Supply Operations in Burma 1942-1945 (first draft original 
May 1949, reprint by MLRS Books) p. 8; Anon, History of the Operations of 21 Army 
Group on the Continent of Europe 6 June 1944-8 May 1945 (Germany: 1945) <Movement 
Control Association, www.movcon.org.uk/History/Documents/ DID/D-MCHS% 
200514.htm> [accessed 15 September 2011] (Chap. V, Phase IV, Section 9); Anon, 
'Operations CHOWHOUND and MANNA', Operation Manna Commemoration 2010 
<operationmanna.secondworldwar.nl/> [accessed 12 February 2013]; MOD, AHB, A Short 
History of the Royal Air Force <www.raf.mod.uk/history/shorthistoryoftheroyal 
airforce.cfm> [accessed 14 September 2011] (pp. 157-173); MOD, RAF Timeline 1918-
Footnote continues on next page. 
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Three airbridges are explored in this chapter, the American India-China Airlift 1942-
1945; the Anglo-American one at Imphal March to June 1944, and the Germans at 
Stalingrad November 1942 to February 1943.  They are selected as they should have 
been in the recent institutional awareness of those involved in the Berlin Airlift.  
Stalingrad was chosen because Major General William Tunner, Commanding 
General Combined [Berlin] Airlift Task Force [CG CALTF], wrote in Over the 
Hump that the German failure there might have coloured the early Soviet response to 
the Berlin Airlift.
2
  The wider Soviet experience during the Second World War is 
also explored for the same reason.  A survey of western Berliners' opinions about the 
likely success of the Berlin Airlift was taken in July 1948 (Chapter 2 above).  Two 
Der Abend essayists, who had wartime experience of air supply, were pessimistic, 'I 
gave up hope for Berlin' but how most individuals reached their views was not 
explained.  Thus the impact of past air transport operations on the citizens cannot be 
evaluated.
3
   
THE AMERICAN INDIA-CHINA AIRLIFT - 'THE HUMP' 
The Japanese had taken control of Manchuria and the coast of China in 1931.  
Nationalist China had been more actively fighting Japan since 1937.  America 
supported the Nationalists with materiel delivered along the Burma Road.  Two 
thirds of the Japanese army was engaged in China in a complex war that at different 
times involved the Nationalists, the Chinese Communists, and the Soviet Union.  
When Burma fell to Japan in 1942, delivery could only continue by air but now with 
a mutual enemy it became imperative that the Nationalists continued to fight.  
Furthermore, the forward bases for the Boeing B-29 'very heavy bombers' attacking 
Japan and Manchuria were located in China during the second half of 1944 and these 
                                                                                                                           
1929: 23 Dec 1928 <www.raf.mod.uk/history/raftimeline 19181929.cfm> [accessed 14 
September 2011]; Forrest C. Pogue, US Army in World War II The European Theatre of 
Operations: The Supreme Command (Washington DC: U.S. Government, 1954) pp. 457-
458; Hilary St George Saunders, 'Volume III: The Fight is Won', Royal Air Force 1939-1945 
(London: HMSO, 1954) pp. 192-196, 235-236, 278-279, 292. 
2
  William H. Tunner, Over the Hump (Washington DC, US Government, 1985) p. 184. 
3
  Walter Phillips Davison, The Berlin Blockade: A Study in Cold War Politics (New York: 
Arno Press, 1980) pp. 135-143 (p. 143 for quotation). 
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too had to be supplied by air.
4
  Tunner wrote that Roosevelt described the air route 
from India into China, 'The Hump', as 'an epic of the war'.
5
  
The Hump was an example of gradual but spectacular improvement.  It started with a 
few twin-engine aircraft, operating from insufficient and inadequate airfields, at the 
end of long tenuous lines of communication, backed up by a very poor maintenance 
organization.  In July 1942 85 tons were delivered, in July 1945 71,042 tons 
(equivalent to nine days deliveries to Berlin in April 1949
6
).  Approximately 690,000 
tons were hauled over the Hump between July 1942 and November 1945 with over 
60% of it being hauled between January and August 1945.  Gasoline and oil 
accounted for 57% of the tonnage.
7
  There was a China to India lift but it was 
substantially smaller and by 1945 most aircraft returned westbound empty or in 
ballast.
8
  This section considers the India to China airlift only. 
By May 1942 the Japanese had cut the surface supply routes to the non-communist 
Chinese and overtime the growing American forces in China.  Air movement over 
the Himalayas was the only means available.  The Japanese occupation of Burma 
meant that until late 1944 the consigning airfields had to be in eastern Assam and the 
route had to cross the High Himalayas to the Yunnan Province of China.
9
  Dinjan 
airfield in Assam was 500 miles from the ones at Kunming.  It is 100 feet above sea 
level.  The route from there to China quickly rose to 10,000 feet, followed by a series 
of 14,000-16,000-foot ridges before descending to 6,200 feet above sea level at 
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  Wesley Frank Craven, and James Lea Cate , 'Forward', The Army Air Forces in World War 
II, Volume V: The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki June 1944 to August 1945 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1953) pp. XII-XV; Norman Stone, World War Two: A Short 
History (London: Allen Lane, 2013) pp. 11-12, 55, 76-77, 125, 160-161. 
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  HQ BAFO, AP3257 A Report on Operation PLAINFARE (The Berlin Airlift) 25
th
 June 
1948 - 6
th
 October 1949 (Bielefeld: Control Commission, 1950) p. 519. 
7
  Frank H. Heck, 'Chapter 5 Airline to China', in The Army Air Forces in World War II, 
Volume VII: Services Around the World: 1. Air Transport, ed. by Wesley Frank Craven and 
James Lea Cate (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958) generally and pp. 146-147 
specifically; HQ Army Air Forces, Office of Statistical Control, Army Air Forces Statistical 
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<www.afhra.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090608-043.pdf> [variously accessed 
2011] (Table 211).  
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  Heck, pp. 146-147. 
9
  Heck, pp. 114-115; Tunner, p. 59. 
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Kunming.  At these altitudes violent turbulence was common whilst flying at higher 
levels risked severe icing for several months of the year.  Overcast conditions 
sometimes reached up to 30,000 feet (above the operating ceiling of most of the 
aircraft deployed) and thunderclouds could rise to 60,000 feet.  The true monsoon 
started in mid-May with 200 inches of rain falling in the next five months.
10
 
Almost all the materiel needed in China had to be imported into India and then 
transported '1,500 miles by primitive railways of varying gauges and limited 
capacity' and 'slow, ancient river barges' to the Assam airfields.  Besides the lines of 
communication and the weather, the airlift suffered initially from a lack of aircraft 
and all-weather airfields, and from attacks by the Japanese on both the infrastructure 
and the aircraft.
11
  Up until 1944 there were serious manpower deficiencies.  
Reinforcements were generally late.  Both aircrew and maintenance staff arrived 
inadequately trained and experienced.  Pilots, for example, required additional local 
training.  Serious illnesses posed a constant challenge and the high work rates meant 
extreme fatigue needed to be watched for.  At times morale was low for similar 
reasons to those in the British Fourteenth Army, the 'Forgotten Army', also based in 
Eastern India and Burma.
12
 
At the start the chain of command was confused and responsibility was placed on 
commanders with other pressing commitments and interests; no experience operating 
transport aircraft, and in some cases a lack of confidence in the airlift concept.
13
  In 
October 1942 Air Transport Command offered to undertake the task providing it had 
full control of the operation under the direct supervision of General Henry Arnold, 
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CG USAAF.
14
  On 1 December 1942, Brigadier General Edward Alexander became 
the commanding officer of the new [US] Air Transport Command [ATC] India-
China Wing.  In September 1944 after several changes in commander Brigadier 
General William Tunner took charge of what had become the India-China Division.  
(ATC Wings were raised to Division status on 1 July 1944.)  He remained in post 
until November 1945.
15
 
The airlift competed with the RAF and other units of the USAAF for the few all-
weather airfields.  More were built but until late in 1943 these were completed far 
behind schedule.
16
  In August 1944 Luliang was opened which with Chanyi gave two 
all-weather alternates to Kunming airfield in China.
17
  In addition the 'long-haul' 
deliveries directly to XX Bomber Command airfields in the Chengtu area further 
reduced the pressure on Kunming.  Although most freight was dispatched from the 
Assam airfields, in November 1944 operations began with Douglas C-54s (a four-
engine military version of a civil passenger liner) and Consolidated C-109s (tankers 
based on the four-engine Liberator bomber) from East Bengal.
18
  By July 1945 there 
were 13 airfields including four C-54 bases as well as six airfields on the China side 
around Kunming.
19
 
On 16 December 1942 43 Douglas C-47/C-53s were available in the theatre to fly a 
service between Karachi and Assam; the Hump airlift, and meet other emergencies.
20
  
By the second week of March 1943, the Wing had 11 Consolidated C-87s and 76 
Douglas DC-3 type aircraft (a mixture of military models such as the C-47 and 
civilian aircraft).
21
 The assigned strength rose to 640 aircraft in July 1945
22
 with the 
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'average number in commission for Hump service' at 332.
23
   
Curtiss C-46s progressively replaced the smaller DC-3 aircraft but inevitably actual 
deliveries were behind schedule.  The C-46 was new to service and had many faults 
that required extensive modifications; a process that reduced aircraft availability 
markedly.
24
  One problem, however, could not be modified out; the C-46 had only 
two engines and was an enormous aircraft at the time for that configuration.  (Its 
wingspan was larger that the 4-engine Boeing B-17 bomber.)  It was, thus, difficult 
to keep airborne when fully laden if an engine failed.  Attrition rates for the C-87 and 
the C-46 aircraft were very high throughout the airlift.  593 cargo aircraft were lost 
on the Hump route between 1 September 1942 and 30 September 1945 including 281 
C-46s and 72 C-87s.
25
  The accident rates meant there was continual pressure to 
improve flight safety.
26
  The C-54's operating ceiling was too low for the northern 
route to China.  The Allied victories in Burma in 1944-1945 allowed a southern 
lower altitude route to be introduced where it could be deployed.  At seven tons (and 
more later) its payload was 70% more than the C-46 and its accident rate was almost 
500% less than the C-87 and C-109.
27
   
In December 1942 the USAAF delivered 1,227 tons.  In January 1943 the Wing's 
establishment was to be built up to permit 4,000 short tons a month to be airlifted 
into China.  In the event the shortage of aircrews which led to under-utilization of 
serviceable aircraft; the continued shortage of all-weather airfields in Assam owing 
to 'the failure to complete the airdromes at Sookerating and Mohanbari', and flooding 
at Kunming in July meant that the 4,000 ton objective was not met until August 
1943.
28
   
By mid July 1943 more aircraft, manpower, equipment, and spares were en-route 
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from the USA by air and sea.  However, none of the pilot reinforcements were 
competent to fly the C-46 and a conversion unit had to be set up which diverted 
sixteen experienced pilots and ten C-46 aircraft from the Hump.  Maintenance 
personnel were few, inexperienced and had to work mainly at night owing to the high 
daytime temperatures; spares were extremely scarce, and third and fourth-echelon 
maintenance and repairs could not keep up with demand.  At one point 26 C-46s 
were out of commission.  Nevertheless, in July 1943 the monthly target was set at 
7,000 tons; it was achieved in October 1943.
29
 
The target for September 1943 was set at 10,000 tons.  In October and November 
night flying was introduced although radio communication, radio navigational 
facilities and airfield lighting were poor.  From September 1943 spares were flown in 
from the USA on a weekly schedule by C-87 and were also carried by aircraft being 
delivered to the airlift.  In December 1943, with the arrival of large numbers of C-87s 
and modified C-46s from the United States together with spares to support them, 
12,590 tons were delivered to China.
30
  The Wing's strength in January 1944 was 180 
transport aircraft which rose to 318 in December 1944 when the number of four-
engine aircraft had grown five fold.  The manpower position improved and airfield 
construction was at last adequate.  In the second half of 1944 156,530 tons were 
delivered to China.
31
   
This growth in tonnage was even more impressive because during the spring and 
summer of 1944 tactical support had to be given to the ground forces defending 
Imphal (and thus the Assam-Bengal railway which was essential to the Assam 
bases)
32
 and General Joseph Stilwell's offensive (which helped free the Myitkyina 
area and allowed all-weather airfields to be built there).  Stilwell's campaign 
permitted aircraft flying from Assam to use a more southerly route at a lower altitude 
over the Himalayas and offered a potential of direct flights between airfields around 
Calcutta and China.  In November 1944 a Japanese ground attack appeared to put 
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Kunming at risk which resulted in a need for maximum effort delivering cargoes and 
Chinese troops to meet the threat.
33
   
Under constant pressure to raise the tonnage carried, increased efficiency and fuller 
exploitation of the existing facilities became an imperative.  The emphasis on very 
high aircraft utilization (Tunner: 'constant utilization of equipment'
34
) led to 
production line maintenance on the Assam airfields.  It became normal practice to 
base only one type of aircraft per airfield.  Another development was the 
employment of 47,009 civilians, mainly to load and unload aircraft.  In January 1945, 
after the allied victories in Burma allowed cargo to be flown from Bengal to China 
and the Assam based planes to use a more southern lower altitude route, the 
eastbound tonnage rose to 44,098.  These developments also meant that the C-54 
aircraft could be used with the first direct C-54 flight from Barrackpore (near 
Calcutta) to Kunming occurring on 1 January 1945.
35
   
The real difficulty lay in finding enough C-54s.
36
  As an expedient, following the 
recapture of Rangoon, several USAAF bomber, cargo and troop-carrying tactical 
units (with associated airfields) were committed to the airlift and placed under the 
operational control of the India-China Division.  These attached tactical units carried 
6,488 tons in June 1945, nearly 20,000 tons in July and 11,000 tons in August.
37
  The 
airlift continued to supply the American forces in China until seagoing vessels could 
unload at Chinese ports.  Tonnages fell rapidly with peace, 39,775 tons in 
September; 8,646 tons in October and 1,429 tons in November.
38
  Table 3.1 below 
shows the growth in tonnage and India to China sorties whilst Table 3.2 covers 
tonnage and number of aircraft.
39
  The Americans recorded passengers by weight and 
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this is included in the tonnage.
40
  Prior to November 1943 the tonnage included the 
fuel required for return flights which between March and July 1943 had varied 
between 383 and 651 tons a month.
41
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Table 3.1: India to China Airlift: Growth in Tonnage and Outbound Sorties 
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Table 3.2: India to China Airlift: Growth in Aircraft and Tonnage  
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Tunner initiated competition between units with the results published in a daily 
bulletin, a motivator that would reappear during the Berlin Airlift.  Fair targets had to 
be set and unlike the Berlin Airlift these had to be handicapped to allow for the 
various aircraft types operated and the different distances between the eventual 
thirteen airfields in India and the six airfields in China.  The daily bulletin grew into 
a newspaper, the precursor of the CALTF Task Force Times.
42
 
The 478 mile long Ledo Road was intended to be the primary supply route to China.  
Work started in December 1942 and the first convoy reached Kunming on 4 
February 1945.  In the subsequent six months 129,000 tons of supplies were carried 
from India to China which was less than 43% of the tonnage airlifted in the same 
period.  (The 26,000 trucks were handed over to the Chinese).
43
  As Lieutenant 
General Sir William Slim wrote, 'If the road was to be really effective, its feeder 
railway should start from Rangoon, not Calcutta'.
44
 
'The strategic importance of this accomplishment [India China airlift] may be open to 
debate, but in terms of the development of air-transport concepts and techniques the 
airlift to China was of first importance'.
45
  The Hump was a proving ground that 
'made it possible to conceive the Berlin airlift of 1948–49 and [for the Americans] to 
operate it successfully'.
46
  For example it emphasized the need to operate the 
minimum number of different robust efficient aircraft types, and the C-54 
particularly, with the necessary ratio of thoroughly trained, highly motivated crews 
per aircraft to achieve full utilization operating from all-weather airfields.  It also 
confirmed that quality maintenance was imperative and whilst the Americans would 
show considerable initiative in this area during the Airlift, it was only as the 
Blockade was ending that they had a fully effective capability.  Where the 
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Americans, unlike the British, were to triumph was in appointing their most 
experienced and successful commander, Tunner, as its Airlift Task Force commander 
and allowing him to reconstitute his management team from his Hump subordinates, 
thereby allowing the expertise gained in South East Asia to be transferred to 
Germany.
47
   
After the Second World War, the USAAF sought full independence from the Army.  
Its strong cards were its proven conventional heavy bomber capability and that it 
provided the sole means of delivering the atomic bomb.  Military air transport 
needed to keep a low profile in this debate as there was a lobby to replace it by 
civilian carriers.
48
  Owing to the number, size, and importance of the USAAF 
wartime bomber forces and the publicity given to them, it was not surprising that 
senior Air Force posts were filled by those with that background.  No doubt it could 
be suggested that this reflected an air force hierarchy - "pecking order" - typified by a 
statement ascribed to the Chief of Staff of the USAF between 1990 and 1994, Gen 
Merrill A. McPeak: 'The service's purpose is to generate combat capability that 
protects the country, and not necessarily to provide equal career opportunities for 
those who fly heavies [transports], or, heaven forbid, don't wear wings at all.'
49
  
Tunner too considered there was a negative attitude in the USAAF and USAF to 
officers who specialized in air transport, and that Cannon, CG USAFE, suffered from 
this.
50
   
However, in the 1940s, unlike 2008 when Lenderman was writing, it would have 
been difficult to substantiate that pecking orders prevented transport commanders 
reaching the highest appointments.  Transport forces were either components of 
larger commands or when independent were much smaller than the bomber fiefdoms.  
It was the environments into which the transport forces were deployed, not the 
underlying culture of the USAAF and the USAF, that produced the inefficient 
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command structures identified in the Hump section above, the Imphal one below, 
and the subsequent Berlin Airlift chapters. 
IMPHAL AND BEYOND 
The successful defence of Imphal in 1944 turned a Japanese advance and led 
subsequently to the recapture of Rangoon in 1945.  Headquarters Air Command 
South East Asia [HQ ACSEA]'s report, 'The Siege of Imphal' gave an airpower 
overview of the siege.  It showed how small the airlift capability was initially, a few 
borrowed C-46s and eight squadrons of C-47s (the RAF name being Dakota) 
provided equally by the USAAF and the RAF.  It recorded the impact of the weather, 
the state of the airfields, the difficulty obtaining and retaining reinforcements, and 
the need for the limited transport fleet to meet many tasks of varying priority, some 
without prior warning, spread across the Indo-Burma theatre, and not just at Imphal 
and Kohima.  Issues at the frontiers between the air forces and the army were 
acknowledged and discussed in a mature way.  It was an excellent introduction but as 
air supply was only one component and because it lacks detailed statistics, the report 
is seldom cited in this section.
51
  Lieutenant General George Stratmeyer's 'Despatch 
on Air Operations in Eastern Air Command covering the period 15 December 1943 
to 1 June 1945' provided the American-orientated introduction.  It too was wide 
ranging covering his period as Air Commander and his Anglo-American operational 
responsibilities for the Photographic Reconnaissance Force, the Strategic Air Force, 
the 3
rd
 Tactical Air Force, and the Troop Carrier Command.
52
  The latter provided 
the air transport capability.
53
 
In his 'Lessons Derived' chapters, Generalmajor D. "Fritz" Morzik
54
 argued that 
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surrounded units should not form 'festungs' and expect to be supplied by air except as 
a last, temporary resort and there was a 'danger of too easy recourse to the 
employment of air support as a stop gap solution' for encircled troops.
55
  In India and 
Burma the philosophy was entirely different in 1944: dig-in; be resupplied by air, 
and wait until you could fight your way out, or were relieved, or a combination of 
both.
56
  However, as Field Marshal Slim wrote, air supply was only part of the 
equation:  
Among the most strategically dangerous ideas that half-baked thinking on air 
supply provoked, was that even if surrounded, positions could be held for 
months provided that they might be maintained from the air.  In fact, troops 
thus cut off, even if fed and maintained, eventually lost heart and air supply is 
so easily interrupted; the weather or a few well sited anti-aircraft weapons 
can easily put a stop to it.  Air supply is only half the answer.  The other half 
is an adequate relieving force which, however good the prospect of air 
supply, must appear in a reasonable time and which the beleaguered garrison 
must know will appear.
57
   
The British not only held out but at Imphal, after the reopening of ground 
communications, both the Imphal garrison (IV Corps) and the relieving force 
(XXXIII Corps) went over to the offensive and defeated the Japanese.
58
  In Berlin, as 
Chapters 4-6 show, the Americans and the British had no end-game plan other than 
to continue, for years if necessary, until the Soviets gave up or agreed to a negotiated 
solution. 
'Fought between 7 March and 18 July 1944, the Battles of Imphal and Kohima were 
the turning point of one of the most gruelling campaigns of the Second World War 
(1939-45)'.
59
  The encirclement at Imphal lasted from approximately 30 March to 22 
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June 1944.
60
  The airlift was undertaken simultaneously with the Hump
61
, and 
involved air supply concurrently to units falling back before the Japanese
62
, to 
encircled locations (the one at Kohima, for example, was 80 miles from Imphal)
63
 
and to troops operating in the Japanese rear
64
.  The defended area at Imphal totalled 
800 square miles and included two all-weather and a number of fair-weather 
airfields.
65
  The Imphal airbridge provided resupply, air movement of 
reinforcements, and evacuation of non-combatants, sick and wounded.
66
  Aircraft 
were supplied from USAAF and RAF sources, mainly Curtis C-46s and Douglas C-
47s, but also twin-engine bombers.
67
  Transport aircraft were diverted from other 
tasks, including the Hump and the Mediterranean theatre.
68
  Imphal was similar to 
the Berlin Airlift in that the Americans were the major supplier of aircraft and the 
British of the ground infrastructure.   
The Air Ministry Air Historical Branch [AHB] gave the size of the force supplied by 
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air at Imphal as 120,000 but did not indicate when during the siege this applied.
69
  
The New Zealand Official History stated that 150,000 men were 'now surrounded'.
70
  
Kane stated Imphal was surrounded on the 29 March encircling over 155,000 troops 
and 11,000 animals.
71
  Airbridge statistics are problematic as it is not always clear 
whether figures were specific to Imphal or covered the total defence against the 
Japanese attack, including the siege and relief of Kohima.  This is not surprising, for 
example one division reinforced both IV Corps at Imphal and XXXIII at Dimapur 
and Manipur (which were outside the besieged area)
72 
whilst the AHB quoted a 
Dakota pilot:  
All our jobs are mixed up.  One day we take in reinforcements to Imphal, the 
next day go to Comilla and collect flour, ammunition and petrol from the 
dumps for delivery to Imphal, where we pick up a load of "useless mouths" 
and return them to the Brahmaputra.  Then we take casualties from the 
Kohima battle and the next day we are back again at the old supply-dropping 
job in the Kaladan.
73
 
Bad weather led to hours, even days without flying in April and May 1944.  The 
south-western monsoon had started early bringing both storms and torrential rain 
which affected flying; caused congestion at the all-weather airfields, and reduced 
deliveries as materials to improve the fair-weather airfields had to be airlifted 
instead.  In mid-June the weather became relatively benign and during the remainder 
of 1944-1945 it was not as bad as anticipated allowing flying and ground operations 
to continue.
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Bowen acknowledged his statistics were approximate.  Moreover, they covered 
between 18 April and 30 June 1944 and were specific to 'flown for the 4 Corps'.  
They are cited in Table 3.3 as an indication of the task of maintaining in combat 
within the encirclement at Imphal four divisions; elements of an armoured brigade; 
varying numbers of No. 221 Group fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons, and six 
airfields.
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Casualties 742 4259 5,264
Reinforcements 1480 5,101 6,041
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Table 3.3: Bowen Statistics: IV Corps 18 April to 30 June 1944 
The daily requirement was an 'elastic' 540 long tons
76
 but the daily average achieved 
overall was only 275 tons and despite the evacuation of non-essential personnel and 
relocation of some No. 221 Group squadrons to airfields beyond the encirclement, 
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rations had to be reduced and stocks fell sharply
77
.  During May 1944 'a very serious 
backlog was developing' but by June over 400 tons a day was achieved.
78
  The AHB 
cited 604 tons a day were delivered between 18 and 30 June 1944
79
 although much of 
that was after the Siege was ended on 22 June 1944 and road convoys started arriving 
on the 23rd.
80
  Imphal had survived but overall air supply had not delivered the 
tonnage sought.  The causes included those found at Stalingrad: lack of aircraft, the 
weather, the infrastructure including the supply lines to the rear, and the inexperience 
of the air forces and the army.  As Kane argued, the Japanese lacked the airpower 
and anti-aircraft weapons to interrupt the airlift and were unable to capture the 
airfields.
81
  At Stalingrad the Soviets achieved both.  Crucially, Slim had a successful 
end-game. 
Prior to Imphal cargo aircraft in India had been perceived as a supplement to the 
Army's poor lines of ground communication.  At Imphal, aircraft suddenly had to 
supply a complete Corps and a number of RAF squadrons.
82
  It was the start of a 
sharp learning curve that continued thereafter when air supply was delivered by air 
drop, air landing and glider in support of the Fourteenth Army's advance to 
Rangoon.
83
  Table 3.4 shows the size of the Anglo-American airlift
84
 from the 
crossing of the Chindwin River in October 1944
85
; through the capture of Rangoon in 
May 1945
86
; the redeployment of the USAAF Cargo Combat Groups in June
87
, and 
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 78 
'the Battle of the Break-out' in July 1945
88
.  The June 1945 tonnage of 25,954 also 
reflected the deteriorating weather; squadron redeployments, and RAF and Army 
shortcomings.
89
  In April 1949, the last full month of the Berlin Blockade, the RAF 
delivered 13% more, 29,311 short tons.
90
 
Total hours flown  448,027 
Average daily hours operating per serviceable aircraft 6.9 
Total short tonnage delivered  379,976
91
 
Number of reinforcements delivered  371,507 
Number of casualties evacuated 103,700 
Total USAAF/RAF/RCAF short tonnage in April 1945  76,709 (2,557 per 
day) 
Total RAF/RCAF short tonnage in June 1945  25,954 (865 per 
day)   
 
Table 3.4:  Operations in Burma October 1944 to July 1945 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park, Allied Air Commander South-East Asia, recorded 
'Each part of the planning and assessment of air lift must be carried out by the 
Service in whose province it lies' and 'Air supply depends on so many agencies, and 
is affected by so many imponderables, that the allocation of resources and good 
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 79 
brains to ensure efficiency, speed and good liaison can never be too generous'.
92
   
Air supply was found to be more than having an adequate number of aircraft and 
aircrews.  It needed extensive administration; infrastructure (airfields suitable to 
handle air transport with depots to store the range of potential cargoes close by, and 
railways, roads and waterways to haul freight to those depots), and speedy, efficient 
loading and unloading capabilities for effectively wrapped cargo.  The Army and the 
Air Force needed to cooperate closely; to drop "tribal loyalties"; to understand each 
other's problems, and for the Army, to appreciate the advantages and the limitations 
of air transport.  At all levels the Army and the RAF needed to co-ordinate their 
actions and to adopt appropriate best practices.
93
  The formation of the Army Air 
Transport Organization [AATO] helped but it did not resolve the difficulties 
completely.
94
  When the war ended, the British had still to hone their combined-
service coordination and their tactics for airlift logistics.
95
  On the positive side, the 
Army retained the AATO concept after the war.  It would play a significant and 
varied part during the Airlift.  Moreover, Brigadier J. A. Dawson, who had been 
Commander Combined Army Air Transport Organisation within Allied Land Forces 
South East Asia, was appointed Commander Army Air Transport Organization 
[CAATO] for the Berlin Airlift.
96
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 80 
The organization and command structures in South East Asia were astonishingly 
complex.
97
  For example during the first half of 1944 Eastern Air Command [EAC], 
which was commanded by a USAAF Major General, reported operationally to the 
ACSEA, whose commander was a RAF Air Chief Marshal.  EAC had a British RAF 
officer of equivalent rank (Air Vice Marshal) to the American as assistant 
commander.  One of its subordinate organizations was the Anglo-American Troop 
Carrier Command [TCC] commanded by a USAAF Brigadier General.
98
  On 1 May 
1944, whilst heavily involved supplying Imphal, TCC was placed under the 3
rd
 
Tactical Air Force commanded by a RAF Air Marshal.
99
  Operationally Air Marshal 
Sir John Baldwin was subordinate to the Major General commanding EAC.
100
  For 
all other purposes, however, RAF units - including those in TCC - had different 
reporting chains.
101
  
There were a number of changes in the last year of the war but for a time separate 
organizations for administrative control; administrative services, and operational 
control continued.  In October 1944 (15 September according to CG EAC
102
) an 
expanded TCC became the Combat Cargo Task Force [CCTF] under the command 
of an American, Brigadier General Frederick Evans, with Air Commodore J. Donald 
Hardman as his deputy.  It remained an integrated American-British task force and 
once again reported directly to HQ EAC.  Its air supply responsibilities covered the 
ground forces in Burma other than the Americans and Chinese in Northern Burma 
who were supported by units of the US 10
th
 Air Force.  In April 1945 the British 
element of CCTF became a Transport Command group, No. 232, whilst remaining a 
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component of the task force.
103
  There was a second Transport Command Group, No. 
229, in India and Burma.  This commanded the British and Commonwealth transport 
squadrons that were not involved in the immediate support of the combat forces.
104
  
'All these anomalies which appear curious, if not incomprehensible' were still being 
resolved when the Japanese surrendered.
105
 
As part of the expansion of the RAF in the Far East (and the withdrawal of American 
airpower from Burma
106
) a Transport Force Commander for the whole Far East was 
proposed.  This Air Marshal and his headquarters would have been subordinate to the 
Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief [AOC-in-C] Transport Command but would have 
also acted as advisor to the Air Commander-in-Chief South East Asia amongst 
others.  In theatre he would command three groups, Nos. 229, 232, and 238 (the 
latter for Airborne assault).
107
   
Park recorded that if 'two R.A.F. squadrons were made available for Airborne 
training by 1st June [1945], that internal airlines requirements were met, and that 
U.SA.A.F. transport squadrons were all out of the Theatre from 10th June [1945], it 
was calculated that the following transport aircraft would be available 11 June-31 
July —8 R.A.F. Squadrons —240 C-47'.108  Air Marshal Sir Ralph Cochrane wrote 
that the 'ACSEA Stage II target' was 22 squadrons (4 long range and 18 medium 
range) split between Nos. 229, 232 and 238 Groups.  Three of the long range 
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 82 
squadrons were Halifax-based intended for the Airborne forces.
109
  Planning figures 
hovered at five heavy bomber squadrons out of a suggested total of 91 squadrons 
including the 22 transports ones.
110
  Had the war in the Far East continued the issues 
inherent in one Command operating transport squadrons owned by another might 
have been resolved and the limited involvement of heavy bombers might have led to 
a more balanced appreciation of air power.  Instead after the Berlin Airlift the 
transport force would be greatly reduced to permit expansion of Bomber and Fighter 
Commands.
111
 
As Chapters 5 and 6 show, organizational, inter-Service and international challenges 
were present during the Berlin Airlift.  There would be complicated chains of 
command; more organizations with which to cooperate; closer Governmental 
involvement, and a larger international dimension.  British Government departments 
would include the Air Ministry, Foreign Office, Ministry of Civil Aviation, Ministry 
of Supply, Treasury and War Office.  In Germany there would be the American, 
British and French occupation authorities and the German administration.
112
   
Rangoon was captured, and in spite of all the difficulties, the Allies received 
infinitely better support than the Japanese.  Park recorded Major General Ichida 
(Vice Chief of Staff, Japanese Burma Area Army) as saying: 
The Japanese in Burma had not reckoned with two important and vital factors 
which upset their calculations and placed their forces at disastrous 
disadvantages: 
(a). Allied air supply, which permitted ground forces in Burma to consolidate 
their positions without being forced to retreat and thus rendered the enemy's 
infiltration and encircling tactics abortive. 
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(b). Allied air superiority, which so disrupted Japanese supply lines, both in 
Burma and further afield, that starvation and illness overtook thousands of 
Japanese troops facing the Fourteenth Army and also denied them the 
essential supplies of fuel, equipment and material with which to fight a better 
equipped and supplied, Allied Force.
 113
 
Japanese logistics arrangements were parlous even without Allied intervention.
114
  
Park emphasized further the part played by air transport reporting that: 'Thanks 
mainly to Allied air superiority, and resulting air supply, they had withstood the siege 
of Imphal, and, on the siege being raised, had taken the offensive down through 
Burma with the knowledge that fuel, rations, ammunition and miscellaneous 
equipment would be air-dropped or air-landed to them'.
115
  Air Commodore J. 
Donald Hardman, Deputy Commander CCTF and Air Officer Commanding [AOC] 
No. 232 Gp., might be perceived, albeit on a much smaller scale, as Britain's Tunner.  
He recorded that:  
The whole campaign has been a striking illustration of a fact new in warfare - 
namely that airpower can be used to transport, supply and support ground 
troops entirely independently of ground channels.  This has been South East 
Asia's contribution to the art of war.
116
 
With accolades like those of Park and Hardman, the India-Burma campaigns of 
1944-1945 should have had significant impact on the post-war RAF.  However, 
Henry Probert wrote: 'Yet incredibly those back in the UK, [Marshal of the Royal Air 
Force - Chief of the Air Staff - Sir Charles] Portal downwards, were unaware of the 
RAF's overall contribution and in particular the 14
th
 Army's dependence on it for its 
maintenance'.
117
  Given that these campaigns (and their commanders) lacked the 
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immediateness and the profile of those in Europe and the Mediterranean his 
statement appears reasonable.
118
  However, it does not correlate entirely with the 
correspondence that took place in 1944 and 1945 between the Vice Chief of the Air 
Staff [VCAS], the Air Member for Supply and Organization [AMSO] (both members 
of the Air Council), the two wartime AOCs-in-C of Transport Command and 
ACSEA.  This reflected a growing awareness about the importance of air transport in 
the Far East.
119
   
It is the degree to which this army's dependence on air supply was recognized and 
the acceptance of its general applicability that is important.  By the late 1940s the last 
paragraph of the AHB monologue about air supply in Burma stated that:  
These facts clearly discourage any tendency to regard the air supply 
achievements in Burma as a basis for a world-wide doctrine.  Air supply is 
inevitably uneconomical in comparison with land or sea lines of 
communication, when the latter are available.  It does not, therefore, follow 
from the success of this new technique, great as are its potentialities in 
conflicts carried out over territory similar to that of Burma, that it can be 
regarded as of universal application irrespective of tasks, opposition or 
terrain.
120
   
The wording was composed just before or in the early stages of the Airlift and 
undoubtedly reflected the RAF's position at the time, air supply in South East Asia 
Command [SEAC] had been atypical.   
Air supply in SEAC did not join the Battle of Britain and Bomber Command as RAF 
icons in the post-war period.  It had not benefited from the equivalent of five years of 
wartime propaganda about the heavy bomber that followed 20 years of Trenchardian 
theory that 'Victory can be achieved by bombing enemy vital centres, thus breaking 
the enemy's will to fight'.
121
  There was no 'Few' just the 'Forgotten Army'.  
Furthermore, it was a question of size.  In July 1944 the RAF element of the Allied 
Expeditionary Force, including the Air Defence of Great Britain, comprised ten 
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groups and 146 squadrons.
122
  Bomber Command had had eight operational groups 
controlling 129 squadrons, although the latter were not all operational at one time.
123
  
There had been a mere maximum of eight RAF and two Royal Canadian Air Force 
[RCAF] transport squadrons permanently assigned to the Indian-Burma theatre and 
the majority of the airlift capacity had come from the USAAF.
124
   
No one at the highest level elected to apostolate air supply.  Park retired in 1946 and 
Louis Mountbatten (ex-Commander-in-Chief [C-in-C] SEAC and then Viceroy of 
India) was filling a rear admiral's command in the Mediterranean.  Given the nation's 
financial difficulties; the political priorities of the time, and the infighting for limited 
resources between the Services and within the RAF, it is difficult to see what even 
the most powerful and well
 
publicized advocate could have achieved prior to the 
Airlift.  Once the Blockade had started it would have been generally too late aside 
from advocating early reassignment of the Dakota air and ground crews - Air Vice 
Marshal Charles Guest's 'more an embarrassment than a really effective load-carrier' 
- to improve the utilization of the larger four-engine aircraft
125
 and the temporary use 
by the RAF of spare four engine Avro Tudor airliners as cargo hauliers.
126
  The latter 
would, however, have been opposed by Air Marshal Sir Brian Baker, AOC-in-C 
Transport Command.
127
 
By the time of the Airlift, Hardman was an Air Vice Marshal and Assistant Chief of 
the Air Staff (Operations) [ACAS(Ops)] in the Air Ministry.  His rank was too senior 
to command the British contingent and his career was marked for higher things and 
not as the transport specialist that Tunner was labelled.  In spite of the Airlift and his 
relatively close involvement with it in the Air Ministry, he was posted as 
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Commandant of the RAF Staff College Bracknell in January 1949.  An appointment 
as Chief of Staff of the Royal Australian Air Force [RAAF] followed and then, as an 
Air Chief Marshal, as Air Member for Supply and Organisation in 1954.  His career 
path after Burma reflected ability and it avoided him being pigeonholed as a 
specialist.
128
  His successor at ACAS(Ops), Air Vice Marshal Charles Guest, had 
also commanded air transport in South East Asia (AOC No. 229 Group) and he 
would become AOC-in-C Transport Command, but at the start of the Airlift he was 
also too senior.
129
  Whilst both Hardman and Guest were too senior for the Operation 
PLAINFARE command, they would have been too junior to have been successful as 
the RAF's post war airlift advocates had they chosen to do so. 
Rainsford, an acting Group Captain, with a wartime experience in heavy bomber 
operations, became responsible within the Air Ministry for the daily implementation 
of Government policy for supplying Berlin by airlift.  Prior to the Airlift his 
department's main responsibilities were the planning and operational policies for the 
RAF's small transport force.  The air transport role after the war concentrated on the 
routine air carriage of mainly high priority passengers and a little freight with 
growing emphasis on the 'Trunk Route' to Singapore; the provision of services to the 
Foreign Office in the absence of British civil aviation; tactical air support for the 
army via training for parachute and glider-borne landings, and contingency planning 
for the carriage of evacuees from and reinforcements to garrisons worldwide in 
emergency.
130
  Moreover, as Chapters 5 and 6 will show, Britain had insufficient 
aircrews and effective robust aircraft for them to fly.  Furthermore, the RAF, unlike 
the Americans, did not deploy an appropriately experienced commander and 
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management team to the Airlift.
131
  This was not the basis from which to rapidly 
implement a major airlift to supply two million people.  Fortunately AATO had been 
retained in the Army which helped the British evolve successful Airlift tactics on the 
ground and an experienced Brigadier was appointed as CAATO for Operation 
PLAINFARE.
132
  It is within the RAF that the lessons available to be learnt had been 
mislaid. 
In Mid-July 1948 not all in the US military were able initially to envisage a long-
term airlift that could meet the minimum requirements of over two million blockaded 
Berliners.
133
  Similar views were held in Britain where Field Marshal Viscount 
Montgomery, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, stated that: 'In submitting the 
paper to the Minister of Defence it should be made clear that it would in fact prove 
impossible to nourish and sustain the western sectors of Berlin by air transport 
alone'.
134
  After all, even as early as October 1948 the Berlin Airlift hauled 147,581 
short tons which was more than double the best the Hump achieved at 71,042 tons in 
July 1945.
135
  True, the distance from the US Zone in Germany to Berlin was half 
that for the Hump and the mountains only a quarter as high
136
, but for those without 
the detailed airbridge experience (and the vision) necessary to extrapolate, tonnage-
achieved would have been what mattered.  Moreover, as Chapters 5 and 6 and the 
Chronology at Appendix 8 reveal, bringing together the American Airlift task force; 
crewing it with specially trained personnel, including recalling reservists, and 
renovating, extending and even building airfields took time and during the winter of 
1948-1949 the cautious views were very nearly right. 
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The Airlift's conception needed powerful advocates.  Albert C. Wedemeyer had been 
Mountbatten's Chief of Staff and after 27 October 1944, Chief of Staff to the 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
137
  In 1948 he was a Lieutenant General in the US 
Army and the Director of Plans and Operations of its General Staff.  On the 24-25 
June 1948 he was flying to Europe on a routine inspection with William H. Draper, 
Undersecretary of the Army and another important member of the US military 
hierarchy.  During the flight, using Wedemeyer's Hump experience and possibly that 
of the Indo-Burma campaign and Draper's of the US air transport fleet and the 
supplies Berlin would need, they calculated that an airlift 'might work'.  In Europe 
they discussed the possibility with Bevin and Clay.
138
   
The idea of an airlift was not new to either Bevin or Clay.  On 25 June 1948, in a 
meeting with ministers, the Deputy British Military Governor - Major General Nevil 
Brownjohn - had been 'pessimistic' about an air supply solution.  'Bevin was not all 
satisfied….and demanded, as a matter of urgency, technical advice'.139  Clay, 
together with Major General Edwin Herbert - General Officer Commanding [GOC] 
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 89 
British Troops Berlin - and General Sir Brian Robertson - British Military Governor - 
had seen the airbridge calculations of Air Commodore Reginald Waite, done on the 
23/24 June 1948.
140
  (Waite was Head of Air Section, Combined Services Division of 
the Control Commission and had no air transport experience.
141
)   
The Airlift was no single person's idea.  It arose from multiple inputs and was 
perceived as a temporary solution pending diplomatic resolution of the Blockade.
142
  
(JP (48) 86 (Final) 26 July 1948 recorded that an airlift was not a permanent solution 
but could maintain the status quo for six months
143
 whilst Smith cited the 10 August 
1948 telegram from Robertson to Bevin which 'doubted if Berlin could be supplied 
much longer'.
144
) 
SOVIET AIR TRANSPORT IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
The investigation into precedent and Soviet decisions during the Berlin Airlift is 
constrained by the material available in English; ideological and political constraints, 
and at Leningrad and Stalingrad, the conditions at the time.  The Soviets did not 
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 90 
mount an airbridge operation similar in size to either the Hump or Imphal and it is 
necessary to look wider to gain insight into precedents for the Soviet reaction to the 
Berlin Airlift.  Stalin's character and method of rule cannot be ignored either.  He 
was an individual to whom advice was given cautiously.  Specialists chose to keep 
quiet rather than risk execution (and the Gulag for their families).  Moreover, Stalin's 
relationship with Leningrad was generally negative.  He opposed special recognition 
of the city's wartime experience; a crackdown on its intelligentsia started in summer 
1946, and a purge had begun there in February 1948.
145
  Consequently, this analysis 
tends towards "what is reasonable to conclude" rather than what is certain. 
During their Great Patriotic War the Soviet airpower doctrine centred on air defence 
of the USSR's centres of production and close air support of its field armies.  This 
can give the impression that its various air forces' inventories comprised only single-
engine fighters and ground attack aircraft, and twin-engine light and medium 
bombers engaged in short-range flying.
146
  This view was reinforced by Tunner 
writing that: 
The Russians did not understand instrument flying themselves and therefore 
did not believe that we could maintain the [Berlin] Airlift during the long 
European winter.  Frequently a cloud cover extending from five hundred feet 
on up to five thousand feet could cover the entire region……..  I am 
convinced that the Russian unfamiliarity with instrument flying led them to 
take our airlift too lightly.  They did not think we could do it.
147 
 
Whilst lack of instrument flying experience may have been the case for the tactical 
air forces (which were present in strength in eastern Europe in the late 1940s) the 
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 91 
Soviet Union had operated a small long range bomber force during the war, 
including Lend-Lease North American B-25s (which were fitted with appropriate 
instrument flight rules [IFR]
148
 instrumentation as standard).  This force was 
nowhere as successful as the tactical air forces but it flew in winter; above extensive 
cloud, and at night.  The Soviet navy operated Lend-Lease flying boats and the Air 
Defence Forces
149
 employed night fighters fitted with indigenous Gnejs radar.  Thus 
there was some IFR capability across the Soviet air forces.
150
  
The pre-war Tupolev TB-3 four-engine heavy bomber had also been used in civilian 
guise as a long range transport.  818 TB-3s were built and after initially serving as a 
bomber during the Second World War the survivors were converted to transport 
duties.  The Soviet Union also manufactured the Lisunov Li-2 (initially termed PS-
84) aircraft, a licensed derivative of the Douglas DC-3.  By the war's end between 
2,500 and 3,000 Li-2s had been built.  Whilst large numbers were used as night 
bombers and aircrew trainers, some of them and 707 Lend-Lease C-47s were 
employed as transports.
151
  Thus the Soviets had an air transport capability and 
Pavlov, for example, mentioned the Li-2 as part of the Leningrad airlift.
152
 
The siege of Leningrad was one of the key Soviet (and subsequently Russian) 
memories of its war.
153
  It started officially on 8 September 1941.  Air 
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communications were instigated shortly thereafter to carry passengers, mail and 
freight in a similar fashion to the RAF's P.19 communications flights before and 
during the Berlin Airlift.  These continued throughout the siege which ended 
officially on the 27 January 1944.  In the autumns of 1941 and 1942 and the spring of 
1942 as the ice was forming or thawing on Lake Ladoga, air transport provided the 
only connection between the City and unoccupied USSR.
154
   
Statistics for the Leningrad airbridge vary between sources and not solely because 
the periods covered differ.  However, from the start of the siege to the end of 1941 
the maximum tonnage appeared to be 6,186 inbound and 1,017 outbound together 
with 50,099 evacuees.  64 planes were allocated to the task of which 20 or 22 were 
serviceable on average.  Pavlov records that both transport aircraft and heavy 
bombers were used to fly in highly nourishing compact food.
155
  When Novaya 
Ladoga had been available as the consignor airfield, five or six return trips to 
Leningrad per day were possible but after Luftwaffe attacks two thirds of the force 
was dispersed to more remote airfields from which they flew two return journeys.  
Flights were intercepted by the Luftwaffe and so flew in formation, often with fighter 
escort.
156
   
Pavlov viewed the airlift as 'costly' consuming thousands of tons of fuel; diverting 
transport aircraft from important military operations and aircraft were lost.
157
  Given 
the priority accorded to the defence of Moscow and the losses suffered by the Soviet 
air forces during 1941, at first sight it is surprising that any aircraft were allocated to 
carry freight into Leningrad.  However, the inbound airlift has to be viewed 
alongside the importance accorded by the Soviet leadership to the outbound loads of 
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priority skilled workers; industrial machinery; locally produced weapons and 
munitions; apparatchiks and intelligentsia.
158
 
To put the size of the 1941 Leningrad airlift into perspective, it totalled about 9% of 
that delivered to western Berlin in July 1948, the first full month of the Berlin Airlift.  
Similarly the total Soviet backload tonnage was only 71% of the RAF equivalent for 
July 1948.  It was only in terms of the 50,099 evacuees that the Leningrad airlift 
proportionally exceeded the Berlin Airlift.
159
  As at Stalingrad, which is examined 
shortly, the Leningrad airlift failed to meet its daily target of 200 tons, delivering 
approximately 80 tons per day.
160
 
The significance of the Siege of Leningrad extends beyond its airlift.  Although 
almost entirely delivered by vehicles and boats, the effort committed to sustain the 
city showed what a country might do logistically to maintain its position.  (Of course, 
the welfare of the average Leningrader had not been the prime objective).  At the 
start of the Berlin blockade Clay, his political adviser, Robert D Murphy, and the 
head of the Foreign Office's German Department, Sir Patrick Dean believed that no 
nation would deliberately starve a city to death to achieve its objectives.
161
  The 
Siege of Leningrad - which was covered at the Nuremberg Trial - should have 
challenged their thinking.   
The Germans had intended to exterminate Leningrad's population by starvation.  The 
28 June 1964 Red Star newspaper wrote that 'No one knows exactly how many 
people died in Leningrad and the Leningrad area'.
162
  Whilst almost certainly an 
underestimate, the 1946 Nuremburg Trial recorded that 641,803 civilians died in 
Leningrad, Pushkin and Peterhof during the siege from starvation.
163
  The western 
_____________________________________________________________ 
158
  Reid, pp. 40, 152-157; Salisbury, pp. 395-396. 
159
  AP3257, App. R; Salisbury, p. 382. 
160
  Allaz, p. 156; Morzik, pp. 180, 193; Salisbury, p. 382. 
161
  Erickson, The Road to Berlin, pp. 60-61, 167-168; Glantz, City under Siege, pp. 68-69; 
Daniel F. Harrington, The Air Force Can Deliver Anything: A History of the Berlin Airlift 
(Ramstein AFB: USAFE History Office, 1998) p. 14. 
162
  Salisbury, pp. 514 (for quotation), 516. 
163
  Salisbury, p. 514; The Avalon Project, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School, 
'Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 7, Sixty-Second Day Tuesday, 19 February 1946' 
<avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/02-19-46.asp> [accessed April 2013] and 'Nuremberg Trial 
Footnote continues on next page. 
 94 
Berliners may have been cold and their meals monotonous but they were infinitely 
better placed than the average Leningrader had been in the winter of 1941-1942.  
Resupply to Leningrad is thus important but as it was not achieved through an 
airbridge, a separate annex has been attached at Appendixes 1 and 2.   
Research into Soviet Second World War sources has been limited owing to 
availability of reliable material and the paucity of significant air transport operations.  
The Soviets had planned to use air supply to support their armoured forces during the 
liberation of Inner Mongolia, Manchuria and Korea in August 1945.  This campaign 
has been covered from the ground force perspective by a Russian speaking US Army 
officer, David Glantz
164
, and more recently on television by Star Media using 
Russian sources
165
.  A generic picture was given of a spectacularly fast and deep 
penetration by the Sixth Guards Tank Army which strained its logistic resources to 
breaking point with units experiencing severe fuel shortages and with the whole 
army stalled for want of fuel on 12 and 13 August 1945.  The supply lines stretched 
back 700 kilometres and vehicle attrition was substantial due to the terrain.  An airlift 
started on 11 August with possibly 400 unspecified aircraft making 160 deliveries 
per day.
166
  Whilst the size of the airlift was uncertain, it was clear that only part of 
the army was able to continue its advance on the 14
th
.  After joining up with air-
landed detachments at Changchun and Mukden on 21 August, Sixth Guards Tank 
                                                                                                                           
Proceedings Vol. 8, Sixty-Fifth Day, Friday, 22 February 1946' <avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/02-
22-46.asp> [accessed April 2013]. 
164
  David Glantz, 'August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria 
1945', Leavenworth Paper No. 8 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, US Army 
Command and General Staff College, 1983); David Glantz, 'August Storm: The Soviet 1945 
Strategic Offensive in Manchuria', Leavenworth Paper No. 7, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat 
Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1983); David Glantz, 'The 
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Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, Nov 1984); David M. Glantz, The 
Soviet Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945: "August Storm" (London: Frank Cass 
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165
  Anna Grazhdan, Director, 'War Against Japan', Episode 10 of Soviet Storm: WWII in the 
East, Second Series, (Star Media, broadcast on 1
st
 Channel Russia OJSC, retransmitted in 
English on Sky Military History Channel, 21 May 12). 
166
  Glantz, Leavenworth Paper No. 7, Chap. 7 cited the aircraft as coming from 453d 
Aviation Battalion whilst Grazhdan, stated two divisions of 12
th
 Air Army were diverted.  
Precision was not helped because Glantz lists at Chap. 4 the total air assets of the front as 
1,324.   
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Army had to travel on to Port Arthur by rail because of continued fuel shortages.
167
  
To what degree the problems of resupply experienced in August 1945 affected Soviet 
Airlift thinking in 1948 is unclear as the invasion succeeded without embarrassment 
because the Japanese failed to resist the Sixth Tank Army.
168
 
A second siege that penetrated deeply into the Soviet consciousness was their victory 
at Stalingrad.
169
  Tunner recorded that: 'Perhaps the failure of the German airlift at 
Stalingrad was one of the factors in the early Russian reaction to the American-
British Airlift into Berlin.  The Russians had never had an airlift themselves, and 
they didn't take ours seriously until it was too late.'
170
  Thus why did the German 
airbridge fail and what were its precedents that may have misled the Soviets? 
Stalingrad Airbridge 
The Stalingrad airbridge was one of many air supply operations undertaken by the 
Germans during World War II.  It and two others that impacted on it were examined: 
Demyansk and Tunisia.  At Demyansk the Soviets surrounded 95,000 Germans.  An 
airbridge started on 19 February 1942 with its peak activity ending on 18 May 1942 
when a degree of surface communication was re-established.  The aircraft were 
almost entirely tri-engine Junkers Ju52/3Ms and the operation was commanded by 
Colonel Morzik.
171
   
Records for the Demyansk airbridge are probably inaccurate
172
 but between 19 
February and 18 May 1942 Huschke's figures averaged 273 tonnes delivered per day 
whilst Morzik's were 302 tons against the absolute minimum inbound requirement of 
300 tonnes per day from Huschke and 300 tons from Morzik.  Huschke also recorded 
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that 22,093 wounded were evacuated during the same period.
173
  Demyansk was at 
the time considered a success because the trapped German forces were supplied until 
relieved.
174
   
Morzik, however, argued that the operation was 'badly prepared, carried out at the 
cost of tremendous expenditure in materiel and effort', and so 'must be booked as a 
failure whose superficial success brought with it the danger of too easy recourse to 
the employment of air support as a stop gap solution'.
175
  300 aircraft were diverted 
from aircrew training for four months which Morzik called 'catastrophic'.
176
  The 
operation also revealed 'a lack of experience on the part of the Army in air 
transportation of supplies and to the hampering effects of bureaucracy and poor 
organization'.
177
  It is most unlikely that the lessons from Demyansk influenced 
American or British thinking and some of its perceived success factors, for example 
simple, clear-cut command and control arrangements, were absent from the Berlin 
Airlift, as Chapters 5 and 6 reveal.
178
 
The Tunisia airbridge is relevant because it diverted assets from Stalingrad.  In 
November 1942 the Axis elected to garrison Tunisia after its defeat at Second 
Alamein and the seaborne invasion of Algeria (part of Operation TORCH).  320 Ju-
52s were sent to the Mediterranean to help carry the reinforcements.
179
  The Tunisia 
airlift was maintained at this peak level until the end of December 1942 when some 
transport aircraft were transferred to Stalingrad.  During November and December 
41,768 troops, 8,614 tons of equipment and 1,472 tons of fuel were delivered at a 
cost of 128 Ju-52s.  By the end of January 1943 the Luftwaffe had lost 659 transport 
aircraft, 56% of its strength, in the Mediterranean theatre and at Stalingrad.
180
  The 
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Germans lacked the capability to supply Stalingrad and Tunisia concurrently and had 
to surrender both.  In 1948-49 the Americans and the British had to redistribute their 
air delivery assets and there was pain worldwide.  However, they did not face the 
same dilemma as the Germans because the Berlin Airlift ended before the Korean 
War started.
181
   
On 22 November 1942 the C-in-C German Sixth Army, General Friedrich Paulus, 
radioed that Stalingrad was encircled and had six days worth of supplies.  This 
emphasized how perilous the German lines of communication in southern Russia 
were in 1942
182
 despite one He-111 and nine Ju-52 groups of Luftflotte 4 having 
delivered about 42,000 tons of which between about 7,000 and 9000 tons were for 
the German Army and the rest for the Luftwaffe.  Additionally 27,000 troops were 
carried in and 51,000 casualties had been evacuated.
183
  The first supplies were 
airlifted into Stalingrad on 23 November 1942.  However, such was the state of the 
Luftflotte 4 transport aircraft after a summer's constant campaigning, as well as their 
other commitments, that on 25 November only 30 aircraft out of a force of 295 were 
committed to the Sixth Army
184
.   
At the start of the siege the Sixth Army senior officers sought 750 tons per day but 
reduced the figure subsequently to 500 tons which matched the Sixth Army 
Quartermaster's late November 1942 survival figure.
185
  In the same timeframe, 
Generaloberst Kurt Zeitler (Chief of Staff of the Army General Staff - OKH) claimed 
to have told Hitler, during a dispute with Göring, that 300 tons per day was the 
absolute minimum but 500 tons per flying day was needed because of the oncoming 
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winter weather.  Generaloberst Wolfram Richthofen (Commander Luftflotte 4) 
recorded being required to fly in a 'not possible' 300 tons per day.
186
  On 19 
December 1942 Generalleutnant Martin Fiebig (Commander VIII Fliegerkorps) was 
tasked to airlift four thousand tons of fuel and 1,800 tons of rations in addition to the 
daily target, in case the Sixth Army had to undertake an orderly retreat after the 
LVII
th
 Panzer Corps established contact.
187
  Finally on 25 December 1942, the daily 
target was set at 550 tons a day 'to maintain combat readiness'.
188
  A lack of reality 
appears to have existed outside of Fiebig, Richthofen
 
 and Zeitler.
189
  
Morzik stated that reliable figures were not available for the tonnage airlifted but 
then gave a precise figure of 6,591 tons.
190
  He identified the activity peak as 
occurring between 12 to 21 December 1942 when the average daily total was 137 
tons; see Table 3.5.
191
  Huschke listed Morzik's figure (but calling it 'tonnes') as well 
as 8,251 tonnes which is ascribed to Generalfeldmarschal Erhard Milch (Deputy C-
in-C Luftwaffe)'s post-operation report.
192
  Hayward cites both 8,350.7 tons (117.6 
tons per day) and a lower figure from Generalmajor Wolfgang Pickert (Commander 
9th Flak Division and although an artillery specialist, the senior Luftwaffe officer in 
the Stalingrad Pocket
193)
 of 103 tons per day.
194
  Personnel were flown in and out and 
between 24,910 and 30,000 sick and wounded evacuated.
195
  There are no figures 
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available (if there ever were) about how much actually reached the Axis troops inside 
the Pocket.
196 
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Table 3.5:  Stalingrad Airlift - Average Tonnage Carried per Day - Morzik's 
Figures  
The Stalingrad airlift failed because the Axis did not hold the airfields.  Initially the 
aircraft flew mainly from the very congested, inadequate airfields at Tatsinskaya 
(Junkers Ju-52 and Ju-86 base) and Morozovskaya (Heinkel He-111 base).
197
  After 
the former's capture by the Soviet army on 24 December 1942 and the latter's 
evacuation on 2 January 1943, they moved to even poorer airfields at Salsk and 
Novocherkassk.  After Salsk fell, the Ju-52s redeployed to the 'woefully inadequate' 
site at Zverevo on 15 January 1943.
198
  Morozovskaya was 200 kilometres from the 
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Pocket; Novocherkassk 330; Salsk 350; Tatsinskaya 230 and Zverevo 400.  Salsk 
and Zverevo were barely within Ju-52 operating range.
199
 
The landing grounds in the Pocket were primitive with runways and unloading areas 
of compacted snow.  Pitomnik was the only one equipped to handle aircraft night and 
day.
200
  Basargino came within range of Soviet artillery early on and ceased to be 
used.  Gumrak was put into use after the loss of Pitomnik on 16 January 1943 but it 
was unsuitable to handle cargo aircraft on a regular basis.  It was captured on 23 
January as was the last extreme possibility at Stalingradskiye a few hours later.
201
  
Thereafter air drops continued until the Northern Pocket surrendered on 2 February 
1943.
202
   
Even if the airfields had been held, Morzik argued that the airlift would have failed 
because the Luftwaffe was unable to generate enough airlift capacity on a day by day 
basis.  Morzik explained that to deliver 750 tons per day (the Sixth Army senior 
officers' original figure) would have required 375 two ton Ju-52 deliveries per day.  
Based on one round trip per day and an operational availability of 30% to 35%, he 
concluded that 1,050 Ju-52s would have been needed.
203
  The Luftwaffe had about 
750 Ju-52s of which about 250 (Murray cited 320
204
) were reinforcing and supplying 
North Africa where 200 were still employed at Christmas 1942.
205 
 
There are issues with the parameters Morzik used.  At 30% 1,250 aircraft would have 
been needed and at 35% 1,071.  He planned on two tons per delivery making no 
allowances for aircraft bulking out before they exceeded their permissible payload or 
being dispatched part full.  His availability rate was 30% to 35% whilst over time the 
Ju-52 figure fell to as low as 25% owing to the usage of aircraft in adverse weather 
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and the shortages of spares, ground equipment, ground crews, and hangars.
206
  
(Murray recorded that on 18 January 1943 less than 7% of available Ju-52s and 33% 
of He-111s were serviceable.
207
)  
Morzik made no allowance for aircraft losses which reached 488 (that is seven a day 
with 54.5% of losses being Ju-52s and 33.8% He-111s).
208
  There were few 
replacements for lost aircraft and by the 29 January 1943 Luftflotte 4 had only 363 
Ju-52s and He-111s at the consignor airfields.
209
  Morzik included no contingency 
for bad weather yet there were only 27 days of totally unhindered flying weather in 
the Pocket.  Moreover, when the weather was favourable there it might not have been 
at the consigning airfields.
210
  Hayward cited Fiebig for a period before 6 January 
1943:  'around thirty percent [of our planes] fail to get through'
211
 whilst as recorded 
above, Zeitler's contingency was 66%.  On the other hand, Morzik's calculation used 
750 tons for his daily target not the lower ones of 550, 500 or 300 tons. 
Morzik assumed one delivery per serviceable aircraft per day.  He recorded that 
aircraft flew at night and in low visibility
212
 but this would have only been possible 
when the weather permitted, the aircraft was equipped for night flying, and there was 
an aircrew capable of doing so.
213
  However, if those constraints had not been present 
was more than one flight per day possible anyway?  After the capture of Tatsinskaya 
at Christmas 1942, the Ju-52s had to fly from Salsk.
214
  The total flight time Salsk-
Pitomnik-Salsk would have been about 220 minutes without allowing for stacking; 
forming formations, and detours to avoid known anti-aircraft batteries and to 
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'confuse' Soviet fighters.
215
  Initially aircraft were being turned around in the Pocket 
in two hours but as the siege continued the figure dropped to four.
216
  Thus by early 
January 1943 the time from initial take-off to return landing would have been at least 
seven hours 40 minutes.  At the base airfields aircraft would have had to taxi; be 
refuelled; the passengers and wounded unloaded, and new cargo loaded.  Before the 
next sortie, some form of pre-flight inspection would have had to be undertaken and 
probably the aircraft would have had to be dug out from the snow and de-iced.
217
   
In theory at least two deliveries per day should have been possible, if the airfields 
and strips in the Pocket could have handled them night and day.  Hypothetically to 
haul 750 tons per day the Stalingrad airlift should have needed a daily minimum of 
between 765 and 1,071 Ju-52s (based on 750 tons at two tons per Ju-52 delivery, two 
deliveries per day, Fiebig's weather contingency of 30% not getting through, and 
between 25% and 35% serviceability).  Seven serviceable aircraft would additionally 
have been needed daily to allow for losses. 
Owing to the deficiency in dedicated Luftwaffe transports, aircraft were 
commandeered from other duties such as long range reconnaissance, bombing and 
training, and from organizations outside the Luftwaffe, such as Lufthansa.  Many had 
to be re-rolled to become temporary transports and aircraft from out of theatre had to 
be modified to operate in the extreme cold.  This took time but by early December 
Luftflotte 4 had about 500 transports of all kinds.  However, what was needed were 
tactical robust transport aircraft able to operate from rough landing strips; the Ju-52s 
and He-111s (which were limited in types of cargo it could carry) met these criteria, 
the Junkers Ju-86 trainers and four engine long range bombers and reconnaissance 
aircraft did not, and some aircraft types had to be withdrawn.
218
  Moreover, the 
presence of a number of different types and in the case of the Ju-52, models, often in 
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small numbers, would have been detrimental to the daily generation of aircraft, 
planning and cargo preparation.  When set against the reality of the miscellany, the 
above hypothetical calculations are optimistic.  
The calculations also assume the normal approach to achieving the largest daily 
tonnage possible from an aircraft fleet.  That is that each one is launched as soon as it 
is ready.  At Stalingrad the Luftwaffe had to employ a surge method (rather than 
continuous flow) to take advantage of breaks in the weather and the availability of its 
limited fighter cover.
219
  The deficiencies in the support infrastructure meant it could 
not generate enough sorties to use the surge method effectively and so would have 
been unable to achieve the hypothetical maximum.
220
   
In April 1949, the last full month of the Berlin blockade, CALTF delivered on 
average 7,845 short tons daily in 862 deliveries from eight airfields to three in Berlin 
using about 370 aircraft per day from airfields with good facilities.  It used tried 
procedures for ground handling and air traffic control.  The fleet was supported by 
excellent (for the time) avionics, and well-trained and experienced personnel.
221
  The 
Luftwaffe at Stalingrad had nothing like this and it seems improbable that the Pocket 
could have handled an average of 375 deliveries per day, especially as the period 
between sunrise and sunset was in the order of 8 hours 20 minutes and the aircraft 
would have arrived in groups rather than a continuous stream.
222
 
The Soviet victory at Stalingrad was widely published across the Allies (and was 
admitted to by the Germans).  What was released was subject to wartime 
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propaganda, misconception, and in broad summary.
223
  The detail, however, could 
not have been known by those about to mount the Berlin Airlift.  During the Berlin 
Airlift Major General William H. Tunner, CG CALTF, explored with Hans-Detlef 
Herhudt von Rohden (Oberst, Chief of Staff Luftflotte 4, 24 August 1942–23 
February 1943
224
) why Stalingrad failed.  Tunner concluded that the airlift was 
'hampered by' too many aircraft, many of which were not winterized; poorly kitted 
air and ground crews; too few airfields; insufficient aircraft maintenance, and lack of 
know-how 'rather than Russian action'.
225
   
Some of Tunner's conclusions matched with Morzik's reasons for the Stalingrad 
airlift's failure.  However, unlike Tunner, Morzik also pointed to the loss of the 
airfields and to the inability to protect them and the transports from Soviet air 
attack.
226
  The Berlin Airlift would have failed too if the Soviets had occupied the 
Berlin airfields.  Tunner believed that too many aircraft were involved and one way 
to reduce the numbers would have been to improve the turn round times.  In Berlin 
aircraft were turned around in less than 40 minutes
227
, not the two to four hours that 
applied in the Pocket.  However, even if better turn rounds had been achieved by the 
Germans, uncertainty remains about how many landings per day the Pocket could 
have handled.  The real need was fewer landings with far larger payloads; a robust 
tactical cargo carrier with at least a 20 ton payload and a roll-on roll-off capability 
but such aircraft did not enter service until the 1950s.
228
  
_____________________________________________________________ 
223
  Beevor, Stalingrad, Chaps. 23, 25. 
224
  Von Rohden was a Luftwaffe staff officer and neither an engineer nor an air transport 
specialist, who as an ex-generalmajor helped recruit German mechanics for USAF squadrons 
in CALTF - Huschke, pp. 24, 194.  
225
  Tunner, pp. 183-184. 
226
  Morzik, p. 200. 
227
  Tunner, p. 171. 
228
  Beverley Association, 'Beverley Details' <www.beverley-association.org.uk 
/html/history/history.htm> [accessed 7 July 2013]; The National Museum of the USAF, 
'Lockheed AC-130A Hercules', Fact Sheets <www. nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/ 
factsheet.asp?id=3357> [accessed 7 March 2013]; USAF, C-130, Fact Sheets, <www.af.mil/ 
AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/ 224/Article/104517/c-130-hercules.aspx, dated 
September 2003>.  
 105 
CONCLUSION 
The Hump was a proving ground that made it possible for the Americans to appoint a 
Berlin Airlift commander with a management team that had operated the airbridge 
successfully.  However, it took time to set up the highly effective task force and put 
in place the essential infrastructure to support it.  America had the robust and 
effective Douglas Skymaster aircraft - used during the Hump - and by recalling 
reservists was able to achieve high utilization.   
In contrast, the airbridge experience gained in a remote part of the world by a few 
squadrons with much USAAF assistance was lost post-war in the much reduced RAF 
which was commanded mainly by those with wartime bomber and tactical air force 
experience.  Unlike the Americans, the RAF did not deploy an experienced task force 
commander.  Owing to Britain's financial state, it lacked appropriate aircraft in 
adequate numbers whilst political decisions not to recall reservists en masse led to 
insufficient aircrews and maintenance staff.  AATO was still in existence in 1948 
and its South East Asia wartime commander was appointed Berlin Airlift CAATO 
with Anglo-American responsibilities in the Northern Zone of Germany.   
Tunner wrote that the Luftwaffe's failure at Stalingrad coloured Soviet thinking 
about the Berlin Airlift, but is this why the Soviets 'didn't take ours seriously until it 
was too late'.
229
  What the Soviet leadership took from its wartime experiences and 
those of its allies and enemies is conjecture.  They may have known the effort that 
had been needed to support Leningrad during its siege, that the Leningrad and 
'August Storm' airbridges had not met their targets, and that the Luftwaffe failed to 
deliver a few hundred tons daily at Stalingrad.  Probably the most significant point 
would have been that no previous airlift had delivered the tonnages that CALTF 
would need to haul to supply western Berlin.  Even at its peak, the largest of the 
wartime airbridges, the Hump, averaged only 41% of the target set for western Berlin 
during the winter of 1948-1949.
230
  Moreover, Pavlov had described the Leningrad 
airlift as costly.  Was expense another reason why the Airlift was unexpected?   
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There were those in the upper echelons of the USAF and in Britain who also 
considered that the Airlift would fail and as Chapters 5 and 6 will show, they were 
very nearly right during the winter of 1948-1949.  As Dr Arthur Charlesby wrote: 
'The unusually mild weather, which permitted Berliners to pass the winter without 
excessive hardship and with only a minute contribution of space-heating coal.  Had it 
been necessary to give each family the modest amount of four cwt of coal for the 
entire winter, as was hoped, the supply position would have become quite 
impossible.'
231
  Threaded through much of the Berlin Blockade research material was 
a proposition that the Soviets did not wish to start a war and so were unwilling to 
interfere seriously with the Berlin Airlift.
232
  A perception that the Airlift would fail 
anyway would have been reassuring.  
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231
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CHAPTER 4: 
BERLIN BLOCKADE - THE INTERNATIONAL, GERMAN AND 
DIPLOMATIC DIMENSIONS 
Chapter 4 continues the thread started in Chapter 2 by identifying the international, 
German and diplomatic aspects of the Blockade whilst the corresponding chronology 
of significant events is continued in Appendix 8.  The population of western Berlin 
was recorded at 2,118,631 and before the Blockade 12,000 tons per day were 
delivered there by road, rail and barge.
1
  Faced with a situation where the Soviets 
appeared to hold all the trump cards the Americans and British considered options 
such as evacuating 1.5 million western Berliners by air; sending through armed 
convoys, or supply by air.
2
  Whilst dehydration of food and reduction in packaging 
would reduce the tonnage to be hauled
3
, when the USAF Air Staff reported that 'the 
air operation is doomed to failure'
4
 it would have seemed a reasonable appraisal 
although the variant used by Deputy Under Secretary Foreign Office, Sir Ivone 
Kirkpatrick, is less acceptable nowadays: 'the two million inhabitants of our zones of 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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Berlin could not be supplied by air, it was important to do all we could……..to 
enable us to feed the key Germans i.e. newspaper proprietors and politicians'
5
.  Smith 
cited Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett as using the descriptors: 'unsatisfactory' 
and 'temporary expedient', and that Forrestal 'brooded darkly about a deadline in 
mid-October when winter weather would ground the airlift'.
6
  Nevertheless, in spite 
of their reservations the Americans and the British opted to supply their garrisons 
and the civilians in western Berlin by air until such time as the blockade could be 
resolved by negotiation which introduced diplomatic and international dimensions to 
the Berlin Blockade as well as the Airlift ones.
7
 
The American and French ambassadors in Moscow and Frank Roberts (Bevin's 
private secretary who represented the British as the ambassador was absent sick) held 
preliminary meetings with Valerian Zorin (Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister) and 
Vyacheslav Molotov (Soviet Foreign Minister) on the 30 and 31 July 1948 
respectively prior to meetings with Molotov and Stalin on 2 August to explore ways 
to lift the Blockade.  Meetings continued until an agreement was reached on 27 
August 1948.  This was published on the 31
st
 and indicated that the recently imposed 
restrictions on communications, transport and commerce would be lifted and the east 
mark would be Berlin's sole currency.  The German Bank of Emission of the Eastern 
Zone would regulate currency in Berlin and a financial commission of 
representatives of the four military governors would be set up 'to control the practical 
implementation of the financial arrangements … involved in the introduction and 
continued circulation of a single currency in Berlin'.  The Military Governors were 
directed to identify the detail to implement the agreement and to set a timetable.  
They were to report to their Governments by 7 September 1948.
8
  The directive also 
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required that a satisfactory basis for trade between Berlin and the West be worked 
out.  The Military Governors met but detailed negotiations quickly broke down over 
the supervision of the Bank of Emission and the east mark; Soviet demands for 
restrictions on civil air travel, and the control of trade with Berlin.
9
    
The published text of the Moscow Agreement was ambiguous and made no mention 
of various verbal assurances given by Stalin or his emphasized objection to the 
development of a separate West Germany.
10
  Whilst what was achieved was probably 
the best that might have been expected, the alternative of reaching no agreement 
rather than a bad one might have been a better option.
11
  Davison applauded the 
Soviet handling of the negotiations and argued that their initial objective was to 
cause the Western Powers to alter their intentions for western Germany and to allow 
the Soviet Union greater involvement there.  When that failed they attempted to gain 
control of all of Berlin.
12
  The attacks by communist-led mobs against the Magistrat 
and City Assembly; on-going propaganda directed at the Germans and the 
international community; the continued blockade, and the July 1948 offer to supply 
food to all Berliners may be seen as parallel activities aimed at achieving control of 
the city.  The food offer would have placed all Berliners under Soviet administrative 
control and, noticeably, it did not include coal or electricity.
13
  Davison argued that 
the Soviets moved to seeking a situation where either the Western Powers stayed in 
Berlin on sufferance or withdrew.
14
  Narinskii recorded a Soviet expectation that the 
Western Powers could be persuaded to quit Berlin albeit not necessarily 
immediately.
15
  The phrase 'We lost our diplomatic shirt in Moscow' - attributed to 
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an unidentified member of the American Military Government - seems aptly to sum 
up the Moscow negotiations from an American, British and French viewpoint.
16
     
[Sir] Frank Roberts gave a slightly different assessment of the Moscow meetings in 
1989.  Technically the negotiations addressed the introduction of the west mark into 
Berlin and Soviet withdrawal of their 'measures which amounted collectively to a 
blockade'.  However, during the meetings with Stalin it became clear that his real 
concern was developments in western Germany.  At the second one he said: 'But 
don't forget, I'm not making this a condition, but I do attach great importance to your 
either stopping, as I would like it, or anyway slowing down the building-up of the 
West German administration'.  Roberts contended that Stalin did not believe that he 
could drive the Western Powers from Berlin.
17
  This assessment is relevant when the 
low level of Soviet interference with the Airlift is considered in Chapter 5. 
Between the 14 and 25 September 1948, after the breakdown of the Military 
Governors' discussions, notes were exchanged unproductively between the Western 
Powers and the Soviets.
18
  On the 29
th
 the American, British and French 
Governments asked the Secretary General of the UN to have the Security Council 
consider the 'threat to peace' that had arisen in Berlin.  The Council agreed to put it 
on its agenda on 5 October in spite of strong Soviet protestations that the matter 
should be referred to the Council of Ministers instead.  The Soviets then refused to 
take part.
19
  On 22 October the six 'neutral members' put forward a resolution to end 
the blockade which the Soviets vetoed on the 25
th
.
20
  The UN continued and on 30 
October gained Soviet collaboration to participate with a committee of technical 
experts from the six neutrals to formulate the technical details needed for the east 
mark to become the sole Berlin currency.
21
   
As the committee started work the formation of the 'Staatsoper' Magistrat on 30 
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November 1948 split local government in the City and changed the stance of the 
Western Powers.
22
  On 3 January 1949 the committee of neutral technical experts 
submitted its report to the four Powers.  The USA submitted a counterproposal that 
placed control of the east mark in the western sectors solely in American, British and 
French hands.  The Soviets rejected the counterproposal and accepted the 
committee's report only with major amendments, whilst the Western Powers rejected 
the report.
23
  On 3 February 1949 the Americans indicated they were laying aside the 
Moscow Agreement (which in propaganda terms had been a millstone from the 
start).  The Western Powers' position had become that the B-mark would circulate in 
the western sectors until a single city administration was restored.
24
  On 11 February 
1949 the committee of neutral technical experts informed the Security Council that 
further work to resolve the Berlin issue did not seem productive currently.  The west 
mark finally replaced the B-mark on 20 March 1949.
25
 
On 31 January 1949 Stalin replied to questions submitted by American journalist J. 
Kingsbury-Smith stating his conditions for ending the blockade and making no 
reference to the currency issue.
26
  Secretary of State Dean Acheson instructed Dr 
Phillip Jessup (US Deputy Representative to UN Security Council) to take soundings 
with Yacob Malik (Soviet Representative to UN Security Council).
27
  This occurred 
on 15 February 1949 but it was not until 15 March that they met again when Malik 
confirmed that the omission was not accidental.
28
  On the 21
st
 Malik proposed 
linking a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers with the lifting of the 
blockade.  Malik would not agree to include the British and the French in their 
discussions.  Jessup therefore informed their UN representatives about what was 
taking place.
29
  At the 5, 11 and 13 April meetings Malik manoeuvred to couple 
developments for a West Germany state and the Council of Ministers meeting but 
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was firmly rebuffed; each would proceed at its own speed.  Moreover, Jessup was 
unwilling to agree a date for the Council's meeting or discuss the agenda.  (No doubt 
this firming of position by the Americans reflected stiffening injected by Bevin who 
had concerns about Soviet motives, particularly attempts to interfere with the 
creation of West Germany and NATO
30
).  At those meetings and ones on 27 and 29 
April Malik still continued to baulk at expanding attendance at their discussions.
31
   
Nevertheless, on 5 May 1949 all Four Powers issued the following official statement:  
The Governments of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States have reached the following 
agreement:  
1.   All the restrictions imposed since March 1, 1948, by the Government of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on communications, transportation, 
and trade between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany and between the 
Eastern zone and the Western zones will be removed on May 12, 1949.  
2.   All the restrictions imposed since March 1, 1948, by the Governments of 
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, or anyone of them, on 
communications, transportation, and trade between Berlin and the Eastern 
zone and between the Western and Eastern zones of Germany will also be 
removed on May 12, 1949.  
3.   Eleven days subsequent to the removal of the restrictions referred to in 
paragraphs one and two, namely, on May 23, 1949, a meeting of the Council 
of Foreign Ministers will be convened in Paris to consider questions relating 
to Germany and problems arising out of the situation in Berlin, including also 
the question of currency in Berlin.
32
  
The Americans and the British should have been able to start running down their 
Airlift operation after the Blockade was lifted on the 12 May 1949 but inevitably the 
transition from blockade to open access did not go smoothly.  The Airlift had to 
continue to build up stocks and to counter continued Soviet restrictions and 
harassment of military and civil road, rail and waterway traffic, 'a state of semi-
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blockade'.
33
  On 22 May 1949 the problems with surface transport were made worse 
when the western sectors trades union led a strike of Berlin's railway workers with 
the objective of having wages being paid in full in west marks.  (At the time the east 
mark was worth between
 
a third and a fifth of a west mark).  Resolving the strike was 
not helped by the Reichsbahn Directorate being controlled by the Soviet Military 
Administration and being willing only to negotiate with the communist-run union.  
The strike, which Bevin viewed as 'over-ambitious claims', adversely affected 
resupply; helped force the expensive Airlift to continue, and provided the Soviets 
with camouflage for its semi-blockade.  After two ballots and pressure from the 
western sectors Magistrat and the western Commandants, a kind of normality 
returned to the railways at the start of July.  Rundown of the Airlift started after the 
strike ended continuing between12 July 1949 and 6 October 1949.
34
  West Berlin 
would remain vulnerable to blockade, of course, until Germany was reunited and so 
the three Western Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany had to maintain 
contingency plans for further airlifts.
35
 
The American, British and French did not have the resources to stay in Berlin 
without the support of the western Berliners, even assuming that they had the 
political will to try.  Tegel airfield was built during the Blockade using 17,000 
labourers, over half of whom were women, and the 'stevedores' off-loading the 
aircraft were western Berliners.
36
  Reuter said (in translation): 'People of this world 
… look upon this city and see that you should not and cannot abandon this city and 
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this people!'.
37
  Davison suggested that 'Berliners support the Western powers; West 
Germans must support their fellow nationals in Berlin; therefore, West Germans 
should support the Western Powers'.
38
  It was slightly more complicated than that.  
The stance that the western Berliners took and the commitment of the Americans and 
British to breaking the blockade persuaded sceptical German politicians to go on 
with the creation of a Federal Republic aligned to the Western Bloc within a divided 
Germany, developments which in turn helped to support morale in western and then 
West Berlin.
39
  
Opposition existed to Soviet domination before the blockade but Davison's 'The Man 
in the [western Berlin] street' was hesitant about openly causing offence.
40
  In his 
research Davison used the 300 essays submitted to Der Abend in 1951 describing life 
during the blockade.
41
  Twenty five essayists attributed their anti-Soviet attitudes to 
incidents when Berlin was captured and 47 to experiences during the Blockade.  
Others cited occurrences in the Eastern Zone or general experiences with the 
Soviets.
42
  Davison also referred to a UNESCO sponsored poll of 644 western 
Berliners taken in August 1948 which found that at 79% the Russians were the least 
popular foreigners.
43
   
That the Berliners were prepared to oppose the Soviets
44
 was, however, surprising 
given that the US Military Government's Opinion Survey Branch found only 45% of 
a sampled population in July 1948 believed that the Airlift would be adequate during 
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the winter.
45
  Moreover, those with 9 or more years education were more pessimistic 
than those with less (49% to 38%).
46
  Sixty seven Der Abend competition essayists 
mentioned what their 'expectations during the first few days' had been.
47
  Thirty two 
expected the Airlift to fail and only 11 thought it would succeed.  Although opting 
for the Western Powers, the citizens were not naive and did not believe that the 
Airlift was mounted altruistically for their welfare, nor did it mean that there was no 
criticism of the occupation personnel, which was usually centred on the disparity 
between the conditions endured by each group during the Blockade.
48
   
From June until September 1948, the Airlift was intended to deliver supplies until 
normal surface communications were re-established.  Cargoes were sufficient to 
satisfy a 'relatively low-level existence for a short time'.  From October 1948 to the 
start of March 1949, it became the means to survive the winter 'without considerable 
hardship to the civilian population'.  This period was especially challenging to both 
the Airlift and the western Berliners as insufficient stocks had been built up before 
the Blockade started.  Thereafter, the Airlift supplied the population and built up 
stocks for the winter of 1949/50.
49
  The long term plans recognized that the western 
Berliners could not be expected to accept 'the emergency levels' supplied to date and 
improvements were needed to the monotony of the rations and the provision of 
electricity, gas, transport and industrial raw materials.
50
  In the event, the period from 
the lifting of the Blockade in May until the early October 1949 constituted a fourth 
phase.
51
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The effort committed by the Americans and the British and the Airlift's growing 
success increased the opposition of the western Berliners to the Soviets.
52
  In terms 
of "hearts and minds", however, one noticeable failing was that although the 
American and British Governments gradually became reconciled to paying most 
Airlift costs they neither discussed the subject with western Berlin's leaders nor 
informed them of the decision thus leaving them to worry about eventual payment.
53
  
The Magistrat and other German enterprises and organizations were especially 
sensitive about money as the Soviets had blocked their deposits in Stadtkontor (the 
city's communist-controlled central bank) on the 30 July 1948 and time would elapse 
before the majority of the funds were released, whilst unemployment in the western 
sectors increased outgoings and reduced income.
54
 
Chapter 3 showed that sieges resulted in reductions in rations and in the case of 
Leningrad - the only siege examined where data about the civilian population was 
recorded - that civilians suffered the most.  Davison's Der Abend research identified 
72 essayists who mentioned the lack of electricity and that mainly for heating; 69 the 
lack of fuel again mainly for heating, and 35 the lack of or the dullness of food.
55
  
Clearly from the Berliner's view point coal and food were the priority cargoes.
56
  The 
Airlift hauled 1,586,529.9 short tons of coal between its start and the end of 
September 1949.
57
  This, however, was insufficient to meet the various purposes for 
which it was used in the 1940s including heating, electricity generation and town gas 
production.  Electricity and gas were used for cooking, lighting and heating; 90% of 
domestic cooking had been done by gas and it became rationed.
58
  
The Berliners suffered the shortfall as the essayists recorded.
59
  They were living in 
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crowded domestic accommodation, often war-damaged with little repair.60  During the 
winter of 1948-49 only 12.5 kg of coal were allocated to each household and a small 
wood ration (mainly newly felled).  Even with what could be scavenged in this 4th winter 
of post war deprivation, acquired from the Eastern Zone or bought in the black-market, 
most western Berliner's domestic accommodation was unheated.61  Indeed as Chapters 5 
and 6 reveal, had the Berlin winter of 1948-1949 not been exceptionally mild the Airlift 
could well have failed through lack of coal for domestic heating.62   
The Blockade was not just a physical embargo on movement.  On 24 June electrical 
power supplied from the Soviet Sector was affected and next day the supply of brown 
coal to the western sectors ceased.  Eastern Zone supplied food (including babies' milk) 
was distributed only in the Soviet Sector.63  On the 25 June there was a Soviet inspired 
rumour that the water system would fail.  Fortunately this was quietened before 
excessive demand filling baths and other containers meant that it did.  Stone mentioned 
that turning off the water supply was an option open to the Soviets that they chose not to 
adopt whilst a 1950 Western report suggested this might have been possible.64   
The problem with the supply of electricity lay not only with insufficient coal and liquid 
fuel (which was burnt in increasing quantities during the blockade65) but in the 
availability of power stations.  The Berlin West power station in the British sector had 
supplied a quarter of the city's electricity but had been destroyed by Soviet pillaging 
before the Americans and the British had been allowed in to the City.66  The failure to 
achieve a quadripartite agreement to rebuild it or for the British to do so unilaterally 
before the blockade meant that western Berlin had only eight small 'obsolete' power 
stations and had to rely on supplies from the Eastern Zone which, with few exceptions, 
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ceased during the Blockade.67  Essential electricity supplies were augmented to a limited 
degree by small oil burning generators.  The RAF flew in over 200 but most of these 
would have been for the use of the occupying powers.68   
Mention is made of inadequacies but this should be measured against the shortage of 
food across the whole of Germany that was described in Chapter 2.  The rations at the 
start of the blockade were those inherited from earlier Kommandatura agreements and 
applied across the city; see Table 2.1 above.  Thereafter those in the Soviet Sector 
differed from the other parts of the city.  Table 4.1 displays the new ones that were 
introduced for the western Berliners on 1 November 1948 and for comparison that 
pertaining in the Soviet Sector at that time.69  BAFO statistics record 485,501 short tons 
of food were carried by the Airlift between June 1948 and the end of May 1949.70 
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Table 4.1:  Daily Food Ration from 1 November 1948 
_____________________________________________________________ 
67
  Barker, pp. 10, 38; TNA, AIR 25/1273, No. 46 Gp. ORB Appendices, App. 86, 17 April 
1949; Tusas, pp. 104-5, 141, 145.  There were examples of sharing power supplies for 
mutual benefit.  The S-bahn was kept running by Soviet electricity - Tusas, p. 193.  The 
Soviet sector supplied electricity to RAF Gatow whilst the British sector supplied the Soviet 
airfield at Staaken (Dalgow) and the Radio Berlin building - Barker, p. 55. 
68
  Barker, pp. 37-38.  
69
  Anon, 'A special study of Operation "Vittles": the story of the Berlin Airlift', Aviation 
Operations Magazine, Vol.11, No. 5 (Conover-Mast Publications, April 1949) p. 14; Control 
Commission, Notes, pp. 19-20; Davison, pp. 142-3. 
70
  AP3257, p. 521. 
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In the western sectors, blood donors, the chronically ill, diabetics, nursing mothers, 
and the elderly received supplementary rations.
71
  Vitamin C tablets had to be issued 
as the supply of vitamin-rich fresh vegetables was controlled throughout the Airlift 
and quotas were small, whilst much of the wheat came from Canada and lacked 
sufficient vitamins.
72
  Nourishment was imperative to the western Berliners whilst 
tonnage was to the Airlift.  Table 4.2 indicates what was needed daily to satisfy the 
ration in November 1948.
73
 
Product Short 
tons 
Product Short 
tons 
Product Short 
tons 
Flour and Wheat 646 Meat and Fish 109 Coffee 11 
Potatoes 180 Sugar 85 Cheese 10 
Vegetables 144 Fats 64 Whole dried 
milk 
5 
Cereals 125 Skimmed dried 
milk 
38 
Salt 19 Yeast 3 
TOTAL 1,439 short tons 
 
Table 4.2:  Tons of Food needed daily by western Berlin in November 1948 
Appendix 1, describing Leningrad, showed the gap that could appear between the 
official ration and what was actually available.  Simon in 'The Berliners' Daily Grind' 
wrote that that even 'the basic foodstuffs were often in short supply' and the quotas 
given in Tables 2.1 and 4.1 represented the maximum daily allowances but did not 
guarantee what was available.
74
  Arnold-Forster - a journalist in blockaded Berlin 
and writing in the 1970s - placed great emphasis on the supply side of the rationing 
system working 'very well' and without the 'despair and insecurity' of systems that 
_____________________________________________________________ 
71
  Mark Arnold-Forster, The Siege of Berlin (London: Collins, 1979) p. 82. 
72
  TNA, T 236/1026, E.66 FO (German Section) No. 141 Basic 10 January 1949; Tusas, pp. 
239, 241. 
73
  Anon, 'A special study of Operation "Vittles"', pp. 13-14 'Daily Food for Berlin'.  
74
  Horst Simon, 'The Berliners' Daily Grind', 60th Anniversary Of The Berlin Airlift: The 
First Battle Of The Cold War May 1948 – June 1949 (Berlin: The Cold War Museum – 
Berlin Chapter, 2007) <www.coldwar.org/BerlinChapter> [accessed 1 February 2011].  'The 
Berliners' Daily Grind' was written by an author whose credence cannot be established. 
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failed to deliver.
75
  In addition to the formal ration allowances, small aid packages, 
such as those from the Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe (CARE), 
were distributed in limited quantities being hauled into the City by air.
76
  For those 
seeking additional foods and who had something to trade, there was either the black 
market or trips on packed trains outside Berlin - part of the porous aspect of the 
blockade - with the risk of confiscation by Soviet or eastern German officials.  An 
estimated 500,000 tons was acquired from the east during the Blockade, part of 
which would have been food but such food was not distributed equitably.  The black 
markets in Berlin and western Germany increased the theft of goods from the Airlift 
stores and during transportation.
77
  
Food was dull and monotonous with the content determined by factors such as what 
was available on the world market - hence the absence of fats in the ration - or in 
military stores - the source of POM
78
; the absence of refrigeration resulted in 
processed meat and much powdered egg; the need to minimise weight resulted, for 
example, in dehydrated vegetables and powdered milk; the limited fuel available for 
preparation in Berlin prevented nourishing tasty dishes such as pea soups, and the 
necessity to avoid returning containers affected the kinds of fish that could be 
brought in.
79
  There were, however, positives too.  Weight considerations meant that 
bread was baked locally (although wheat bread rather than the Berliners' preference, 
_____________________________________________________________ 
75
  Arnold-Forster, p. 82. 
76
  'GRF', 'Candy From Heaven', insert to 'Berlin 1948-1948 Edition', in Armed Forces 
Journal International, ed. by John Roos, (Maclean VA: May 1998) pp. 22-23; For example: 
Roger G. Miller, To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948-1949 (College Station, TX: Texas 
A&M University Press, 2000) p. 77; John Provan and R.E.G. Davies, Berlin Airlift: The 
Effort and the Aircraft (McLean VA: Paladwr Press, 1998) p. 60; Tusas, p. 269. 
77
  Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, p. 165; Davison, pp. 196-8, 314; Elizabeth S. Lay, 
Historical Division, Headquarters European Command, 'The Berlin Airlift: Part 2: 1 January-
30 September 1949', Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1948 -1949, (Karlsruhe: 1952) pp. 
27-28, 50-51, 155; Miller, To Save a City (Texas A&M) pp. 52-54 (pp. 53-54 for 500,000 
ton figure); USNA, Record Group 319, Army Staff, Plans and Operations Division, Decimal 
File 1946-1948, Box 118, Military Governor for Germany (US) 'Is Berlin Blockaded?' 23 
October 1948 provided a comprehensive description to show the porous nature of the 
Blockade up to that point. 
78
  'POM' was one of the more popular dehydrated foods - Davison, p. 324. 
79
  AP3257, p. 304; Arnold-Forster, p. 82; Davison, pp. 313-314; Simon, 'The Berliners' 
Daily Grind'; Tusas, The Berlin Airlift, pp. 239-242. 
 121 
rye) and cheese and jam were introduced into the ration.
80
  
In spite of the negative aspects of Airlift rations, the response to the 19 July 1948 
food offer by the Council of Ministers of the USSR to all Berliners was a dismal 
failure.  This was probably because when the details were announced on 25
th
 it 
involved registering in the Soviet Sector and the western Berliners were well aware 
of the real conditions in the east.
81
  The contemporaneous Notes on the Blockade of 
Berlin stated that 2,032,631 western Berliners drew rations in the western sectors and 
86,000 in the Soviet Sector.
82
  The Notes analysed the latter figure and speculated 
that 11,000 of these were individuals who lived on the border of a western sector 
where the Soviets had arbitrarily undertaken to supply rations and a further 15,000 
lived in the west but worked in the east and so it was a matter of convenience to 
continue to shop there.  Others lived in a western sector but continued to deal with 
the near-by shops they had traditionally used which since the war were in the east.
83
  
Finally, there was the question of money which was not directly discussed in the 
Notes analysis.  Owing to the rate of exchange (3.2 to 1 by the end of August 1948) it 
would have been financially attractive for those whose income was in east marks to 
buy in the Soviet Sector.
84
 
Food was not the only commodity the western Berliners needed.  The October 1948 
column of Table 4.3 shows their element of the newly set daily Airlift target of 5,620 
short tons.
85
  The May 1949 column is the forecasted requirement for western 
Berliners based on CALTF's expectation that on average across the month a total of 
7,370 short tons per day would be available to airlift.
86
  Charlesby's average daily 
_____________________________________________________________ 
80
  Control Commission, Notes, pp. 19-20; Davison, pp. 313-314; Tusas, pp. 239-242.  
Barker, p. 10 recorded that in 'airspace' terms real coffee was 'cheaper' than the fuel to 
manufacture the ersatz variety. 
81
  Davison, pp. 165-166; Tusas, p. 192. 
82
  Control Commission, Notes, p. 17.  Davison, p. 167 suggested 86,000 may have been a 
maximum figure and that by the year's end Magistrat figures indicated 85,000 albeit this was 
a growth from the 19,000 cited in the Tagesspiegel as registered in the east by 4 August 
1948. 
83
  Davison, p. 167; Control Commission, Notes, p. 17. 
84
  Davison, pp. 166, 317-318. 
85
  AP3257, p. 301. 
86
  AP3257, p. 65. 
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figures for December 1948 through February 1949 were slightly larger totalling 
5,179 short tons as against 4827 tons in Table 4.3.  The difference was almost 
entirely coal.  Even then, Charlesby found that the average daily shortfall during the 
period was 16% which had to be met from the stocks built up prior to the Blockade.
87
  
His analysis is examined further in Chapter 6 when addressing how close the Airlift 
came to not succeeding during the winter of 1948-1949.   
 20 October 1948 May 1949 
Food 1435 1800 
Coal 3084 4006 
Commerce, industrial and medical supplies 257 280 
Newsprint 35 38 
Liquid fuel 16 440 
Total in short tons 4827 6564 
 
Table 4.3:  Daily Airlift Allocation to western Berliners 
When the German requirements are compared with the needs of the Americans, 
British and French, the full magnitude of supplying the western Berliners becomes 
apparent.  In May 1949, for example, 89% of the daily requirement was for the 
western Berliners.
88
  It was not charity; it was the price that had to be paid to retain 
the status quo in Berlin.   
To conclude, the blockade was lifted by negotiation.  It was achieved without the 
Western powers having to quit Berlin, modify their currency reform or their 
intentions for western Germany to form a separate independent nation within the 
Western Bloc.  The resolve of the western Berliners, the Americans and British in 
countering the blockade by the Airlift gave momentum to both the creation of the 
Federal Republic and NATO.  However, negotiation took far longer than the Western 
powers had hoped for originally; was confused at times, and whilst delivering a 
bridgehead in East Germany, the issue of secure access had not been resolved.  The 
western Berliners' opposition to the Soviets and their commitment to the West was 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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  AP3257, p. 367. 
88
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dependant on the Airlift's success and the staunchness of the Western powers to 
Soviet aggression.  The need to retain western Berliner support has to be recognized 
when deciding if the Americans could have replaced the British.   
 124 
CHAPTER 5: 
BERLIN AIRLIFT - KEY SUCCESS FACTORS 
The Berlin Airlift presented a challenge that was far beyond any previous airbridge.  
A CALTF post-operational Report described its mission as: 'To supply the island of 
[western] Berlin with the necessities of life by air'
1
; Barker wrote that 'It is almost 
incredibly difficult …… to direct a stream of aircraft into and away from a single 
airfield, with a frequency nearly equal to that of Underground trains using one 
platform of Piccadilly station in the rush hour'
2
, and Air Clues published that 'One of 
the main objects of the Operation was to achieve maximum utilization of aircraft: 
the intensity of flying was far higher than in any other unit of the Air Force.  It was 
essential to account for every minute of aircraft time.'
3
 
As recorded in Chapter 3, Tunner concluded that Stalingrad was 'hampered by' too 
many aircraft; too few airfields; insufficient aircraft maintenance, and a lack of 
know-how.  Morzik's reasons for the failure additionally included the loss of the 
airfields and the inability to protect the air transports from Soviet attack.  One way 
to reduce aircraft numbers would have been by using homogeneous robust cargo 
carriers hauling large loads, whilst another would have involved reducing aircraft 
turn round times.  High utilization meant having sufficient aircrews to allow every 
serviceable, loaded aircraft to takeoff immediately it became available.  In Russia, as 
in northern Europe, it also involved maintaining high sortie rates in adverse weather.  
Fast turn rounds depended on efficient ground operations.  Lack of know-how linked 
with another theme present throughout Chapter 3, an efficient, experienced chain of 
command.  None of these factors were individually the recipe for success; a 
balanced integration was required which again emphasizes know-how and 
command.   
_____________________________________________________________ 
1
  HQ BAFO, AP3257 A Report on Operation PLAINFARE (The Berlin Airlift) 25
th
 June 
1948 - 6
th
 October 1949 (Bielefeld: Control Commission, 1950) p. 281.  A variant: 'To 
supply the island of Berlin through three air corridors with the necessities of life' - AFHRA, 
IRISNUM 241477, 'Briefing for Mr Symington and party December 24 1948'. 
2
  Dudley Barker, Berlin Airlift: An Account of the British Contribution (London: HMSO, 
1949) p. 6. 
3
  AM, RAF Air Clues, Vol. 3, No. 12, August 1949, p. 23. 
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Chapter 5 records what was found during the research into the Airlift's command 
structure, aircraft generation, airfields, freight handling and Soviet harassment.  
Aircraft generation identifies the types, the numbers deployed, their distribution, and 
relevant performance considerations.  It considers maintenance and manning levels, 
both on the ground and in the air.  Chapter 5's emphasis is on the RAF and the 
British Civil Lift.  The aim is to understand how these success factors were 
implemented during the Airlift and how they affected it as a precursor to the 
analyses in Chapter 6.  Without an understanding of how the Airlift operated, the 
implications of scenario changes such as the relocation of American aircraft cannot 
be established and the potential amendments to the Airlift system and its 
infrastructure cannot be identified and examined.  The same success factors are used 
to detect differences between the Americans and the British thereby determining if 
the latter's lower performance arose from reasons beyond Barker's aircraft numbers 
and sizes.   
AIRLIFT COMMAND 
The Berlin Airlift's Combined Airlift Task Force Headquarters [HQ CALTF], and 
thus its constituents 1
st
 [US] Airlift Task Force [1
st
 ALTF] and Number 46 Group 
RAF [No. 46 Gp.], did not operate under the command of the national transport 
specialists (the American Military Air Transport Service and the British Transport 
Command
4
) but reported to the local organizations, Headquarters United States Air 
_____________________________________________________________ 
4
  Transport Command was formed on 25 March 1943 from Ferry Command which itself 
was created on 20 July 1941.  Its role post war had been scheduled passenger and priority 
freight movements; communications flights; preplanned movement of units; training for 
Airborne assault units, and aircraft ferrying - M. B. Barrass, 'RAF Home Commands formed 
between 1939 - 1957', Air of Authority - A History of RAF Organisation <www.rafweb.org/ 
Cmd_H3A.htm> [accessed 12 June 2012]; TNA: AIR 24/2046-2050, T C ORBs and 
Appendices 1948-49.  At the time Transport Command was the most junior RAF Command 
- 'Orion (1949)', 'The Berlin Airlift: Operation PLAINFARE', Journal of the Royal United 
Service Institution, 94: 573, February 1949, pp. 82-86. 
Military Air Transport Service (MATS) was even newer having been formed from the 
USAF Air Transport Command and the Naval Air Transport Service on 1 June 1948.  At the 
time of the Berlin Airlift MATS did not include Troop Carrier units.  Its origins too were in 
ferrying, Air Corps Ferrying Command created on 29 May 1941 - AFHRA, 'Military Airlift 
Command', Fact Sheet <www.afhra.af.mil/factsheets/ factsheet.asp?id=12476, posted 
'5/21/2008'>; Herman S. Wolk, USAF Historian, Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air 
Force 1943-1947 (Washington DC: US Government, 1984) pp. vii, 31, 70, 179, 220-221, 
231. 
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Forces in Europe [HQ USAFE] and Headquarters British Air Forces of Occupation 
(Germany) [HQ BAFO].  These had evolved from wartime tactical air forces.  They 
were involved mainly with occupation duties and lacked core competence in air 
transport operations.
5
  The local higher formations "owned" the infrastructure from 
which the Airlift operated and had extant channels of communication with the local 
army Commands and the civilian occupation organizations that were essential to the 
wider operation.
6
   
The Americans appointed USAF Major General William Tunner, who had airbridge 
experience, as its operational commander but his and MATS [US Department of 
Defense Military Air Transport Service]'s expertise were constrained by the 
reporting chain through HQ USAFE - described by Tunner as 'an unsympathetic 
command'.  Tunner arrived with his selected team of ex-Hump specialists.
7
  The 
RAF appointed Air Commodore John Merer who was Air Officer Commanding of 
one of the involved Transport Command groups.  He had held that post for nine 
months, but otherwise had no experience of commanding air transport.
8
  Figure 5.1 
displays the British Airlift command, control and coordination structure whilst 
Figure 5.2 identifies the personalities and their experience thereby emphasizing the 
general lack of air supply experience in the upper echelons of the RAF.
9
  
_____________________________________________________________ 
5
  AP3257, App. B; Roger G. Miller, To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948-1949 (College 
Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2000) pp. 66 citing Gp Capt K. B. B. Cross, 96-
98.  TNA, AIR 24/1821, Charlewood 1 April 1949 revealed that aside from the Berlin 
Airlift fleets, HQ BAFO comprised 10 squadrons of twin and single engined aircraft fighter 
and fighter bombers (128 aircraft) at two stations plus a few Auster spotters. 
6
  AP3257; HQ USAFE, Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, 26 June 1948-30 September 
1949 (HQ Ramstein AFB: USAFE reproduction Centre, undated, circa 1950); Elizabeth S. 
Lay, Historical Division, Headquarters European Command, 'The Berlin Airlift: Part 1: 21 
June-31 December 1948' and 'The Berlin Airlift: Part 2: 1 January-30 September 1949', 
Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1948 -1949, (Karlsruhe: 1952); TNA: AIR 20/7148, 
AM Conference 25 October 1948 including Appendix A; AIR 20/7824, Waite 11 March 
1949 - reorganization in Berlin; AIR 38/310, Merer 22 October 1948. 
7
 Anon, 'Hump and Lift - twin Triumphs of Air Transport', The Task Force Times, 26 March 
1949; Miller, To Save a City (Texas A&M) pp. 89-90, 95-99; William H. Tunner, Over the 
Hump (Washington DC, US Government, 1985) pp. 162-165, 197 (latter for quotation). 
8
  M. B. Barrass, 'Air Vice Marshal J W F Merer (07250)', Air of Authority - A History of 
RAF Organisation <www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Merer.htm> [accessed 2 February 2012].  
Further details about Merer are given below after Figure 5.2. 
9
  Compiled from: AM, The Air Force List, various, 1947-1950 (London: HMSO, 1947-
1950); Anon, various 'Service Aviation: Royal Air Force and Naval Air Arm News and 
Footnote continues on next page. 
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Figure 5.1:  British Command, Control and Coordination 
                                                                                                                           
Announcements', Flight, (Flightglobal archives) <www.flightglobal.com/ pdfarchive/ 
view/……..> [accessed various]; AP3257, pp. 7-11, 66-67, 153, App. B; M. B. Barrass, Air 
of Authority - A History of RAF Organisation <www.rafweb.org./Cdrs_Alp_ind.htm and 
www.rafweb.org/Biographies/.....> [accessed 2010-2012]; Liddell Hart Centre for Military 
Archives, King's College London Survey of the Papers of Senior UK Defence Personnel, 
1900-1975; Hilary St George Saunders, 'Volume III: The Fight is Won', Royal Air Force 
1939–1945 (London: HMSO, 1954) p. 343; TNA: AIR 2/10064, AM AX2431 1 April 1949; 
AIR 24/1806, 'Brief Resumé of BAFO Command', October 1948; Herbert Weaver, 'Chapter. 
14 The Pattern of India-Burma Operations, 1943', in The Army Air Forces in World War II 
Volume IV: The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan August 1942 to July 1944: 4. China-
Burma-India, ed. by Wesley Frank and James Lea Cate (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1950) p. 461.  
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Air Ministry 
Chief of the Air Staff [CAS]:   MRAF Lord Tedder – wartime 
experience tactical air power; deputy to Eisenhower 
| 
| 
Vice Chief of the Air Staff [VCAS]:   1
st
 Air Mshl Sir James 
Robb - wartime experience in bomber, reconnaissance, 
tactical air power; 2
nd
 Air Mshl Sir Arthur Sanders – wartime 
experience primarily HQ Bomber Command, ex-AOC-in-C 
BAFO (in its occupation role and early Airlift involvement) 
| 
| 
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff [DCAS]:   Air Mshl Sir Hugh 
Walmsley – wartime experience almost entirely in Bomber 
Command.  Post-war: Air Officer, Transport Command, 
South East Asia for two months in 1946 before becoming Air 
Officer Administration Air Headquarters India 
| 
| 
ACAS(Ops):   1st AVM Hardman; 2nd AVM Guest – 
wartime experience of both, command of air transport South 
East Asia 
| 
| 
Deputy Director of Air Support and Transport Operations 
[DDASTO]:   Gp Capt Rainsford – wartime experience 
bombers in North Africa and North West Europe; post war: 
Headquarters Transport Command and as a civil servant in the 
Ministry of Civil Aviation  
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British Air Forces of Occupation 
Air Officer Commanding in Chief, :1
st
 Air Mshl Sir Arthur Sanders 
– see VCAS above; 2nd Air Mshl Thomas Williams - for experience 
see below 
| 
Air Officer Commanding No. 46 Gp. RAF and Deputy 
Commander CALTF: Air Cdre John Merer - for experience 
see below 
Transport Command 
AOC-in-C Transport Command from 1947 Air Mshl Sir Brian 
Baker - wartime experience mainly in Coastal Command not 
air transport 
Figure 5.2:  RAF Personalities involved in Command, Control and 
Coordination 
Williams's wartime experience was initially in Bomber Command followed by 2-star 
appointments between January 1942 and July 1944 in South East Asia.  On 1 August 
1944 he became ACAS(Ops).  For much of his time in India resources were limited 
and the aircraft types that were available were operationally obsolete in Europe.  He 
would have returned to the UK with broad if limited experience in most facets of air 
power including tactical air support.  He would have had a general appreciation of 
the potential and challenges of air supply but had not commanded major air supply 
operations unlike Tunner, Hardman and Brigadier General William Old (CG Troop 
Carrier Command).  He had worked with and for Americans and had been assistant 
commander of Eastern Air Command.
10
  In a locally produced 'Personalities' 
_____________________________________________________________ 
10
  Compiled from: AHB, The Campaigns in the Far East: Volume V: Air Supply Operations 
in Burma 1942-1945 (first draft May 1949) Chaps. 1-2, and Chap. 5; Liddell Hart Centre for 
Military Archives, King's College London, Survey of the Papers of Senior UK Defence 
Personnel, 1900-1975; Saunders, The Fight is Won, Chaps. XIV-XV; TNA: AIR 2/5665, 
Air Mshl Sir John Baldwin, Bengal Command 15 November - 17 December 1943 p. 3; AIR 
23/2077, Organization Chart of Eastern Air Command Enclosure 1 to General Order 1; AIR 
23/4683, Despatch on Air Operations in Bengal Command covering the period January 1st 
to June 20th, 1943 by AVM Williams August 1943; AIR23/4684, Despatch on Air 
Operations in Bengal Command covering the period June 21st to November 15th 1943 by 
Footnote continues on next page. 
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pamphlet he was described as the 'ambassador of the RAF/USAAF integration of 
this theater'.
11
   
Post-war he remained as ACAS(Ops) before becoming Commandant of the RAF 
Staff College, Bracknell in 1947 and AOC-in-C BAFO in October 1948.
12
  BAFO's 
regular operational role was tactical air support.  Britain was the smaller partner in 
the Anglo-American Berlin Airlift coalition.  His varied experience made Williams a 
balanced choice as the new AOC-in-C BAFO.  The Air Ministry progressively 
sidelined HQ Transport Command during Operation PLAINFARE until on 5 May 
1949 DCAS wrote to the AOC-in-C that 'In conclusion I am to reiterate that the 
primary task of your Command is to provide the C.-in-C., B.A.F.O., with sufficient 
number of adequately trained crews and aircraft in the agreed proportion to deliver a 
minimum daily average of one thousand tons into Berlin'.
13
  By then Williams had 
gained seven months experience commanding BAFO.   
Merer's wartime experience was at HQ RAF Middle East between 1939-1942; 
Deputy Head of Plans British Joint Staff Mission USA 1942-1944, then Officer 
Commanding RAF Scampton, and finally AOC, No 56 Base, RAF Syerston.  
Between 1945 and 1947 he was Director of Allied Co-operation and Foreign Liaison 
at the Air Ministry before becoming AOC No. 46 Group, a Transport Command 
Group, in 1947.  Group Captain Noel Hyde, a Transport Command station 
commander, was the Officer Commanding Transport Force before Merer took 
command (and subsequently became senior permanent RAF representative at HQ 
CALTF).  His wartime experience was in Bomber Command (before becoming a 
prisoner of war in 1941).
14
 
                                                                                                                           
AVM Williams December 1943; AIR 24/178, Eastern Air Command Personalities: First 
Anniversary. 
11
  TNA, AIR 24/178, Eastern Air Command Personalities: First Anniversary. 
12
  Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College London, Survey of the Papers 
of Senior UK Defence Personnel, 1900-1975. 
13
  TNA, AIR 2/10064, E.28 ACAS (Ops) CMS.1066/48 1 December 1949 and E.193 
Walmsley 5 May 1949 (for quotation). 
14
  AP3257, pp. 128-129, 273; M. B. Barrass, Air of Authority - A History of RAF 
Organisation <www.rafweb.org/Biographies/..... for 'Hyde' and 'Merer'> [accessed on 
Footnote continues on next page. 
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The prevalence of senior RAF officers with a bomber background is not considered 
to be a reflection of "pecking orders" within air forces
15
 but arose because of the 
large number of Air Officers that Bomber Command produced for whom 
appointments were needed post-war.  Nevertheless, the RAF failed to apply one of 
the fundamental success factors which had become apparent in the Second World 
War precedents, namely that command of the operation should be allocated to a 
small specialist unit which reported to a single higher authority that had air transport 
competence.  That it deployed Headquarters No. 46 Group to Germany helped but, 
as Chapter 3 showed, RAF post war air transport was routine and significantly 
different from intensive operations such as the Hump, Imphal and the subsequent 
liberation of Burma. 
The relationship between CALTF and No. 46 Gp. was one of coordination of traffic 
arrangements rather than true command.
16
  HQ CALTF was not truly a joint 
headquarters as its American element also commanded 1
st
 ALTF.  HQ No. 46 Group 
was short of staff officers to fill its own posts without meeting Tunner's 
requirements at a headquarters based at Wiesbaden Air Force Base [AFB] in the 
Southern Zone.
17
  (Canon was adamant that relocation of HQ CALTF to the 
Northern Zone was unacceptable
18
).  No. 46 Group HQ and the prime real estate for 
the airlift - as is examined below and in Chapter 6 - lay in the Northern [British] 
Zone of Occupation.
19
  At air task force level, BAFO recognized in AP3257 that 
from the British viewpoint HQ CALTF had not developed as had been anticipated 
and that it was inefficient.
20
  The complexity of the wider "direction" of the Airlift is 
                                                                                                                           
multiple occasions 2012-2013]; Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College 
London, Survey of the Papers of Senior UK Defence Personnel, 1900-1975; Tunner, p. 210. 
15
  Laura L. Lenderman, 'The Rise of Air Mobility and Its Generals', Drew Paper No. 1 (Air 
Force Research Institute, Air University Maxwell AFB, 2008) p. 68. 
16
  AP3257, pp. 9-13, 153-4, 284. 
17
  AP3257, p. 10; TNA: AIR 8/2612, correspondence on 'integration' 17 to 24 September 
1948; AIR 24/1835, Operational Instruction 19/48 'Operation PLAINFARE' 1 October 
1948, Tunner 28 October 1948; AIR 55/218, Es:185-188 Merer 13 January 1949, Es:189-
190 unsigned HQ BAFO Air Staff note 13 January 1949; AIR 55/220 Es:93-95 - relevant 
pages in Baker and Williams Joint Staff paper 22 December 1949. 
18
  Tunner, p. 209. 
19
  AP3257, pp. 10, 16-17. 
20
  AP3257, p. 10. 
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pertinent throughout Chapters 5 and 6, although often in a conjectural way, for 
example when considering relocation of the American 1
st
 ALTF to the Northern 
Zone and whether an American commanding general, wedged under HQ USAFE 
and HQ BAFO, could have overcome British objections in key areas such as the 
ratios of aircrew and maintenance staff to aircraft? 
Given the many, multinational civilian and military organizations involved in the 
wider Airlift it is difficult to see how it could have functioned other than by 
cooperation and negotiation.  Those involved in the Airlift included American, 
British, French and German politicians and in Britain and the USA, civil servants 
and military officers in ministries and air force commands.  In western Germany 
there were the military governors, civil servants of the occupying authorities, 
commanders and their subordinates in the American, British and French armies, 
BAFO and USAFE.  In western Berlin the commandants and their staffs and 
American, British, French and indigenous civilian authorities participated.  Finally 
across the world there were the civilian contractors.  Figures 5.1 and 5.4 show a 
small part of this.  AP3257's diagram 'The Life Line to Berlin' dealt solely with the 
'Organization of Freight Supply'.  Nevertheless, it identified 12 organizations located 
in Germany in addition to the air forces.
21
   
AIRCRAFT GENERATION 
The RAF was the major British carrier as Table 5.1 reveals, whilst the Civil Lift 
came to specialize in the bulk transport of liquid fuels as Table 5.2 emphasizes.
22
   
_____________________________________________________________ 
21
  AP3257, pp. 66-68. 
22
  AP3257, pp. 519, 521. 
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Table 5.1:  Division of the British airlift 
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Table 5.2:  Significance of Liquid Fuels within the Civil Airlift 
The RAF airlift's average composition in Germany in 1949 is summarized in Table 
5.3.  The Avro York and Handley Page Hastings numbers remained more or less 
constant during the period whilst the Douglas Dakota population fell from 59.8 in 
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January to 45.5 in May 1949.
23
 
Type Average Daily Strength between 1 
January and 31 May 1949 
Planning Tonnage in 
Short Tons 
York 38.9 8½,  
Dakota 50.8 3½ 
Hastings 13.8 9½ 
 
Table 5.3:  RAF Airlift Force Strength 1949 
By the start of its rundown, the Civil Lift had been refined to six different aircraft 
types operating from RAF Schleswigland, RAF Wunstorf and Fuhlsbuttel civil 
airport.  All were four-engine but only the Handley Page Halifaxes and Avro 
Lancastrians (conversions of Second World War bombers) were present in double 
digit numbers and only the Avro Tudor (a "failed" civil airliner
24
) could carry 10 
short tons
25
.  The American 1
st
 ALTF was assigned 225 USAF and United States 
Navy [USN] four-engine Douglas Skymasters able to carry between 9.5 and 10 short 
tons.
26
  Numbers are indicative because strengths varied from day to day and the 
number serviceable was usually less than the on-station/base strength, for example 
the USAF had a daily average of 191.1 aircraft assigned to its operating groups 
_____________________________________________________________ 
23
  TNA: AIR 2/10064, E.329 Airlift Progress Report undated circa 15 February 1949 - 
increase in Hastings payload to permit it to haul the same as the Skymaster; AIR 55/100, 
E.30 Charlesby 22 March 1949, nine short tons 'are now under consideration for the York'; 
AIR 55/110, BAFO compiled 'RAF Form No. STATS 120 (provisional)'. 
24
  'The Tudor was built like a battleship.  It was noisy, I had no confidence in its engines 
and its systems were hopeless.  The Americans were fifty years ahead of us in systems 
engineering.  All the hydraulics, the air conditioning equipment and the recircling fans were 
crammed together underneath the floor without any thought.  There were fuel-burning 
heaters that would never work; we had the floorboards up in flight again and again.' - 
Gordon Store, BSAA chief pilot and manager of operations, quoted in Andrew (Jackman) 
Brookes, Disaster in the Air (London: Ian Allan, 1992) p. 40. 
25
  11 short tons as freighters - AP3257, p. 284. 
26
  AP3257, Part 4 and p. 284.  DO49(6) Cabinet Defence Committee note by the Minister of 
Defence dated 28 January 1949 in TNA PREM 8/990 gave 9.7 short tons for the Skymasters 
as did Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, p. 79.  Narratives in miscellaneous papers held by 
AHB cited 9.5 as is implied by the calculations quoted by Miller in To Save a City (Texas 
A&M) pp. 197-198.  Tunner, pp. 187, 197-198 recorded the same calculation but elsewhere 
used 10 tons.  In the HQ CALTF Plans Division paper of 25 June 1949 'Requirements to 
Lift 3500 tons to Berlin Daily' in TNA, AIR 38/301 it was intended to use 'stripped' 
Skymasters each hauling 11 tons. 
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between 1 January 1949 and 30 September 1949 but only 108.5 were in 
commission.
27
   
Table 5.4 compares by base airfields the RAF fleet with USAF C-54s and the two 
highly productive USN R5D squadrons for the period 1 March to 31 May 1949.  The 
table shows the RAF's under performance; the difference between USAF C-54s in 
the Northern (British) and Southern (American) Zones, and between the USN and 
the USAF at Rhein-Main Air Force Base [AFB].
28
  RAF Wunstorf was near by the 
C-54s at RAF Celle and RAF Fassberg.  Had its Yorks achieved during March, 
April and May 1949 the sortie rates of these American neighbours they would have 
delivered an extra 10 to 11.6 short tons per day per assigned aircraft into Berlin or 
up to 450 short tons.
29
  Thus in the spring and early summer of 1949 the Yorks were 
achieving about 60% of what they might have been expected to do.
30
   
_____________________________________________________________ 
27
  Department of the [US] Air Force, Operations Statistics Division, United States Air 
Force Statistical Digest Jan 1949 - Jun 1950 Fifth Edition (Washington DC: US 
Government, 1951) USAF Airlift Data, Table 207. 
28
  AFHRA, IRISNUM 241489, CALTF Statistical Summary June 1948 to 31 July 1949; 
Anon, '2 Navy Air Transport Squadrons Fly Record Loads into Berlin via Airlift', All Hands 
No. 390 (Aug. 1949); Anon, 'Navy Squadrons Lead Pack', Naval Aviation News No. 293 
(May 1949); Anon, 'Navy Wins Airlift Honors', Naval Aviation News, No. 299 November 
1949; AP3257, pp. 520, 523, 529; J. G. Barlow, USN Historian, 'The US Navy's 
Participation in the Berlin Airlift', (Naval Historical Centre DC) <www.history.navy.mil/ 
branches/org4-10.htm> [accessed 20 July 2012]; Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, pp. 5, 
15; Navy History and Heritage Command, VR-6 Historical Reports for 30 October 1948 to 
31 May 1949 and semi-annual report for 1 July to 31 December 1949; Navy History and 
Heritage Command, VR-8 Historical Report 1 July-31 December 1949 [no reports were 
issued during the Blockade]; TNA, AIR 55/110, Monthly Form STATS 120 records; USAF 
Statistical Digest Jan 1949 - Jun 1950, Table 207. 
VR-6 Historical Reports for March, April and May 1949: VR-8 out performed VR-6 in two 
of the three subject months and both did better than the USAF squadrons at Rhein-Main 
AFB.  In March VR-6 did 901 trips hauling 9161 tons.  In April VR-6 hauled 11,938.3 tons 
in 1,174 trips.  In May the VR-6 figures were 962 trips and 9847.4 tons.  VR-6 R5Ds were 
hauling 10.2 tons per delivery. 
29
  AFHRA, IRISNUM 241489, 'CALTF Statistical Summary'; AP3257, p. 523; TNA, AIR 
55/110, Monthly Form STATS 120 records. 
30
  Charlesby examined RAF performance at length coming to similar findings about under 
performance - TNA: AIR 55/98, AIR 55/99, AIR 55/100, and AIR 55/102. 
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Aircraft Type Base Gross Short Tons/ 
Aircraft at base/Day 
Trips/ Aircraft 
at base/ Day 
Dakota RAF Lubeck 4.4 1.3 
Hastings RAF Schleswigland 13.2 1.5 
York RAF Wunstorf 15.8 1.9 
C-54 RAF Celle 32 3.3 
C-54 RAF Fassberg 30.3 3.1 
Skymaster Rhein-Main AFB 28.5 2.8 
(C-54 USAF at Rhein-Main 
AFB 
27.7 2.7) 
(R5D USN at Rhein-Main
31
 31.5 3.4) 
C-54 Wiesbaden AFB 22.6 2.3 
 
Table 5.4:  Average Daily Tonnage Carried by Military Aircraft during March, 
April, May 1949 
The British terms 'strength' and 'serviceable' and the American ones 'assigned', 'on 
hand' and 'in commission' whilst similar were not the same.
 32
  After smoothing out 
the differences between RAF and USAF and using statistics for June 1949, 
Charlesby concluded that the assigned C-54s at RAF Celle and RAF Fassberg were 
flying three times more trips than the RAF Yorks based close by at RAF Wunstorf.  
Charlebury's smoothing led to inclusion of all aircraft other than RAF ones 
undergoing major overhauls at contractors, American ones in the USA for 1,000 
hour overhauls, and aircraft from both countries undergoing major repairs.  His 
figures were: C-54s at RAF Celle 41.1 and at RAF Fassberg 45.9; Yorks (in BAFO 
and the Airlift ones in Britain) 64.9, and on the same basis a total of 31 Hastings.
33
  
A summary of the differences in recorded statistics is given in Appendix 3 
"Comparison of Aircraft Utilization Data for June 1949".  Whilst the RAF's inability 
to deliver American sized tonnages was due partly to numbers of aircraft and sizes 
_____________________________________________________________ 
31
  AFHRA, IRISNUM 1038190, Lt Gen Rawlings (Comptroller USAF) 27 January 1949, 
recorded that the payload of the R5D was potentially 1,500lbs greater than the C-54. 
32
  As the Note on Page 98 of Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary recorded, there were 
statistical differences even within USAFE. 
33
  AP3257, Annexure 5 to Appendix K; TNA, AIR 55/102, Charlesby 21 July 1949. 
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of payload, the reasons were wider as is explored below.   
Table 5.5 provides similar data for the Civil Lift to that in Table 5.4 for the military 
Airlift.  There are no sure statistics to separate by aircraft type the civilian 'Wet Lift' 
from the "dry" one.
34
 
Aircraft Type Short Tons/Aircraft at 
base/Day 
Round Trips/aircraft at 
base/day 
Halifax 13.9 2.1 
Lancastrian 20.8 3.0 
Liberator 12.1 1.7 
Tudor 25.4 3 
York 25.7 2.7 
 
Table 5.5:  Average Daily Tonnage Carried by the Civil Lift during March, 
April, May 1949 
Table 5.6 combines graphically Tables 5.4 and 5.5 to show how the small Dakota 
was dragging down the Airlift tonnage and not just because the type was the first to 
be withdrawn from the timetable when adverse weather prevented the system 
operating up to its saturation level.
35
  The Dakota occupied RAF Lubeck.
36
  It 
consumed technical ground staff and had similar sized crews to the larger Hastings 
and Yorks - albeit at a lower crew to aircraft ratio; see Table 5.7 below.
37
  These 
resources could have been diverted to improve RAF capabilities elsewhere in the 
Airlift.
38
   
_____________________________________________________________ 
34
  AFHRA, IRISNUM 241489, CALTF Statistical Summary; AP3257, pp. 520, 523, 530; 
TNA, AIR 55/110, Monthly Form STATS 120 records. 
35
  AP3257, pp. 14, 17, 23, 158, 174, 356, 451, 520, 537-539; Barker, p. 28; TNA: AIR 
2/10063, Es:45-52 Cannon/Williams 22 December 1948; AIR 2/10064, Es:54-58 DDASTO 
draft note on re-introduction of PLAINFARE August 1949; AIR 20/6891 ACAS(Ops) 
[AVM Hardman] undated Report on Visit to BAFO 30 September to 2 October 1948; AIR 
55/100, E.17 Charlesby undated; AIR 55/110, Monthly Form STATS 120 records. 
36
  AP3257, pp. 17, 324. 
37
  AP3257, p. 537; TNA, AIR 2/10064, Es:54-58 DDASTO draft note on re-introduction of 
PLAINFARE August 1949.  
38
  TNA: AIR 2/10064, Es:54-58 DDASTO draft note on re-introduction of PLAINFARE 
August 1949; AIR 55/100, E.30 Charlesby 22 March 1949. 
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Table 5.6:  Comparison of Average Daily Tonnage by Type and Base during 
March, April, May 1949 
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Table 5.7:  Number 46 Group RAF Average Aircraft and Crew Strengths 
In August 1949 DDASTO argued that medium range transports such as the Dakota 
were grossly uneconomical, and they complicated the sophisticated but necessarily 
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rigid air traffic control procedures and when IFR applied they had to be grounded to 
make way for larger aircraft.  His draft paper on the re-introduction of the Airlift 
recommended that medium range force aircraft (Dakotas and Valettas) should only 
be used in small numbers for essential scheduled services.
39
  ACAS(Ops), Air Vice 
Marshal Guest, reiterated that view, stating [The Dakota squadrons were] 'more an 
embarrassment than a really effective load-carrier'
40
. 
On 6 January 1949 the USAFE suggested to Merer that C-54s should be introduced 
into the RAF's fleet to improve the lift.
41
  It appears to have been made unofficially 
and without any details.  Williams reported the suggestion to Walmsley and the 
matter gained momentum.
42
  It became the subject of documents and discussion 
across the involved Ministries and the RAF.  It was raised with Cannon by Williams 
and then towards the end of January Marshal of the Royal Air Force [MRAF] Lord 
Tedder, Chief of the Air Staff, spoke to Cannon and Tunner about the proposal.  
VCAS recorded that following these conversations Tedder intended to approach 
Vandenberg directly.
43
  (Tunner described the aircraft at the start of 1949 as 
obsolescent 'cargowise' but it would have been an improvement on the Dakota.
44
)  In 
early March 1949 Tedder discussed the loan with General Hoyt Sandford 
Vandenberg, Chief of Staff USAF.
45
   
_____________________________________________________________ 
39
  TNA, AIR 2/10064, E.53 Revill 28 September 1949, Es:54-58 DDASTO draft note on 
re-introduction of PLAINFARE August 1949 - triggered by Cabinet Paper C.P(49) 154 15 
July 1949. 
40
  TNA, AIR 2/10064, Minute 157 by ACAS Ops, AVM Guest, 25 August 1949. 
41
  TNA, AIR 2/10063, E.58 HQ BAFO AX545 7 January 1949. 
42
  TNA: AIR 2/10063, Es:24-25 Meeting 18 January 1949, E.58 HQ BAFO AX545 7 
January 1949; AIR 20/6892, Walmsley to VCAS 26 January 1949 (for quotation). 
43
  TNA, AIR 2/10064, E.345 MFM 4 March 1949 and E.346 an undated and unsigned draft 
gave summaries of the loan progression up to early March 1949 and that 7 March 1949 was 
the date planned for Tedder/Vandenberg meeting. 
44
  Tunner, p. 197.  The undated and unsigned draft at TNA, AIR 2/10064, E.346 recorded 
that Tunner had proposed the original C-54 loan to Merer but E.345 which may have been 
raised from the draft, made no such statement. 
45
 LoC, 'Hoyt Sanford Vandenberg Papers: A Register of his papers in The Library of 
Congress', (Washington DC: Manuscript Division, 2008) Scope and Content Note, p. 4.; 
Reuters, 'Skymasters only on the Airlift?: Increasing Efficiency', Manchester Guardian, 25 
February 1949; TNA: AIR 2/10063, E.12 draft signal February 1949, Es:21-25 Meeting 18 
January 1949; AIR 20/6892, Air Ministry MSX850 4 February 1949, Air Mshl Sir Arthur 
Sanders (VCAS) 28 January 1949; AIR 20/7148, extract of Gen.241/4 Committee Meeting 
Footnote continues on next page. 
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The Tedder/Vandenberg discussion is surprising as Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles 
Medhurst of the Joint Services Mission to Washington had replied to a personal 
signal from Tedder on 2 February 1949, saying: 'As regard loan of C.54's here again 
I am afraid answer will be negative since they are themselves completely stuck for 
spares and feel they cannot release any to us.  I understand wear and tear on those 
being used in airlift is greater than they expected and their repair and maintenance 
facilities are not (R) not what they hoped they would be.'
46
  In fact the reply seems 
gentle to modern eyes given that the text of the brief to Vandenberg before his 
meeting with Medhurst ended: 'Recommend that Sir Charles be given a definite NO 
to his request' [anticipated to be 24 C-54s with spares and maintenance 
equipment].
47
  In his discussion with Tedder in March 1949 Vandenberg's position 
was that the loan was unlikely as the aircraft was obsolescent and the USAF was 
having great difficulties getting replacements and spares.
48
  Bevin had stressed the 
C-54 spares problem to the Committee of Ministers in early February 1949.
49
  In the 
event because the Airlift ran down thereafter no 'operational loan' was necessary.
50
   
In a modified form, 'C-54 or other ten-ton carriers'
51
, it was a critical element of the 
Cannon/Williams 'Long Range Plan for Berlin Airlift' joint appraisal and 
                                                                                                                           
7 February 1949; USNA, Record Group 341, Headquarters U.S. Air Force (Air Staff) 1934 - 
2004, Top Secret Decimal Correspondence Files compiled 1942 - 1954, Germany 381, NM-
15-335A, Box 808, Air Cdre H. E. Nowell 3 February 1949. 
46
  TNA: AIR 2/10064, E.332 Extract from BJSM Signal AX910 24 February 1949 (under 
cover E.331, APS to CAS 4 March 1949), E.345 MFM 4 March1949; AIR 20/6892, Draft 
by DCAS 2 February 1949. 
47
  LoC, Vandenberg Papers, Container 40, Britain folder 2 1949, Smith dated 4 February 
1949. 
48
  TNA, AIR 2/10573, Es:132-138 under cover of James 30 April 1949, p. 2, E.183 James 
18 March 1949. 
49
  TNA, AIR 20/6892, brief CBN.241/4 by Bevin to Meeting of Ministers 7 February 1949. 
50
  TNA: AIR 2/10063, Es:21-26 Meeting 18 January 1949, pp. 4-5; AIR 55/218, Es:147-
148 Charlesby 18 March 1949 - availability of sufficient crews to fly the C-54s 'unlikely 
during the present year'. 
51
  TNA, AIR 20/6892, James 10 March 1949, Williams to Robertson 26 February 1949; 
USNA, Record Group 341, Headquarters U.S. Air Force (Air Staff) 1934 - 2004, Top Secret 
Decimal Correspondence Files compiled 1942 - 1954, Germany 381, NM-15-335A, Box 
808, McGuire 8 March 1949. 
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consequently included in correspondence from Robertson to Bevin.
52
  As late as 23 
March 1949 British proposals for US military Aid included provisionally 50 C-
54s.
53
  In April 1949 Major General Samuel Anderson, Director [USAF] Plans and 
Operations, submitted a paper 'Factors and Implications affecting the Continuation 
of Operation VITTLES at the Present or on an Expanded Scale' to Vandenberg 
which stated that the 'proposed transfer of 50 C-54s to the British was not feasible'.
54
 
In apparent anticipation of a possible negative outcome to the loan request
55
 the Air 
Ministry and the inter-Ministry working party looked at alternative approaches such 
as increasing the Civil Lift and especially the number of large four-engine Avro 
Tudors that fitted the Airlift role comfortably.  The options were estimated to cost 
between £14M and nearly £21.8M per annum against the then authorised ceiling of 
£9.6M.
56
  What does not appear in the National Archives [TNA] records is how the 
airspace limitations in adverse weather would have been handled without Dakotas to 
ground.
57
 
Why did the RAF expend so much effort trying to acquire an aircraft that the 
_____________________________________________________________ 
52
  TNA, AIR 20/6892, Robertson to Bevin 4 March 1949, Appendix A to brief for ACAS 
ahead of 25 February 1949 Meeting (copy of Brownjohn 27 January 1949), 
Cannon/Williams 14 February 1949. 
53
  TNA: AIR 2/10064, E.281 Whittuck 23 March 1949, Es:302-303 ACAS(Ops) minute 15 
March 1949; AIR 2/10573, E.183 James 18 March 1949 'premature, therefore, to say that 
we shall not get any of this type'; FO 1012/298, E.71 AL/103/1/1/Air 7 April 1949 [Name of 
HQ Airlift Gp Capt missing from signature block]. 
54
  USNA, Record Group 341, Headquarters U.S. Air Force (Air Staff) 1934 - 2004, Top 
Secret Decimal Correspondence Files compiled 1942 - 1954, Germany 381, NM-15-335A, 
Box 808, attachment to Anderson 13 April 1949, p. 3. 
55
  TNA: AIR 20/6892, Meeting 16 February 1949; AIR 20/6893, DCAS Meeting 29 March 
1949 'improbable' and Interdepartmental Working Party 30 March 1949 'slight'. 
56
  TNA: AIR 2/10063, Es:51-52 Appendix C to Cannon/Williams 22 December 1948 
(Es:45-48); AIR 2/10573, Es:119-123 paper on long-term civil lift under cover Smith (FO) 
24 May 1949, Es:132-138 James 30 April 1949, Es:144-146 Seal (FO) 28 April and Cribbett 
(MCA) 25 April 1949, Es:175-177 Meeting 28 March 1949; AIR 20/2071, Whitfield 19 
March 1949, FO (German Section) No. 1636 Basic 8 April 1949; AIR 20/6892, Meeting 16 
February 1949; AIR 20/6893, Interdepartmental Working Party Meetings on the 
Contribution of Civil Aviation to Berlin Airlift on 30 March and 26 April 1949, DCAS 
Meeting 29 March 1949, James 30 March and 20 April 1949, Rainsford 10 March 1949, 
Walmsley 17, 19 and 30 March 1949; AVIA 54/416, Tudor Conversion for Berlin Airlift. 
57
  TNA: AIR 2/10063, Es:45-48 Cannon/Williams 22 December 1948; AIR 20/6891, 
ACAS(Ops) [AVM Hardman] undated Report on Visit to BAFO 30 September to 2 October 
1948; AIR 20/7804, Cross 24 September 1948. 
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Americans deemed obsolescent?  The rationale provides an understanding of Britain 
at the time.  The RAF's transport fleets at home and overseas were over-
committed.
58
  The Government - not solely the RAF - was sensitive about its poor 
performance, inadequate aircraft, and insufficient manpower.  For example, in 
Foreign Office correspondence between Sir William Strang's German Section
59
 and 
General Robertson during November 1948, British 'prestige' was mentioned in 
relation to relocating American aircraft to the Northern Zone to increase the tonnage 
delivered which could reduce British involvement to 'special types (tankers, etc)'.  
Robertson warned 'I note that you wish us to discontinue giving publicity to 
respective British and American shares of the airlift…I fear however the press will 
be likely to get hold of the information in any case'.
60
  In December 1948, even 
when the lower sortie rate of the British was ignored, the American tonnage per 
flight (almost entirely C-54s) was 9.7 short tons whilst the British managed an 
average of 5.7.
61
  The C-54 was also attractive if the British could obtain it as an 
operation loan for the duration of the Airlift with the Americans supplying the spares 
and all servicing beyond first line.  A loan and free spares would have avoided the 
Treasury expending dollars.
62
   
The in-vogue phrase 'C-54 or other 10 ton carrying aircraft' appears to have been 
"spin".  The Douglas DC-6 (successor to the DC-4) was not yet on order for the 
_____________________________________________________________ 
58
  TNA, AIR 2/10064, E.346 undated draft. 
59
  Permanent Under Secretary for the German Section at the Foreign Office becoming 
Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1949; replaced in the German 
Section by Sir Ivone Augustine Kirkpatrick - Ann Lane, 'Kirkpatrick, Sir Ivone Augustine 
(1897–1964)', in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. by Brian Harrison (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004) <www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34339> [accessed 9 July 
2013]; Anne Deighton, 'Strang, William, first Baron Strang (1893–1978)', in Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, ed. by Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004) <www.oxforddnb.com/ view/article/31729> [accessed 9 July 2013]. 
60
  TNA: AIR 20/6891, Frankfurt, 920 Basic, 6 Nov 48 (for "prestige" and "press" 
quotations); AIR 2/10063, Es:158-159 FO (German Section) 3212 Basic, 3 November 1948 
(for "special types" quotation).  Example of ambiguous use of "RAF": TNA, AIR 20/6892, 
HQ BAFO AX572 5 February 1949, AM AX1644 10 February 1949, HQ BAFO, AX576 
12 February 1949, AM MSX850 4 February 1949.  Salt was carried by Halifaxes in their 
panniers and became another specialty: TNA, AIR 20/7804, BAFO AO174 5 August 1948.  
61
  TNA, AIR 2/10063, Es:45-48 Cannon/Williams 22 December 1948. 
62
  TNA, AIR 2/10063, Es:21-26 Meeting 18 January 1949. 
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American military.
63
  The British Avro York ('a difficult aircraft to keep serviceable' 
and with declining stocks of spares) was a long range aircraft which did not stand up 
well to intensive operations with short flights and frequent take-offs and landings at 
maximum payload.
64
  The York's relatively level fuselage when parked and high 
wing configuration helped cargo handling as did the large doors on the freighter.
65
  
The position and the size of the door on passenger versions, however, caused 
problems.
66
   
The York's replacement, the Handley Page Hastings was entering service late; from 
a production line that was delivering (and could only deliver) a mere handful a 
month; with inevitable teething troubles; a lack of spares to support such intensive 
operations, and significantly, with several design faults of which instability at low 
speed had to be corrected by redesign before further orders would be placed.
67
  The 
issue of the Hastings tail wheel arose during the 16 February 1949 meeting after 
AOC-in-C BAFO reported that runways were being damaged owing to the 
configuration.  The limitations of tail wheels were not unknown.  There were 
loading and off-loading problems owing to the fuselage slope and high sensitivity to 
cross-winds.
68
  Handley Page's proposal for a rear loading, tricycle undercarriage 
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Hastings (HP89 Mark VI) had been under discussion with the Air Ministry and the 
War Office since 10 June 1948 and a tricycle civil airliner, the Hermes IV, was 
under construction for BOAC.
69
  Nevertheless, the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff 
(Technical Requirements) at the Air Ministry was minuted as saying that 'he could 
not give a spot estimate' on the delays caused by a major modification such as 
tricycle undercarriage.
70
   
Aircraft with greater load carrying capability were imperative but the Vickers 
Valetta, not the Hastings, was the planned replacement for the Dakota and its 
payload was similar to the Dakota.
71
  The Skymaster, a militarized variant of the 
DC-4, had evolved during the late 1930s and very early 1940s as a long range 
passenger airliner for American operators.
72
  It performed extremely well during the 
Airlift, being a rugged, tested workhorse, hauling greater payloads than the York, 
and for most of the Airlift, the Hastings.
73
  Had they received C-54s
74
 the RAF 
intended to use them to replace the Dakota.  The questionable assumption was that 
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conversion would be easier than to an alternative four-engine type because both 
were made by Douglas.
75
  
At the end of September/beginning of October 1948 ACAS(Ops) had found York 
serviceability was at 40%, Hastings 50% and Dakotas 60% with 'over-snagging' by 
York aircrews who, unlike the Americans, were assigned to a pool rather than 
retained in their squadrons, resulting in low morale.  The maintenance personnel and 
the aircraft were also pooled which added to the problem.
76
  AP3257 was critical of 
pooling and of the appropriateness and application of the new technical wing 
concept to Operation PLAINFARE.
77
  The 14 February 1949 joint Cannon/Williams 
long term appraisal, albeit on the assumption that the RAF would receive C-54s on 
loan, looked for higher manning and adequate spares and equipment so that the 
serviceability across the fleet would reach 65%.
78
  James probably expressed the Air 
Ministry's "feelings": 'However much the British contribution to this "acceptable 
scale of maintenance" seems beyond our powers we do at least know what ought to 
be achieved'.
79
  As discussed earlier, the numbers of Skymasters in commission and 
assigned to 1
st
 ALTF Groups varied at different times.  Those in commission fell 
from a monthly average of 60% after October 1948 and remained there until June 
1949, with the lowest point approaching 50% in January 1949.
80
  Thus the 
Americans had difficulties too but theirs were not as great as the RAF's. 
Transport Command had assigned much of its small medium and long range fleets to 
Operation PLAINFARE.  Its aircrews, especially signallers and navigators, were 
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losing skills through lack of application.  (On 19 November 1948 a junior member 
of the Air Ministry stated that the Berlin Airlift was analogous to 'a Green Line Bus 
Service…..all flights are the same'.81)  Second pilots were not usually carried and so 
they received neither familiarisation nor continuation training.  Some were being 
employed on extraneous ground duties.  The Airborne elements of the Army were 
suffering too as their support was a Transport Command task.  Furthermore, the 
same Command was an intrinsic part of the reinforcement plans for the Middle East 
but with its aircraft and its aircrews deployed in Germany, air mobility could not be 
practiced and aircrew members had either no recent experience of such flying or 
none at all.
82
  As early as 13 December 1948 ACAS(Training) was minuted as 
saying that 'It had taken years to build up Transport Command and we could not 
afford to allow the present state of affairs to continue'.
83
  It was essential to withdraw 
part of the RAF task force for other duties.
84
 
Throughout the Airlift the RAF was short of aircrew ('critical….with no sign of any 
improvement'
85
) and experienced, thoroughly trained technical tradesmen.
86
  Sorties 
were being lost in Germany owing to insufficient manpower.  Charlesby concluded 
that the limiting factor for the Americans was aircraft and aircraft utilization but for 
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the RAF 'manpower shortages are a [the meaning is "the"] critical factor, and it is 
their utilization which should be increased'.  He calculated, for example, that seven 
additional York and Hastings crews on the Airlift in Germany, plus a further 3.5 on 
rotation in the UK, would increase the daily haul across the year by 71 short tons.
87
   
Personnel shortages worsened at the end of March 1949 as the Government kept its 
promises about demobilisation.
88
  As early as 23 July 1948 the planned assignment 
of C-54s to Operation VITTLES rose to 126.  Each aircraft was assigned three crews 
which meant that about two thirds of all C-54 aircrews were committed.  Merer 
stated in January 1949 that two thirds of American crews would shortly be recalled 
reservists.  This approach was operationally sensible but was not an avenue that the 
British Government would adopt.
89
  Conscription was essential as an Air Ministry 
brief for a Conference on Long-Term Requirements for Operation PLAINFARE 16 
February 1949 recorded: 'If increases in Transport Command are made there will 
have to be either: corresponding reductions elsewhere ….or a call-up from civil life.  
It is useless to talk of increasing the size of the RAF unless we are given more 
money and trained men are conscripted from civil life - we won't get volunteers'.
90
   
Over time the American aircrew to aircraft ratio grew to five aerial engineers (crew 
chiefs) per aircraft and towards the end of the Airlift an aspiration for 3.6 pairs of 
pilots, albeit not all would be on duty at one time.  In July 1949 1,258 'assigned duty' 
pilots had flown with 1
st
 ALTF and by 1 July 1949 the USAF Great Falls 
Replacement Training Unit had passed out 1,675 pilots.
91
  The Statistical Digest 
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gave a daily average for May 1949 of 2.3 USAF aircrews available on Airlift bases 
per C-54 available to the 1
st
 ALTF operating groups with each aircraft delivering on 
average 2.9 cargoes (including passengers) per day.
92
   
In February 1949 Walmsley had proposed three crews per RAF aircraft and in a pre-
meeting brief 3 to 3.5 were suggested.
93
  Merer argued that air crews should be 
determined by the number of sorties that maintenance could provide.
94
  As planning 
at the time called for 2.4 sorties per day, no increase appeared to have been needed 
(which seems contrary to Charlesby's conclusions in March 1949
95
) and the RAF 
were having great difficulty finding enough crews for its current needs let alone 
expanding them.
96
  The sole exception would have been the loaned C-54 where three 
crews per aircraft were proposed in recognition of its capability for high intensity 
operations.
97
  The RAF plans that emerged to maintain indefinitely its average of 
1,000 short tons daily (1,061 short tons actually) were for 191 aircrews (41% 
Dakotas) to be assigned to the Airlift and actually in Germany to fly a multiple-type 
fleet of 96 aircraft (42% Dakotas).
98
  The actual strength in Germany at the time of 
planning was 115 aircrews (39% were Dakota crews) and 106 aircraft (52% 
Dakotas).
99
  
Attempts were made by the RAF to detach aircrew from non-flying posts and other 
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Commands.
100
  Both Transport Command and Bomber Command had an 
establishment of 144 four-engine crews.  This was a far cry from the Command that 
frequently mounted 1,000 four-engine bomber raids at night.  In September 1948 the 
Air Ministry concluded that if Bomber Command was committed to the Airlift as its 
first priority, on a sustained basis, locating its aircraft in Germany, it could make 27 
deliveries per day totalling between 67.5 and 121.5 (probably long) tons, depending 
on product.  Only 52 of its pilots had the instrument ratings that would have 
permitted them to have flown in the Berlin Airlift.  By February 1949 there had been 
a little improvement with 80 rated crews.
101
  It is not surprising that the Chief of the 
Air Staff, in the presence of the Secretary of State for Air, was minuted as saying 
that bombers should be engaged only 'as a last resort'.
102
 
Planning in March 1949 concluded that to maintain a degree of Transport 
Command's normal commitments; to convert from Yorks to Hastings, and Dakotas 
to Valettas; to maintain the Airlift long term; to meet the political demobilisation 
objectives and with the RAF's endemic shortages of aircrew and tradesmen whilst 
not recalling reservists, meant that rather than delivering 1,000 short tons daily the 
figure could fall to between 650 and 750 short tons.
103
  Aircrew shortages were 
greatest amongst navigators and in the post-war RAF the non-commissioned trades 
of signaller and air engineer.
104
   
Substantial discussion arose about whether RAF aircrews and ground personnel 
should be posted to BAFO on full tours or should be rotated between BAFO and 
Transport Command on various cycles.  Nothing was implemented for aircrew 
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before the Airlift ceased and thus the topic was not included in the thesis.  The 
documents, however, help to identify further the shortage of aircrews and challenges 
facing the RAF if the Airlift continued long-term.
105
  A précis of Transport 
Command's planning figures for June 1949 through April 1950 is given in Appendix 
4.
106
  In summary it planned on a potential of 1,377 short tons per day with the 
average expected across the period at 1,065.  This would have been achieved by an 
average of 60 Hastings and Yorks in Germany (augmented by a slowly declining 
number of Dakotas) with an average of two heavy transport aircrews per aircraft.  
The heavy transport element would have been expected to average 2.1 deliveries per 
aircraft.  Where the extra 524 aircrew needed to achieve these targets and the 
rotation plans would have come from is conjecture.  The proposed draft from DCAS 
to VCAS was cautious in that regard.
107
   
In May 1949 the USAF daily average number of aircrews available on their Airlift 
bases for each USAF C-54 assigned to an Airlift group was 2.3 with each aircraft 
delivering an average 2.9 cargoes.
108
  The significant difference between the USAF 
actual figures for May 1949 and the long-term British plan was the 0.8 extra 
deliveries per "assigned" aircraft per day that the Americans were already achieving 
above the British intentions.  
The challenges that the under-resourced RAF faced are also apparent in DDASTO's 
August 1949 draft plan for the Long Range fleet of Hastings and Yorks.  This was 
based on the experience during the Airlift and concluded that for every 60 aircraft 
operating on the Airlift a further 40 were needed as a maintenance reserve including 
those transiting to or from the UK and those undergoing inspection and maintenance 
there.  DDASTO's planning potential was 2.2 sorties per day but for the eight 
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months of summer 20% of those potential sorties would be lost owing to weather 
and the figure was 40% in winter.
109
  Adverse weather, especially fog reduced the 
sorties flown as did to a lesser degree severe icing in flight.  Winter weather also 
adversely affected ground activities, particularly maintenance, which lessened the 
sorties that could be launched when the conditions improved.
110
   
Manning shortages would have been helped by the loan of C-54s.  The RAF would 
have mirrored the Americans and crewed the C-54 with two pilots and a crew chief 
thereby resolving elements of its shortage.  One C-54 hauled the same as 2.8 
Dakotas meaning less (and less complex) crews were needed per ton hauled and two 
of the latter squadrons would have been replaced by one of the former.  The ground 
technical personnel shortages would also have been eased by the reduction in 
squadrons and by the RAF's proposal to limit its involvement in C-54 servicing to 
first line.
111
 
The Royal Australian Air Force, Royal New Zealand Air Force and South African 
Air Force provided aircrew for the Operation PLAINFARE Dakota pool.
112
  The 
Netherlands offered aid from the start.
113
  Although the offer was of charter aircraft, 
Baugher's tables
114
 indicated that its Government (including the Dutch East Indies) 
_____________________________________________________________ 
109
  TNA, AIR 2/10064, Es:54-58 DDASTO's draft note on re-introduction of PLAINFARE 
August 1949.  Caution must be applied to the aircraft numbers and tonnages in the draft as. 
Minutes 156-157 and 159 Rainsford 23 August 1949, Guest 25 August 1949, Beringer 31 
August 1949 recognized.  The criteria and numbers work when calculating the capability of 
Plan "F" - the potential post-Airlift Transport Command establishment - but not when 
applied to calculate the additions needed to the Plan "F" to deliver an average across the 
year of 1,000 tons per day.  There are pencilled and ink corrections which may be 
contemporaneous.  
110
  AP3257, pp. 24-25, Apps: J and K.4.  
111
  TNA: AIR 2/10063, Es:21-26 Meeting 18 January 1949; AIR 20/6892, Meeting 16 
February 1949 - finding enough second pilots would have been a challenge and the RAF 
considered using Navigators with addition training. 
112
  AP3257, pp. 59, 142 - 10 crews were loaned from RAF Mediterranean and Middle East 
Command; TNA: AIR 2/10064, Es:305-308 DDASTO 14 March 1949, Es:285-287 
DDASTO 29 March 1949; AIR 20/6893, James 4 April 1949; AIR 24/2047, Minutes of 
AOC-in-C Staff Conferences: 31 August 1948, 6 September 1948, 20 September 1948, 4 
October 1948; AIR 28/978, ORB RAF Bassingbourn. 
113
  TNA: AIR 20/7816, Waite 29 June 1948; T 236/1025, E.34 to Playfair 21 August 1948, 
E.38 Serpell 23 August 1948. 
114
  Joseph F. Baugher, 'USAF Serial Numbers' <www.joebaugher.com/usaf_serials/ 
usafserials.html> [last revised 2012] (1940-1946); Baugher, 'US Coast Guard Aircraft Serial 
Footnote continues on next page. 
 152 
and airlines operated 22 Skymasters or DC4 airliners modified from Skymasters.  
Belgian and Swedish involvement was also suggested but like the Dutch they did not 
automatically have the right to fly their aircraft along the corridors and thus the 
matter progressed no further.
115
  (Although the Dutch did not participate in the air, 
the Royal Netherlands Air Force did provide German interpreters to the Airlift
116
).   
Assistance from Canada was attractive, not just its aircrews and ground crews but its 
Merlin-engine variants of the DC-4, the Canadair North Star, that the Royal 
Canadian Air Force [RCAF] operated (as did BOAC from spring 1949).
117
  The 
Canadians were asked to participate on several occasions but avoided becoming 
embroiled.
118
  Canada was not one of the four occupation powers and so its North 
Stars would have had to fly under RAF or USAF markings.
119
  If aircrew alone had 
been provided to aid the British, they would have been pooled within the RAF as the 
Australians, New Zealanders and South Africans were.
120
  Neither approach was 
attractive to a country that during the Second World War had perceived itself to be 
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ignored in the upper echelons of Allied policy making and planning.
121
   
Lieutenant General Maurice Pope's autobiography regularly recorded the impotence 
of Canada and its Military Mission to the Allied Control Council [in Berlin] and 
cited the shortfall in the loads hauled in to Berlin.  There was no mention of requests 
for Canadian participation in the Airlift, however.
122
  Britain's early attempts to 
recruit Canadian help for the Airlift had insensitively attempted to play the 
Commonwealth card which had potential to cause political problems for the Liberal 
Administration.
123
  Whether this justified William Lyon Mackenzie King misleading 
Parliament on 30 June 1948, however, must be a matter for Canadian 
interpretation.
124
  Canadians did take part as serving members of the RAF
125
 and 
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  Anon, 'First Canadian Bomber Group [effective 1 January 1943], Service Aviation', 
Flight, dated 14 January 1943; Brereton Greenhous, Steven J. Harris, William C. Johnston, 
William G. P. Rawling, The Crucible of War, 1939-1945: The Official History of the Royal 
Canadian Air Force: Volume 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press in cooperation with 
the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 
Supply and Services Canada, 1994) pp. 633-5; Library and Archives Canada, Record Group 
25, DI, Department of External Affairs, Vol. 829: File/Dossier 9 as a whole and File/Dossier 
20, Maj Gen Maurice Pope dated 10 June 1944 and ADP Heeney dated 27 June 1944 on 
Canadian wartime sensitivity; Urs Obrist, 'An Essential Endeavour: Canada and West 
Germany 1946-1957' (doctoral thesis, University of Toronto, 2006) pp. 44-50.  
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  Maurice A. Pope, Soldiers and Politicians (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962) 
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never been asked'. 
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  Clark, Operation Pelican, pp. 38-39; Library and Archives Canada, Record Group 2, 
Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Vol. 2643: 1949/03/22, 1949/03/29, 1949/04/12; 
Library and Archives Canada, Record Group 25, DI, Department of External Affairs, Vol. 
829, File/Dossier 16, No. 1788 dated 12 October 1948 Robertson and Reid/RN dated 13 
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E.203 High Commissioner No. 494 21 April 1949, E.289 High Commissioner No. 364 24 
March 1949, E.329 Berlin Airlift Progress Report undated circa 15 February 1949; AIR 
8/2607, JP(48)86 (Final) 26 July 1948, Commonwealth Relations Office telegraph to High 
Commissioners 22 July 1948; AIR 20/6891, High Commissioner in Canada No. 901 9 
October 1948 suggested a Québécois element to Canada's position; AIR 20/6893 James 4 
April 1949.  
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  Obrist, p. 60. 
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  RCAF, 'RCAF participates in the Berlin Airlift, providing West Berlin with food, 
medicine and essential goods' <www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/v2/hst/page-eng.asp?id =901> 
[last accessed 11 April 2013 and since removed] stated that the RCAF participated in the 
Berlin Airlift.  Brian Sutherland, Directorate of History and heritage, HistoryandHeritage-
Histoireetpatrimoine @forces.gc.ca 18 April 2013, confirmed that this was an error that has 
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Footnote continues on next page. 
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individual members of the RCAF may have done so occasionally as members of No. 
24 Squadron RAF.
126
  
The dollar was again relevant with British hopes that the North Stars would be 
provided with the Canadians paying the dollar element and the British the sterling.
127
  
In the spring of 1949, when the Canadian Cabinet revisited the question of 
participation as part of an international force, it was estimated that a balanced force 
of 14 North Stars and 475 personnel would cost Can$11 million in the first year.  
This force was expected to generate daily a minimum of three aircraft.  The Cabinet 
discussions also implied that had Canada participated it would have preferred to 
have operated with the USAF not the RAF.
128
  A solution suggested to the Canadian 
question was for support to be given by other members of NATO.
129
  This would 
have introduced problems of using personnel for whom English was not their native 
language and of operating small contingents.  It was unlikely to have been 
welcomed by the Americans for whom by then efficiency was paramount.
130
  How 
NATO membership would have overcome the issue of which nations had the 
automatic right to use the corridors is unclear.
131
  Canadian participation had not 
been achieved before the blockade was lifted.   
Besides personnel numbers and aircraft designs, numbers, payloads, and robustness, 
the RAF's performance was degraded by its maintenance policies.  Pooling 
                                                                                                                           
1994 issue of Airforce Magazine recorded that: 'Several Canadian wartime aircrew had 
joined the Royal Air Force during 1947 after demobilization from the RCAF. …….. at RAF 
Wunstorf, Germany, I met …….. F/L Cliff Wenzell, a pilot from Ontario who later won the 
Air Force Cross …… during the Berlin Airlift……'; this was confirmed by Peter 
Worthington, QMI Agency, 'Legendary military pilot, Cliff Wenzel, 89', Toronto Sun, 4 
March 2011 <www.torontosun.com/news/columnists/ peter_worthington/2011/03/ 
04/17496746.html> [accessed 18 April 2013]. 
126
  Clark, Operation Pelican, pp. 18-20; TNA, DO 35/2470B, Harvey 19 November 1948.  
Station and Squadron data at TNA is unclear whether RCAF personnel with No. 24 
Squadron participated. 
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  TNA, AIR 20/6893, Seal Meeting 6 April 1949. 
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  Library and Archives Canada: Record Group 2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Vol. 
2643, 1949/03/22, 1949/03/29, 1949/04/12. 
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  TNA, AIR 2/10064: E.224 Rainsford 30 March 1949, E.289 High Commissioner No. 
364 24 March 1949. 
130
  TNA, AIR 2/10064: E.225 James 28 March 1949. 
131
  TNA, AIR 2/10064: E.225 James 28 March 1949. 
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Transport Command squadrons in Germany meant that technical tradesmen lost 
organization, identity and immediate supervision - critical in a predominantly 
conscript air force
132
 - and they serviced non-squadron aircraft and so were unaware 
of each one's quirks.  The application of the newly conceived three wing 
organization to this deployed force and the retention of base servicing at the parent 
Transport Command stations in the United Kingdom also degraded performance.  
Second line servicing increased substantially yet personnel and equipment, based on 
establishments that were set for route flying, were deployed to Germany to augment 
the first line servicing and rectification teams there.
133
   
Charlesby identified a high incidence of RAF aircraft in Germany being grounded 
awaiting spares ['AOG'].  He ascribed the inadequate stocks of spares to false 
economies.  There is insufficient primary evidence left to substantiate his rationale.  
The RAF would have been criticised for holding too many spares given its relatively 
light commitments before the Airlift.  Because of the maintenance policies 
employed during Operation PLAINFARE there had to be holdings in Britain and 
Germany.  Maintaining Transport Command's routine peacetime tasks would have 
meant stocks were needed at route stations and terminals and in the case of the 
Dakota, overseas Commands.  The Hastings was new into service and the Yorks had 
not previously operated in this way.  Thus there would have been no past 
consumption profiles to base "establishments" on.  It took time to obtain financial 
authority, to let contracts and to manufacture spares.
134
  Finally, as Schrader 
recorded, spares from the USA would have had to be purchased with scarce 
dollars.
135
 
It is too easy to blame Operation PLAINFARE's maintenance difficulties on the 
_____________________________________________________________ 
132
  National servicemen were cheap labour, on short engagements, with constant turnover, 
limited and shallow training, and little experience.  Servicing, maintenance and rectification 
relied heavily on supervision by "career" NCOs many of whom during Operation 
PLAINFARE had to be diverted to coordinating these activities across large numbers of 
aircraft dispersed around "foreign" airfields - AP3257. 
133
  AP3257, pp. 7-8, 19, 41-43, 79, 81-86, 179-185; TNA, AIR 24/1806, AHQ BAFO 
Fs540, Technical Branch September 1948. 
134
  TNA, AIR 55/102, Charlesby 21 July 1949. 
135
  Helena P. Schrader, The Blockade Breakers: the Berlin Airlift (Stroud: The History 
Press, 2010) p. 52. 
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substantial friction between Transport Command and BAFO with AOC-in-Cs 
seeking to retain or grow their "empires", or technical officers seeking to exploit the 
establishment of technical wings on stations to increase their promotion 
opportunities.
136
  Fundamentally the issue had two causes.  The RAF was tasked to 
do too much with few resources.
137
  For example when a major assembly became 
defective the Americans tended to replace it whilst the British strove to repair it 
thereby both consuming manpower and decreasing aircraft utilization.
138
  Second, 
the maintenance personnel deployed from Transport Command (and other 
Commands) had to operate under BAFO station commanders on bases where both 
the technical accommodation and the local technical support were insufficient.
139
 
Whilst use of permanent RAF bases in England for monthly 100 hour inspections 
and base servicing was in many ways unproductive, it did offer two advantages over 
the airfields in Germany.  It provided technical accommodation, especially large 
hangars, where aircraft could be serviced and inspected.  For example, there were 
five hangars each at the pre-war expansion stations such as the Hastings bases at 
RAF Dishforth and RAF Topcliffe whilst there were two at RAF Schleswigland.
140
  
Second, there was no distraction caused by the day to day Operation PLAINFARE 
operations.  The absence of technical accommodation also affected the Civil Lift 
adversely causing it to recover to Great Britain for in-depth maintenance.
141
    
Charlesby studied RAF utilization and found that in the spring of 1949 a York 
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  AP3257, p. 41 for shortage in Germany, 225; MOD [RAF], 'Topcliffe' and 'Dishforth', 
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1949. 
 157 
should have made a trip to Berlin once every four hours yet on average it was doing 
so once every 11.5 hours and the figures for Dakotas and Hastings were poorer.  
RAF Airlift serviceability matched that of the Service generally but crucially its 
utilization was far below that of the Americans and at the end of the Blockade, the 
Civil Lift.
142
  Thus given the objective was to haul as great a tonnage as possible, not 
to undertake routine peacetime flying, the RAF's performance was far from 
spectacular.   
This is not a criticism of the individual air and ground crew members.  In April and 
May 1949, following reorganization of the RAF rotas, the daily average number of 
trips per aircrew became approximately the same across the fleets and the aircraft 
types: USAF 1.75, Civil Tudors 1.65, Yorks 1.8 and Hastings 1.6.  Charlesby used 
these figures to observe that the lack of RAF aircrews was a serious limitation in 
achieving full utilisation of its aircraft.
143
   
Charlesby's data did not address the remainder of the Civil Lift and the RAF 
Dakotas, nor was there a breakdown between the two zones for the Americans.  E. P. 
Whitfield, Manager Civil Airlift Division, provided utilization statistics.  His had no 
aircrew data for the Lancastrians and the daily figure for a Tudor aircrew was 1.28 
trips not 1.65.
144
  The BAFO Command Statistical Officer recorded the number of 
aircrew in BAFO and the average daily trips per RAF aircrew.  Again these are 
lower than Charlesby's, by nearly 20% in the case of the Hastings and 30% for the 
York.
145
  These differences probably resulted from Charlesby's modifications to 
achieve a common baseline.  Nevertheless, they imply too wide a difference to allow 
them to be used to fill the gaps in his figures. 
Given the propensity for RAF aircraft to return from a trip requiring rectification and 
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  AP3257, p. 355; TNA, AIR 55/98, Es:21-23.  Additional discussion about British and 
American utilization rates: AP3257, App. K; TNA: AIR 55/97, 'Utilisation of British and 
American Aircraft'; AIR 55/99, 'Maintenance: Reports and Memoranda'; AIR 55/100 Es:12-
33.  The CALTF Report in AP3257 App. G identified short-comings in RAF maintenance 
which reinforced Charlesby.  TNA, AIR 2/10063, E.47 Cannon/Williams 22 December 
1949 was critical about RAF centralized servicing.  
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  TNA, AIR 55/98, Es:22-23. 
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  AP3257, p. 252. 
145
  AP3257, pp. 537-539.  
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thus to miss its place in the next block, it made sense to use this greater time on the 
ground to load more time consuming cargo.
146
  The three RAF aircraft types needed 
to be ballasted when flying empty to maintain correct centres of gravity.
147
  This 
made them attractive candidates to carry backloads and passengers from Berlin.
148
  
Between the beginning of January 1949 and the end of May 1949
149
 the average 
backload per trip was 636.5lbs for the USAF and 1338lbs for the RAF.  
(Backloading on Civil Lift aircraft was minimal).
150
  It is important to appreciate 
that the RAF's involvement with backloads, passengers (see Table 6.11 below) and 
time consuming cargoes was not the reason for its poor performance relative to the 
Americans - as some secondary sources appear to imply.  Rather, it showed how the 
British made best use of their aircraft in spite of the inherent defects.
151
   
Charlesby recognized that low utilization was also partly due to the aircraft 
scheduling system ('the block system' outlined below) that favoured the more robust 
Skymaster; the grounding of Dakotas in adverse weather, and the sensitivity to 
cross-winds of the British fleet.
152
  However, Charlesby's main rationale for the poor 
state of affairs is clear: the number of aircrews and maintenance personnel was too 
low; the number of unserviceable aircraft awaiting spares was too high; the aircraft 
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th
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th
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: 
Date Civil Lift RAF US 
9
 
April 1949 0 0 178 
10
 
April 1949 50 72 242 
11
 
April 1949 93 164 295 
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were over-inspected and over-serviced both in Germany and in the UK; RAF aircraft 
were more prone to defects than the Skymaster, and too long was spent in the UK.
153
  
The Americans regularly flew their aircraft safely even when not fully serviceable 
whilst the RAF tended to ground theirs pending rectification.
154
  To be fair, these 
failures in fit-to-fly and maintenance policies were not a product of BAFO, they lay 
within the RAF as a whole.   
Maintenance in Germany benefited from the mild winter and reduced de-icing of 
aircraft before takeoff.
155
  The RAF employed aircraft mobile shelters and the 
Americans 'work docks' to protect their staff and the aircraft during servicing.  A 
number of them caught fire.
156
  RAF Burtonwood was reopened on 15 November 
1948 to undertake the American 200 hour inspections that had previously been done 
in Germany.  The Americans accepted the loss of productive flying hours and 
aircrew availability that resulted from flying aircraft to England for their 200 hour 
inspections but it was not until April 1949 that throughput reached the necessary 
level.
157
  The Americans were deployed at the end of a 4,000 to 6,000 mile logistics 
pipeline that resulted in difficulties owing to the multiple Services and Commands 
involved; technical manpower shortages; aircraft defects caused by intensive short 
haul operations, and spares shortages necessitating cannibalization which consumed 
more of the manpower resources.  Nevertheless, with their greater experience of 
operating their prime aircraft type; their greater resources, and a more flexible 
approach, these issues were overcome to a far greater degree.
158
   
An example of American flexibility was the employment of ex-Luftwaffe aircraft 
mechanics with its inherent risks and the resources consumed in cross-training, 
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  AP3257, pp. 309-310. 
158
  AFHRA, IRISNUM 198189, 'History 1965
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 AACS' 18 September 1948-31 May 1949; 
IRISNUM 1038214, Grier (Base Aircraft Maintenance Officer) dated 20 May 1949; 
AP3257, pp. 308-314, 316-318; Anon, 'A special study of Operation "Vittles"', pp. 53-119; 
Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, pp. 74-103, 116; LoC, Vandenberg Papers: Container 59, 
Symington (via Air Attaché London) No. 74388 27 December 1948. 
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language and supervision.  Nevertheless, by the end of the Airlift they were 
established at 80 per USAF squadron.  The RAF, with major problems resourcing 
aircraft maintenance, used locally engaged labour only for 'non-skilled' tasks.
159
  It is 
worth noting that in spite of the views recorded above that the RAF over-inspected 
their aircraft, the short flights necessitated the Americans undertaking a limited 
number of activities on a 100 hour basis, such as changing crank case oil.
160
  
AP3257 acknowledged that there had been:  
17.   A most marked difference between the aircraft utilisation of the USAF 
and RAF was observed during the Airlift.  During the period May-July 1949, 
one USAF Wing of 40 C-54 aircraft (lifting 9.9 tons) was lifting a greater 
daily average tonnage than the whole of the RAF transport force, consisting 
of approximately 100 aircraft and based at three stations.  In spite of the 
greater U.S. manpower backing, it appears that the overall cost of operating 
three stations with 100 aircraft [of three types] and the necessary 
headquarters is much higher in proportion to the cost of one station operating 
40 aircraft.  
18.   It is felt that this is a most important problem which should be very 
carefully studied.  The reasons for the disparity appear to be many, and are 
primarily:-  
(a)   Better design and reliability of aircraft.  
(b)   More flexible system of servicing.  
(c)   Better manpower backing.
161
 
The domestic accommodation in Germany was inadequate too.  Air Staff at HQ 
BAFO observed that Airlift aircrew needed to be: 'treated more as officers and less 
like lorry drivers' and RAF physician Group Captain R. H. Stanbridge expressed 
concern about fatigue being caused by commissioned and non-commissioned 
aircrew accommodation.  If it was poor for officer aircrew, then it would have been 
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  AP3257, p. 310. 
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worse for the national service aircraftman trade assistants.
162
   
In 1948 the British had to play the hand they had been dealt at the war's end which 
included a small transport fleet of aircraft which were inappropriate to the Airlift's 
needs.  The situation was not helped by the different agendas of BAFO and 
Transport Command.  However, as the AP3257 quotation above said
163
, and the 
thesis shows, Britain may not have spent its money in the most efficient way prior to 
and during the Airlift resulting in the lack of aircrews and maintenance personnel.  
Moreover, it had opted for replacement transport aircraft, the Handley Page Hastings 
and the Vickers Valetta, whose designs looked backwards rather than forwards. 
AIRFIELDS AND CORRIDORS 
The Airlift needed adequate numbers of airfields able to operate under most weather 
conditions 24 hours per day and to handle intensive aircraft traffic; the various 
aircraft types being operated (including aircraft diversions), and the ground 
operations.  Table 5.8 lists the airfields that were used, excluding the 1948 flying 
boat bases.
164
 
Berlin Northern Zone US Zone 
RAF Gatow RAF Buckeburg (P.19 flights) Rhein-Main AFB 
Tegel RAF Celle Wiesbaden AFB 
Tempelhof RAF Fassberg   
 Fuhlsbuttel (Civilian managed)  
 RAF Lubeck  
 RAF Schleswigland  
 RAF Wunstorf  
 
Table 5.8:  Airlift Airfields 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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  Anon, 'The Airmen's Charter', Flight, 3 August 1950; AP3257, App. Q; Rainsford, 
Memoirs, pp. 106-107; TNA, AIR 55/218, E189-190 Air Staff unsigned 13 January 1949 
(for quotation). 
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  AP3257, p. 24.  
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  AP3257, pp. 150-152, 323-327, 522-523, 526. 
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As the German airfields and the air corridors are referred to regularly in Chapters 5 and 
6, a Map at Appendix 5 displays their locations.  It includes the airfields that were used, 
plus RAF Buckeburg, the 1948 flying boat bases, and RAF Luneburg. 
All the Operations VITTLES and PLAINFARE airfields had hardened (concrete or 
asphalt) runways and most had hardened perimeter tracks and aircraft loading areas, 
although some used pieced steel plank or both.165  The CALTF Report mentioned an 
additional 'base under construction'166 at the end of the blockade which was probably 
RAF Luneburg that was being developed as another Skymaster airfield and was planned 
to be ready in either August or September 1949.167  In September 1948 Major General 
Edwin Herbert, GOC British Troops Berlin, had suggested to the British Military 
Governor 'the opening of a new airlift airfield, say at Luneburg, before the frost comes' 
yet on 18 January 1949 Williams reported it was 'being considered'.168  There appears to 
have been a lack of urgency upgrading RAF Luneburg when compared with Tegel or 
RAF Celle.  Completion was targeted for 1 September 1949 but that slipped to the 31 
December 1949 by the time the project was terminated.169   
The intention initially was to enhance RAF Luneburg to allow 60 US Skymasters to be 
based there and this led to delays whilst positioning of the taxi ways and hard standings 
were argued over between the RAF and the USAF.  Progress would not have been 
improved by Group Captain Operations at BAFO's proposal to base 60 Hastings 
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there.170  At the end of the Airlift work was also in hand to enlarge all the Northern Zone 
Airlift military airfields to operate 60 heavy aircraft; to build a third runway at RAF 
Gatow, and was about to start at Fuhlsbuttel to provide more local domestic 
accommodation and hard standings to park 40 twin-engine aircraft.171  Given time and 
the appropriate priority, the American Army, the Royal Engineers and the RAF Airfield 
Construction Branch, with support from German contractors and labour, could upgrade 
and even build new airfields, as happened for example at RAF Celle and Tegel.172   
Airfield To Frohnau  Return from Berlin  Total 
Nautical miles  
RAF Buckeburg  188 145 from Gatow 333 
RAF Celle  134  122 from Gatow 256 
RAF Fassberg 119  125 from Tegel 244 
Fuhlsbuttel  139  146 from Tegel 285 
RAF Lubeck  125  176 from Gatow 301 
RAF Schleswigland 206  186 from Tegel 392 
RAF Wunstorf 174  139 from Gatow 313 
 To Berlin  Return from Berlin  Total 
Wiesbaden AFB 244 292 536 
Rhein-Main AFB  232 292 524 
 
Table 5.9:  Distances to and from Berlin173 
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Warm Climes' part of the 'Support of Air Operations' Symposium, Royal Air Force 
Historical Society Journal, No. 51 (Witney: Windrush, 2011); Lay, 'The Berlin Airlift: Part 
1', pp. 36-40; Lay, 'The Berlin Airlift: Part 2', pp. 39-41, 92-98; TNA: AIR 26/596, ORB 
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RAF Gatow, July 1948 - May 1949 inclusive; WO 106/5909, RE Report on Operation 
Plainfare. 
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  AP3257, pp. 336-341 covered all but Rhein-Main and Wiesbaden.  The AP3257 source 
for Table 5.9 used the Frohnau beacon which was 14.4 nm from Gatow.  No distance has 
Footnote continues on next page. 
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The distance for the round trip to Berlin impacted on potential tonnage hauled daily.  
As Table 5.9 shows, the Northern Zone bases were nearer to Berlin than were those 
in the Southern Zone.  They were also closer to the north German ports where cargo 
and aviation gasoline [AVGAS] were imported.   
Airfield Nautical miles Bearing Notes 
RAF Buckeburg 55 SW P.19 base 
RAF Celle 20 198°  
Fuhlsbuttel 43 350°  
RAF Fassberg 0 0  
RAF Gutersloh 91 SW See below 
Lohausen 159 SW 
RAF Lubeck 56 19°  
RAF Luneburg 21 25° Under development  
RAF Schleswigland 95 NNW  
RAF Wunstorf 39 SW  
RAF Uetersen 47 NNW See below 
 
Table 5.10:  Distance and Bearing from RAF Fassberg of Northern Zone 
Airfields 
Table 5.10 identifies the locations of the Northern Zone airfields in terms of their 
relationship to RAF Fassberg.
174
  It includes airfields that were considered but not 
used when the Blockade ended.  RAF Gutersloh
175
 and RAF Wunstorf were 
                                                                                                                           
been found from Frohnau to Tegel but it appears slightly less than Frohnau to Gatow.  TNA, 
AIR 20/7805, Dangerfield 7 September 1949 - cites 'Luneburg to Gatow at about 125 statute 
miles' but figures may not allow for routing.  The distances for Rhein-Main and Wiesbaden 
came from USAF Statistical Digest Jan 1949 - Jun 1950, p. 400.  They are to 'Berlin' and 
have been converted to nautical miles from statute miles.   
174
  Airfields:<www.ourairports.com/airports/EDDH, /EDDL, /EDHE, /EDHG, /EDHL, 
/ETHB, /ETHC, /ETHS, /ETNS, /ETNW and /ETUO; www.fallingrain.com/icao/ETHS and 
EDHE> [accessed 27 and 29 July 2011]. 
175
  Tony Fairbairn, Action Stations Overseas (Sparkford: Patrick Stephens Ltd, 1991) pp. 
79-80. 
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proposed to the Americans but RAF Fassberg was chosen.
176
  Fuhlsbuttel was a 
BAFO reserve airfield and was intended as Hamburg's civil airport.
177
  The 
Americans were offered it but declined because of inadequate accommodation and 
its unsuitability for heavy aircraft.
178
  Had it been selected, the Civil Lift there would 
presumably have moved to RAF Uetersen along with the 'international civil aircraft'.  
This airfield was 10 nautical miles west of Fuhlsbuttel and was typical of World 
War II Luftwaffe airfields.  Major civil engineering upgrades would have been 
needed to make it an Airlift base.
179
  There was also an ex-Luftwaffe base at Stade 
which was 17 nautical miles west south west of Fuhlsbuttel.
180
  Another potential 
base was Lohausen (Dusseldorf) civil airport where civil engineering enhancements 
were completed in April 1949 with considerable RAF help.  The BAFO Operation 
Record Book [ORB] stressed it was not an Airlift base.  However, it was close to the 
Ruhr coalfields and the Duisburg bagging facility and might have served as a base 
from which to carry Ruhr coal directly to Berlin if the Blockade had continued.
181
   
Routes were determined by having to use the three authorised corridors (Appendix 
5) and the flight paths imposed by HQ CALTF (Figure 5.3 below).  For an example 
of the impact of the latter, RAF Celle, RAF Fassberg and RAF Wunstorf were near 
to each other (Table 5.10) but the British had to take a longer route to the northern 
corridor than the Americans (Table 5.9) to avoid the airspace around the two USAF 
_____________________________________________________________ 
176
  Miller, To Save a City (Texas A&M) pp. 61, 72; TNA: AIR 28/1039, RAF Gutersloh; 
AIR 28/1163, RAF Wunstorf. 
177
  TNA, AIR 24/1806, AHQ BAFO Fs540, Air Staff, September 1948. 
178
  TNA, AIR 2/10063, E.21 Meeting 18 January 1949, E.54 FO(German Section) 173 
Basic 5 January 1949, E.61 Berlin 37 5 January 1949, E.67 BAFO AX523 16 December 
1948. 
179
  TNA: AIR 2/10063, E.67 BAFO AX523 16 December 1948, E.75 Cox 15 December 
1948; AIR 24/1806, Air Staff, April 1948. 
180
  <www.ourairports.com/airports/EDHS> [accessed 6 August 2012].  RAF Gutersloh had 
a 6,000 foot concrete runway and a 5,100 foot PSP one, RAF Utersen a 4,500 foot PSP one, 
and Stade with a 3,900 foot 'tarmac' runway - Anon, 'A special study of Operation "Vittles"', 
p. 54; TNA, AIR 20/7805, E.31 unsigned note. 
181
  TNA: AIR 20/7820, E.109 HAMGOV CAB151 31 January 1949, E.110 HAMGOV 331 
Basic 14 February 1949; AIR 24/1807, April 1949, Part 1 Air Staff Summary, p. 2. 
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bases.
182
   
Rhein-MainWiesbaden
Tempelhof
Wunstorf
Lubeck
Schleswigland
Fuhlsbuttel
Celle
Fassberg
Gatow
Tegel
 
Figure 5.3:  Airlift Routes 1949 
Airfields were meaningless without aircraft and vice versa and Table 5.11 brings the 
two together by giving the number of aircraft directly engaged in Operations 
VITTLES and PLAINFARE at three relevant points, in February 1949, at the end of 
the Airlift, and from an appraisal of capability undertaken in February 1949 for the 
long term Airlift.
183
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
182
  AP3257, pp. 21, 165-166, 286, 335-340; Miller, To Save a City (Texas A&M) p. 37; Bill 
Odell and Bill Von Sennet, '[Index for simulator flights] Berlin Airlift', Microsoft FS98 and 
FS2000 <www.billvons.com/bal/flights> [accessed 8 July 2011]. 
183
  AP3257, p. 152 from the No. 46 Group Report for Northern Zone airfields, p. 277 'Phase 
out' started on 1 August 1949, p. 286 from the CALTF Report for Southern Zone ones; 
TNA: AIR 2/10063, E.61 Berlin 37 5 January 1949; AIR 20/6892, Cannon/Williams 14 
February 1949, Williams 26 February 1949.  Figures at AP3257, p. 286 also included those 
for the Northern Zone.  The major difference was for RAF Fassberg where 58 C-54s were 
listed.  USAF Statistical Digest Jan 1949 - Jun 1950, Table 207 gave the July 1949 monthly 
average as 50. 
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Airfield Northern Zone at 1 July 
1949; Southern Zone 
Immediately prior to 1 
August 1949 
14 February1949 Appraisal 
 Strength 
February 
1949 
Potential Strength 
RAF Celle 42 Douglas C-54 40 40 
Suggested increase to 54 
RAF Fassberg 46 C-54s 60 66 
Fuhlsbuttel (civilian 
managed) 
10 Handley Page 
Halifaxes 
7 Avro Lancastrians 
16 16 
BAFO considered 
expansion to a full scale 
PLAINFARE airfield 
RAF Lubeck 42 Douglas Dakotas 54 50 C-54s (assumed to be 
the loaned ones) 
Rhein-Main AFB 95 C-54s 96 96 
RAF Schleswigland 23 Handley Page 
Hastings 
11 Handley Page 
Halifaxes 
2 Consolidated 
Liberators 
24 60 
Wiesbaden AFB 26 C-54s + 5 C-82s 29 23 
RAF Wunstorf 40 Avro Yorks 
4 Lancastrians 
5 Avro Tudors 
1 Avro Lincoln184 
58 60 
 
Table 5.11:  Aircraft Distribution during the Blockade 
Traffic between the west and Berlin was limited to three air corridors.  Each was 20 
miles wide with - subject to disagreement - a ceiling of 10,000 feet.
185
  In December 
1948 the Southern Zone operated Skymasters and a handful of C-82s
186
 whilst the 
_____________________________________________________________ 
184
  The Avro Lincoln was a 4-engine converted bomber on trial after Blockade was lifted. 
185
  AP3257, pp. 20, 217. 
186
  AP3257, p. 15; USAF Statistical Digest Jan 1949 - Jun 1950, Table 207. 
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Northern Zone had 11 different aircraft types.
187
  Aircraft routing and control 
systems had to be developed to cope with a theoretical saturation point in good 
weather of one landing every three minutes with equivalent rates for take-offs at 
each of the three Berlin airfields
188
; different navigation techniques and aids (and for 
parts of the Civil Lift, lack of aids
189
)
190
; the absence of navigators and exact 
positioning avionics on board C-54s (hence their inability to maintain precise 
separation throughout the flight)
191
; different aircraft cruising speeds leading to six 
standard cruising speed groupings in the Northern Zone
192
, and the absence of de-
icing capabilities on some civil aircraft requiring them to operate at lower 
altitudes
193
.  Moreover, the systems had to operate in good visibility and poor, day 
and night.
194
  Bad weather, which rarely affected the whole area of operations
195
; the 
number of serviceable aircraft; the availability of aircrews; loads and turn round 
times, and airfield maintenance especially in Berlin
196
 could lower peak capacity and 
introduce different pinch points into the system.
197
   
In the specially orchestrated Easter Parade during the 15-16 April 1949 24 hour 
recording period 1,398 sorties landed in Berlin having been despatched via the 
northern and southern corridors.  The northern one handled 883 inbound flights.
198
  
_____________________________________________________________ 
187
  AP3257, pp. 14, 157, 243; TNA: AIR 2/10063, E.50 App. B to Cannon/Williams 22 
December 1948; AIR 2/10064, Es:172-178 Williams 21 April 1949. 
188
  AP3257, pp. 23, 28 (acceptance rates one every two minutes were achieved where two 
runways were in use), 157, 217, 292; Tunner, p. 174. 
189
  AP3257, pp. 195, 225. 
190
  AP3257, pp. 15, 157, 165-167. 
191
  AP3257, pp. 23, 27-28, 165-155, 217, 220, 288-289; Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, 
p. 8; TNA, AIR 55/98, E.59 part of progress report undated. 
192
  AP3257, pp. 165-166, 338-341 (Speed groupings east: 160/148/125 knots and west: 
180/157/135 knots).  TNA, AIR 2/10063, Es:51-52 App. C to 22 December 1948 indicates 
that the flying boats flew at 145 knots in both directions.  
193
  AP3257, pp. 24, 157, 195, 224, 230. 
194
  AP3257, pp. 24-25, 31, 166, 219. 
195
 AP3257, p. 167; TNA, AIR 2/10063, E.46 Cannon/Williams 22 December 1948. 
196
  Fox, 'Cold War Warm Climes'; TNA, AIR 20/6892, Cannon/Williams Appraisal 14 
February 1949 
197
  The points contained in this paragraph were reinforced by Charlesby's research in TNA: 
AIR 55/98, AIR 55/99, AIR 55/100, AIR 55/102 and AP3257, App. K. 
198
  AP3257, pp. 148, 292; TNA, AIR 8/1649, HQ No. 46 Gp. AO398 16 April 1949. 
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Precise figures for the return flights are not certain.  The majority of aircraft would 
have returned via the central corridor but a few aircraft may have remained in Berlin 
temporarily and those for Fuhlsbuttel and RAF Schleswigland would, in accordance 
with standard operating procedures [SOPs], have returned via the northern one.  It 
can be estimated using a number of sources that about 1,330 returned via the central 
one with circa 65 returning via the northern one.
199
 
The variety of aircraft and number of airfields in the Northern Zone led to a system 
whereby each airfield was allocated a period during which its aircraft could take off.  
Initially each 'block' reoccurred every four hours but over time it became a two 
hourly cycle which was designed to suit the British better.  Finally an hourly 
despatch cycle was introduced for RAF Celle, RAF Fassberg and RAF Wunstorf.
200
  
There was horizontal separation between aircraft and between blocks which were 
also separated vertically.  Different altitudes were assigned to each despatching 
airfield.
201
  The Southern [American] Zone also used a four hourly block initially but 
then moved to the more efficient system of continuous flow.
202
   
As the Airlift evolved, aircraft in the Northern Zone were routed to Berlin through 
the northern corridor and returned along the central one.
203
  Southern Zone traffic 
used the southern corridor into Berlin and returned via the central one.
204
  From 
January 1949 Fuhlsbuttel and RAF Schleswigland aircraft returned along the 
northern corridor to reduce flight time.
205
  The RAF would have preferred to have 
employed continuous flow and two-way traffic flows in all the corridors relying on 
separation by position and height because as Table 5.9 showed this would have been 
_____________________________________________________________ 
199
  TNA: AIR 8/1649, HQ No. 46 Gp. AO398 16 April 1949; AIR 20/2071, Whitfield 16 
May 1949; AIR 28/1108, ORB RAF Schleswigland 15 April 1949; AIR 28/1163, ORB RAF 
Wunstorf 16 April 1949; AIR 55/109, AATO 1-30 April 1949. 
200
  AP3257, pp. 23, 156; D. J. Sutton, Brig, ed.-in-chief, The Story of the Royal Army 
Service Corps and Royal Corps of Transport 1945-1982 (London: Leo Cooper, 1984) p. 
106. 
201
  AP3257, pp. 23, 165, 219, 335 recorded that safety gap time separation between blocks 
applied only to either side of American ones. 
202
  AP3257, pp. 291-292. 
203
  AP3257, pp. 23, 291-292. 
204
  AP3257, pp. 23, 291-292. 
205
  AP3257, pp. 230, 292. 
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shorter, reducing for example the round trip for RAF Wunstorf by 39 nautical 
miles.
206
  However, the avionics fitted to American aircraft and their lack of a 
navigator prevented this becoming a general practice across the Airlift.
207
 
Airlift aircraft had also to be separated from Soviet ones using their seven airfield 
circuits in the Berlin Air Safety Zone.  Three of these were either immediately 
adjacent to or intersected those of Tegel, Tempelhof or RAF Gatow.
208
  No accidents 
occurred but inevitably there were incidents, as wonderfully recorded in a Berlin 
Military Governor signal: 'A number of Soviet aircraft which were probably 
preparing to land at Dallgow this afternoon slightly infringed the Gatow control 
zone…….A formal protest was made to the Russians in the Air Safety Centre but we 
are on weak ground, since our aircraft infringe the Dallgow zone up to 70 times per 
day.'
209
  In Berlin all the runways had the same bearing unlike the typical triangle 
layout employed in the UK by the RAF.
210
  This may have been why the British 
continued to design aircraft with a tail wheel even though they were far more 
susceptible to cross winds than aircraft like the Skymaster with a nose wheel.
211
  
RAF Lubeck was two miles west of the Eastern Zone and instrument approaches 
from that direction meant flying over Soviet occupied territory.  There were three 
fatal crashes on the approach to the airfield.  All were in bad weather and occurred 
over the Eastern Zone.
212
  
_____________________________________________________________ 
206
  AP3257, pp. 156; TNA, PREM 8/990, DO 49(6) 28 January 1949: 'a continuous stream, 
instead of the "time block" system', might make better use of aircraft'. 
207
  The Americans were aware of the inefficiencies in the traffic patterns.  When 
considering a smaller airbridge, divided into a 
2
/3
rds
 American and 
1
/3
rd
 British commitment, 
with lower traffic densities they proposed that aircraft from the Southern Zone should fly 
into Berlin along the southern corridor and return along the central one; American aircraft 
from Celle and Fassberg should use the northern corridor in both directions and British 
aircraft should use the central one in both directions - TNA, AIR 38/301, HQ CALTF Plans 
Division paper 25 June 1949 'Requirements to Lift 3500 tons to Berlin Daily'.  
208
  AP3257, pp. opposite 28, 217. 
209
  TNA, T236/1025, Berlin Military Governor No. 1848 9 September 1948. 
210
  AP3257, p. 219. 
211
  AP3257, pp. 80, 217, 293; MOD, airfield layout examples: RAF Dishforth, RAF 
Topcliffe, RAF Waterbeach <www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/s89.html, … /s96.html 
.…./s49.html> [all accessed 16 September 2012]. 
212
  AP3257, pp. 34-5 151, 165, 324; TNA: AIR 15/815, 'Load Bearing Tests' [LCN] 
Appendix A to CC/TS2295/15/Plans 10 April 1949; AIR 20/6892, Cannon/Williams 
Footnote continues on next page. 
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FREIGHT HANDLING 
The block system inherently led to bunching of aircraft take-offs at the start of each 
time period.  Loading (and maintenance) had to be managed carefully to ensure that 
when slots became available they were not wasted.
213
  Aircraft arrivals at the 
airfields in Berlin had to avoid surges followed by troughs.
214
  These made 
inefficient use of resources and the peaks could delay turn rounds.  Quick turn 
rounds were imperative because they minimised the time for the round trip and 
helped to ensure that more aircraft would be ready for the next block.
215
  They may 
also have helped the case to improve block frequency.  Essentially, the quicker the 
turn round the more trips possible in a day and so the greater the tonnage delivered. 
Load planning and assembly differed between airfields.  In April 1949, for example, 
RAF Fassberg concentrated on coal, a single cargo for every aircraft, ten tons of 
bagged coal.  At close by RAF Wunstorf dry lift cargoes -mail, food, and 
commodities for the British occupation in Berlin and for airfield maintenance - had 
to be readily available to be quickly handled, stowed, trimmed and secured for 
military Yorks with freight doors, ones with passenger doors and civilian Yorks with 
different tonnage limitations as well as diesel, gasoline and kerosene for 
Lancastrians, Liberators and Tudors with differing capabilities and capacities.
216
 
Quick loading and offloading required adequate numbers of warehouses to store the 
cargoes and at consignor airfields to pre-prepare standard aircraft loads.  Vehicles 
were needed to haul the freight to and from the aircraft.  Trained personnel had to 
prepare consignments; to load lorries and trailers, and then to reload the freight onto 
the aircraft, stowing it safely and securely, and at the destination, to reverse the 
process.  These activities had to conform to tried and effective SOPs and not to be 
                                                                                                                           
Appraisal 14 February 1949; AIR 20/7804, Dugmore 22 September 1948 envisaged 40 four-
engine aircraft at RAF Lubeck. 
213
  AP3257, pp. 156-157. 
214
  AP3257, p. 291. 
215
  AP3257, pp. 156-157, 301-308. 
216
  AP3257, pp. 67, 521, 523, 573.  RAF Wunstorf also consigned coal - Paul R. Wood, 
'Berlin Airlift Reconsidered: Problems and Success', Air Clues, Vol. 41, No. 7, July 1987, p. 
268. 
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the random genius or otherwise of each individual or team.  They had to be achieved 
without damaging the inherently fragile aircraft.  Much paperwork was involved 
(consignment notes, trim sheets, truck documentation, labour returns for locally 
hired civilians, and "stats returns").
217
   
It should have been the moment of glory for those in the RAF responsible for 
aircraft loading and unloading, the air movements personnel, for as Michael Donley, 
Secretary of the [US] Air Force, said during a veterans Diamond Jubilee reception 
and dinner: 'the success of the Berlin Airlift also relied on the herculean efforts of 
allied airmen, who provided game-changing innovations like: mixing aircraft loads 
of differing densities to maximize tonnage - for example, mixing items like pasta, 
which weighed little but took up space, with sugar, which was the opposite….'218  
Why then during a symposium on the history of RAF Supply and Movements in 
2005 was the Berlin Airlift covered in a few lines of trivia?
219
 
The air movements organization, training, the experience of the officers, and the 
acute shortage of personnel were highly criticized in AP3257, RAF Wunstorf's ORB, 
and Group Captain A. J. Biggar's 13 July 1948 report.  The Air Publication recorded: 
'In the early stages of the operation the RAF air movements organisation was very 
inefficient owing to an acute shortage of personnel and lack of training for the type 
of work that the available personnel were called upon to do.'
220
 
In May 1948 Transport Command had carried 5,972 passengers on an average 
journey of 1,342 miles and hauled 747.6 long tons of freight and 86.2 of mail with 
the average ton of freight travelling 894 miles.
221
  The senior officer specializing in 
_____________________________________________________________ 
217
  AP3257, pp. 68-69, 85-86, 157-158,173-175, 301-308, 557-572, 586-587; TNA, AIR 
24/2047, 'Responsibilities in respect of the safe loading of aircraft', Transport Command Air 
Staff Instruction, Vol. 1, No. 2. 
218
  Michael Donley, Secretary of the [US] Air Force, remarks at the Berlin Airlift Veterans 
Diamond Jubilee reception and dinner, Washington DC, 8 November 2009 
<www.af.mil/information/speeches/speech.asp> [accessed 6 July 2011]. 
219
  Duncan Grant, Gp Capt (Rtd), 'Movements and the Supply Branch' part of the 'Supply - 
an Airpower Enabler' Symposium, The Journal of the Royal Air Force Historical Society, 
No. 35 (Abingdon: Advance Book Printing, 2005) p. 82. 
220
  AP3257, pp. 68 (for quotation), 121, 173-5; TNA, AIR28/1163, 7 July 1948 and in 
Appendices: BAHQ(M)/104/RAF 13 July 1948, p. 2. 
221
  TNA, AIR 24/2046, 'Transport Command Statistical Summary May 1948'. 
 173 
movements at Headquarters Transport Command in June 1948 was a relatively 
lowly wing commander from the Secretarial Branch who had previously been 
aircrew.
222
  The Air Ministry Directorate of Movements covered air and surface 
movements.  The air commodore and his group captains and wing commanders all 
came from the Equipment Branch but below that level, the officers' backgrounds 
were mixed.
223
   
Two thirds of the first edition of the RAF's Manual of Movements was dedicated to 
surface movements.
224
  Thus the adverse comments are not surprising.  The 
specialism was unprepared for a large intensive operation like the Berlin Airlift.  It 
was subject to the same financial constraints as the rest of the RAF's "tail"; was few 
in numbers and was "brevetless" in an environment where being or having been a 
pilot counted for much.  In a peace time Air Force prior to Operation PLAINFARE, 
which seemed to consider Imphal and Burma to be an aberration, there was neither 
motivation nor justification for Transport Command to demand broader training and 
larger establishments or to practice large airbridge-type operations.  Brigadier (Rtd) 
R. C. Crowdy, in front of an audience of academics and retired RAF personnel, 
reinforced this explanation for the performance of RAF air movements: 
I do believe that at the higher echelons of command it would be much 
simpler if the loading and off loading of aircraft was not done by the Army 
but was done by the RAF, because you are then under one centralised 
control.  The reasons I understand it has not been possible in the past is a 
question of distribution of manpower, it's as simple as that, but I'm sure it 
would make the higher command very much easier to control where the 
loading and off loading were entirely in the hands of the RAF.
225
   
The RAF's attempts thereafter to resolve the lack of air movements staff during the 
Airlift left much to be desired.  In June and July Transport Command loaned 22 
_____________________________________________________________ 
222
  TNA, AIR 24/2046, Minutes of the AOC-in-C's Staff Conference 28 June 1948. 
223
  AM, The Air Force List, various, 1948-1949. 
224
  AM, AP3150: Royal Air Force Manual of Movements, 1
st
 edn., 1948. 
225
  R. C. Crowdy, Brig (Rtd) 'The Berlin Air Lift 1948-1949', The Proceedings of the Royal 
Air Force Historical Society, Issue No. 6, September 1989, p. 81. [Also recorded as 
Crowley in proceedings].  For spelling of his name, see HMG. Third Supplement to The 
London Gazette No. 42998 of 11
th
 May 1963 (published Tuesday 21 May 1963).  He 
participated in the Airlift as a Lt Col within AATO - Sutton, p. 108. 
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officers and 68 airmen to BAFO from its air movement staff.
226
  At the 6 September 
1948 AOC-in-C Transport Command's Staff Conference it was reported that the 
Transport Command's air movement assistants manning level was 60% and would 
fall to 39% at the end of October with forthcoming releases from service.
227
  
Solutions were considered during Staff Conferences.  Use of Transport Command's 
air quartermasters raised questions about their status as non-aircrew members of 
aircraft crews.
228
  No. 47 Group's Polish pilots, who could not be used on the Airlift 
because they were not yet naturalized
229
 and Glider Regiment Pilots were 
employed
230
.  There was concern about the morale of 47 Group's 100 second pilots 
employed on 'extraneous ground duties'.
231
  Thirty eight air movements personnel 
were transferred from the Middle East in December 1948.
232
  By February 1949, 
after 45 had been assigned to BAFO, lack of staff at route stations entered the 
agenda under 'Air Movements Problems'.
233
  Nevertheless, despite the need, air 
movements training had been closed down in October 1948 (as instructors were 
detached to BAFO) and routine courses did not restart until January 1949.  By Mid-
January 106 NCOs had volunteered for training.  There was parallel confusion about 
the future need to train officers.
234
 
The Army had the necessary manpower and a broad range of skills if not air 
_____________________________________________________________ 
226
  TNA: AIR 24/2046, HQ TC RAF Fs540 24-30 June 1948; AIR 24/2047, RAF F540 31 
July 1948. 
227
  TNA: AIR 24/2047, Minutes AOC-in-C Staff Conferences 6 and 20 September 1948; 
AIR 24/2048, Minutes AOC-in-C Staff Conferences 4 October 1948.  Included shortages at 
RAF Abingdon and technical staff loading aircraft. 
228
  TNA, AIR 24/2047, AOC-in-C Staff Conference 6 September 1948. 
229
  TNA, AIR 24/2048, AOC-in-C Staff Conferences 4 October 1948, 11 October 1948, 18 
October 1948, 25 October 1948. 
230
  TNA: AIR 24/2048, AOC-in-C Staff Conference 15 November 1948, 22 November 
1948, 13 December 1948, 20 December 1948; AIR 24/2049, AOC-in-C Staff Conference 4 
April 1949; AIR 38/309, 'Operation Plainfare Employment of Glider Pilots'. 
231
  TNA, AIR 24/2048, SASO's Conference 4 October 1948. 
232
  TNA, AIR 24/2048, AOC-in-C Staff Conference 6 December 1948, 13 December 1948, 
20 December 1948. 
233
  TNA, AIR 24/2049, Minutes AOC-in-C Staff Conference 28 February 1948. 
234
  TNA, AIR 24/2048, AOC-in-C Staff Conferences, 25 October 1948, 1 November 1948 
(reopening mid-November but no more officers were to be trained), 8 November 1948 
(plans for officer training), 6 December 1948, AOC-in-C Staff Conference 10 January 1949. 
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movements specialist ones.
235
  AATO had a history that traced back to the Burma 
airlifts.
236
  AP3257 recorded that: 'The AATO organisation was instituted at the 
beginning of the Airlift and worked with outstanding success throughout.  Co-
operation with the RAF, USAF and CCG [Control Commission for Germany] was 
excellent.'
237
  AATO was crucial to the success of the Airlift.  Pending Brigadier J. 
A. Dawson's arrival, it was commanded by Brigadier G. Lucas (Deputy 
Quartermaster-General British Army of the Rhine [BAOR]).
238
  Dawson had 
commanded the fledgling organization in Burma and had been Commandant Army 
Airborne Transport Development Centre between June 1946 and May 1948.
239
  
AATO's Headquarters was located alongside HQ No 46 Group ('in effect we worked 
as one integrated formation to ensure the closest possible liaison'
240
) and it had Rear 
Airfield Supply Organization [RASO] units at Fuhlsbuttel, RAF Celle, RAF 
Fassberg, RAF Lubeck, RAF Schleswigland and RAF Wunstorf.
241
  The Forward 
Airfield Supply Organization at RAF Gatow reported to it on technical matters.  
Figure 5.4 displays the organization in Germany.
242
 
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
235
  Sutton, pp. 102-3, identified one Army unit in Europe 'that had any experience in air 
supply', 749 Company RASC (Air Despatch).  It was to become closely involved. 
236
  Sutton, p. 108, for example Lt Col R. C. Crowdy, air supply Burma and from July 1948 
Operation PLAINFARE; R. C. Crowdy, 'The Berlin Air Lift 1948-1949', The Proceedings 
of the Royal Air Force Historical Society, Issue No. 6, September 1989, pp. 67-69. 
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 AP3257, p. 68. 
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  Sir Oliver Leese, Lt Gen, 'Operations in Burma from 12th November 1944 to 15th 
August 1945', Second Supplement to The London Gazette No. 39195 of 6
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(published 12 April 1951) pp. 1942-1944; William J. Slim, Defeat into Victory (London: 
Pan, 1999) p. 386; Airborne Assault, Plaque from Army Airborne Transport Development 
Centre <www.paradata.org.uk/media/43632?mediaSection =Photos&mediaItem=43741> 
[accessed 13 July 2013]; HMG, Supplement to the London Gazette No. 41760 dated 7
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1959 (printed 10 July 1959).  
240
  J. W. F. Merer, 'The Berlin Air Lift', Proceedings of Lecture to Royal Aeronautical 
Society, 13 April 1950, p. 9. 
241
  AP3257, p. 68. 
242
  AP3257, pp. 68, 557-558; T. H. Downes, 'The Berlin Airlift', The Royal Army Service 
Corps Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1948 (Aldershot: The RASC School, undated) p. 27. 
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Figure 5.4:  AATO Organization 
The RASOs at the airfields in the Northern Zone received the supplies (including 
when necessary unloading them and transferring them from local railheads) and then 
stored, accounted and onwards shipped them via the Air Forces in the proportions 
and against the programmes issued by HQ AATO at the priorities stipulated by the 
Bipartite Control Organization.  Stockholdings were reported to the CCG so that 
levels could be maintained and the bizonal authorities' delivery programmes 
maintained.  Each RASO sorted the supplies into consignments appropriate to each 
type of aircraft using the airfield and loaded them into the aircraft under the 
supervision of the involved Air Force.  It controlled and where relevant supervised 
all the locally engaged civilians, the motor transport, and the military drivers needed 
to deliver the RASO functions.
243
   
The RAF Air Movement Section or the USAF traffic personnel were responsible for 
the documentation and overseeing the correct disposition and lashing of loads in the 
aircraft.
244
  At RAF Gatow the Forward Airfield Supply Organization offloaded the 
aircraft and handed the supplies on to Military Government Berlin or to the British 
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military authorities depending on where they were ultimately destined.  It also 
backloaded empty sacks but not other consignments nor passengers which were 
handled by RAF air movements personnel.
245
  Similar functions in the Southern 
Zone and at Tempelhof were undertaken by the American forces whilst Tegel 
involved all three nations although the British were not normally involved in loading 
or unloading aircraft there.
246
 
Where cargoes comprised a range of products, some heavy and dense others light 
and bulky, they needed to be blended carefully to ensure each load fully utilized 
both the aircraft's available payload and its cubic capacity.  These 'marriages' of 
commodities resulted in a variety of package types, weights and sizes that could 
cause handling difficulties that adversely affected loading and offloading times.
247
  
They complicated consignment planning and at the Berlin airfields, commodity 
redistribution.
248
  Palletization would have helped but was not viable generally as it 
would have added weight and required mechanical assistance.  Instead small items 
were carried in sacks or boxes sized to permit easy man-handling and on-board 
stowage.
249
  Standard (uniform) loads were used when possible as this simplified 
loading, stowage and documentation.  In some cases, such as coal, it was beneficial 
to carry single cargoes.
250
  Frequent checks on the actual weight of standard 
packages were necessary to ensure accurate filling and so avoid endangering aircraft 
by exceeding permitted payloads or affecting trim.  This was especially true of 
enthusiastically over-filled coal sacks.
251
  Ropes and chains were used to 'lash' cargo.  
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Chains were cumbersome and heavy and reduced the beneficial payload.  Nets saved 
considerable time but could not be used for all cargoes.
252
   
Except for heavy loads (for example components for the West Berlin Power Station, 
construction equipment and rolls of newsprint), teams of displaced persons and 
German labourers, working under Army supervision, were found to be the fastest 
and most effective means of loading and unloading aircraft.  The Army Report 
'Observations on army aspects of Operation "Plainfare"' recorded off-loading times 
at RAF Gatow as 18 minutes for a C-54 carrying food and in 12 minutes for coal 
whilst a York loaded with food took eight minutes.
253
  The tasks were carried out as 
a fixed drill where every individual knew his task.
254
  The locally engaged civilian 
force of a typical RASO numbered 343 drivers, 2397 labourers, together with 
railway workers for the sidings, interpreters and clerks.
255
  Mechanical aids were 
used only for heavy items.
256
  Operating mechanical equipment including trucks and 
trailers near aircraft risked damage to intrinsically fragile aeroplanes.
257
  Carrying an 
entire aircraft load on one truck was found to reduce this risk and also to simplify 
loading.
258
 
The task of loading and unloading was made harder by the design of almost all the 
aircraft types employed.
259
  British aircraft needed ballast to maintain their centre of 
gravity when empty.  The Hastings and to a lesser extent the Dakota had a severe 
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slope that made handling cargo unnecessarily hard.  The loading doors into the body 
of the Halifax and the passenger variant of the York were small and poorly 
positioned in the latter case.  Hastings and Skymaster doors were high off the ground 
although they were conveniently low on the high-wing York.  Floor strengths near 
the doors could be insufficient for the weight of items carried and where dedicated 
crew entrances were absent, a gangway was necessary in the cargo hold.  These 
issues slowed loading and unloading and could affect what was carried.
260
  Door 
problems, moreover, introduced the risk of damage to the aircraft structure near the 
doors.
261
  Time to re-role aircraft from cargo to passenger could be a consideration 
too.  It was one of the reasons that the Dakotas were preferred over the Yorks or 
Hastings to carry evacuees as it could be done 'in a matter of minutes against the 40 
minutes or more'.
262
 
The standard Transport Command methods of documenting freight and passengers 
were too complicated and lengthy.  A master weight-and-balance form was 
introduced for each type of aircraft.  The cargo hold was divided up into 
compartments and the form recorded the weight that could be carried in each 
compartment.  The freight manifest was simplified too.  It recorded just the weight 
and a brief description of what was stowed in each compartment which speeded up 
loading and unloading.  The revised forms were sufficient to track consignments and 
to provide aircraft captains with what they needed pre-flight.  Passenger 
documentation was also reduced.  As far as was safely possible documentation was 
completed beforehand.
263
  Not only did documentation revision speed up turn round, 
it simplified the tasks of the air movements staff, 'many of whom had received no 
instruction in air movements duties prior to their employment in the operation'.
264
  
Integrated air movements/RASO load controls evolved as experience was gained.
265
  
They made up each aircraft's cargo and called it forward in a timely fashion.  Close 
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co-operation between the load control, servicing control, aircrew control, and 
airfield approach control allowed the matching of loads to aircraft availability.  This 
permitted awkward consignments to be assigned to aircraft which were undergoing 
minor rectification whilst that which was quick to load was allocated to serviceable 
aircraft with available aircrews.
266
  Efficiency developed with experience.  
HARASSMENT   
The Hump, Imphal and Leningrad airbridges were liable to enemy attack.  Any 
residual chance that the garrison at Stalingrad might have had disappeared when the 
Soviets captured the Luftwaffe's consignor and consignee airfields.  A similar 
situation would have arisen in Berlin if the Soviet army had rolled forward a couple 
of miles and blocked RAF Gatow's runways.  The orderly and efficient ground-
handling of aircraft, so essential to the Airlift, would have been unachievable if the 
airfields in Berlin had been subject to air attack or spasmodic shelling.   
The Soviet sector supplied electricity to RAF Gatow.
267
  Electricity to RAF Gatow 
was cut-off on 15/16 September 1948.
268
  The Tusas cited an occurrence on 2 
October 1948 and that the power returned permanently once the British authorities 
reminded their Soviet counterparts that they supplied the Soviet airfield at Staaken 
(Dalgow/Dallgow) and the [Soviet-controlled] Radio Berlin building.
269
  
Noteworthy to this incident is that Staaken was rarely used at night and so it may 
have been Radio Berlin that triggered their cooperation.
270
 
MATS recorded 733 harassment incidents by the Soviets during the Airlift.
271
  
Exploration of the incident summaries does not point to these being orchestrated by 
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a central authority and it is questionable whether many were harassment.
272
  None of 
the Airlift crashes were attributed to Soviet action.
273
  If neither side sought open 
warfare, it would have been foolish to have taken action that caused an unarmed 
transport aircraft legitimately flying along a corridor to have come down with 
probable loss of life.  The Airlift made extensive use of radio and radar to achieve its 
high performance, 24 hours per day and in most weathers.
274
  Eighty two incidences 
were ascribed to radio interference.
275
  The RAF had counter measures ready.  They 
recognized that Soviet electronic 'jamming' would have a serious impact on the 
Airlift but believed that it was unlikely to be used.
276
   
Reports were produced in 1950
277
 and 1952
278
 addressing the options available to 
the Soviets to interfere with any future airlift.  The possibilities varied from being 
able to stop the traffic flow by jamming to more reassuring conclusions that the 
tonnage hauled would be 25%
 
less than planned but an airlift was still practical.  To 
avoid being 'so blatant' as to become a 'casus belli'
279
, Soviet or East German 
measures such as burning bush fires, raising balloons and jamming might have been 
used intermittently for their nuisance effect.  As the Berlin Air Safety Zone was 
shared and the airfields close together, a parallel Soviet Airlift would have been 
detrimental as would have been building tall buildings and radio masts in the Soviet 
Sector along the approaches to RAF Gatow.
280
  There was nothing new generically 
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in 1950 or 1952 that the Soviets could not have done in 1948-1949 and as discussed 
in Chapter 6, the Berlin Airlift margins were at times very fine.  The absence of 
orchestrated interference reinforces the views that the Soviet hierarchy was not 
seeking an armed conflict and that they probably expected the Airlift to fail without 
their overt interference.
281
  
CONCLUSION 
Chapter 5's examination of the success factors found in the earlier airbridges at 
Chapter 3 identified a mixture of lessons learnt, not learnt and examples where the 
advantages may have been appreciated but implementation was not possible.  
Theoretically RAF No. 46 Group and the US 1
st
 ALTF were part of CALTF under 
Tunner with Merer as his deputy.  In reality the British and American air transport 
fleets were commanded on a day to day basis by a national specialist unit detached 
from Transport Command and MATS respectively.  Each one reported to a local 
higher formation which was not experienced in air supply and the arrangement was 
far from perfect.  However, this was a large complex operation which needed the 
infrastructure controlled by these higher authorities and the extant liaison between 
them and with the local army Commands and the civilian occupation organizations.  
Thus from this wider viewpoint the involvement of HQ BAFO and HQ USAFE 
made sense. 
Both Americans and British flew 24 hours per day in most weathers although 
initially the contractors tended to be "fair weather flyers".  Air traffic procedures 
were developed to make best use of the corridors, the airfields, and the more 
effective aircraft in the larger American fleet.  The airfields nearest to Berlin were in 
the British Zone and as time passed the USAF operated from two RAF bases, with a 
third one under development.  Civil engineering was undertaken to improve all 
Airlift airfields and Tegel was built from scratch.   
The American fleet concentrated on one aircraft type.  Its USAF element was short 
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of mechanics on the squadrons but 1
st
 ALTF was adaptable enough to employ ex-
Luftwaffe personnel to increase the numbers.  By sound but flexible thinking and the 
allocation of large numbers of aircraft to the front line with growing support, the 
Americans were able to generate sufficient deliveries to meet their targets.  The 
British had to employ a range of different aircraft including aircraft and personnel 
contracted from civilian companies.  The larger RAF aircraft were unreliable and all 
three types had design deficiencies.
282
  The RAF was short of aircrew and 
maintenance staff.  Unlike the Americans, it did not use ex-Luftwaffe personnel for 
other than 'non-skilled' tasks and the Government was unwilling to recall reservists 
en mass.  RAF maintenance policies were unsuitable for this type of operation.   
Some of the British aircraft types were difficult to load owing to having tail wheel 
configurations which caused steep slopes inside the fuselages whilst others had 
small access doors.  Cargo handling on the ground was efficient being undertaken 
almost entirely by the British and American armies augmented by large numbers of 
locally engaged civilians.  Most of the loading and unloading of aircraft was done by 
hand using trained teams adhering to standard procedures.   
The Soviets had the capability to interfere with the Airlift.  They opted not to do so 
probably to avoid the risk of the Cold War becoming hot and because they expected 
the Airlift would fail during the winter of 1948-1949.  That would have been a not 
unreasonable expectation if their reference experience was Leningrad and 
Stalingrad.  Whilst these are plausible arguments, they do not explain why 
capabilities were not deployed after it was apparent that the Airlift was not failing, 
especially as the Soviets had options that did not directly risk CALTF aircrews or 
their aircraft.   
As AP3257 acknowledged, RAF performance was not as good as the Americans.
283
  
Furthermore, the differences between the American and British performances arose 
from reasons in addition to Barker's aircraft sizes and numbers.  Chapter 5 revealed 
that the causes for Britain's performance were due partly to the Nation's financial 
state and the priorities that her Government had set post-war.  The reduced state of 
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the RAF meant that Dakotas had to be deployed to increase her share of the tonnage 
delivered and even then there was a shortfall which necessitated contractors having 
to be engaged.  The ratio of aircrews to RAF aircraft was insufficient as were the 
number of maintenance personnel both in Britain and in Germany.  Poor pay and 
conditions reduced the possibility of retaining those with a discharge option and 
persuading suitable ex-servicemen to rejoin.  The size of the Air Force, and its 
transport arm especially, led to shortages generally and deploying Dakotas 
necessitated spending dollars on additional spares that could not be purchased in 
sterling.  Examination of performance differences continues in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
BERLIN AIRLIFT - ANALYSIS OF THE LOGISTICAL RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
Chapter 6 explores whether participation by British aircraft was necessary 
logistically and could the more efficient Americans, with greater aerial resources, 
have undertaken the airborne operation on their own.  It answers three specific 
questions: were British aircraft needed logistically; could the Americans have 
replaced them by deploying more resources or by locating all of 1
st
 ALTF in the 
Northern Zone which was nearer to Berlin than the American Southern Zone.  In 
evaluating these questions, Chapter 6 also continues to identify the reasons that the 
British hauled less tonnage than the Americans.   
From June until September 1948, the Airlift was intended to tide over western Berlin 
until normal surface communication was resumed.  From October 1948 to the start of 
March 1949, it allowed western Berlin to survive the winter.  The next phase was 
intended to supply western Berlin and to build up stocks for the next winter.  Instead 
with the lifting of the blockade in May 1949 it became a period when stockpiles were 
built by air and surface transport in case the Soviets reinstated the Blockade.  
Towards the end of that phase the Airlift was gradually rundown with the last RAF 
aircraft (Hastings at RAF Schleswigland) stopping operations on 6 October 1949.
1
  
This research focussed on the Airlift during the Blockade, from the first sorties by 
RAF Waterbeach aircraft from RAF Wunstorf on 25 June 1948 until it was lifted at 
0001 hours on 12 May 1949.
2
 
Resolution of the question about the necessity for British aircraft involved 
comparison of the targets set and the tonnages carried.  The one about deploying 
more American resources entailed determining whether enough additional resources 
existed to replace the British aircraft.  Relocating 1
st
 ALTF explored how much 
additional tonnage would have been carried by Wiesbaden or Rhein-Main aircraft if 
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based at an airfield on the eastern side of the British Zone.
3
  The targets set were 
compared with the tonnages achieved or potentially achievable.  Additional issues 
had to be considered which drew on material contained in Chapters 4 and 5 such as 
airfield availability; impact on traffic flow in the three corridors and within the Berlin 
Air Safety Zone, and British specialities such as the Wet Lift.
4
  It provided the 
opportunity to examine further the efficiency of the British fleets; the cost to and 
cost-sensitivities of the Treasury about the Civil Lift
5
, and Transport Command's 
other commitments
6
.   
TERMINOLOGY AND STATISTICS 
Tonnage statistics form the kernel of Chapter 6.  These are taken from those 
compiled at the time and in the main originated from the cargo manifests which were 
not always accurate.  With so many different nationalities and organizations 
collecting data at different points in the system for a variety of purposes, there were 
disparities as the examples at Appendix 6 show.  Normally the Americans and the 
British captured their statistics independently and then shared the information.   
As Barker wrote, 'A good deal of statistical confusion has arisen about the airlift 
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because the nations concerned use the word "ton" to describe different weights'.
7
  
The Americans and the British measured aircraft weights and cargo manifests in 
'Anglo-American' pounds.
8
  The loads were then totalled in tons, with the Americans 
using short tons (2,000lbs) and the British employing long tons (2,240lbs) initially 
before moving to short ones.  The Germans and western Berlin occupation 
authorities utilized metric tons/tonnes (2,204.6lbs).
9
   
The various "tons" led to misleading information being published and to friction 
between organizations.  Communication in this area also displayed the growing 
embarrassment of the British about size of the tonnage carried by the RAF in 
comparison with the Americans.  Complaints were made by HQ BAFO that the daily 
Airlift situation reports [ALREPs] distributed by the British in Berlin showed the 
RAF's performance in a bad light.  The AOC-in-C BAFO communicated tersely 
directly to the RAF senior officer Airlift Headquarters (a British unit under the 
command of the GOC British Troops Berlin).  The GOC British Troops Berlin 
responded by agreeing to circulate some of the 'sensitive' (about RAF performance) 
statistics on a limited distribution.
10
  As late as April 1949 disputes were still taking 
place about the use of gross or net weight and metric or short tons, and how 
information should be released to the media.
11
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Although terms such as 'sortie' were defined, they were sometimes used colloquially.  
Care needs to be taken to determine whether USAF and USAFE data included the 
two high performing USN squadrons that were part of 1
st
 ALTF.
12
  Sources 
expressed doubts about the accuracy of the recorded data
13
, including whether the 
notional weight of passengers was included in reported tonnages
14
.   
The ALREP recording cycle in Berlin covered from midday to midday whilst, for 
example, the Wunstorf RASO cycle initially centred on 0600 but subsequently also 
synchronized on 1200 hours.
15
  Even when daily statistics were aligned the question 
remained whether a total represented the receipts in Berlin or tons despatched from 
western Germany.
16
   
Gross weight was significant to the US and British Air Forces and the Armies in the 
western zones as it was what they handled.  Net weights were important in Berlin as 
it was the contents that were crucial to them.
17
  AP3257 cited a 7% difference 
overall.
18
  The civilian tanker fleet ('tank machines'
19
) carried its bulk fuel cargo in 
tanks that were an intrinsic part of the aircraft, albeit often specially added to the 
airframe, or in a pannier slung below it.  In the case of the Wet Lift net weight was 
_____________________________________________________________ 
12
   AFHRA: IRISNUM 240605, 'USAFE and the Berlin Airlift 1949: Supply and 
Operational Aspects' HQ USAFE 1 February 1950, p. 224; Berlin Airlift: A USAFE 
Summary, p. 5; Department of the [US] Air Force, Operations Statistics Division, United 
States Air Force Statistical Digest Jan 1949 - Jun 1950 Fifth Edition (Washington DC: US 
Government, 1951) USAF Airlift data Table 207 which stated at p. 397: 'This presentation 
covers USAF operations only'. 
13
  TNA, FO 1077/4, CAATO Notes on Conference 27 April 1949; William H. Tunner, Over 
the Hump (Washington DC, US Government, 1985) p. 204 about the accuracy of manifests; 
USAF Statistical Digest Jan 1949- Jun 1950, Table 207 recorded for example that between 
March through May 2% of the sorties flown to Berlin by USAF C-54s at Rhein-Main were 
aborted, a total of about 3,410 short tons. 
14
  TNA, AIR 20/7816, Waite 6 January 1949. 
15
  AP3257, p. 564; TNA: AIR 20/7285, for example; WO 267/497; WO 267/498. 
16
  TNA, AIR 20/7816, Herbert 11 November 1948. 
17
  TNA, AIR 20/7816 Waite 21 September and 10 November 1949, Herbert 11 November 
1949. 
18
  AP3257, p. 5; TNA, AIR 20/7816, Herbert 19 October 1948 cites 4% tare for coal. 
19
  TNA, AIR 20/6891, FO (German Section) 3213 Basic, 3 Nov 48. 
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recorded.
20
 
Passengers were carried in Operation PLAINFARE and Operations VITTLES 
aircraft.
21
  Before the Blockade the RAF ran scheduled 'P.19' flights between RAF 
Buckeburg and RAF Gatow carrying mail, official passengers and freight.  These 
flights continued during the Blockade using Dakotas provided from the Operation 
PLAINFARE fleet.
22
  P.19 data was sometimes included in PLAINFARE statistics 
but at other times it was not.
23
  Passengers were recorded in the American tonnage as 
a notional gross weight.  AP3257 cited P.19 statistics including weights of 
passengers.
24
  Passengers and freight were also carried into Berlin by the civilian 
scheduled airlines which were not included in Airlift statistics.
25
   
Tonnages despatched differed from those received by Berlin which made routine 
comparison with the Airlift targets an imprecise activity.
26
  Charlesby, for example, 
found a 10% disparity between CALTF figures and those compiled at Berlin during 
the period December 1948 through February 1949 period.
27
  This was due to the 
inaccurate manifests and aborted delivery sorties identified above and also to theft, 
spillage and "natural wastage".
28
  Food gives an example of the impact of such 
_____________________________________________________________ 
20
  AP3257, Apps. C pt. VI, and T. 
21
  AP3257, pp. 65-66. 
22
  AP3257, pp. 100, 119; TNA, AIR 28/997, RAF Buckeburg ORB; examples of squadron 
detachments to P.19 duties: TNA: AIR 27/2395, 10 Sqn December 1948 - January 1949; 
AIR 27/2405, 27 Sqn July 1948; AIR 27/2406, 30 Sqn February 1949 Appendix 1; AIR 
27/2417, 46 Sqn December 1948. 
23
  AP3257, App. R; TNA, AIR 24/2046-2052, TC ORBs, monthly statistics summaries. 
24
  AP3257, pp. 301 (three C-54 passenger flights were included in the daily requirements as 
30 tons), 526-527; TNA, AIR 20/7816, Waite 6 January 1949. 
25
  AP3257, p. 341, for example BEA; Theodore Joseph Crackel, A History of the Civil 
Reserve Air Fleet, Air Force History & Museums Program (Washington DC: US 
Government, 1998) pp. 60-61 for US airlines, citing American Overseas Airlines, the 
scheduled operator making 2,186 trips to Berlin between June 1948 and the end of May 1949 
lifting 'over 7,250 tons of cargo and more than 29,000 passengers'. In all Crackel writes that 
about 2,500 trips to Berlin were made by US airlines. 
26
  TNA, AIR 55/100, Es:24-26 Charlesby undated but post 1948/49 winter. 
27
  AP3257, p. 365. 
28
  Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, pp. 30, 165; Sebastian Cox, 'Britain and the Berlin 
Airlift'  Royal Air Force Air Power Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 2004, p. 39; Elizabeth S. 
Lay, Historical Division, Headquarters European Command, 'The Berlin Airlift: Part 2: 1 
January-30 September 1949', Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1948 -1949, (Karlsruhe: 
Footnote continues on next page. 
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disparities.  Between the Airlift starting and its end the combined force hauled nearly 
540,000 short tons of food.
29
  If this figure was too high by 5%, the shortfall would 
have been 27,000 tons or in excess of 25lbs per western Berliner which equated to 
nearly 19 days rations at the 20 October 1948 level.
30
   
Although Chapter 6 concentrates on targets, requirements and achievements, it 
would be wrong to suppose that when there were shortfalls the western Berliners had 
to rely on any personal reserves, shopkeepers' stocks or the porous blockade (Chapter 
2 above).  Stockpiles had been built up prior to the Blockade (Chapter 2).  
Charlesby's study into 'The Supply of Berlin during the Winter of 1948/1949' 
(actually 1 December 1948 to 28 February 1949) revealed that planners had 
stockpiles and minimum levels which they strove to maintain.
31
  At the end of 
February coal stocks totalled 28 days consumption
32
 including 4 days arising from 
the 'discovery of further coal stocks' as opposed to the minimum reserve level of 21 
days.  Charlesby described 'the margin of safety' as 'quite small' but with summer two 
months away and assuming the Airlift continued, Berlin's quartermasters should have 
been comfortable with those stock levels.
33
  What should have been of greater 
concern were the food levels which a study graph showed had risen then fallen and 
by the end of February were at about 27 days against a planned level of 34.
34
  
WERE BRITISH AIRCRAFT NEEDED LOGISTICALLY? 
Table 6.1 summarizes the division of the Airlift in terms of tonnage between the 
Americans and the British.  In July 1948 the British hauled 42% of the cargo, in 
August 38%, but in September, which marked the start of their decline in percentage 
terms, only 27%.  Over the whole Airlift period the British transported 23% of the 
                                                                                                                           
1952) pp. 5, 21, 27-28, 50-51, 127, 129; J. W. F. Merer, 'The Berlin Air Lift', Proceedings of 
Lecture to Royal Aeronautical Society, 13 April 1950, p. 10; TNA, FO 1077/4 CAATO 
Conference 16 May 1949; Tunner, p. 204. 
29
  AP3257, p. 521. 
30
  AP3257, p. 301. 
31
  AP3257, pp. 365-370; TNA, AIR 55/100, Es:24-29 Charlesby undated. 
32
  Whether this was at winter, summer or average rates was not stated. 
33
  AP3257, p. 367. 
34
  AP3257, p. 370. 
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total.  Was this effort necessary logistically?
35
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Table 6.1:  Division of the Airlift between the Americans and the British 
During the Blockade the military governors set several targets
36
 for the Airlift with 
the actual monthly requirements being circulated by the Occupation Authorities
37
.  
The targets, however, must be viewed against the CALTF 'constitution' which 
directed that:  
2.  The purpose of this organization is to merge the heretofore but 
independent, USAF-RAF airlift efforts in order that the resources of each 
participating service may be utilized in the most advantageous manner.  Its 
primary mission is to deliver to Berlin, in a safe and efficient manner, the 
maximum tonnage possible consistent with combined resources of equipment 
_____________________________________________________________ 
35
  AP3257, p. 519. 
36
  AP3257, pp. 5-6, 301; TNA, AIR 2/10064, Es:275-280 Robertson 18 March 1949 and 14 
March 1949 Appreciation. 
TNA, AIR 55/100, Es:8-9 Charlesby 30 November 1948, 14-16 Charlesby 11 January 1949, 
24-26 Charlesby undated but post 1948/49 winter - reports on target planning. 
37
  AP3257, pp. 65-67, 300-301, 563-564; examples in TNA: AIR 20/7803; AIR 20/7807; 
AIR 20/7828; AIR 20/7829. 
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and personnel available.
38
 
Table 6.2 shows in two parts what the Airlift achieved between its start in June 1948 
and the end of the Blockade in May 1949 against the "mandatory" targets recorded in 
AP3257 and the higher "desirable" requirements for July and August 1948 (4,374 
tons per day) and April 1949 onwards (8,944 tons per day).
39
  Whilst in each period 
the tonnage hauled exceeded the mandatory target, the winter figures show how close 
the margins were, just half of one winter's day's target (and, as discussed above in the 
'Terminology and Statistics' Section, that assumes that the overall tonnages recorded 
were correct).  Between 1 July 1948 and 30 April 1949 the mandatory targets were 
met but the desirable ones were not with the Airlift falling short by a total of 93,000 
tons.  The 1 to 12 May 1949 inclusive figure gave a daily average of 8,799 short tons 
hauled which was well above the daily mandatory target of 5,620 but still below the 
desirable one of 8,944.
40
   
_____________________________________________________________ 
38
  TNA, AIR 25/1266, No. 46 Gp. ORB, Appendices September-October 1948, Appendix 
20 to Form 540 dated 15 October 1948. 
39
  AP3257, pp. 5-6, 301, 519.  AP3257, p. 301 gave the date for the winter 1948-1949 
revision to 5,620 short tons as 20 October 1948 but did not identify when it became the 
Airlift target.  Roger G. Miller, To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948-1949 (College 
Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2000) p. 169 stated that the "Clay" 5,620 short 
ton requirement was set on 22 November 1948 with it becoming an Airlift target at the start 
of the New Year 1949. 
40
  AP3257, pp. 65, 301, 519; TNA: AIR 19/621; AIR 20/7816; AIR 20/7285; AIR 20/7286; 
AIR 55/110. 
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Table 6.2.1:  Comparison of Targets and Deliveries - Graphical Summary  
  
Carried Mandatory 
Target 
Desirable 
Requirement 
a-b a-c 
(a) (b) (c) 
June 1948 1,404     
July - October 
1948  475,212 400,052 538,002 75,160. -62,790. 
November 48 - 
March 1949 775,371 772,614 772,614 2,757 2,757 
April 1949 235,364 168,600 268,320 66,764 -32,956 
1 to 12 May 1949 
41
 105,589      
July 1948 - April 
1949 1,485,946 1,341,266 1,578,936 144,680 -92,990 
 
Table 6.2.2:  Comparison of Targets and Deliveries - Detail (rounded short tons) 
1948-1949 was an exceptionally mild winter (average temperatures for December 
_____________________________________________________________ 
41
  Because of the way data was concatenated in the daily reports, the figures include 12 
hours after the blockade ceased. 
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1948 through February 1949 matched those normally experienced in November).
42
  
The domestic heating coal ration was only 50lbs per family rather than the intended 
four cwt thereby saving nearly 1500 metric tons per day.
43
  The good weather 
improved aircraft maintenance and permitted more trips per day than had been 
expected.
44
  An additional four days' coal stocks were discovered in western Berlin
45
 
and more Skymasters were provided than had been planned.
46
  Nevertheless, for a 
time the Airlift had to haul coal instead of food so that the city did not fall below its 
21 day minimum reserve level.
47
 
However, it is not the interim Airlift targets that should be considered when deciding 
if British participation was necessary but the long term one of 8,944 short tons per 
day.
48
  This was a daily average across the year and because of the adverse weather 
in winter, the figures hauled in summer had to be greater to compensate.  DDASTO, 
for example, wrote that adverse weather meant that a force with a potential to deliver 
851 short tons per day could be expected to deliver 680 on average in summer and 
510 in winter.
49
  Not only did the daily sorties fall in winter but consumption grew as 
the example at Table 6.3 shows.  
_____________________________________________________________ 
42
  AM, RAF Air Clues, Vol. 3, No. 12, August 1949, pp. 16-17.  
43
  Air Clues, August 1949, p. 17. 
44
  Air Clues, August 1949, p. 17. 
45
  Air Clues, August 1949, p. 22; TNA, AIR 55/98, E.66 part of draft for Air Clues. 
46
  Air Clues, August 1949, p. 17. 
47
  Air Clues, August 1949, p. 22; TNA, AIR 55/98, E.66.  TNA: FO 1012/567, Es:4-7 
Command Section (Plans) CS(P)7 Prince 15 December 1948 provided the estimate sought 
by GOC British Troops Berlin of shortfalls to be expected during January and February 1949 
assuming 14 days' coal stocks remained on 28 February 1949 at February's consumption 
rates and CALTF met its error-corrected targets; FO 1012/568, Command Section (Plans) 
CS(P)8 Prince 23 December 1948 revised the estimated shortfall to reflect the lower than 
expected deliveries in December and a reduced expectation for January and February 1949.  
Whilst nowhere near as dire as conditions during the Siege of Leningrad these estimates 
pointed to an unpleasant winter. 
48
  AP3257, p. 6; TNA, Air 2/10064, Es:318-319 James 10 March 1949. 
49
  TNA, AIR 2/10064, Es:54-58 DDASTO August 1949.  In the December 1948 Appraisal - 
TNA, AIR 2/10063, Es:45-52 Cannon/Williams 22 December 1948 - the forward estimate of 
losses for January 1949 was 48% for the British overall and 36% for C-54s owing to weather 
and other factors.  The BAFO Chief Research Officer - AIR 55/98, Es:19-20 part of draft 
undated BAFO report - used slightly different criteria and reached slightly different figures 
for the impact of adverse weather, a loss of 50% in the worse month and 6% in the best. 
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Table 6.3:  Comparison of Predicted Daily Requirements against Predicted 
Daily Airlift July 1949-June 1950
50
   
Robertson's 18 March letter to Bevin
51
 (albeit considering a slightly smaller long 
term figure of 8,685 short tons) used descriptions such as 'minimum'.  This was in 
spite of the intended one third of the potato ration being fresh, a growth in the 'average' 
ration to 2,100 calories, and an increase in domestic electricity to four to five hours 
per day and possibly six.  Particularly he stated a domestic coal quota for heating of 
four cwt per household was inadequate and pointed to 18 cwt having been issued in 
the Northern Zone during the previous winter.  Robertson proposed a target of 9,000 
short tons but recognized even that would only provide five cwt per household.  
Williams indicated 10,000 tons would be the target sometime in 1950
52
 and Clay 
advocated the same figure for the next target upgrade
53
.  Thus the figures for early 
May 1949 whilst seemingly good were not approaching the tonnage needed to be 
delivered that summer. 
May 1949 was the peak month when the average number of landings per day at all 
_____________________________________________________________ 
50
  TNA, AIR 19/766, App. A to ALC/R(49)1. 
51
  TNA: AIR 19/766, Robertson 18 March 1949 and attached AK/Memo(49)6 dated 14 
March 1949; AIR 20/6892, Bourne 3 March 1949 cited a 'narrow margin of safety'; FO 
1012/571, Es:2-6 C.S.(P)14Command Section Ferguson 17 February 1949. 
52
  TNA, AIR 2/10063, Es:21-26 Meeting 18 January 1949. 
53
  TNA, AIR 2/10064, Es:318-319 James 10 March 1949. 
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three Berlin airfields, including the daily handful of P.19 trips, totalled 894.
54
  The 
Americans calculated the theoretical saturation point, would be a force of 475 aircraft 
and making 1,440 landings per day in Berlin in good weather.
55
  This was based on 
the three airfields in Berlin and 20 landings per airfield per hour.  RAF Gatow 
achieved one in two minutes using its two runways
56
 and in May 1949 a third runway 
was started there.  In actuality, weather, runway and taxiway maintenance and 
blockages reduced the figure.
57
  (US standards for runway maintenance appeared to 
have been higher
58
 although the poor state of Tegel's runway - built and operated by 
the Americans in the French Sector - was affecting British tail wheeled aircraft
59
).  
The best rate overall occurred during the specially orchestrated 'Easter Parade' on 16 
April when there were 1,398 Airlift landings at the three Berlin airfields.
60
  Thus 
even at the end of the Blockade neither the average deliveries per day nor a one-off 
event had reached the saturation point calculated by the Americans.  Moreover, as 
the next two sections will show, the CALTF airfield capacity in the Northern and 
Southern Zones would only have become sufficient for 475 aircraft after completion 
of the civil engineering at RAF Luneburg and Fuhlsbuttel.
61
   
_____________________________________________________________ 
54
  AP3257, pp. 526, 529. 
55
  AP3257, pp. 23, 28, 289, 324; TNA: AIR 2/10064, E.175 - part of Es:172-178 Williams 
21 April 1949 and attachments; AIR 20/6892, Cannon/Williams Appraisal 14 February 
1949; Tunner, p. 174.  This equates to 3 trips per day per aircraft available on base and at 
60% serviceability 5.  Set against the theoretical ceiling of 6 trips daily per aircraft, 475 
aircraft implies a 51% utilization rate.  At the Cannon/Williams target of 65% and 6 trips 
daily, 369 aircraft would have been required but such utilization rates across 1
st
 ALTF do not 
appear credible on a regular basis. 
56
  AP3257, pp. 157, 320.   
57
  AP3257, Apps. E, L; John Fox, 'Cold War Warm Climes' part of the 'Support of Air 
Operations' Symposium, Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal, No. 51 (Witney: 
Windrush, 2011) pp. 46-50 indicated in his presentation that runways were shut down for 
about an hour a day at RAF Gatow for repairs; Arthur Pearcy, Berlin Airlift (Shrewsbury: 
Airlife, 1997) p. 56; TNA, AIR 2/10063, E.46 Cannon/Williams 22 December 1948 gave 
landings saturation figures 'for some weeks' of 480 at Tempelhof, 360 Tegel whilst working 
up, and 380 RAF Gatow whilst one runway closed for repairs.   
58
  Berlin Airlift: A Summary, p. 78 citing RAF Fassberg and RAF Celle specifically. 
59
  AP3257, p. 235. 
60
  AP3257, pp. 148, 292. 
61
  AP3257, Apps: E, K-4, L, pp. 148, 152, 157, 235, 292, 320, 324, 326; Berlin Airlift: A 
USAFE Summary, p. 78 citing RAF Fassberg and RAF Celle specifically; Pearcy, Berlin 
Footnote continues on next page. 
  197 
British aircraft were not superfluous from the strict logistics angle.  They were 
needed to meet the tonnage totals.  Even if this had not been true, maintaining the 
support of the western Berliners was imperative.  The citizens were living close to 
the margins, with 43,143 unemployed and 67,219 on short time owing to the 
Blockade.
62
  The Airlift system was nowhere near its routine saturation point of 
1,440 deliveries per day and for the British to have withdrawn would have provided 
the Soviets with a major source of propaganda.
63
   
COULD THE AMERICANS HAVE DEPLOYED MORE RESOURCES? 
Tunner wrote in September 1948 that 'Should as many as 400 C-54's be placed in the 
operation [plus 100 in the 1,000 hour inspection in the USA] participation by the 
British would be limited to ground support'.
64
  This section addresses whether the 
Americans had sufficient resources to have replaced the British airlift aircraft with 
their own.  The circumstances under which this might have occurred are hypothetical 
but not beyond rationality.  The French Air Force's airlift was limited, of short 
duration, and only supported France's garrison in Berlin.  It comprised 424 trips 
delivering 881 tons and carrying 10,367 passengers (the latter mainly outbound from 
Berlin).  The aircraft were few in number and of several types.  They operated from 
RAF Wunstorf, RAF Buckeburg and a French airfield at Baden-Baden.
65
  By the end 
of September 1948 the French ceased to participate in the Airlift and their garrison 
                                                                                                                           
Airlift, p. 56; Tunner, p. 174; TNA: AIR 2/10064, Es:172-178 Williams 21 April 1949 and 
attachments; AIR 20/6892, Cannon/Williams Appraisal 14 February 1949. 
62
  Barker, pp. 59-60. 
63
  TNA: FO 1012/569, Es:2-8 C.S.(P)12 Third Edition and FO 1012/571, Es:2-6 C.S.(P)14 
Command Section Ferguson 17 February 1949 on importance of maintaining civilian 
morale. 
64
  AFHRA, IRISNUM 1038197, 'History of the Airlift Task Force (Prov.): September 1948', 
Tunner 28 September 1948. 
65
  Miller, To Save a City (Texas A&M) pp. 74-75; François Pernot, 'The Berlin Airlift and 
the French Air Force', for a symposium organized by USAF, AHB and the City of Berlin in 
April 1998, narrative held by AHB with further papers in French; François Pernot, 'Un 
succès politique et diplomatique', Helmut Trotnow, and Bernd von Kostka, coordinators, Die 
Berliner Luftbrücke – Ereignis und Erinnerung (Berlin: Frank and Timme, 2010) pp. 67-69.  
In January 1949 the British thought that the French should make 'some contribution' to the 
Airlift using their Bristol Freighters but the idea was not carried forward as that type of 
aircraft was withdrawn from the Civil airlift - TNA, T 236/1026, Es:20-22 Serpell 5 January 
1949 and E.55 Crawford 8 January 1949. 
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and the Berliners in their sector were supplied by the Americans.
66
  Photographs of 
French participation appear regularly in secondary sources because the Armée de 
l'Air deployed indigenously manufactured Junkers Ju-52s, the aircraft used by the 
Luftwaffe at Stalingrad.
67
  
Whilst the Anglo-Saxon personnel spoke approximately a common language, the 
British also had a miscellany of aircraft type albeit in rather larger numbers once the 
smaller civilian types were withdrawn.
68
  The RAF small twin-engine Dakotas 
remained in use and made up its largest component numerically.  They were the first 
to be grounded to make way for the larger four-engine aircraft when poor weather or 
other factors reduced corridor capacity.
69
  It is not unreasonable, therefore, to 
examine whether the Americans could have replaced the British leaving the latter's 
place in Airlift history as the provider of airfields and their associated ground support 
(and for secondary sources, the supplier of photographs of RAF Short Sunderland 
flying boats operating from the Havel-See during the autumn of 1948 such as that at 
Photograph 13 above
70
).   
HQ BAFO Air Staff recorded that 'It is understood that the Americans have plans for 
increasing numbers and size of aircraft.  There may come a time when we will 
become an embarrassment rather than an asset'.
71
  Barker was not employed to 
speculate about potential British redundancy when writing the 1949 account of the 
British contribution that HMSO published for public consumption.  Nevertheless, he 
too must have grasped the reality when he wrote: 'Let it be said at once that the 
Americans, with more and larger aircraft, carried the major part of the tonnage 
_____________________________________________________________ 
66
  Harrington, The Air Force can Deliver Anything, pp. 109-110; Miller, To Save a City 
(Texas A&M) p. 75; TNA, AIR 28/1034 recorded handling French aircraft as 'normal airport 
traffic' (as opposed to Airlift) until the end of December 1948.  USNA, Record Group 319, 
Army Staff, Plans and Operations Division, Decimal File 1946-1948, Box 118, 'French Air 
Assistance' HAB undated. 
67
  Miller, To Save a City (Texas A&M) p. 76; Pearcy, Berlin Airlift, p. 40 - collision of two 
Ju-52s at RAF Wunstorf. 
68
  AP3257, pp. 156, 223-224, 231, 246. 
69
  AP3257, pp. 23, 156; TNA, AIR 2/10063, Es:47-48 Cannon/Williams 22 December 1948. 
70
  Sunderlands were a great morale booster to the Berliners - 'Freddie' Rainsford and Paul 
Wood, 'The Berlin Air Lift 1948-1949', The Proceedings of the Royal Air Force Historical 
Society, Issue No. 6, September 1989 (Bristol: Top Copy, 1989). 
71
  TNA, AIR 55/218, Es:189-190 Air Staff 13 January 1949. 
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through the air; that the British, placed nearer to Berlin geographically, undertook the 
major part of the work on the ground.'
72
  Not that the British effort on the ground was 
trivial.
73
  By the 14 May 1949 the Northern Zone was despatching 59% of the 
tonnage hauled (61% of which was flown by USAF aircraft from RAF Fassberg and 
RAF Celle)
74
 and by 15 May 1949 RAF Gatow was receiving 34% of the freight 
delivered to Berlin for the western Berliners
75
. 
The question of the US capability to replace the British aircraft involves 
investigating a number of parameters.  The thesis has assumed that the additional 
resources would be based on airfields nearest to Berlin and close by the C-54s 
located at RAF Fassberg and RAF Celle.  The logic of this assumption is clearly 
shown by using the HQ CALTF corridors allocated in 1949.  The round trips were 
244 and 256 nautical miles respectively whilst from Wiesbaden AFB it was 536 and 
from Rhein-Main AFB 524.
76
  Thus it was necessary to determine if there was 
enough capacity on the Northern Zone airfields to permit this.   
A second assumption was that the Americans would have continued their strategy of 
a military airlift using one aircraft type (the Skymaster) augmented by a handful of 
C-82 specialist end-loading aircraft for abnormal indivisible loads and the occasional 
deployment of 'very heavy transports'
77
 on trial.
78
  Subsidiary examinations of 
alternative strategies involving an American civil airlift and multiple aircraft types 
are touched on at the section's end. 
Whilst the Americans were the coal specialists, as time progressed the Civil Lift 
_____________________________________________________________ 
72
  Barker, p. 6. 
73
  TNA, AIR 28/1034, ORB 12 May 1949 'Message from British Commandant'. 
74
  TNA, AIR 55/110, BAFO Form STATS 120 1 May to 14 May 1949. 
75
  TNA, AIR 20/7285, ALREP 16 May 1949 8-15 May 1949 Statistics - 'Tonnages and 
Sorties'.  
76
  See thesis, Table 5.9. 
77
  TNA, AIR 2/10064, Es:174-178 Tunner undated. 
78
  AP3257, pp. 284-5; USAF Statistical Digest Jan 1949 - Jun 1950, Table 207; Berlin 
Airlift: A USAFE Summary, pp. 11, 20, 72, 103 114.  A Douglas C-74 VHT and separately a 
Boeing C-97 VHT were used for short periods and 5 C-82 rear loading aircraft were 
deployed for abnormal loads. 
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gained a monopoly handling liquid fuel in bulk as Table 6.4 reveals.
79
  In May 1949 
13,504 short tons of diesel, 2,607 of gasoline and 1,797 of kerosene were hauled at 
an average of 578 tons per day.
80
  Thus before calculating what additional resources 
would have been needed to replace the British, the 'wet fuel' aspect needs special 
examination. 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Jul-48
A
ug-48
Sep-48
O
ct-48
N
ov-48
D
ec-48
Jan-49
Feb-49
M
ar-49
A
pr-49
M
ay-49
N
et
 s
h
o
rt
 t
o
n
s 
p
er
 d
a
y
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
20000
N
et
 s
h
o
rt
 t
o
n
s 
p
er
 m
o
n
th
Average Wet
Fuel per Day
Short Tons
per Month
Daily Target
in Short Tons
 
Table 6.4:  British Civil Wet Lift 
As the initial reserves of liquid fuels were consumed, the Anglo-Americans 
resupplied by air.  The Americans used 55 US gallon metal drums.
81
  The Hump had 
given them an appreciation about hauling liquid fuel (see Chapter 3) both in 
Consolidated C-109's tankers (modified Consolidated B-24 four-engine heavy 
bombers) and drums.  The USAF no longer had these tankers and it had only 11 of 
the bombers left.
82
  The Americans and the British would have been aware that using 
_____________________________________________________________ 
79
  AP3257, pp. 199-201, 216, 228, 233-234, 521. 
80
  TNA, AIR 20/2071, 'Civil Airlift Monthly Report No. 5 - May 1949' Whitfield 9 June 
1949. 
81
  AP3257, p. 199; Miller, To Save a City (Texas A&M) p. 155. 
82
  Department of the Air Force, Operations Statistics Division, United States Air Force, 
Statistical Digest 1948 Third Edition (Washington DC: US Government, undated) Table 18, 
p. 22, 31 March 1948. 
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drums was inefficient as they were heavy (365 lb each), hard to handle in the 
confined space of an aircraft's fuselage, difficult to stow once on board, and the 
contents were volatile.  The empty drums had to be stored separately, steam-cleaned, 
and back loaded.
83
   
The first bulk fuel delivery was made by the specialist company Flight Refuelling on 
27 July 1948.
84
  Between October 1948 and the end of January 1949 the civilian Wet 
Lift expanded but failed to meet its targets.
85
  Alternative solutions had to be 
considered and in January 1949 the RAF used 18 Hastings flights to carry gasoline 
into Berlin.  Each one carried circa 800 imperial gallons in 40 gallon 'barrels' 
(equivalent to 55 US gallons).
86
  Jerry cans were also considered owing to an 
insufficiency of barrels with a load of three to five net short tons per flight being 
anticipated.
87
   
At the start of January 1949 the Wet Lift contractors had deployed only 11 tankers 
instead of the 31 ordered and even at the end of January 1949 they were 4 aircraft 
light.
88
 The force then rose to a peak of 42 aircraft.
89
  As with other aspects of the 
_____________________________________________________________ 
83
  AP3257, pp. 199, 302; Cox, 'Britain and the Berlin Airlift', p. 32; Lay, 'Berlin Air Lift: 
Part 2', pp. 10, 53, 155; Miller, To Save a City (Texas A&M) p. 155; TNA: AIR 2/10063, 
E.37 BAFO AOX65 13 January 1949; T 236/1025, E.97 Berlin No. 1296 Basic 8 September 
1948, E.175 FO (German Section) No. 2113 Basic 21 September 1948, E.177 Berlin No. 
1512 Basic 21 September 1948. 
84
  AP3257, pp. 215, 221; Richard K. Smith, Seventy-Five Years of Inflight Refuelling, Air 
Force History and Museums Program (Washington DC: US Government, 1998) pp. 15-17, 
23. 
85
  AP3257, pp. 223-226, 521; TNA: AIR 2/10063, Es:21-26 Meeting 18 January 1949; 
examples: AIR 20/7284, ALREPs 20-24 January 1949 (cited 19 landings); T 236/1026, E.17 
Berlin No. 51 Basic 5 January 1949, Es:44-45 FO (German Section) No. 110 Basic 7 
January 1949, E.48 FO (German Section) No. 110 Basic 7 January 1949, E.111 FO (German 
Section) No. 389 Basic 22 January 1949. 
86
  Victor F. Bingham, Handley Page Hastings and Hermes, (Peterborough: GMS 
Enterprises, 1998) p. 38. 
87
  TNA, AIR 2/10063, E.37 BAFO AOX65 13 January 1949.  Other containers were 
considered including 20 gallon drums and 5 gallon square cans - TNA, T 236/1025, E.94 
Berlin No. 1901 Basic 20 September 1948 and E.100 Berlin No. 1331 Basic 9 September 
1948.  TNA, AIR 20/7805, Dangerfield and Waite documents spanning between 23 
September 1948 and the note at 5 October 1948 covering a range of options to transport 
diesel. 
88
  AP3257, pp. 199, 225-226. 
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Civil Lift, costs were necessarily important to the Treasury.
90
  Liberators were 
ordered in January 1949 when the Wet Lift was not performing well because they 
had a good payload and were cheap
91
 whilst an experimental Avro Lincoln replaced 
two Tudors when these were withdrawn at the end of May 1949 because the 
contractor would not accept the money being offered
92
.  On the other hand, revised 
contracts were eventually agreed in May 1949 and these motivated contractors to 
increase their aircrafts' available payloads.
93
   
The RAF refused to become involved in questions about contract pricing:  
The Treasury, not unnaturally, began to worry about the cost of hiring this 
large miscellaneous fleet of civil aircraft and were continuously pressing me 
to state what would be a reasonable cost to pay per hour ………I refused 
absolutely to get involved…… there was no way we could participate in any 
sort of cost control exercise. ………I felt that the cost would have to be 
sorted out afterwards by better qualified people, but the urgent requirement to 
sustain the citizens of Berlin and our own forces there could not be assessed 
now in pounds and pence.  No doubt many charter companies made a great 
deal of money out of the airlift…….94   
By spring 1949 the civil Wet Lift was performing sufficiently well for it to be the 
                                                                                                                           
89
  AP3257, p. 302.  TNA, AIR 20/2071, Table 'Civil Aircraft Statistics' April 1949 and May 
1949 displayed well the numerical difference between aircraft under contract and those 
operating in Germany.  Peaks cited in the different AP3257 reports:  
Type CALTF 
Report p. 302 
No. 46 Gp. Report 
p. 199  
Civil Airlift Report p. 243 
(average for May 1949) 
Lancastrians 16 14  14 
Tudors 7 7  7 
Halifaxes 17 17  13 
Liberators 2 2 2 
Total 42 40 36 
 
90
  TNA, T 236/1026, E.116 to Serpell 25 January 1949, Es:222-226 28 February 1949 
meeting. 
91
  AP3257, pp. 231-232. 
92
  AP3257, p. 235. 
93
  AP3257, p. 232.  
94
  Rainsford, Memoirs, p. 110.  On profits, also H. S. L. Dundas, 'Big Money', Sunday 
Express, 6 February 1949. 
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Airlift's sole carrier of diesel, gasoline and kerosene.
95
  In April 1949 despite the 
extra time taken to load and offload the cargo
96
, the Wet Lift was achieving 
substantially more sorties per aircraft per day than the RAF although only two thirds 
of the RAF Celle C-54 average.
97
  The daily target grew as power stations and 
industry converted to diesel or diesel assisted firing to benefit from its better thermal 
value per ton.  Such was the eventual success of the Wet Lift that had the Blockade 
continued there was a proposal to replace domestic coal with kerosene (which had a 
higher thermal value than coal and 'none [of the heat] goes up the chimney'
98
) even 
though this would have involved supplying 500,000 stoves.
99
 
The aircraft were a miscellany of types run by a number of companies.
100
  Many of 
the modifications to fit the tanks had been "quick fixes" that in the event were not 
quick to install.
101
  There were different arrangements to carry fuel (even across the 
same aircraft type); different couplings to connect to the loading and unloading 
systems, and limitations on the products that could be carried.
102
  In some cases, 
_____________________________________________________________ 
95
  AP3257 pp. 231, 233. 
96
  AP3257, pp. 199-201, 302. 
97
  TNA, AIR 55/98, Es:21-22 part of undated draft report, E.44 part of Charlesby 15 
February 1948. 
98
  AP3257, p. 228 cited 77 short tons of diesel equalling 110 of coal; G. W. C. Kaye, and T. 
H. Laby, '3.11.4 Calorific values of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels', Tables of Physical and 
Chemical Constants, web edn. (National Physical laboratory Teddington) 
<www.kayelaby.npl.co.uk/chemistry/3_11/3_11_4.html> [accessed 22 January 2013] stated 
that general purpose coal had a gross calorific value/MJ kg
−1 
value of 32–42 whilst kerosene 
was 47; TNA: AIR 20/6892, Bourne 3 March 1949 indicated that 40,000 metric tons of 
kerosene would replace 100,000 metric tons of brown coal; AIR 2/10064, E.292 BAFO 
AOX 478 21 March 1949 (for quotation).  TNA, T 236/1026, E.93 FO (German Section) No. 
165 Basic 18 January 1949, bottled gas was similarly explored as a lighter weight means 
than coal to provide gas. 
99
  AP3257 p. 228; Bob Clarke, 10 Tons for Tempelhof: The Berlin Airlift (Stroud: Tempus, 
2007) p. 158; TNA: AIR 20/6893, Meeting in Mr Seal's Office 6 April 1949, 
Interdepartmental Working Party 26 April 1949; AIR 20/7829 generally for range of 
products carried; AIR 24/1807, Air Staff January 1949; AIR 55/218, Es:147-148 Charlesby 
18 March 1949; FO 1012/569, Es:2-8 C.S.(P)12 (Third Edition) paragraphs 23-25; FO 
1012/571, Es:2-6 C.S.(P)14 Command Section Ferguson 17 February 1949; T 236/1025, 
E.97 Berlin No. 1296 Basic 8 September 1948, E.165 Playfair 18 September 1948; T 
236/1026, E.230 FO (German Section) No. 1136 Basic 10 March 1949.  
100
  AP3257, pp. 194-195, 200-201, 231, 243. 
101
  AP3257, p. 225. 
102
  AP3257, pp. 227, 231-232, 587. 
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tanks were overly heavy, leaked or split.
103
  Some tank installations prevented 
particular fuels being hauled.  Rubberized ones dissolved if products other than 
gasoline were carried whilst some Halifax installations, for example, were prohibited 
from carrying gasoline.
104
  Had the Blockade continued it was intended that future 
Tudor Mk IV conversions should be capable of operating in both wet and dry 
roles.
105
  Turn round times were extended by the specific needs of bulk fuels and 
loading from and offloading into road tankers or bulk fuel installations with limited 
numbers of fixed standpipes and insufficient pumping capacity.
106
  On-board tanks 
had to be emptied before reuse to prevent over-filling.
107
   
SOPs had to be strictly observed.  These included when tank cleaning was necessary.  
Indeed avoiding cross-contamination of petroleum products remained a challenge 
throughout the Wet Lift.  It was a problem that extended from the ports of discharge 
to the customers in Berlin and the dangers involved to the end-users were heightened 
when AVGAS was involved.
108
  It was not simply the requirements of western Berlin 
that necessitated handling of large quantities of liquid fuels.  In May 1949 the British 
consumed 11,944 long tons of AVGAS
109
 and the Americans nearly 13 million US 
gallons (circa 35,000 long tons).
110
  In terms of tonnage, three times as much 
AVGAS was used in May as petroleum products were delivered to Berlin by the Wet 
_____________________________________________________________ 
103
  AP3257, p. 200. 
104
  AP3257, pp. 200,-201, 227, 575; TNA: AIR 20/2071, HQ Civil Airlift Division 
unnumbered telegram 2 May 1949; AVIA 54/416, Caygill 11 April 1949 and Meeting 4 
April 1949 - potential limitation on configurations for some Tudor marks. 
105
  TNA: AIR 20/7820, Collins 11 April 1949; AVIA 54/416, Caygill 4 April 1949, Meeting 
4 April 1949. 
106
  AP3257, pp. 200-200, 226-227, 234, 563, 587; TNA, T 236/1025, E.206 Berlin No. 1659 
Basic 1 October 1948, E.208 FO (German Section) No. 2322 Basic 2 October 1948, E.213 
Smith 4 October 1948. 
107
  AP3257, pp. 227, 587. 
108
  AM, AP3160: RAF Manual of Fuels, Oils and Lubricants; AP3257, pp. 45, 587; TNA, 
FO 1077/4, CAATO Notes on Conference 6 April 1949. 
109
  AP3257, pp. 52-53, 541.  Page 53 gave the quantity issued as against that consumed as 
12,222 tons.  The average monthly consumption in BAFO the year before had been 
approximately 1,630 tons - AP3257, p. 52. 
110
  Lay, 'The Berlin Airlift: Part 2', pp. 105-106. 
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Lift.
111
 
The Wet Lift was based at RAF Schleswigland, RAF Wunstorf and Fuhlsbuttel.
112
  
An efficient Wet Lift required more than aircraft.  It needed specialist equipment to 
store, to load and offload quickly, and to transport fuel.
113
  Such an installation was 
inherited from the Luftwaffe at RAF Schleswigland but needed extension to handle 
diesel.
114
  A better version was built by the Army at RAF Wunstorf which came into 
use in April 1949.  Before then arrangements had been primitive.
115
  Had the airlift 
continued a version of the Wunstorf installation would have been constructed at 
Fuhlsbuttel.
116
  14,233 tons were loaded at Fuhlsbuttel, 23,985 at RAF 
Schleswigland, and 54,175 at RAF Wunstorf.
117
  In Berlin purpose-built offloading 
facilities were built at RAF Gatow (managed by Shell Deutsche) and at Tegel (by 
Standard Oil) but not at Tempelhof.
118
  At RAF Gatow a 3km pipeline was built from 
the airfield fuel farm to the loading stage on the Havel-See to permit water-borne 
onwards transfer.
119
  As at 11 April 1949 the pipeline at Tegel was not in use.
120
  By 
late May 1949 Merer estimated that if RAF Gatow and Tegel each had two pipelines 
in operation Berlin would be capable of receiving up to 1,900 short tons per day 
(although allowing for the product-split this figure would have been lower).
121
  
Whilst there were advantages in using the relatively efficient bulk fuel installations at 
specific airfields, it reduced operating flexibility. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
111
  AP3257, p. 521. 
112
  AP3257, p. 199. 
113
  AP3257, pp. 199-200, 587; K. W. McQueen, 'Use of Tanker Aircraft in Operation 
"Plainfare"', The Royal Army Service Corps Review 1948, Vol. 1, No. 1. 
114
  AP3257, pp. 199, 267. 
115
  AP3257, pp. 199, 226, 234, 264. 
116
  AP3257, pp. 199, 226, 234, 268, 302; TNA, FO 1014/829, MacGregor 30 August 1949. 
117
  D. J. Sutton, ed.-in-chief, Brig, The Story of the Royal Army Service Corps and Royal 
Corps of Transport 1945-1982 (London: Leo Cooper, 1984) pp. 110-111.  The fuel figures 
quoted are Sutton's and were 111 tons less that the BAFO total at AP3257, p. 521. 
118
  AP3257, pp. 227, 302, 563; TNA, AIR 20/7822, Palmer 28 July 1949 including 
attachment 'Method of Off Loading'. 
119
  AP3257, pp. 226-227. 
120
  AP3257, p. 200; TNA, AIR 20/7820, Collins 11 April 1949. 
121
  TNA, AIR 38/302, Merer minute sheet 24 May 1949. 
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Table 6.5 summarizes the capability of the aircraft types contracted for the Wet Lift.  
The tonnage figures are generic for the aircraft type, not for a particular tank 
installation or petroleum product.
122
  In some cases the authorised payload (and thus 
potential cargo capability) increased over time.
123
  BAFO, No. 46 Group, the Civil 
Airlift Division, CALTF and AATO gave different capacity figures in their reports in 
AP3257.
124
  Table 6.5 uses the latter's figures as they recognized the different 
specific gravities of diesel, 'MTGas' (i.e. 80 octane gasoline) and kerosene and thus if 
the aircraft had sufficient capacity, the gallons that could be carried.  For example, 
using Tudor tanker figures, the maximum capability for heavier diesel was recorded 
at 2,083 imperial gallons and at 2,331 for lighter MTGas.  The variety in the table 
also indicates the problems faced by planners, tasking authorities and those filling 
and unloading each individual aircraft. 
Type Peak 
Number 
Tonnage - short 
tons 
Capacities (Imperial 
Gallons) 
Avro Lancastrian 14
125
  8.1 - 9.3
126
  2,114 - 2390 
Avro Lincoln 1 9.4 2,202 - 2,533 
Avro Tudor 7 8.4 - 8.9 2,083 - 2,331  
Consolidated 
Liberator 
2 6.6 for one aircraft, 
9.1 for the other 
One at 1532 - 1,666, 
the other at 2,450 
Handley Page Halifax 17 5.6 - 7.7 1,370 - 2075 
 
Table 6.5: British Wet Lift Fleet
127
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
122
  TNA, AVIA 54/416, covering Tudor wet fuel capacities, and aircraft marks and fuel tank 
configuration installed. 
123
  AP3257, p. 232. 
124
  AP3257, pp. 15, 195, 199-201, 232, 244, 284, 302, and 575; E. P. Whitfield, [Manager 
Civil Airlift Division] Civil Airlift Operation PLAINFARE 4 August 1948 - 15 August 1949 
(Luneburg: Control Commission for Germany, forward dated 5 September 1949). 
125
  AP3257, the No. 46 Gp. Report cited 14, the CALTF one cited 16. 
126
  This would have been the peak for Lancastrian capacity - TNA, AIR 20/7820, Collins 11 
April 1949.  For May 1949 Whitfield reported that most were still operating at 6.6 short tons 
- TNA, AIR 20/2071, Whitfield 9 June 1949. 
127
  The Civil Airlift statistics show that during the Airlift and across the marks and operators 
the average cargo was 7 short tons with the Halifax at 6.2; Lancastrian 6.6; Liberator 7.1; 
Footnote continues on next page. 
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'The British excelled in hauling specialized commodities such as liquid fuels.'
128
  
Even though the Wet Lift became effective, becoming a major Airlift success, its 
efficiency was still improving as the contracts were terminated.  Planning for the 
long term Wet Lift fleet had not been finalised when the blockade was lifted.
129
  
Targets were uncertain because of the possible need to haul more kerosene.
130
  A 
number of options were under discussion including a fleet of Avro Tudors and Avro 
Lancastrians operated by the three most effective companies to meet a daily target of 
550 net short tons.
131
  The usual friction between operational efficiency and cost was 
reflected in counter-arguments for retaining, even increasing, the less efficient 
Handley Page Halifax population.
132
  It should not be overlooked that had 
Governmental priorities been different, there could have been another less expensive 
source of bulk fuel carriers.  As identified in Chapter 5, the RAF's four-engine 
bomber force was small but it consisted of Avro Lancasters and Lincolns
133
, both of 
which in civilianized format were used by the Wet Lift. 
The Wet Lift was an important niche activity but in terms of the total daily Airlift 
tonnage the quantities were small.  Given the issues involved in hauling liquid fuel 
and the advantages of using the relatively efficient fuel installations at specific 
airfields, the Americans might have preferred the British civilian Wet Lift to have 
continued.  That said, 1
st
 ALTF and the RAF did haul 1,000 tons of less volatile 
asphalt in 400lb drums to build and maintain airfields.
134
   
The data for the USAF C-54s based at RAF Fassberg and RAF Celle had been 
                                                                                                                           
Lincoln 9.5; Tudor 8.5 and a civilian York 8.4 - AP3257, p. 244.  Dry lift Tudors could haul 
up to 22,000lbs - AP3257, p. 15 and TNA, AVIA 54/416, King 12 May 1949. 
128
  Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, p. 14. 
129
  AP3257, p. 233. 
130
  AP3257, p. 231; TNA: AIR 20/6893, Meeting in Seal's Office 6 April 1949; AIR 
20/7820, FO 1636 Basic 8 April 1949; AIR 20/7820, FO 1444 Basic 29 March 1949. 
131
  AP3257, p. 231; TNA: AIR 20/6893, Apps: A(2) and B to 6 April 1949 Meeting in Mr 
Seal's Office; AIR 20/7820, HQ BAFO AOX 541 1 April 1949. 
132
  TNA, AIR 20/6893, Interdepartmental Working Party 26 April 1949, Meeting in Seal's 
Office 6 April 1949, James 20 April 1949. 
133
  TNA, AIR 22/383. 
134
  Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, pp. 31, 78; TNA: AIR 20/7285, ALREP 7 May 1949 
Pt. II; FO 1030/62, HQAATO DECY2305 12 February 1949. 
  208 
earmarked for calculating the additional resources needed to replace the British.  
However, RAF Fassberg was 'in danger of coming apart' owing to friction between 
senior USAF officers and the RAF station commander and poor morale amongst the 
personnel.  Colonel Theron 'Jack' Coulter (USAF) took sole command on 7 March 
1949 and Charlesby recorded that it was 'recovering' in April 1949 and as efficient as 
RAF Celle in May.
135
  Similar issues did not occur at RAF Celle.  RAF Fassberg 
specialized in a single cargo, coal, whereas, as the three tables comprising Table 6.6 
show, proportionally the British carried more varied loads, especially foodstuffs.  
90% of RAF Celle's load was coal and the rest was food which whilst still coal 
intensive was more varied.  Thus, its statistics are used in this section.
136
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  AP3257, p. 382; T. Ross Milton, 'Inside the Berlin airlift: fifty years later, the Task Force 
Chief of Staff reflects on Operation Vittles', Air Force Magazine, Vol. 81, No. 10, October 
1998, Arlington VA; Tunner, p. 210; TNA, AIR 28/1029, RAF Fassberg ORB. 
136
  AP3257, pp. 519, 521; Daniel F. Harrington Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, The 
Airlift and the Early Cold War (Lexington Ky: University of Kentucky, 2012) p. 146; USAF 
Statistical Digest Jan 1949 - Jun 1950, Table 207. 
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COAL HAULED BY AMERICANS AND BRITISH IN SHORT TONS
0
25000
50000
75000
100000
125000
150000
175000
200000
Feb-49 Mar-49 Apr-49 May-49
American Coal
British Coal
 
COMMODITIES OTHER THAN COAL IN SHORT TONS
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Table 6.6:  Commodities Lifted by Nation 
The commodities hauled by the British were not spread evenly across the bases.  
Besides the specialist airfields for the Wet Lift, the Dakotas handled much of the 
German economic freight, including mail and the rolls of newsprint and RAF 
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Wunstorf hauled over 99% of British 'Services account' consignments.
137
  As shown 
in Table 4.2 about two thirds of the food hauled was flour, dehydrated potatoes and 
cereals all of which were, like coal, capable of being transported in standard sacks 
once the demand side of the supply equation allowed the purchasers more power to 
stipulate contract conditions.
138
  Thus food, whilst not as uniform as bags of coal, 
would not have been as hard to handle as might be perceived.   
Statistics were not recorded routinely for British turn round times at their bases.
139
  
Samples were taken during short periods for specific purposes.  Fourteen aircraft 
were sampled at RAF Wunstorf on 19 November 1948.  Charlesby was very cautious 
about the resultant average figures hinting that circumstances made it better than 
normal.
140
  The April 1949 study sampled loading times at RAF Celle (18 minutes), 
RAF Fassberg (14 minutes), RAF Schleswigland's Hastings (between 18 to 25 
minutes), and RAF Wunstorf's RAF Yorks (between 30 to 40 minutes) with the 
cryptic comment 'more difficult' loads.
141
  It is true that there were difficult loads 
carried by both the Americans and the British
142
 - typically abnormal and indivisible 
ones in road haulage terms
143
.  However, the phrase was also used in British records 
to describe mixed load consignments with a variety of packaging and especially 
packages that were harder to manhandle or to stow.  The perceived antithesis was a 
cargo dedicated to coal.   
In April 1949 during studies into RAF utilization Charlesby found that RAF Gatow 
_____________________________________________________________ 
137
  Sutton, pp. 110-111. 
138
  TNA: WO 291/1056, Department of the Scientific Adviser to the Army Council, Army 
Operational Research Group, Report No. 8/48, Time and Motion Study of Air Supply 
(Operation PLAINFARE) paragraphs 23-46; WO 291/1101, Report No. 28/49, paragraphs 
16-27 and App. A. 
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  AP3257, p. 384. 
140
  TNA, AIR 55/102, Charlesby 24 and 25 November 1948. 
141
  TNA, AIR 55/102, Charlesby 21 July 1949. 
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  Special lifts included airfield constructional equipment and material for rebuilding the 
Western Berlin power station in the British sector - AP3257, pp. 65, 303; Anon, 'British 
Moving Equipment for New Power Plant', The Task Force Times, 4 February 1949; TNA: 
AIR 20/7814, 'Materials for Berlin West Power Station'; AIR 25/1273, App. 86; FO 1077/4, 
CAATO Notes on Conferences: 8, 14, 22, and 29 April 1949 and 5 May1949. 
143
  Highways Agency, 'Abnormal Indivisible Loads' <www.highways.gov.uk/> [accessed 29 
July 2013]. 
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turned round C-54s from RAF Celle at an average of 37 minutes and RAF aircraft at 
38.4 whilst at Tegel the RAF Fassberg C-54s took 31.2 and the RAF 38.6.
144
  The 
Army Operational Research Group recorded unloading times at RAF Gatow of 8 
minutes for Yorks, 18 minutes for C-54s when carrying food and 12 minutes for the 
latter with coal consignments.  The Group stressed the advantages of single 
commodity loads and the need for the capability of an aircraft type to be 
standardized.
145
 
Charlesby's report recorded approximate flying times for round trips with RAF Celle 
and RAF Fassberg at 110 minutes, RAF aircraft at RAF Wunstorf 125 minutes and at 
RAF Schleswigland 155 minutes.  Thus the flying time for a Wunstorf initiated trip 
was 14% greater than a Celle one.
146
  The report contained a chart on graph paper 
that compared the three aircraft types and four bases.  Based on flying time, loading 
and refuelling time, and turn round at Berlin a return trip from RAF Wunstorf took 
20% longer than from RAF Celle.
147
   
Neither RAF Lubeck nor the Civil Lift was sampled.  One Skymaster trip would 
have hauled the equivalent of "2¾" Dakotas and thus its turn round times at Berlin 
and its base should have been noticeably less than the total for the Dakotas it would 
have replaced.  It is uncertain how the longer loading times for RAF Yorks at RAF 
Wunstorf would have translated to American aircraft hauling similar loads.  The 
speeds of the Fuhlsbuttel, RAF Schleswigland and RAF Wunstorf aircraft were set at 
160 knots outbound to Berlin and 180 on the return flight.  These were faster than the 
C-54s at RAF Celle and RAF Fassberg by 12 and 23 knots respectively and 35 and 
45 knots better than the RAF Lubeck Dakotas.  Transit altitudes for the latter were 
also the highest further extending their flight times.
148
   
If Skymasters had been based at RAF Schleswigland and the extant routes retained, a 
return flight to Berlin would have been 53% further than from RAF Celle and about 
_____________________________________________________________ 
144
  AP3257, p. 384. 
145
  TNA, WO 291/1101, Report No. 28/49, paragraph 21. 
146
  AP3257, p. 382, extracted from TNA, AIR 55/102, Charlesby 21 July 1949.  
147
  AP3257, p. 383.  
148
  AP3257, pp. 338-341.  Charlesby's round trip distances were greater than those in the 'Air 
Staff Instructions' with the largest disparity applying to the C-54 routes - AP3257, p. 382. 
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50 minutes longer at the authorised C-54 speeds.
149
  However, the Skymasters that 
replaced the British might have been "clutched" on airfields in the RAF Fassberg 
area thereby avoiding such longer flights.  As Chapter 5 showed, the routes 
employed in April 1949 disadvantaged the British.  In a Skymaster-centric 
environment these might have been revised thereby shortening the distances for RAF 
Wunstorf and RAF Lubeck (Table 5.9 above).   
Charlesby's sampled aircraft flew in waves within the block scheme.
150
  A 
combination of relocation, fewer trips per day to achieve the same tonnage, and the 
concentration on Skymasters might have allowed the replacement of the blocks by 
the more efficient continuous flow.  With so many permutations and uncertainties it 
was not possible to determine the aircraft overhead that needed to be added to 
calculations resulting from RAF Celle statistics.  However, given that in May 1949 
RAF Celle's 317
th
 Troop Carrier Group was operating at a very high rate of 5.8 trips 
per day per serviceable aircraft, it appears likely that more aircraft would have been 
needed than the results in Table 6.9 below suggest.
151
   
RAF Celle did not open for use until mid December 1948
152
 and 1st Airlift Task 
Force did not reach its assigned strength of 225 Skymasters until during January 
1949
153
.  Thus the analysis in the thesis has assumed that the Americans could not 
have started to replace the British with C-54s until February 1949 at the earliest and 
this is reflected in statistics for RAF Celle's C-54s in Table 6.7.
154
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  AFHRA, IRISNUM 241489, CALTF Statistical Summary.  USAF Statistical Digest Jan 
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Summary and at Rhein-Main AFB it covered only the USAF squadrons.  It gave the average 
daily C-54s on hand at RAF Celle as 40.9, 43.1, 45.1 and 44.1 respectively and a monthly 
difference in tonnage of a few tons.  The Table 207 figures would have increased the number 
of additional Skymasters needed by 4%. 
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Month 1949 Average Number of 
C-54s Assigned 
Total Short Tonnage 
Carried 
Average Short 
Tons/Assigned 
Aircraft/Day 
February 39.78 30,076 27 
March 42.71 37,397 28 
April 43.94 44,194 33.5 
May 39.94 42,935 35 
 
Table 6.7:  RAF Celle C-54 Performance   
The total quantities hauled by the British airlift in the same period are given in Table 
6.8.
155
 
1949 Total Tonnage Dry Lift Wet Lift 
February 31,824 24,469 7,355 
March 41,678 30,896 10,782 
April 45,407 32,765 12,642 
May 58,563 40,654 17,908 
 
Table 6.8:  Tonnage Hauled by British 
In February 1949 the Wet Lift had yet to convince the sceptical military of its ability 
and the possibility cannot be ruled out that because of its past performance and the 
importance of its cargo, it would have been replaced before success was achieved.
156
  
Two sets of estimates are needed, one covering replacement of all but the Wet Lift 
and the second replacement of the British airlift totally.   
Table 6.9 identifies the C-54s needed to haul the British tonnage excluding the Wet 
Lift based on the figures achieved by RAF Celle given in Table 6.7. 
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  AP3257, pp. 519, 521. 
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  TNA: AIR 20/2071, Whitfield 11 February 1949 about Lancashire Aircraft Corporation 
'a whole farrago of excuses and alibis …. I cannot recall a single assurance…… which has 
been honoured', reinforced by Williams 25 February describing the company as 'lamentable'; 
AIR 20/6892, Rainsford 11 February 1949, Interdepartmental Meeting 14 February 1949; 
PREM 8/990, Bevin to Prime Minister 4 February 1949. 
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1949 Additional C-54s (Rounded up) 
February  33 
March 36 
April 33 
May 38 
 
Table 6.9:  Tonnage based calculation of additional C-54s required in 1
st
 ALTF 
to replace the British airlift less its Wet Lift  
The same "simple" approach could not be used for the Wet Lift and a more complex 
estimate had to be constructed.  Again there are no statistics about turn round times.  
Pumping capabilities are given for the British bulk fuel installations at RAF 
Schleswigland and RAF Wunstorf and in a few instances other figures were recorded.157  
In March 1949 RAF Wunstorf allowed 40 minutes for refuelling operations.158  In April 
1949 the maximum delay waiting to discharge at Tegel was 18 minutes providing 
aircraft arrived equally spaced.  Two aircraft per discharge point per hour could be 
handled and from 15 April the plan was to have nine points feeding four bulk fuel 
tanks.159  The potential impact of receiving large amounts of kerosene at Berlin was not 
recorded other than to recognize that the capacity at Tegel could not be increased.160  
Whilst there were not substantiating sets of statistics, owing to the various methods of 
delivery and discharge, the need for product separation and quality control, the numbers 
of standpipes and tanks available, pumping rates and equipment serviceability, and the 
variety of aircraft installations and couplings, aircraft turn round times would have been 
longer than those for RAF Celle's C-54s.   
Information exists about the Skymaster's integral fuel tank capacity and layout and some 
were later used as fire fighting aircraft with an external pannier (like the Halifax) filled 
with ten short tons of retardant.161  The Civil Airlift Division Report recorded the 
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The Douglas Skymaster Family (Stroud: Tempus, 1999) pp. 17-21. 
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average dry lift tonnage of a Tudor to be 9.7 short tons162 which is in line with that for a 
C-54 engaged on the Airlift.  The estimate therefore uses the Tudor tankage figures for a 
hypothetical bulk fuel carrying Skymaster.  Using the upper gallonage figures for 
Tudors163; applying it to May 1949's target of 550 short tons, and breaking it down using 
the product ratios for the actual month's deliveries, 62 trips would have been needed 
daily.164   
As detailed in Table 6.10 the Wet Lift fleet comprised 35 aircraft on 1 May 1949.  An 
average of 81 trips were flown daily to deliver 578 short tons. 165  Kinnear proposed 21 
Tudors, 24 Lancastrians and 2 Liberators for a long-term civil Wet Lift delivering 562 
short tons daily across the year.  His figures were superseded by those in the James 
memo but that lacked detail about utilization.166  What is unknown are the pinch points 
in an American Wet Lift and how they would have corrected them. 
Contractor Strength Aircraft 
type 
Location Trips/ day/ 
aircraft      
in BAFO 
1 May 
1949 
1 June 
1949 
Flight Refuelling 9 9 Lancastrian Fuhlsbuttel 3.79 
BSAA 5 5 Tudor Wunstorf 3.69 
Skyways 4 5 Lancastrian Wunstorf 3.27 
BAAS 2 2 Halifax Schleswigland 2.84 
Airflight 2 0 Tudor Wunstorf 2.57 
LAC 10 10 Halifax Schleswigland 2.44 
Westminster 2 2 Halifax Schleswigland 1.74 
Scottish Airlines 1 2 Liberator Schleswigland 1.67 
 
Table 6.10:  Wet Lift Strength and Performance May 1949 
As identified above, there would have been noticeable differences in turn round times 
between RAF Celle's C-54s and bulk fuel carrying Skymasters.  Furthermore, flight 
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  AP3257, p. 244. 
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  AP3257, pp. 65, 199, 216; TNA: AIR 20/2071, Whitfield 9 June 1949; AIR 20/7285, 
ALREP Pt. IIA for May 1949.  
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  TNA, AIR 20/2071, Whitfield 9 June 1949. 
166
  TNA, AIR 20/6893, James 20 April 1949, Appendix A(2) to 6 April 1949 Meeting.  
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times would have increased if the bulk-fuel specialist airfields at RAF Schleswigland 
and RAF Wunstorf were retained.
167
  RAF Celle's 3.5 trips per assigned aircraft per 
day would appear overly high but again by how much is uncertain.
168
  Nevertheless, 
at that rate the 62 trips per day 1
st
 ALTF Wet Lift would have involved 18 aircraft.  
Towards the low end of the performance spectrum would have been Kinnear's 
summer planning rate of 2 trips daily which would have equated to 31 assigned 
aircraft.
169
  (As Table 6.10 showed, the actual May 1949 Wet Lift daily performance 
varied between contractors and where the aircraft were located ranging from 3.79 to 
1.67 trips 'per aircraft in BAFO'
170
). 
Accordingly in the peak month of May 1949, a 1
st
 ALTF Wet Lift would have 
required between 18 and 31 Skymasters making in total between 56 and 69 to replace 
the whole British airlift.  Besides the aircraft in Germany on the front line, the 
Americans had C-54s at their Great Falls training unit and in the 1,000 hour 
comprehensive overhaul pipeline that stretched back to bases and contractors in the 
USA.
171
  By the end of May 1949, 344 C-54s had been returned there for a 1,000 
hour overhaul with peak monthly figures during the Airlift of 60 in April and May 
1949.
172
  Assuming any increase at the "sharp-end" would have resulted in a 
proportional increase in the "tails", then in May 1949 the Americans would have 
needed in total between 87 and 108 Skymasters to replace the British fully and 59 if 
the Wet Lift was excluded.  (Additional aircraft may also have been needed to 
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convert aircrew from other aircraft types to create and maintain the numbers 
necessary to support the larger C-54 frontline force). 
The extra Skymasters needed on the Northern Zone bases either to replace the British 
totally or just the RAF and civil dry lift exceeded the spare capacity at RAF Celle 
and RAF Fassberg.  However, as Chapter 5 recorded, it would have been possible to 
deploy the extra aircraft (38, 56 or 69 depending on scenario) to the eastern flank of 
the Northern Zone.  Several options were available.  The conversion of RAF 
Luneburg (targeted for completion 1 September 1949) into a 60 aircraft Skymaster 
base and the Fuhlsbuttel expansion could have been completed expeditiously.  The 
proposed RAF Celle development could have been started and again speedily 
finished.  Residual Operation PLAINFARE aircraft or permanent BAFO squadrons 
could have been relocated to permit the Americans to use RAF Wunstorf, RAF 
Gutersloh or Fuhlsbuttel.  As 1
st
 ALTF had previously declined these bases, airside 
and American-specific domestic work services might have been needed first.   
Relocation of any residual British transport fleet could have had ramifications.  As 
Chapter 5 indicated Fuhlsbuttel aircraft could have moved to RAF Uetersen but only 
after the pieced steel plank runway had been replaced with a hardened one to 
withstand the heavy traffic.  Relocation to RAF Schleswigland would have 
substantially increased the hours flown.  If the Wet Lift at RAF Wunstorf had 
moved, its bespoke bulk fuel handling capability would have been lost.  As identified 
above, the long-term Airlift proposals included enhancing Fuhlsbuttel and building a 
Wunstorf-type bulk fuel handling installation there.  The airport was relatively near 
to the north German ports and the northern air corridor.  It might have made sense to 
have expanded the building programme and to have made it the Wet Lift base.  The 
facilities at RAF Wunstorf and RAF Schleswigland could have been retained as 
contingency for periods of adverse weather.   
Cannon/Williams had intended to base all 50 of the RAF's "operationally loaned" C-
54s at RAF Lubeck (where RAF Dakotas were presently based).
173
  Williams was 
either unaware of or chose not to consider that it was two miles from the Eastern 
Zone and its local circuit operated with the tolerance of the Soviets.  His Command 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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  TNA, AIR 20/6892, Cannon/Williams 14 February 1949. 
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Air Traffic Control Officer was well aware of the problem saying in a meeting 
chaired by BAFO's Group Captain Operations that 'The Russians seem to have 
forgotten about violations in this area but he felt that they would object to heavy 
aircraft flying up to ten miles into their zone in broad daylight'.
174
  It is probable 
therefore that intensive use of RAF Lubeck by the Americans would not have been 
possible.
175
   
Complete replacement of the British would have involved an upper figure of 169 
Skymasters operating in the Northern Zone.  Assuming they were all around RAF 
Fassberg and at any one time a few aircraft were not on base, this could have been 
achieved after the British had vacated RAF Wunstorf (and any associated 'works' 
completed).  Crowding would have continued, however, until civil engineering was 
finished at RAF Celle and RAF Luneburg.  Examination of the airfield capability 
continues in the next section of this chapter when location of the whole of 1
st
 ALTF
 
 
(230 aircraft) in the North Zone is considered. 
Having examined the requirement and the airfield capacity, available American 
resources need to be established.  The USAAF had received 1,163 Skymasters
176
 of 
which a couple of hundred
177
 were passed as R5Ds either directly to the USN or 
indirectly via those returned by the RAF after the war.  (The RAF had received 
Skymasters under lend-lease and had returned them in 1946
178
).  The USAAF was 
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the major user with 853 in service.
179
  After the Second World War aircraft were 
allocated to other US Government departments and large numbers disposed of to 
foreign governments, scheduled and non-scheduled airlines (with some being 
converted back to civilian DC-4 standards) and air freight carriers.
180
  The USAAF 
holdings had fallen to 489 in December 1946.
181
  As Tunner recorded: 'C-54s were 
selling for a song as government surplus…….The C-54s we were going to buy at 
$75,000 apiece became worth $675,000 each when the government needed them for 
the Berlin Airlift and later the Korean War'
182
. 
At the start of the Berlin Airlift the USAF had 462 C-54s
183
  The number had fallen 
to 441 by 31 March 1949 and 435 by 30 September 1949 of which 390 and 353 
respectively were categorized as 'first-line active'.
184
  The USN inventory had 132 on 
1 April 1949 and 129 on 1 October 1949, including its MATS and US Marine Corps 
squadrons and those listed as awaiting or undergoing overhaul, repair and 
modification.
185
   
The 1948 'Blitz Book' contained a summary of American four-engine long range 
aircraft capacity from August 1948.  It included military aircraft and those of 
American airlines (both scheduled and unscheduled) but not aircraft that may have 
been operated by other Government departments and agencies.  C-54s, C-74s, C-97s 
and C-69s (probably including the C-121 development as well) and their naval and 
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civilian equivalents plus Douglas DC-6s (the DC-4 replacement) were identified.  
1,050 aircraft were available.  866 were in the DC-4 family which broke down into: 
421 USAF of which 214 were assigned were to MATS; 134 USN, with its MATS 
contribution of 54; an additional 41 USAF aircraft leased to the airlines, and 270 
owned by the scheduled and non-scheduled airlines.  129 C-54s were directly 
involved in the Berlin Airlift out of 473 members of the DC-4 family 'not considered 
available in an emergency'.  393 (out of a total of 510 aircraft of all types) were 
available for an undefined emergency, of which 10% were estimated to be needed for 
route support.  The elapsed time before all 393 could be committed was estimated at 
30 days.
186
  The Blitz Book estimated that on 1 January 1949 the USAF would have 
52 C-54s (including those supporting Strategic Air Command) available in the USA 
for immediate deployment overseas; 143 overseas and available for employment, and 
175 worldwide operating continually, a total of 370.  It is noteworthy that whilst C-
47s, C-74s, C-82s, C-97s, C-119s, C121s and C124s were cited in these estimates, 
the Curtiss C-46s were not.
187
 
On 4 February 1949, Vandenberg was briefed that there were 201 USAF C-54s 
involved directly with the Airlift as part of 1
st
 ALTF; a further 67 were in 'the 
pipeline and overhaul pool' with 20 more assigned that day, and 19 were at the Great 
Falls AFB Airlift training school making a total of 307 from a USAF inventory of 
447 with an anticipated monthly attrition of two aircraft.  Of the remaining aircraft, 
eight were in the VIP pool and other untouchables included those supplying the 
arctic weather stations.  Recovering the 40 aircraft leased to the airlines, including 
seven which were operating on contract to the USAF in support of Operation 
VITTLES, would have been politically difficult whilst further transfers from the Far 
East Air Force would be resisted strenuously by the US Army.
188
  It is likely that C-
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186
  LoC, Vandenberg Papers Container 38, 'Blitz Book' 1948, National Strategic Air Lift 
Capacity, 11 August 1948 and Combat Readiness Estimated on 1 January 1949; LoC, 
Vandenberg Papers, Container 59, Symington 10 November 1948, O'Connell 14 October 
1948, Anderson 25 October 1948. 
187
  LoC, Vandenberg Papers, Container 38, 'Blitz Book' 1948, Combat Readiness Estimated 
on 1 January 1949. 
188
  LoC, Vandenberg Papers, Container 40, Britain folder 2 1949, Smith 4 February 1949; 
USNA, Record Group 341, HQ U.S. Air Force (Air Staff) 1934 - 2004, Top Secret Decimal 
Correspondence Files 1942 - 1954, NM-15-335A, Box 808, Anderson 27 April 1949, Chief 
Footnote continues on next page. 
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54s would also have been required to convert pilots who were new to the type before 
beginning training at Great Falls. 
In April these figures were updated in another submission to Vandenberg.  The 
USAF inventory numbered 441 C-54s.  The 1
st
 ALTF numbered 201 C-54s and 24 
R5Ds and the Great Falls figure remained at 19.  The pipeline and pool had increased 
to 92 C-54s aircraft, total of 336 aircraft.  Of the 89 USAF C-54s not engaged in the 
Airlift, in support of it, or leased to the airlines, eight were VIP ones; 11 were 
passenger transports; 12 supported Strategic Air Command and a further two were 
trainers for that Command's navigators and modified accordingly; four provided 
transport and air sea rescue in the Aleutians, and eight were assigned to special (and 
in most cases costly) development projects.
189
  Probably only the cargo C-54s of the 
MATS and Far East Air Force were immediately available, a maximum of 42 aircraft 
which owing to Skymaster attrition were a wasting asset. 
The 13 April 1949 "Anderson attachment" anticipated Operation VITTLES attrition 
at approximately two per month.  Between 1 April and 31 December 1949 this was 
to be met from Far East Air Force holdings.  Thereafter the leased aircraft would be 
used.  However, 33 of them were passenger aircraft that would require modification 
before being used on the Airlift.  Moreover, they were powered by an engine that 
was not common in the USAF.
190
 
The April Anderson attachment gave the 'Navy C-54 Inventory' as 132 aircraft
191
 
                                                                                                                           
of Staff Army 1 April 1949.  AFHRA, IRISNUM 1038188, 'Summary of the Berlin Airlift' 
13 May 1949 listed 18 Skymasters, eight C-47s and one C-82 as wrecked. 
189
  USNA, Record Group 341, HQ U.S. Air Force (Air Staff) 1934 - 2004, Top Secret 
Decimal Correspondence Files 1942 - 1954, Germany 381, NM-15-335A, Box 808, 
attachment to Anderson 13 April 1949; Miller, email CIV USAF AF/HOH, 111820 October 
2011 citing other American commitments. 
190
  USNA, Record Group 341, Headquarters U.S. Air Force (Air Staff) 1934 - 2004, Top 
Secret Decimal Correspondence Files compiled 1942 - 1954, Germany 381, NM-15-335A, 
Box 808, attachment to Anderson 13 April 1949. 
191
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including the 24 R5Ds (and members of squadrons VR-6 and VR-8
192
) assigned 
respectively to 513
th
 and 61
st
 Troop Carrier Groups of 1
st
 ALTF; a further 30 with 
MATS; eight employed on training (VR-44 was established at seven R5Ds on 1 
February); ten on special missions, and 32 in maintenance.
193
  Other sources cited 
eight R5Ds in an Airlift maintenance and inspection pipeline and a USN MATS 
squadron (VR-3 established at 15 aircraft) provided trans-Atlantic support and 
continuation training for aircrew holding prior to reassignment to the two Navy 1
st
 
ALTF squadrons.  VRs-3 and 44 aircraft were not employed solely on Operation 
VITTLES.
194
  Thus about 67 R5Ds could have been available to reinforce 1
st
 ALTF 
if the other transport commitments were discarded and time was available to recover 
those in maintenance and deploy them to Germany.   
However, the Americans were operating a worldwide navy and in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s the USN was fighting very viciously with the other Services for 
finances.
195
  Although conjecture it is most unlikely that aircraft in addition to those 
in MATS would have been surrendered easily and so only 15 additional R5Ds might 
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have been available if VR-3 maintained its current roles.  This makes a total for the 
American military of a further 57 Skymasters immediately available, sourced from 
MATS and the Far East Air Force, and assuming the latter's objections were 
overruled. 
As shown above between 87 and 108 Skymasters would have been needed to have 
replaced the complete British airlift and 59 if the substitution had been limited to the 
RAF and civil dry lift.  The "Anderson" military fleet was 573 strong with 366 
committed directly or indirectly to the Airlift (including USN VRs 3, 6, 8 and 44 plus 
the 8 R5Ds in the maintenance pipeline).  Assuming the eight USAF VIP transports, 
the two Strategic Air Command [SAC] trainers, the four in the Aleutians, the eight 
on development trials and the ten on USN special missions were not reassigned, 175 
Skymasters remained for other tasks, to replace the British, and to meet future 
attrition.  Thus it appears that replacement might have been possible numerically in 
an emergency if there was time to recover leased aircraft; re-role passenger planes to 
cargo, and to regain assets in maintenance.  At short notice, using only the 57 MATS 
and Far East Air Force aircraft, there would not have been enough. 
However, the objective was not to replace the British and meet the Airlift targets for 
late winter, spring and early summer of 1949 but to achieve the larger future ones 
and to do so for two to three years.
196
  The operational loan of C-54s to the RAF was 
examined in the preceding chapter.  It found that the Americans needed to retain their 
military inventory to meet their own long-term needs.  The introduction to the 4 
April 1949 HQ CALTF paper 'Introduction of very heavy transport aircraft into the 
Berlin Airlift' stated: 'It is understood that the existing fleet of C-54s represents all of 
that type of aircraft that can be made available for airlift duty' and 'It is understood 
that there are no more C-54s available to replace losses in the present fleet engaged 
on the airlift.  The present yearly attrition rate is approximately 36.'
197
  Turner's 
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808, Standards Evaluation Branch Planning Research Division 'Long-range Planning for 
Operation Vittles, An Application of Linear Programming' Study 3 15 March 1949 cited 
eight aircraft lost on Operation VITTLES through 'wreck' or ground accident but none 
Footnote continues on next page. 
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covering letter stated 'there is likely to be a critical period when no further C-54s are 
available to replace losses'.
198
 
The Anderson attachment addressed factors affecting the continuation and expansion 
of Operation VITTLES, including use of very heavy transports [VHTs], citing the 
civil engineering challenges and numbers to be expected under various possible 
procurement programmes.  It found that the transfer of C-54s to the British was not 
possible and it recorded that of the 5,620 short tons flown in per day the RAF were 
hauling 900.  Its calculations for a range of growing tonnages assumed without 
discussion that the British would deliver a 'Clay premise' of 2,003 tons a day.  
(Probably on the edge of the feasible as a daily average across the year providing the 
Halifaxes could be kept in the air; the Government accepted the costs for an 
increased Civil Lift and assembling more Tudors, and the additional personnel were 
available
199
).  The Anderson attachment estimated that 434 Skymasters would be 
needed in 1
st
 ALTF, the USAF pipeline and at the Great Falls training unit to haul 
6,682 short tons per day at 65% utilization.  For 7,997 short tons the figure grew to 
522 and at 9,246 short tons, 731 Skymasters.  The detail underlying these figures was 
not given and the postulated Skymaster tonnages appear on the low side.
200
  (That 
problem was not unique to the Pentagon.  CALTF's and Cannon/Williams's estimates 
were also low
201
).   
                                                                                                                           
through 'wearouts'.  A long-term attrition rate at about two per month was assumed in the 
Box 808 attachment to Anderson 13 April 1949. 
198
  TNA, AIR 2/10064, E.174 Tunner undated. 
199
  TNA: AIR 2/10064, Es:54-58 DDASTO's draft note on re-introduction of Operation 
PLAINFARE August 1949, Minute 156 Rainsford 23 August 1949, Minute 157 Guest 25 
August 1949 addressing the RAF lifting 1,000 short tons daily long-term if the Blockade 
were re-introduced; AIR 20/6893, 6 April 1949 Meeting, item 4, App.  A(1) to 6 April 1949 
Meeting stated 'it seems reasonably safe to say that the civil lift could be increased to 900 - 
1000 tons a day' if the Treasury agreed.  The latter felt 'such a large increase….would require 
a decision by Ministers'.  
200
  USNA, Record Group 341, Headquarters U.S. Air Force (Air Staff) 1934 - 2004, Top 
Secret Decimal Correspondence Files compiled 1942 - 1954, Germany 381, NM-15-335A, 
Box 808, attachment to Anderson 13 April 1949.  Tonnages are the assumed American 
components of the 8,685, 10,000 and 11,249 short ton targets respectively.  The latter was 
Clay's daily average tonnage requirement for FY 1951 and thereafter. 
201
  AFHRA, IRISNUM 1038205, Tunner 8 February 1948 and an undated paper 'The 
potentials and Requirements of the Airlift'; TNA, AIR 20/6892, Cannon/Williams 14 
February 1949.  USNA, Record Group 341, Headquarters U.S. Air Force (Air Staff) 1934 - 
Footnote continues on next page. 
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The Anderson attachment was USAF orientated and did not address the USN 
resources in any depth.  It applied the proposed 65% utilization pending an Air 
Materiel Command analysis on whether such a target was viable.  It identified that 
18,817 additional personnel and civilians had been allocated to USAFE to support 
Operation VITTLES.  It pointed to the resulting loss of efficiency in the other USAF 
Commands and that more manpower reinforcements would be needed if additional 
aircraft were committed.
202
   
Aircrew numbers; Tunner's desire to increase USAF ground crew sizes to the level of 
the higher performing 1
st
 ALTF USN squadrons (the subject of concern in the USAF 
and ascribed to the greater numbers of mechanics per aircraft and more senior 
management per USN squadron
203
); employment of cross-trained ex-Luftwaffe 
mechanics by 1
st
 ALTF squadrons, and resultant increases in the number of aircraft 
in the Operation VITTLES logistic support force were not addressed in the Anderson 
Attachment.
204
   
                                                                                                                           
2004, Top Secret Decimal Correspondence Files compiled 1942 - 1954, Germany 381, NM-
15-335A, Box 808, Bagstad 15 March 1949 gave fairly detailed planning parameters but 
ignored weather.  The resultant figures were 11% above the Anderson ones but still below 1
st
 
ALTF's achievements in April and May 1949. 
202
  USNA, Record Group 341, Headquarters U.S. Air Force (Air Staff) 1934 - 2004, Top 
Secret Decimal Correspondence Files compiled 1942 - 1954, Germany 381, NM-15-335A, 
Box 808, attachment to Anderson 13 April 1949. 
203
  AFHRA: IRISNUM 1038190, Rawlings 27 January 1949, Stiles 28 January 1949, 
Tunner 10 February 1949; IRISNUM 1038207 Smith in CALTF History March 1949; 
USNA, Record Group 341, Headquarters U.S. Air Force (Air Staff) 1934 - 2004, Top Secret 
Decimal Correspondence Files compiled 1942 - 1954, Germany 381, NM-15-335A, Box 
808, Tate 3 February 1949. 
204
  AFHRA: IRISNUM 240605, 'USAFE and the Berlin Airlift 1949: Supply and 
Operational Aspects', HQ USAFE 1 February 1950, pp. 156-167, 224, 240-243, 320; 
IRISNUM 241475, 'Command Log HQ CALTF 1 February to 23 May 1946', 12 February 
1949; IRISNUM 1006566, 'A Report on the Airlift, Berlin Mission: The Operational and 
Internal Aspects of the Advance Element', prepared by HQ CALTF, pp. 32-33; IRISNUM 
1038207, Smith in CALTF History March 1949; IRISNUM 1038215, 'Preliminary Report to 
Commanding General USAFE and AOC-in-C BAFO by Commanding General CALTF'; 
AP3257, pp. 312-313; LoC, Vandenberg Papers, Container 59, Secretary of the Air Force 
1948-1950, McKee (for Vandenberg) 16 February 1949; USNA, Record Group 341, 
Headquarters U.S. Air Force (Air Staff) 1934 - 2004, Top Secret Decimal Correspondence 
Files compiled 1942 - 1954, Germany 381, NM-15-335A, Box 808: attachment to Anderson 
13 April 1949, McGuire 31 March 1949 stating after 2
nd
 line life was consumed 'usefulness 
completed', Standards Evaluation Branch, Study 3, 15 March 1949 examined aircrew 
numbers and the 3 crews per aircraft target and saw difficulties only in 1949 and these 
Footnote continues on next page. 
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The paper was concerned that even if the size of 1
st
 ALTF was not increased all C-
54s would eventually have to be committed.  Attrition would grow sharply in the 
aging fleet and by November 1952 all would have passed their first line and second 
line lives.  Its conclusion was that an expansion of the Airlift was not viable and its 
recommendation was that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Departments of the Army and 
State were told so.
205
   
Cannon/Williams's 14 February 1949 paper assumed that 120 aircraft would remain 
in the Southern Zone.  They underestimated the tonnage that the present fleet would 
haul under existing conditions between 1 February and 31 May 1949 by nearly 8%.  
There are other issues with the paper, for example its assumption that 426 10-ton 
aircraft could deliver 10,000 short tons daily did not consider the increases necessary 
in the inspection and maintenance pipeline, the aircrew training fleet, and the air 
transport element of the logistics tail.
206
   
The Cannon/Williams's paper recognized but excluded from its calculations the 
overheads of backloading freight from Berlin - essential for civilian morale and 
employment, and for the city to help pay its way.  Cannon/Williams estimated a loss 
of 40 short tons inbound for every 100 tons back-hauled.  Charlesby admitted there 
were limitations in his backload studies and the answer depended on many factors 
(such as tonnage loaded at Berlin per aircraft and the reliability of the aircraft type).  
His tentative findings were a much lower loss of between five to 15.5 tons inbound 
for every 100 tons backloaded.
207
   
The British backloaded 11,804 short tons between 1 February and 31 May 1949 
inclusive, covering returned containers, including the essential coal bags, and 
                                                                                                                           
declined over the year, McGuire 8 March 1949, Farthing 1 March 1949, Tate 3 February 
1949, Vandenberg 5 January 1949. 
205
  USNA, Record Group 341, Headquarters U.S. Air Force (Air Staff) 1934 - 2004, Top 
Secret Decimal Correspondence Files compiled 1942 - 1954, Germany 381, NM-15-335A, 
Box 808, attachment to Anderson 13 April 1949. 
206
  TNA, AIR 20/6892, Cannon/Williams 14 February 1949. 
207
  TNA: AIR 20/6892: Cannon/Williams 14 February 1949; AIR 55/102, Charlesby 21 
January 1949 and 14 February 1949. 
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German mail and economic freight
208
 whilst the USAF figure in the same period was 
21,599 short tons.  Using Charlesby's upper figure, that would have meant a loss of 
1,830 short tons or an average of 1.5 Skymaster trips per day but using 
Cannon/Williams 40 percent it would have been four trips or just over one Celle-
assigned aircraft.
209
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Table 6.11:  Passengers Carried, including British Trooping 
As Table 6.11 shows, the Royal Air Force majored in the carriage of passengers.
210
  
The Table's figures do not include those carried by commercial airlines.
211
  Civil 
contractors were not authorised to carry passengers although George Isaacs, Minister 
of Labour, flew into Tegel from Fuhlsbuttel on a Flight Refuelling Ltd aircraft on 9 
May 1949.  Between 1 February and 31 May 1949 the RAF carried 12,784 (63% of 
the total) passengers into Berlin and 43,491 (82%) out of which the P.19 service 
_____________________________________________________________ 
208
  Berlin recorded that between midday on 1 February and midday on 12 May 1949 the 
British flew out 11,991 short tons of freight - TNA: AIR 20/7284, ALREP No. 216 Pt. IV; 
AIR 20/7285, ALREP No. 316, Pt. IV; T 236/1025, Es:74-74 Burrows 27 August 1948. 
209
  AP3257, App. R; USAF Statistical Digest Jan 1949 - Jun 1950, Table 207. 
210
  AP3257, pp. 525-527. 
211
 Pearcy, Berlin Airlift, p. 47; John Provan and R.E.G. Davies, Berlin Airlift: The Effort and 
the Aircraft (McLean VA: Paladwr Press, 1998) p. 44. 
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transported 11,381 and 12,204 respectively.
212
  These figures included the rotation of 
two British garrison battalions (totalling a goat, 2,748 passengers and 268 short 
tons
213
).  Assuming the P.19 service had continued and the British mounted one-off 
operations for the battalion rotations, the Americans would have inherited nearly 
30,000 ex-Berlin passengers, or 250 per day.  The Americans scheduled three return 
trips per day to meet the French and its own passenger requirements
214
 at typically 49 
or 50 passengers per flight.
215
  
The handling of passengers (including the evacuation of the elderly, sick and 
children
216
) increased time spent loading and unloading.  Estimates exist of inbound 
freight lost for each planeload of evacuees carried by the Dakota but not for the 
Skymaster.
217
  The freight capacity of the Dakota was slightly better than a third of 
the latter and so the inbound cargo lost if an aircraft missed its next block would be 
less.  Moreover, the Dakota could be rerolled to carry passengers in a 'matter of 
minutes'.
218
  Air travel to and from the City was extremely limited for western 
Berliners and western Germans unless they were on "official business" or had been 
sanctioned as evacuees.  Bourne and Robertson wanted a long-term Airlift to expand 
its availability to boost morale.
219
   
It is uncertain how 1
st
 ALTF would have approached a task which they considered 
was less important than hauling freight to the City and which like salt and wet fuel 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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  AP3257, p. 525. 
213
  AP3257, p. 526; IWM, Ministry of Defence Post 1945 Official Collection 1945 - 1975, 
BER 49-155-001; TNA: AIR 24/1807, 28 March 1949; AIR 38/303, E.9 HQ BAFO ADX 
511 28 March 1949. 
214
  AP3257, p. 65. 
215
  Air Mobility Command Museum, 'C-54M Skymaster' (Dover AFB DE) 
<amcmuseum.org/exhibits_and_planes/c-54.php> [accessed 14 September 2012]; Anon, 'C-
54 Skymaster', Airpower Classics <www.airforce-magazine.com/Magazine 
Archive/Magazine%20Documents/2006/May%202006/0506classics.pdf> [accessed 14 
September 2012]. 
216
  AP3257, pp. 303-304; Barker, p. 54. 
217
  TNA, AIR 55/102, Charlesby 21 January 1949.  Sunderlands had carried in the region of 
40 evacuees who had to be ferried between the shore and the aircraft - interview 26 
September 2012 with Stan Harrison, supernumerary aircrew 201 Squadron. 
218
  AP3257, p. 174. 
219
  TNA: AIR 20/6892, Bourne 3 March 1949, Robertson 4 March1949; FO 1012/561, 
Es:29-33 Chief Administrative Officer [unsigned] 29 March 1949. 
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had become a British speciality.  Just as it might have been attractive to retain the 
Wet Lift and a few commercial Halifaxes with panniers to carry salt, would the 
Americans have pushed for the RAF to continue to carry passengers, probably in a 
squadron of dedicated 60 seat 'passenger-cum-freight' Yorks?
220
  Thus replacing the 
British involved more than just deploying sufficient additional Skymasters to haul 
enough freight to Berlin to meet the increasing targets and a long term 
commitment.
221
   
It is difficult to see how the declining and aging American Skymaster force could 
have met the targets pending sufficient VHTs becoming available.
222
  
Cannon/Williams assumed that would be two years hence whilst Anderson 
anticipated a total of 78 being delivered to the USAF by November 1950 although 
there would then have been a lead time before they could have been deployed on 
intensive operations.
223
  Even if sufficient Boeing C-97As and the Douglas C-124As 
had become available in time - and had entered service without teething troubles - 
extensive civil engineering upgrades to the airfields, including the Berlin ones, would 
have been needed.  Assuming the work in Berlin was done sequentially, Lieutenant 
Colonel M. Falco calculated that it would take three 'construction seasons'; would 
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  RAF Museum, 'Avro York C1', National Cold War Exhibition <www.national 
coldwarexhibition.org/explore/aircraft-information.cfm?aircraft=Avro%20York%20C1 
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  TNA: AIR 2/10064, Es:318-319 James 10 March 1949; AIR 20/6891, HQ BAFO AX545 
7 January 1949. 
222
  TNA, AIR 2/10064, Es:174-186 Tunner undated and HQ CALTF 4 April 1949. 
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  TNA, AIR 20/6892, Cannon/Williams 14 February 1949; USNA, Record Group 341, 
Headquarters U.S. Air Force (Air Staff) 1934 - 2004, Top Secret Decimal Correspondence 
Files compiled 1942 - 1954, Germany 381, NM-15-335A, Box 808, attachment to Anderson 
13 April 1949.  The USAF VHT inventory was identified in the Department of the Air 
Force, Operations Statistics Division, United States Air Force Statistical Digest Fiscal Year 
1951 Sixth Edition (Washington DC: US Government,1953) Table 86 - 'USAF Aircraft 
Flight Operations', Table 110 - 'US Military Aircraft Production - FY 1951', Table 113 - 
'Summary - Acceptances on Incompleted USAF Contracts', Table 125 - 'USAF Average 
Active Aircraft'; the Department of the Air Force, Operations Statistics Division, United 
States Air Force Statistical Digest Fiscal Year 1952 Seventh Edition (Washington DC: US 
Government printing office, 1953) Part II, Table 8 - 'Aircraft and Crews in Combat and 
Airlift Units', Part V, Table 6 - 'Airplanes by Type. Model and Series Authorized for USAF 
Procurement - Fiscal Years 1950, 1951, 1952', and USAF Statistical Digest Jan 1949 - Jun 
1950, Table 100 - 'Status and Line Classification of USAF Aircraft'.  However, the different 
circumstances and priorities pertaining after the Berlin Blockade ended in May 1949 and the 
Korean War started in June 1950 prevent correlation between the actual deliveries and what 
might have occurred if the Berlin Airlift had continued as was anticipated. 
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require 2,500 short tons of plant and 84,000 tons of asphalt to have been flown in, 
and the paving blocks from 240 miles of Berlin streets to have been lifted and 
crushed.
224
   
HQ CALTF had reservations about the C-97 being able to cope with the approaches 
to Tempelhof pointing to their understanding that its flying characteristics were 
similar to the Boeing B-29A which was considered 'unsafe' to 'operate into that 
airfield'.  Tunner advocated that the civil engineering upgrades should be 
concentrated initially on three bases, RAF Luneburg (Northern Zone), Rhein-Main 
AFB (Southern Zone) and Tegel in Berlin.  Thus, if the task was undertaken in 
parallel and with vigour, it should have taken one construction season and if 
approved in 1949, should have been completed before the winter of 1950-1951.  In 
the case of Tegel, it would have necessitated airlifting nearly 31,000 tons of plant 
and asphalt or a tonnage nearly equivalent to the total carried by the RAF in May 
1949 - at 35,749 tons, its best month.
225
   
Writing to Williams in January 1949, Merer expected the Douglas DC-6A (successor 
to the DC-4) to replace the Skymasters as its all-up weight was less than the VHTs, 
although at 15 tons its payload to Berlin was less than the 25 tons HQ CALTF 
anticipated for the C-124.  The rationale for its use was that the runways, taxi ways 
and hard standings would not have needed as much upgrading.  Tunner also 
recommended it because of its proven reliability commercially whereas the VHTs 
_____________________________________________________________ 
224
  TNA, AIR 2/10064, Es:174-186 Tunner undated and HQ CALTF 4 April 1949 with 
attachments; USNA, RG341, NM-15-335A, Box 808, attachment to Anderson 13 April 
1949. 
225
  AP3257, p. 519; TNA, AIR 2/10064, Es:174-186 Tunner undated and HQ CALTF 4 
April 1949 with attachments.  A YC-97 was trialled on the Airlift between 1 May 1949 and 
24 May 1949 and exposed a number of problems.  Finally, it closed a runway at RAF Gatow 
for 7 hours after making an emergency landing during which four tyres burst and it remained 
there until awaiting replacement engines until mid-June 1949 - Miller, To Save a City (Texas 
A&M) p. 197. 
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were untried.
226
  However, whilst the Douglas DC-6A was in production, the USAF 
version, the C-118A, was not yet on order.
227
   
The primary reason for the efficiency of the American airlift lay in it being a military 
operation using a single aircraft type, the Skymaster, which whilst designed as a 
passenger liner was fortuitously a robust heavy load carrier.  Could the Americans 
have replaced the British with contractors or multiple military aircraft types?  The 
degradation that would have arisen from such a move is uncertain and so the next 
part of this section is necessarily at a high level.
228
   
The 11 August 1948 appraisal of the American National Strategic Air Lift Capacity 
identified 478 four-engine aircraft flying with American scheduled and non-
scheduled airlines of which 41 were leased from the USAF.  There were 311 in the 
DC-4 family of which 151 were deemed unavailable in emergency.
229
  American 
airlines had flown C-54s under contract for the US Government during World War II 
and at least one operated under a trooping contract post-war.
230
   
American Overseas Airlines was the scheduled carrier into Tempelhof - as BEA was 
to RAF Gatow; Seaboard and Western made about 100 flights into under contract to 
American Overseas Airlines, and Transocean Air Line delivered control approach 
radar.  PAN AM appears to have flown in unofficially.  Operation VITTLES was 
supported by a logistic tail that stretched back to contractors and military depots in 
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Capacity, 11 August 1948. 
230
  Camille Allaz, John Skilbeck, ed., in English George Grant, History of Air Cargo and 
Airmail from the 18th Century (London: Christopher Foyle in assoc. with the International 
Air Cargo Association, 2004) pp. 160-161, 176; Wixey, pp. 19-20. 
  232 
the USA.  Between 30 June and 31 December 1948 this tail included a civil trans-
Atlantic auxiliary lift involving six airlines making 274 trips and Crackel records that 
overall Pan American, American Overseas Airlines; TWA, Seaboard and Western, 
Alaska Airlines, Transocean Air Line, and Trans-Caribbean Air Cargo flew 610 
transatlantic 'missions'.
231
   
Whilst the American contractors' experience did not match the intensity of Operation 
VITTLES, the US Government, its military and its contractors had experience 
working together.  'Contracts for airlift augmentation during the Berlin crisis 
involved 110 civilian aircraft from some 25 different companies'.
232
  It probably 
came as no surprise to the USAF that friction arose during the Blockade between the 
USAF and some commercial enterprises including claims that contracts were 
awarded for personal gain, possible commercial sharp practice or military naivety, 
and an argument that would continue for most of the Cold War that all MATS 
operations should be undertaken by the airlines.
233
 
Wixey identified countries beyond the USA which would become members of 
NATO or which were members of the "Old Commonwealth" that used the DC-4 and 
the Skymaster and James mentioned the possible purchase of four from Sweden.  
However, aside from the information about the Netherlands, sources are not 
sufficiently accurate to explore either an international DC-4 civil airlift or the 
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potential for buying back DC-4s.
234
   
Type Number at 31 December 1948  Number at 30 September 1949  
C-46  687 (At 31 March 1949, 198 
categorized active second line and 
389 inactive second line) 
321 (of which 85 categorized active 
second line and 236 inactive second 
line) 
C-74 12 12 
C-82 204 195 
C-97  9 11 
C-121  2 10 with the majority being used on 
the trans-Atlantic shuttle. 
 
Table 6.12:  Potential Airlift Cargo Aircraft (besides C-47s and C-54s) 
Table 6.12 shows the five other cargo aircraft that the USAF had besides its C-47s, 
which had withdrawn from the Airlift, and its C-54s.
235
  The USAF deployed its C-
74 VHTs and seven Lockheed C-121 Constellations (primarily a four-engine 
passenger transport
236
) on trans-Atlantic support alongside transiting Operation 
VITTLES Skymasters; civilian contractors, and the USN squadron VR-3.  From 4 
October 1948 the C-74s ran a regular shuttle rising to three round trips per week and 
a monthly peak of 14 trips in January and 16 in February 1949.
237
  This essential 
commitment reduced further the ability of the US military to replace the British with 
other aircraft types.   
A Douglas C-74 had been used to haul construction equipment in August and 
September 1948 and a Boeing C-97 was trialled on the Airlift in May-June 1949 but 
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both had weight and performance implications and continuous use of either (or the 
Douglas C-124 development) required major civil engineering work in Germany.
238
  
Five C-82s were deployed to Wiesbaden AFB to handle abnormal indivisible 
loads.
239
  Between 1 January and 31 July 1949 they achieved slightly less than five 
short tons per trip but could be loaded in half the time taken for a C-54.
240
   
It is conjecture how the Americans would have controlled traffic without a British 
presence but, as outlined in Chapter 5, aircraft cruising speeds were an important 
consideration when controlling movement in the corridors when traffic was mixed.  
A fleet of C-82s would have introduced similar problems to those of the Bristol 
Freighter (another specialist abnormal load carrier), the Sunderland and the Dakota.  
They were slower than the four-engine transports.
241
  The RAF continued to use the 
Dakota throughout Operation PLAINFARE for want of anything better
242
 and the 
departures of the flying boats and the Freighter from the Airlift fleets were not solely 
due to speed
243
.  In the case of the Sunderland, moreover, it was despite of its 
'psychological significance'.
244
  With a maximum freight capability of 5 tons, the C-
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  TNA, AIR 20/6891, Walmsley 13 January 1949.  The USN did not deploy its faster, 
larger Martin JRM-1 Mars flying boat transports - Anon, 'Airlift Over, MATS Resumes 
World-Wide Schedules', All Hands, No. 394, December 1949; William Green, War Planes 
of the Second World War: Flying Boats (London: Macdonald, 1962) pp. 184-5; NHHC, 
'Department of the Navy, The Naval Aeronautical Organization (Fiscal Year 1948)' p. 9a; 
NHHC 'Department of the Navy, Naval Aeronautical Organization Fiscal Year 1949', 
Footnote continues on next page. 
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82 could best be viewed as a substitute for the RAF Dakota in a general purpose 
carrier role. 
The USN inventory held 31 R5Cs (C-46s).
245
  When arguing against withdrawal of 
more C-54s from the Far East Air Force, General Omar Bradley (Chief of Staff 
Army
246
) stated that whilst 13 C-46s were being withdrawn from storage to recover 
more would require '9,500 man hours per plane'.
247
  Williams claimed that a C-46 
could carry about seven tons on short trips which might have applied in the 
Operation PLAINFARE environment.  That assessment is supported by Buffalo 
Airways which uses two C-46s in the North West Territories of Canada but not by 
The National Museum of the USAF which cited five tons.
248
  Henry, writing about 
Imphal, gave its cargo ceiling as 11,000lbs.
249
  Either way, this was more than the 
Dakota although less than the Hastings or York.   
Williams had discovered that the Americans had several hundred surplus C-46s and 
assumed that conversion from Dakotas would be simple.
250
  Tedder raised the C-46 
                                                                                                                           
Second Revision (Washington DC: Aviation Plans Section of DCNO (Air), June 1948) p. 12; 
NHHC, Location of Navy Aircraft, CD Box 3, 1 February 1949 report. 
245
  NHHC, Location of Navy Aircraft, CD Box 3, 1 February 1949 report. 
246
  US Army, Historical Resources Branch, 'United States Army Chiefs of Staff' 
<www.history.army.mil/faq/FAQ-CSA.htm> [accessed 3 November 2012]. 
247
  USNA, Record Group 341, Headquarters U.S. Air Force (Air Staff) 1934 - 2004, Top 
Secret Decimal Correspondence Files compiled 1942 - 1954, Germany 381, NM-15-335A, 
Box 808, Chief of Staff Army 1 April 1949. 
248
  Anon, 'Commercial Aircraft of the World', Flight, 23 November 1961, p. 811; Buffalo 
Airways's website says: 'We are proud to have the Commandos working with us.  Our two 
C-46s can haul up to 14000lbs of bulky freight into short, unprepared strips that are so 
commonly found in the NWT.  Travelling at 190 mph…' <www.buffaloairways.com/ 
index.php> [accessed 28 July 2012]; The National Museum of the USAF, 'Curtiss C-46', 
'Curtiss C-46D', and 'Curtiss C-46D Commando', Fact Sheets (Wright-Patterson AFB OH) 
<www.nationalmuseum.af. mil/factsheets/....> [accessed 10 July 2012]; TNA, AIR 20/6892, 
AX559 28 January 1949.  LoC, Vandenberg Papers, Container 38, 'Blitz Book', 
'Characteristics of USAF Aircraft' gave the C-54G cargo capacity as 33,000lbs whilst the Air 
Mobility Command Museum, 'C-54M Skymaster' (Dover AFB DE) <www.amcmuseum.org/ 
exhibits_and_planes/c-54.php> [accessed 4 August 2012] cites a maximum load of 
28,000lbs.  To avoid excessive wear it was flown at 20,000lbs during the Airlift and 
undoubtedly the same would have had to happen with the twin-engine C-46. 
249
  TNA, CAB 44/215, M. Henry, 'Siege of Imphal: War History' [1955(?)], p. 102. 
250
  TNA, AIR 20/7148, AX559 28 January 1949.  Although the Americans operated the C-
46 in the Northwest Europe and Indo-Burma theatres alongside the British, none were 
delivered to the RAF. 
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possibility with Cannon and was informed that there were no large numbers available 
and those that did exist were 'old and dilapidated'.  Furthermore, as DCAS explained, 
the RAF wanted to concentrate on obtaining C-54s on loan and did not wish their 
efforts diverted by 'any proposal for the loan of other aircraft'.
251
  Tunner wanted a 
single type deployed in 1
st
 ALTF and was no fan of the C-46.  He wrote in his 
autobiography in the section covering his joining the Airlift: 'No more C-46s.  We 
were going to fly the best….the C-54'.252  Whilst this all militates against the C-46, it 
saw service in Korea and remained in USAF service until the late 1960s.  Seventy 
four C-46s were categorised as active first line on the 30 September 1950 and as the 
Korean War continued the number increased to 300 on 30 June 1951.
253
 
If the C-46 had been used as part of the replacement fleet for the British, high 
serviceability under intensive operations would have been critical.  The following 
quotation shows that quality may have been missing: 
But from first to last, the Commando remained a headache.  It could be kept 
flying only at the cost of thousands of extra man-hours for maintenance and 
modification.  Although Curtiss-Wright reported the accumulation by 
November 1943 of the astounding total of 721 required changes in production 
models, the plane continued to be what maintenance crews around the world 
aptly described as a "plumber's nightmare." …….. among the ATC pilots the 
Commando was known, with good reason, as the "flying coffin" ...... ATC 
had elected by March 1946 to retain in service 402 C-47's as against only five 
C-46's.  While AAF storage fields filled up with C-46's retired from 
government service and rejected by the civil airlines, the demand for all 
available C-47's continued brisk.
254
  
Table 6.13 analyzes the Northern Zone performance in May 1949.  It uses BAFO 
sources to minimize differences in terminology and measurement and re-emphasizes 
earlier findings.  It shows why the military wished to replace the Dakota and why the 
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251
  TNA, AIR 20/7148, AM MSX850 4 February 1949 from DCAS (for quotation). 
252
  Tunner, pp. 165 (for quotation), 197. 
253
  Department of the Air Force, Operations Statistics Division, United States Air Force 
Statistical Digest Fiscal Year 1951 Sixth Edition (Washington DC: US Government, 1953) 
Table 119; The National Museum of the USAF, 'Curtiss C-46' to 'Curtiss XC-46L' and 
'Curtiss C-46D Commando', Fact Sheets, (Wright-Patterson AFB OH, accessed 10 July 
2012).  
254
  John D. Carter, 'Chapter 1 The Air Transport Command', in Army Air Forces in World 
War II, Volume VII: Services Around the World: 1. Air Transport, ed. by Wesley Frank 
Craven and James Lea Cate (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958) pp. 25-26. 
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Civil Lift was becoming crucial to the overall British contribution.
255
  Cannon and 
Williams acknowledged that the British needed better performing aircraft operating 
at higher utilization and CALTF's fleets needed to be built up to the system's 
saturation point.
256
  What they did not record, if they even considered it jointly, was 
replacing the British completely.  Given the long-term perspective of the Airlift; the 
1,440 deliveries per day saturation point; the ever growing targets reaching to 10,000 
short tons in 1950
257
, and the likely C-46 Airlift performance, at best it could have 
served as a temporary expedient to replace the smaller Dakota until a better 
performing aircraft became available. 
 Short Tons 
per Day 
Trips 
per Day 
Daily 
Average 
Strength 
Daily Trips 
per Aircraft 
on Strength 
Tons per day 
per Aircraft 
on Strength 
RAF:      
York  700 81 38.8 2.1 18.0 
Dakota 217 58 45.5 1.3 4.8 
Hastings  236 25 13.6 1.8 17.4 
Total 1153     
Civil Fleet 736
258
 100 34.3 2.9 21.5 
American 
Northern 
Zone 
3,026 307 87.1 3.5 34.7 
 
Table 6.13:  Analysis of British Performance May 1949 
To conclude, the Americans could not have replaced the British even just the RAF 
and the civil dry lift with a military Skymaster force especially given the expectation 
of a two to three year Airlift, growing targets, increasing attrition as the fleet aged, 
uncertainty about the VHT procurement programmes, and the associated civil 
_____________________________________________________________ 
255
  AFHRA, IRISNUM 241489, CALTF Statistical Summary; AP3257, pp. 519-521, 526-7, 
529; TNA, AIR 55/110, Form STATS 120 May 1949. 
256
  TNA, AIR 20/6892, Cannon/Williams 14 February 1949. 
257
  TNA, AIR 2/10064, Es:318-319 James 10 March 1949. 
258
  Civil dry lift 158, and Civil Wet Lift 578. 
  238 
engineering upgrades.  They might have done so if it was imperative with a mixed 
military and civil airlift, using a variety of aircraft of American manufacture and 
providing sufficient aircrews and maintenance personnel were found.  Funds, 
resources and time would have been needed to recover aircraft from storage, airline 
use and in some cases, to change from a specialized role.
259
  Such a force would have 
inevitably introduced inefficiencies and whether it could have achieved the projected 
1950 daily target of 10,000 short tons has to be questioned.   
RELOCATING 1
ST
 AIRLIFT TASK FORCE 
In September 1948 HQs BAOR, BAFO and Hanover District explored the 
implications of having 250 four-engine aircraft based on expanded airfields in the 
Northern Zone with the remaining aircraft (such as Dakotas) either held in reserve in 
the Southern Zone or operating from other airfields in the north.
260
  Tunner recorded 
that the weather had been better in the north over the last 50 years
261
 although 
concerns about the different weather patterns in northern and southern Germany were 
tendered as the reason for not relocating 1
st
 ALTF in total
262
.  He believed that two 
aircraft based at RAF Fassberg would equate to three at Rhein-Main or Wiesbaden 
AFBs.
263
  However, he only compared flight times not the multiple components of a 
round trip or the challenges of generating serviceable aircraft.
264
  The 
Cannon/Williams's 22 December 1948 'Appreciation on Operations VITTLES and 
PLAINFARE' recorded that C-54s based at RAF Fassberg carried approximately 
50% more than those from the Frankfurt-on-Main area, potentially 1,339 short tons 
per day.
265
  DDASTO had a different motive when observing in January 1949 that 
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  TNA, AIR 55/98, E.67 part of draft for Air Clues. 
260
  TNA, AIR 20/7804, Es:15-17, Dugmore 22 September 1948 - assumed aircraft 
distribution: RAF Fassberg 100, RAF Wunstorf 70, RAF Lubeck 40 and RAF Celle 40. 
261
  Tunner, p. 186. 
262
  AP3257, p. 143. 
263
  Tunner, p. 170. 
264
  AP3257, pp. 291-293, 381-387. 
265
  Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, p. 15 shows that a 50% increase on its December's 
figures for all aircraft on both Southern Zone bases would have been 978 short tons; TNA: 
AIR 2/10063, Es:45-52 Cannon/Williams 22 December 1948, Es:129-130 Air Staff BAFO 6 
November 1948 estimated for December 1948 that each Northern Zone C-54 would carry 
10.5 short tons more per day; AIR 20/6892 Cannon/Williams 14 Feb 1949. 
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more US aircraft hauling cargo in the Northern Zone could 'release a few of our hard 
pressed squadrons for training and re-equipment'.
266
  This section explores whether 
relocation of 1
st
 ALTF to the Northern Zone would have made the British airlift 
unnecessary.   
Relocation from south to north would have caused temporary disruption resulting in 
a drop in tonnage which as Chapter 4 and earlier in Chapter 6 identified would have 
been disastrous during the winter months.  Thus late spring and early summer would 
have been a far safer time to make a change and so that is the period studied.  It is 
also appropriate to remember that whilst there was a groundswell of opinion to move 
all of 1
st
 ALTF to the Northern Zone, in their February 1949 paper Cannon and 
Williams concluded that 120 Skymasters should be retained in the Southern Zone 
and only the excess deployed in the north.
267
  Nevertheless, the scenario examined in 
this research assumed that the complete Skymaster fleet was located in the Northern 
Zone. 
The first consideration was whether there was adequate spare capacity on the 
Northern Zone airfields.  The available berths in April and May 1949 had not 
changed from those for February in Table 5.11 above.  1
st
 ALTF's establishment of 
225 Skymasters and five C-82s was well documented but identifying the actual 
aircraft strength on each base was not easy.  Contemporary statistics recorded 
monthly averages for April and May 1949.
268
  The difficulty lay with having to use 
averages over a period; they do not show the peaks involved, for example ten aircraft 
on one day and zero for nine produces the same ten day average as one aircraft daily 
for ten days.   
The AP3257 'Report by Civil Airlift Division' identified the maximum number of 
aircraft on contract as 47 in May 1949.
269
  Again the actual number on the airfields 
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266
  TNA, AIR 2/10063, E.41 DAASTO 10 January 1949. 
267
  TNA, AIR 20/6892, Canon/Williams 14 February 1949. 
268
  AP3257, p. 284; NHHC, Location of Navy Aircraft, CD Box 3, 1 June 1949; TNA, AIR 
55/110, Forms STATS 120; United States Air Force Statistical Digest Jan 1949 - Jun 1950 
Table 207.  
269
  AP3257, p. 243 excluded those undergoing certification of airworthiness and 'write-offs'; 
TNA, AIR 20/2071, Civil Airlift Monthly Report No. 5 - May 1949, Whitfield 9 June 1949 
for aircraft undergoing C of A and write-off details. 
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was presented as a monthly average.  In both the American and the Civil Airlift cases 
figures for aircraft off-base for servicing and repair could therefore be ignored.  The 
RAF statistics recorded its aircraft strengths on the airfields in Germany as averages 
over periods of a fortnight and a month.  This overcame the issue of aircraft rotation 
but again did not indicate a theoretical maximum or identify the peak.  The figures 
changed over time and reflected the slow build up of the Hastings fleet.  The Dakotas 
based at RAF Buckeburg (which was not an Airlift airfield) for P.19 duties were 
routinely included in the statistics.  Excluding these, the British fleets in Germany 
during May 1949 averaged 130 aircraft (in rounded numbers) comprising: 17 
Halifaxes, 14 Hastings, 11 Lancastrians, 2 Liberators, 6 Tudors, 40 RAF and civilian 
Yorks and circa 40 RAF Dakotas.
270
   
Primary sources show how the American aircraft were divided between the Northern 
and Southern Zones.
271
  The RAF operated only one type per airfield although at 
RAF Schleswigland and RAF Wunstorf they did so alongside contractors.
272
  The 
Civil Airlift Lancastrians and Halifaxes each operated concurrently from two 
airfields.  Whitfield's reports provided monthly averages for each civilian type and 
base.
273
  Distribution could therefore be established.
274
  Airfield capacity in the 
Northern Zone in May 1949 was unchanged from that in Table 5.11.  RAF Luneburg 
was slowly being developed, expansion at Fuhlsbuttel had started and enhancements 
had been postulated for RAF Celle.
275
  Table 6.14 summarizes the position. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
270
  AP3257, pp. 243, 252, 537-539; TNA: AIR 55/110, Forms STATS 120; AIR 20/2071, 
Civil Airlift Monthly Reports. 
271
  NHHC, Location of Navy Aircraft, CD Box 3 and particularly 1 June 1949; United States 
Air Force Statistical Digest Jan 1949 - Jun 1950 Table 207 and May 1949 particularly. 
272
  AP3257, pp. 17, 152. 
273
  AP3257, pp. 286; TNA, AIR 20/2071, Civil Airlift Monthly Reports and No. 5 - May 
1949 particularly. 
274
  AP3257, pp. 522-523. 
275
  AP3257, pp. 16, 232-233, 268, 323-327; TNA, AIR 20/6892, Cannon/Williams 14 
February, Williams 26 February 1949, Meeting 18 January 1949 [reflects order in file].  
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Airfield Capacity May 1949 Maximum Capacity after 
expansion
276
 
Northern Zone Airfields operating American Aircraft 
RAF Celle 
100  
54 
RAF Fassberg 66 
British Airfields operating British Aircraft 
Fuhlsbuttel  18 60 
RAF Lubeck 54 Dakotas 50 C-54s 
RAF Luneburg  60 
RAF Schleswigland notionally 40 60 
RAF Wunstorf 50 60 
British Total 162 290 
Northern Zone 
Total 
262 410 
RAF Fassberg 
"Clutch" Total 
150 240 
 
Table 6.14:  Northern Zone Airfield Capacity 
The capacity of Northern Zone Airlift airfields was 262 aircraft rising to 410 after 
expansion at RAF Celle and Fuhlsbuttel, completion of RAF Luneburg and assuming 
RAF Wunstorf was full to capacity.  CALTF's theoretical requirement was around 
360 aircraft, 230 of which were American Skymasters and C-82s.  Thus, until the 
civil engineering was complete, there was insufficient space for all the Airlift 
aircraft.  The possible Soviet reaction to four-engine aircraft operating from RAF 
Lubeck was mentioned above and it would appear not to have been an option.  The 
objective would surely have been to maximize capacity on the eastern flank of the 
Northern Zone and to avoid growth at RAF Schleswigland.  In addition it is likely 
that the Americans would have wished to "clutch" their aircraft around RAF 
Fassberg.  Once RAF Luneburg was completed, RAF Celle expanded, and provided 
the British vacated RAF Wunstorf this could have been achieved within a 73km 
_____________________________________________________________ 
276
  Where several figures for airfield capacity were recorded in the primary sources, for 
example when expansion was under discussion, the largest are used. 
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radius but as Table 6.14 shows, the airfields would have been close to full, even 
allowing for not all aircraft being on base at one time.  Besides maintenance, other 
considerations which might have prevented filling airfields to capacity could have 
included American unwillingness to share airfields with British aircraft; to accept 
"substandard" domestic accommodation, or to reorganize the 1
st
 ALTF groups. 
Thus the 1
st
 ALTF aircraft in the Southern Zone could have been repositioned in the 
north but it would have had to be done in phases as capacity became available.  It 
would also have been wise to start building a further Skymaster airfield at the edge of 
the clutch in case crowding had to be eased.  Placing all the American aircraft in one 
small area of Germany
277
 would have resulted in periods when operations there 
would have been impossible owing to bad weather.  Moreover, when conditions 
deteriorated aircraft in transit would have had to be diverted in relatively large 
numbers.  Diversion airfields would have continued to be needed.
278
  The positive 
aspect was that American relocation to the north east and possible British 
rearrangement could have offered the opportunity to improve the traffic flows in the 
corridors and in the Berlin Air Safety Zone.  Gains here, however, would have been 
offset by the distances to Berlin if greater use of RAF Schleswigland had been 
necessary.
279
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
277
  Buckeburg, Celle, Fassberg, Gutersloh, Luneburg, Wunstorf lie within a 110 kilometre 
radius of Hanover. 
278
  AP3257, pp. 143 160, 297. 
279
  AP3257, pp. 20-23, 150, 156-157, 284, 291-293, 335-341. 
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Table 6.15:  Comparison of Skymasters in Northern and Southern Zones 
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Table 6.16:  Ratio of Northern to Southern Zone Tonnage and Trips 
Tables 6.15 and 6.16 show that during March, April and May 1949 the Northern 
Zone assigned Skymasters did not achieve the extra trips over the Southern Zone 
ones that the two Cannon/Williams papers anticipated.  The April 1949 figures may 
have been skewed by 'Easter Parade' when CALTF delivered 12,941 short tons in 24 
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hours during a specially orchestrated event.
280
  May 1949 was the best month with 
performances continuing to rise and RAF Fassberg at last coming very close to RAF 
Celle in both tonnage and trips per assigned aircraft.  Had all the Southern Zone 
Skymasters been repositioned in the North and had they matched the rates achieved 
by the American aircraft already based there, the daily average tonnage increase that 
month would have been about 800 short tons, not the anticipated 1,339.
281
  The May 
1949 daily average for the British was 1,889 short tons of which 578 were hauled by 
the Wet Lift.  Locating all of 1
st
 ALTF's Skymasters in the Northern Zone would not 
have produced enough extra tonnage to permit the total withdrawal of the British or 
even just the RAF and civilian dry lift component at 1,311 short tons.
282
  Thus it 
would have been necessary to have kept some of the British aircraft in Germany. 
Repositioning the British Aircraft in the South 
A contemporaneous suggestion by Charlesby was to transfer the British aircraft to 
airfields in the Southern Zone concurrently with the relocation of the whole 
American task force to the North.  This would have been a temporary measure whilst 
airfield capacity in the Northern Zone was expanded.
283
  This part of the 
"Relocation" section identifies what would have been involved in implementing such 
a proposal.  Although there may have been command and domestic problems 
repositioning the British in the Southern Zone, just as there was for the USAF at 
RAF Fassberg, the airborne aspects alone are considered. 
Besides being a major Airlift base, Rhein-Main AFB was the hub for American 
transatlantic air traffic (including C-74 VHTs) and it served as a neo-depot for intra-
theatre C-54 spare parts and assemblies.  These functions would either have had to be 
relocated to the Northern Zone with adverse impact there on airfield capacity and the 
_____________________________________________________________ 
280
  Miller, To Save a City (Texas A&M) pp. 173-175; Tunner, p. 221-222.  AP3257, pp. 148, 
552 concurred. 
281
  AFHRA, IRISNUM 241489, CALTF Statistical Summary. 
TNA, AIR55/110, E.12 1 May-31 May 1949 Form STATS 120 did not differentiate between 
aircraft types used by 1
st
 ALTF.  It thus produced different figures but showed the same 
trend.  
282
  AP3257, pp. 519, 521. 
283
  TNA, AIR 55/98, Es:38-46, Report 143 15 October 1948; also see TNA, Air 20/7804, 
Es:32-33 App. A to Waite 9 September 1948 to GOC British Troops Berlin. 
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inadequate technical and domestic accommodation or retained in the Southern Zone 
with the resultant inefficiencies being accepted by the Americans and the British.
284
   
Table 5.11 showed the potential capacity of the American airfields in the Southern 
Zone was 119 aircraft and that 126 Airlift aircraft were based there prior to 1 August 
1949.  The latter figure was four aircraft less than the average for the British fleets in 
Germany during May 1949.  In 1948 Tunner had suggested Giebelstadt as an 
additional base in the Southern Zone that had 'suitable runways and parking area' but 
needed to be 'completely manned'.
285
  Airfield capacity would have added to the case 
for the Wet Lift remaining in the Northern Zone where the necessary bulk fuel 
handling capabilities and expertise were and where the corridors were better 
positioned to handle flights to the two specialist terminals at RAF Gatow and Tegel.   
Tempelhof was the third and most south-easterly Airlift airfield in the Berlin Control 
Zone.
286
  It lay in the American Sector and was normally dedicated to traffic from the 
Southern Zone.
287
  Relocation would have meant either revising flight paths in the 
congested control zone
288
 to maintain Tempelhof as an American destination or 
redistributing the consignee bases.  British aircraft used the Gee network and Eureka 
beacons linked to Rebecca radar sets for navigation, and BABS for airfield 
approach.
289
  This equipment would have had to be installed in the Southern Zone.   
The southern corridor routed over the Harz Mountains which peaked at 3,743 feet.
290
  
Vertical separation in the northern corridor ranged from 1,000 to 5,000 feet whilst 
the southern one's minimum altitude was 4,500.
291
  Climbing to this extra height 
increased engine wear, lengthened flight times, and created difficulties controlling 
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  Anon, 'A special study of Operation "Vittles"', pp. 10-11, 118-119; Berlin Airlift: A 
USAFE Summary, pp. 76, 79, 81. 
285
  AFHRA, IRISNUM 1038197, Tunner 28 September 1948.   
286
  AP3257, pp. 21, 29, 150. 
287
  AP3257, pp. 291-292; Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, p. 32; Tunner, p. 170. 
288
  AP3257, p. 292. 
289
  AP3257, pp. 28-29, 39, 46, 161, 165, 167, 169-173. 
290
  Harz National Park, <www.thisisharz.com/index.html> [accessed 5 August 2011]; 
Tunner, p. 168. 
291
  AP3257, pp. 23-25. 
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descents in the Berlin Air Safety Zone
292
.  Flying higher increased the risk of icing 
and the Americans had de-icing issues.
293
  The RAF considered its de-icing 
equipment had insufficient capacity as it lasted only an hour which would have been 
a third of the Berlin round trip from the Southern Zone.
294
  Some civil aircraft lacked 
the equipment completely.
295
  The Halifaxes lacked proper wing de-icing and its 
absence was one of the reasons that the Bristol Freighters were withdrawn.
296
  More 
sorties would have been lost during the winter in the south owing to ice and there 
would have probably been more aircraft crashes.   
As Table 5.9 showed, the round trip between Rhein-Main and Berlin was 200 
nautical miles longer, over an hour more in flying time, than from RAF Wunstorf.  
The higher operating altitudes and the longer distances would have consumed more 
fuel which could have meant that less payload was available for cargo.  On the 
positive side, because the southern corridor would have been dedicated to British 
aircraft, the RAF could have determined the rules for traffic movement.  It might 
have replaced the block system by the efficient continuous flow one and introduced 
two-way traffic, thus reducing the round trip by 60 nautical miles.   
It is plausible to assume that had the British retained responsibility for the Wet Lift, 
it would have continued to have been based in the Northern Zone.  Operating from 
bases in the American Zone would have incurred extra costs and especially dollar 
expenditure which might have terminated the civilian dry lift and a similar case could 
be made for not repositioning the inefficient Dakotas.  Thus just the RAF Hastings 
and Yorks might have been involved.   
Whilst Charlesby's reasons for the RAF's performance
297
 revealed that flight times 
were a minor consideration in the number of trips mounted daily, the current research 
has found no baseline from which to calculate the impact on tonnage that 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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  AP3257, pp. 288-289, 293. 
293
  AP3257, p. 160, 224-225, 294-295 (including ground de-icing measures). 
294
  AP3257, p. 160. 
295
  AP3257, pp. 15, 294. 
296
  AP3257, pp. 195, 224. 
297
  See thesis Chap. 5. 
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repositioning the RAF Hastings and York aircraft in the Southern Zone would have 
caused.  Charlesby's proposal was for a temporary repositioning.  The Airlift was 
expected to continue into US FY1951, with a theoretical saturation ceiling of 1,440 
deliveries per day
298
 and Clay's the long-term average daily target of 11,249 short 
tons
299
.  It would, thus, have been sensible to retain all the British assets; to do so 
from airfields in the Northern (British) Zone alongside the whole 1
st
 ALTF 
Skymaster fleet, and to accept the civil engineering involved in expanding existing 
Airlift bases, developing additional ones, and retaining and provisioning the ones in 
the Southern Zone to provide diversion airfields during inclement weather.   
CONCLUSION 
The British aircraft were not superfluous.  They generated less sorties per aircraft 
than the Americans and aside from the dry lift Tudors, the multiplicity of aircraft 
types hauled less per trip than the Skymaster.  Once it was stabilized the Civil Lift's 
overall utilization was better than the RAF.  With the objective of a long-term 
expanding Airlift, the military Skymaster fleet was insufficient to replace the British.  
Additional aircraft would have needed more personnel in air and ground roles and 
the Americans, unlike the British, were already recalling reservists and employing 
German mechanics to retain their high manpower to aircraft ratios.  The US civil air 
fleet, particularly the DC-4 and DC-6 elements, would have increased aircraft 
numbers and provided aircrews and mechanics but was unlikely to have performed 
as well as 1
st
 ALTF.  The only other military freighters available in large numbers 
and not requiring runway upgrades were the C-46 and C-82.  They might have 
offered an improvement on the Dakota until something better was available but they 
were not the vehicles by which 1
st
 ALTF could have been expanded to allow it to 
replace the British or even the British dry lift. 
Relocating all of 1
st
 ALTF into the Northern Zone would have increased the tonnage 
but by less than was anticipated by its contemporaneous advocates and not by 
enough to have replaced the British or even just the RAF and the dry lift component 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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  Tunner, p. 174. 
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  USNA, Record Group 341, Headquarters U.S. Air Force (Air Staff) 1934 - 2004, Top 
Secret Decimal Correspondence Files compiled 1942 - 1954, Germany 381, NM-15-335A, 
Box 808, attachment to Anderson 13 April 1949.   
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of the Civil Lift.  There was insufficient space on Airlift bases in the north and the 
permutations available to overcome this would have involved civil engineering 
development.  Repositioning of BAFO squadrons or residual Operation 
PLAINFARE aircraft might, moreover, have been necessary to maintain the priority 
accorded to the Skymaster throughout the Airlift.   
A further consideration was the niche tasks that the British airlifts had acquired 
during the Blockade.  How significant these were would have depended on when the 
Americans replaced the British.  The Civil Lift became the sole bulk carrier of liquid 
fuels - the Wet Lift.  The dry lift Halifaxes' removable panniers made them the ideal 
vehicle to haul salt.  The impact of both cargoes on the Americans would have 
extended beyond just hauling extra tonnage.  It seems likely that providing the Civil 
Lift had reached the stage of performing adequately, it would have been asked to 
continue to haul these hazardous cargoes.  The RAF had also found a specialist role, 
the carriage of passengers from Berlin.  The Skymasters could have easily taken over 
the task and the number of aircraft involved would have been small.  However, to 
have done so would have affected adversely the Americans' prized turn round times; 
diverted attention from the supreme objective - as they perceived it - of delivering 
the maximum tonnage to Berlin, and because the task included evacuating the 
elderly, sick and children, complicated ground processing.  Again it might have been 
attractive to the Americans if the British retained this task. 
Thus, with growing targets and a perceived long-term commitment, it would not 
have been sensible to withdraw the British assets, no matter how inefficient some 
were, until the Airlift reached its saturation point.  Britain's aircraft were needed for 
logistical reasons.   
Chapter 6 reinforced and extended the points identified in Chapter 5 about British 
performance and utilization.  It emphasized the implications of the British having to 
fly further than the C-54s based at RAF Celle and RAF Fassberg and the 
disadvantages imposed on them by traffic control in the air corridors.  It revealed the 
advantages of being able to haul standardized loads and that the Americans 
proportionally hauled more homogeneous cargoes.  Eighty percent of their cargoes 
were sacks of coal which were relatively easier to man-handle and to stow onboard 
whereas the equivalent British figure was 30%.  Unlike the 1
st
 ALTF, which was 
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operating a single type, the British were operating seven as the Blockade was being 
lifted with a number of variations even within a particular aircraft type.  Thus even 
when homogeneous possibilities existed, assembling of loads had to be undertaken 
with greater skill by the British, with attention being paid to the characteristics of 
individual aircraft.  This may have had some impact on utilization but nowhere near 
sufficient to explain why a C-54 based in the Northern Zone completed 3.6 round 
trips per day whilst a RAF Yorks did 1.2.
300
  The Civil Lift was an expensive and 
inefficient way to increase the tonnage hauled.  Multiple small companies, often 
operating with inadequate capital, were involved.  There were shortages of 
personnel, spares and ground equipment.  As the Wet Lift showed, selecting 
individual companies on the basis of lowest price rather than the effectiveness of the 
contractor and its aircraft added to problems faced by the Airlift's managers and its 
freight handlers, even to the extent of there not being a standard coupling to connect 
aircraft to the discharge standpipes in Berlin.  Chapters 2 to 6 inclusive also served as 
sources for the comparison between the application of logistics in the Airlift with 
earlier hot wars which is covered in Appendix 7. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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CHAPTER 7: 
CONCLUSIONS 
'The Anglo American airlift was one of the wonders of the world.' 
Clement Attlee, March 1949.
1
 
This chapter brings together the main findings of the research into the Anglo-
American Berlin Airlift - and particularly the British component - presented in the 
course of the thesis.  It recalls how the key factors for a successful airlift identified in 
precedents from Second World War were implemented during the Airlift before 
proceeding to reveal the thesis's findings in response to the four research questions 
set in Chapter 1 above.  By way of a coda, it also offers the findings of a subsidiary, 
but closely related exercise, considering how the application of logistics by the 
participants in the Airlift differed fundamentally from hot wars logistics.  The 
chapter ends by identifying the key areas in the historiography of the Airlift that have 
been augmented by the thesis and proposes areas for future research.   
The June 1948 to May 1949 Blockade of Berlin was a pivotal moment in East-West 
relations.
2
  The motivation for it was the Soviet desire to prevent or at least delay 
developments that would lead to the Federal Republic of Germany.  As Chapter 2 
showed, a blockade was made possible because Berlin was situated 100 miles inside 
the post-war Soviet Zone of occupation.  Thus in June 1948, rather than submit to 
Soviet terms whatever these might be, the three Western powers (and, to a large 
extent, this meant the USA as the dominant element in the partnership) opted to 
supply western Berlin by an airbridge using the three air corridors over the Soviet 
Zone agreed by the Four Powers in 1945.   
An airborne blockade would have required the interception of aircraft flying along 
legally acknowledged routes and thus the probability of open war in the event of 
_____________________________________________________________ 
1
  Anon, ‘Berlin Airlift Inspected by Mr. Attlee‘, The Kalgoorlie Miner, 7 March 1949, p. 5. 
2
  The lifting of the Blockade on 12 May 1949 did not signal guarantee of access.  
Interference with surface traffic continued and the western Berlin railway workers' strike 
necessitated the Airlift continuing into autumn 1949 when the City's stockpiles reached the 
levels considered adequate to match any renewed blockade by the Soviets. 
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such escalation of the crisis.  However, this would appear to be a risk that the Soviet 
leadership were unwilling to take.  The Soviet leadership's wartime experiences of 
the siege of Leningrad and the German defeat at Stalingrad were probably a major 
reason why they may have expected an airbridge would fail of its own accord, even 
without having to take the provocative step of intercepting Western aircraft.  Nor 
were the Soviets alone in misreading the precedents.  Senior Anglo-American 
politicians and officials initially saw the Airlift as a temporary expedient not a viable 
longer-term solution, a holding measure whilst diplomatic negotiations led to a 
speedy resolution. 
Although in the event the airlift sceptics' expectations were confounded, as shown in 
Chapter 4 it was not until 15 March 1949, by when it was clear that the Airlift was 
sustaining western Berlin, that the negotiations started that led to the lifting of the 
Blockade.  Whether their scepticism would have been justified if the Blockade had 
continued is another matter.  Certainly, as the thesis also showed, there are grounds 
for thinking that the Anglo-American plans for an ever-larger Airlift continuing at 
least into 1951, may have been overly optimistic.   
The studies of World War II airlifts in Chapter 3 of the thesis identified five key 
factors necessary for a successful airlift: first, the ability to produce sufficient aircraft 
daily and to keep them flying under all weather conditions; this in turn necessitated 
adequate all-weather airfields at both ends of the airbridge, adequately equipped and 
linked to safe and efficient management of traffic; third, there needed to be efficient, 
and therefore effective, handling of the huge quantities of freight involved; fourth, 
the ability to protect the aircraft and the airfields involved from enemy attack and 
finally, an effective airlift command structure.   
During the Airlift, as Chapters 5 and 6 found, over time the Americans progressively 
became capable of generating large numbers of sorties daily although the British 
were less successful.  Airfields were built, renovated and enhanced; systems and 
training programmes were developed and technology was deployed which permitted 
large numbers of sorties to be flown night and day in almost all weathers.  
Fundamentally the freight hauled daily by the Americans and the British was dictated 
by the number of aircraft sorties mounted.  But without competent handling of the 
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cargoes on the ground, figures in excess of 8,000 short tons would not have been 
achieved.   
Stalingrad and Leningrad were examples of airbridges that had been interfered with 
successfully by the enemy's air and ground forces.  The Berlin Airlift was harassed 
by the Soviets on occasion but it is unlikely that this was centrally orchestrated and 
certainly no aircraft were lost as a result.  We are therefore confronted with the 
question why the Soviets exercised this restraint.  The traditional view, the one 
expressed above, is that the Soviets were unwilling to risk all-out war.  However, as 
the thesis has demonstrated in Chapter 5, the Soviets had other options that would 
have disrupted the Airlift to such an extent that it might have failed.  They could, for 
instance, have undertaken major jamming of ground-to-air voice communications.  
That the Soviets refrained from doing this reinforces the perception that they 
expected the Airlift to fail from the sheer scale of the logistical task.  But this still 
leaves the puzzle as to why such measures were not deployed by the Soviets in 
March and April 1949 to show capability whilst the lifting of the Blockade was being 
negotiated.  The muted, and generally open-confrontation-avoiding Soviet reactions 
to the Airlift thus remain puzzling. 
Another striking feature of 1948-1949 identified in the thesis were the lessons about 
command and control evident in the airlifts of the recent past that were not 
implemented in the Berlin Airlift.  Chapter 3 identified the need for simple, clear-cut 
arrangements - factors that in many regards were absent during the Airlift.  The 
Americans appointed their successful Hump commander, Major General William 
Tunner, to command 1st ALTF.  Likewise, the British Army utilized prior experience 
by appointing Brigadier J. A. Dawson - who had commanded the Combined Army 
Air Transport Organization in Burma - as Commander Army Air Transport 
Organization [CAATO].  The RAF, on the other hand, deployed one of its Transport 
Command Group commanders - Air Commodore John Merer - whose prior 
experience was limited to nine months commanding routine, low-intensity, 
peacetime air transport.   
It was not only the failure to utilize experience that was the problem.  The thesis 
shows that command arrangements were dysfunctional.  Both the American and the 
British Airlift task forces were divorced from their normal functionally-organized 
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command structures and emphatically placed under the two local geographic 
commanders - the Commanding General United States Air Forces in Europe [CG 
USAFE] and the Air Officer Commanding in Chief British Air Forces of Occupation 
(Germany) [AOC-in-C BAFO] - whose headquarters were insufficiently experienced 
in transport operations.  Although a Combined Airlift Task Force Headquarters [HQ 
CALTF] was created under Tunner it was not truly a joint headquarters.  The 
American element also commanded 1
st
 ALTF and because of an overall shortage of 
available British officers, there were few RAF officers on its staff.  HQ CALTF's 
relationship with Air Commodore John Merer's headquarters, Headquarters Number 
46 Group [HQ No. 46 Gp.] was best described as one of traffic coordination.   
Finally, the thesis has shown a further complication adding to the problems of 
command and control.  The RAF was not the only British air fleet involved in the 
Berlin Airlift.  There was also the 'Civil Lift', a collection of civilian contractors with 
each providing a small number of aircraft that were hired by the Foreign Office and 
were managed in Germany - often with difficulty - by the local British European 
Airways manager.  He cooperated closely with the RAF but was not under its 
command.  Moreover, the administrative arrangements in Britain were of Byzantine 
complexity with five ministries being involved: the Air Ministry, the Foreign Office, 
the Ministry of Civil Aviation, the Ministry of Supply and the Treasury.  In 
summary, then, there were deficiencies in the command and control arrangements for 
this multinational operation but even if they had been perfect, it is difficult to see 
how an American commander could have improved significantly the shortcomings of 
the British air fleets. 
The core of the thesis - Chapters 5 and 6 - examined a wide variety of evidence to 
determine how, in practice, the Airlift functioned overall and to assess the 
contribution of the British component in particular.  Assessing the extent of the 
nation's contribution meant that the fundamental question of the utility of its 
involvement was considered: was the participation of British aircraft really essential 
to the Airlift's overall success?  To answer this, four closely related subsidiary 
questions have been addressed.  First, were there reasons beyond considerations of 
aircraft size and numbers that account for the differences in performance between the 
Americans and the British?  Second, were British aircraft needed logistically?  Third, 
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did the Americans have the additional resources needed to replace the British and 
fourthly, was it a feasible or realistic option for the Americans to have replaced the 
British by locating all of their 1
st
 Airlift Task Force [1
st
 ALTF] in the Northern Zone?   
These research questions sit within the 'cinderella' subject of air logistics and the 
historical application of airpower.  A unique hybrid methodology has been developed 
from those of the historical researcher and the logistician which has been used to 
answer the questions set out above.  The thesis is the first time the Berlin Airlift has 
been analysed in this way; indeed following extensive research it may be concluded 
that this is the first time a historian has proved empirically that the participation of 
British aircraft throughout the whole Anglo-American operation was logistically 
necessary. 
Turning to the first of these questions, did factors in addition to aircraft size and 
numbers account for the differences in performance between the Americans and the 
British, the thesis found that in 1949 the average strength in Germany for the RAF 
was 39 four-engine Avro Yorks; 14 four-engine Handley Page Hastings and 51 twin-
engine Douglas Dakotas.  The Dakota was necessary because the RAF had no other 
option and even with the Dakota deployed, the RAF could not achieve the tonnages 
that its political masters aspired to.  Contractors had to be hired.  By May 1949 the 
Civil Lift had been refined to five different four-engine aircraft types with the 
average monthly strength being 47 aircraft operated by 11 companies.  The American 
force, on the other hand, was entirely military and comprised 225 four-engine 
Douglas Skymasters and five end-loading Fairchild C-82s to handle the abnormal 
indivisible loads. 
The small capacity of the Dakotas was not lost on the Americans who had withdrawn 
their equivalent C-47s from the Airlift at the end of September 1948.  In January 
1949 USAFE suggested to BAFO that the RAF should operate Skymasters and the 
Dakotas be withdrawn.  An operational loan for the duration of the Airlift had 
obvious appeal to the British but it soon became clear that American resources were 
stretched and no Skymasters would be forthcoming.  That the RAF continued to 
make attempts to acquire them thereafter suggests much about the state of the 
Service's inventory and its sensitivity about its low performance. 
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Table 7.1 below summarizes statistics recorded at the time about the tonnages carried 
by the different types of aircraft.
3
  They are, however, indicative because of the 
different maintenance policies and ways of accounting for aircraft status across the 
three fleets.  Using Dr Arthur Charlesby's - the Chief Research Officer at HQ BAFO 
- calculations to attain a common baseline, we find, for example, that theoretically it 
took almost three and a half RAF Yorks to haul the same tonnage daily as an 
American C-54 based in the Northern Zone.  Table 7.1 and the York example cited 
display clearly that the RAF's (and to a lesser extent the Civil Lift's) inability to 
deliver American sized tonnages was not due solely to aircraft numbers and sizes; it 
also arose from lower aircraft utilization.   
Aircraft Type Short Tons per aircraft 
at base per day 
Round Trips per aircraft 
at base per day 
BRITISH 
CIVIL LIFT 
Halifax 13.9 2.1 
Lancastrian 20.8 3 
Liberator 12.1 1.7 
Tudor 25.4 3 
York 25.7 2.7 
RAF 
Dakota 4.4 1.3 
Hastings 13.2 1.5 
York 15.8 1.9 
AMERICAN   
C-54 at RAF Celle 32 3.3 
C-54 at RAF Fassberg 30.3 3.1 
Skymaster at Rhein-Main AFB 28.5 2.8 
C-54 at Wiesbaden AFB 22.6 2.3 
 
Table 7.1: Average Daily Tonnage Carried during March, April, May 1949 
_____________________________________________________________ 
3
  See Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 in Chapter 5. 
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The low utilization in the RAF task force arose from several reasons: an 
insufficiency of manpower - both aircrews to fly the aircraft and technical staff to 
service them; the poor serviceability of its aircraft, and the priority accorded to the 
1st ALTF Skymasters by the Anglo-American commanders both in airfield 
allocation and traffic management.  Poor utilization was not peculiar to BAFO; it 
affected the RAF as a whole.  Unfortunately, whilst this may have been tolerated in a 
small, under-funded, under-equipped peacetime Air Force, it was not appropriate to 
hauling the maximum tonnage possible in accordance with the CALTF constitution.
4
 
Diminishing numbers of personnel available to fly and to service its aircraft was a 
problem confronting the RAF in the period immediately after the Second World War.  
Several influences had led to this end: the political commitment to maintain the 
discharge dates of the conscript airmen which meant that during the Airlift expertise 
was leaching away; the Government's decision not to recall reservists in quantity - 
unlike the Americans who employed them extensively - and the poor pay and 
conditions of service which reduced the likelihood of persuading suitable ex-
servicemen to rejoin.  Aircrew were transferred from ground tours and other RAF 
Commands but the Service could not bring together the personnel required for an 
operation as intensive as the Airlift.  Supplementation from the Royal Australian Air 
Force, Royal New Zealand Air Force and South African Air Force palliated, but did 
not solve, the problem.  Moreover, their assistance provided aircrew for the Dakota 
pool not the large aircraft.  Royal Canadian Air Force aircraft (variants of the 
Skymaster) and personnel were sought on several occasions but these requests were 
refused by the Canadian Government.   
Compounding the problem of lack of aircrew was that of keeping such aircraft as the 
RAF had in a state fit for flying.  RAF aircraft were over-inspected and over-
serviced.  Aircraft were grounded for rectification when minor faults were found.  In 
addition there was a high rate of aircraft unserviceability awaiting the delivery of 
spare parts.  The pooling of Transport Command squadrons in Germany; the 
application of the newly conceived three-wing organization; the retention of 100-
_____________________________________________________________ 
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  'to deliver to Berlin, in a safe and efficient manner, the maximum tonnage possible 
consistent with combined resources of equipment and personnel available' - TNA, AIR 
25/1266, No. 46 Gp. ORB, Appendices September-October 1948, Appendix 20 to Form 540 
dated 15 October 1948. 
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hour inspections at the parent stations in the United Kingdom, and an insufficiency 
of experienced maintenance tradesmen all contributed to the problem of poor 
serviceability rates.  Moreover, unlike the Americans who used ex-Luftwaffe 
personnel extensively as mechanics, the British only employed locally engaged 
civilians for non-skilled tasks.  Thus, it is not surprising that after the Airlift HQ 
BAFO recorded that the RAF needed more reliable aircraft; that its maintenance 
policies required revision, and that there had been insufficient aircrews and 
maintenance staff.   
The aircraft-routing and traffic procedures imposed by HQ CALTF also impeded the 
British contribution - both military and civilian - to the Airlift.  The procedures 
rightly gave the more numerous and most effective and robust aircraft, the American 
Skymaster, preference and although revised several times during the Airlift, they 
continued to disadvantage the British.  Moreover, in bad weather when fewer flights 
could be handled, the RAF Dakotas would be grounded to maximise the number of 
deliveries by the larger aircraft.  British aircraft - both military and civilian - were 
also affected adversely by the decisions about where aircraft were based in Germany.  
Positioning USAF C-54s in the Northern Zone at RAF Celle and RAF Fassberg 
benefited the Airlift overall but it meant that British aircraft had to fly further to 
Berlin, an hour more per round trip in the case of the Hastings.   
Because, for the reasons we have seen, the RAF was unable to deliver the tonnage 
that the Government considered appropriate to the national effort, the Foreign Office 
chartered aircraft from numerous small firms - the Civil Lift.  This was an expensive 
way to increase the British tonnage as was shown in Chapter 2 above.  The form of 
contract used, moreover, was defective; there was no motivation for the firms to 
increase their aircraft's payloads.  Selecting individual companies based on the 
lowest price meant that some firms' performances left much to be desired.   Many 
companies operated on a shoestring and were given no inducement to invest beyond 
the minimum essential to retain their contract.  Here too, there were shortages of 
personnel, spares, and ground equipment, and there were extremely few backup 
aircraft.  Furthermore, because of the variety of aircraft types employed and the 
many small firms operating them, there were differences even at the level of 
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individual aircraft about what could be carried and how it could be loaded and 
unloaded which compromised the efficiency of the cargo handling on the ground. 
Thus the difference in tonnages hauled by the Americans and by the British was not 
due solely to the former having more and larger aircraft as Dudley Barker wrote in 
1949.
5
  Lower rates of utilization also played a part and these arose from several 
reasons some of which were due to Britain's difficulties in finding the resources 
needed to deliver the tonnages that the Government considered appropriate in a 
country that was still recovering from the Second World War and whose priorities 
did not include retaining a large air force.   
If the British contribution to the Airlift was compromised as we have just seen, what 
was its contribution to the operation overall?  Was it necessary in logistical terms - 
or, to put the question in a different way, would the Airlift have failed if British 
aircraft had not been involved?  Resolution of this, the second of the research 
questions, was addressed in Chapter 6 and involved comparison of the targets set 
with the tonnages carried by the American and British air fleets.  During the 
Blockade, the American, British and French military governors jointly set several 
mandatory targets for the Airlift as well as some additional higher "desirable" ones.  
In each instance the tonnage hauled exceeded the mandatory target, although, and 
subject to questions about statistical precision, the winter figures showed a margin 
equivalent to just half a day's deliveries by the combined air fleets.  The desirable 
targets, however, were not met.   
Of course, comparison of the tonnages actually delivered with the targets that the 
military governors set is not the sole yardstick by which the logistical need for 
British aircraft should be judged.  Even with the Anglo-American airbridge, 
conditions for the western Berliners during the Blockade were austere and at no time 
during the Airlift was the theoretical saturation point of 1,440 deliveries per day 
reached.  Furthermore, it was not just the actual Airlift targets that need to be 
considered but the larger ones thought to be necessary for the long-term airbridge 
being planned for 1950 and 1951 which were dependant on the British delivering 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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  Dudley Barker, Berlin Airlift: An account of the British Contribution (London: HMSO, 
1949) p. 6. 
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2,003 short tons a day.
6
  Thus, as the thesis showed, the conclusion has to be that 
British aircraft were needed logistically.  
Given the scale of the British contribution, the question naturally occurred to 
contemporaries as to whether it might have been replaced entirely by the Americans 
allocating men and materiel from their own resources.  This - the third research 
question - arose from contemporary British fears - reinforced by a statement made by 
Major General Tunner (Commanding General CALTF) - that growing US strength 
would eventually make the RAF and the Civil Lift redundant.
7
  Was this American 
boastfulness, or did the Americans have sufficient resources actually to effect this?  
The thesis assumed any additional American aircraft needed in Germany to replace 
the British would be based in the Northern Zone close to RAF Fassberg - from which 
C-54s already operated. Two scenarios were considered: first, replacement of the 
RAF and the dry lift element of the Civil Lift and second, the RAF and the complete 
Civil Lift including the aircraft engaged in delivering liquid fuel in bulk - the Wet 
Lift.  The latter was an important niche activity but in terms of the total Airlift 
tonnage it was small - 7% of the total daily tonnage in May 1949.  Moreover, hauling 
liquid fuel in bulk introduced issues which the US 1st ALTF did not face with its dry 
cargoes.
8
  Faced with these challenges the Americans might have preferred not to 
replace a British Wet Lift which, as recorded in Chapter 1, was a possibility that the 
British had appreciated in November 1948. 
The analysis recorded in Chapter 6 revealed that to have replaced all the British 
aircraft in May 1949 would have required in the order of 73 extra Skymasters to be 
based on the Northern Zone airfields whilst 42 would have been needed if the Wet 
Lift element was excluded.  In addition to these aircraft the Americans would have 
needed to augment both the Skymasters being used for Airlift training in the USA 
and in their 1,000 hour comprehensive overhaul pipeline.  Assuming increases at the 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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  A greater amount than the combined British fleets averaged even in the last weeks of the 
Blockade. 
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  AFHRA, IRISNUM 1038197, 'History of the Airlift Task Force (Prov.): September 1948', 
Tunner 28 September 1948. 
8
  For example: the need to modify aircraft; the dangers arising from carrying hazardous 
cargo and the use of purpose-built fuel installations located at specific airfields. 
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"sharp-end" were proportionally reflected in the "tails", in May 1949 the Americans 
would have needed in total 115 Skymasters to replace the British fully and 66 if the 
Wet Lift was excluded. 
Having established the number of aircraft necessary to replace the British, two 
considerations arise: was there sufficient spare capacity on the airfields and did the 
American military have sufficient additional Skymasters?  Chapter 6 showed that to 
have accommodated the extra aircraft on the airfields around RAF Fassberg would 
have required civil engineering enhancements.  In spring 1949 only the conversion of 
RAF Luneburg to handle 60 Skymasters was under way and it was not planned for 
completion until 1 September 1949.  To answer the second consideration, the thesis 
revealed that both the USAF Director Plans and Operations and HQ CALTF doubted 
that the US military would not have enough Skymasters to meet its commitments 
under the long-term Airlift plans.
9
  Moreover, the USAF assessment of Airlift future 
capability had assumed that the British would deliver the 2,003 tons per day 
mentioned above.  Thus the thesis has shown that we have to conclude that the US 
military Skymaster force alone could not have replaced the British and met the long-
term Airlift commitments.  
The American planners also considered the practicability of using very heavy 
transport aircraft for the long-term Airlift.  Even if sufficient had become available in 
time, very substantial civil engineering upgrades would have been needed at the 
involved airfields - for example Tegel in Berlin would have needed 31,000 tons of 
plant and asphalt to be flown in and the work would have taken eight months to 
complete.  The Douglas DC-6A was also suggested as it would have required less 
civil engineering but it was not in production for the US military.  Thus the British 
need not have been afraid of being sidelined by natural growth in the American task 
force's capability for the foreseeable future.  The issue was rather whether the US 
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military would have had the assets and the infrastructure to deliver the tonnages 
being planned for it in the long-term Airlift.   
Chapter 6 also considered if an American Civil Lift might have been a possibility.  
The USAF had identified that over 200 DC-4s and DC-6s were operated by 
American scheduled and unscheduled airlines which it deemed as available for use in 
an emergency.  Contracting with US civilian companies and diversion of aircraft 
from airline use would have taken time.  Moreover, the primary reason for the 
efficiency of the American Airlift lay in it being a military operation and introducing 
contractors could have degraded overall performance.  Also the American task force 
was supported by a logistic tail that stretched back into and across the USA and 
which relied heavily on a variety of military and chartered aircraft.  If either had been 
swapped to cargo delivery into Berlin, it would have affected that supply chain 
adversely.  Nevertheless, given enough lead time and political acceptance of paying 
charter rates, a joint American civilian-military task force might have undertaken the 
Airlift on its own.  The questions about the viability of the long-term plans, of 
course, would have remained. 
The second way in which British airborne participation might have become 
redundant - the final research question - was by locating all of the American 1
st
 
ALTF aircraft to the Northern Zone of Germany?  This question explores a view 
expressed at the time: that aircraft based on airfields on the eastern side of the 
Northern Zone should haul noticeably more per day than those located in the 
Southern Zone.  This move would have necessitated accommodation for a total of 
230 American aircraft and again the preferred locations would undoubtedly have 
been around RAF Fassberg.  To achieve this would have necessitated more civil 
engineering than would have been needed for the option of deploying additional 
Skymasters discussed above as more aircraft would have been involved.  Moreover, 
positioning all the American aircraft in one small area of Germany would have 
resulted in periods when operations there would have been curtailed by bad weather 
locally and so standby airfields would have been needed in other parts of western 
Germany - able to both receive diverted aircraft and then to despatch them fully 
loaded to Berlin.   
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In the spring and early summer of 1949 the Northern Zone Skymasters did not 
achieve the extra trips per day over the ones based in the Southern Zone that had 
been anticipated when the idea of relocation had been suggested.  It remained true 
that basing the whole US task force in the Fassberg area would have increased the 
tonnage delivered to Berlin but the amount would have been insufficient to have 
replaced the British in total or even just the RAF and the dry lift component of the 
British Civil Lift.  Had it been decided to replace the British - either by choice or 
through necessity - then a combination of the relocation of 1
st
 ALTF just described 
and deployment of additional American aircraft would have been the best option.  
For example, in May 1949 an additional 19 Skymasters operating on the Northern 
Zone airfields alongside all of 1
st
 ALTF would have replaced the RAF and the dry 
lift element of the Civil Lift.   With additions to the Great Falls AFB training facility 
and the pipeline and overhaul pool, 29 extra Skymasters would have been needed.  
The question about the viability of the tonnages being proposed for the long-term 
Airlift would have remained, however. 
To summarize the answer to the question about whether the participation of British 
aircraft was essential to the Airlift's overall success, the thesis shows that the 
utilization rates of the British aircraft were poorer than those of the Americans and 
especially so in the case of the RAF.  In spite of this, the capacity of the two British 
air fleets was needed logistically.  Replacement of this capacity by the Americans 
would not have been easy particularly when the plans for the Airlift to continue into 
1951 are taken into consideration.  The US military Skymaster force could not have 
done it alone nor could relocating all of the existing American task force to airfields 
around Hanover.  A combined force of American military and civilian aircraft, 
located in the east of the British occupation zone, might have succeeded if sufficient 
lead time and funds were available but only after civil engineering enhancements to 
airfields.  In the case of the very heavy transports - that were expected to enter 
service in the early 1950s - these would have had to be very extensive and have 
included Berlin.  We must conclude, therefore, that participation of British aircraft 
would have been necessary for the foreseeable future. 
Turning to the subsidiary but related area of research into how fundamentally the 
application of logistics differed between the Airlift and hot wars up until that point, 
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the thesis shows that the Airlift's objective was to sustain over two million in western 
Berlin.  Rather than its normal position in the military repertory, buried in the "admin 
tail", logistics was thus the fundamental purpose of the operation.  In hot wars, 
conditions often change quickly necessitating flexibility and even at junior levels, 
initiative.  The Airlift was a more stable event allowing its logistics systems to be 
approached in a technological way with the higher formations - and especially 
CALTF - designing the processes and over-seeing their implementation which were 
then undertaken in a standard way.  Unapproved initiatives were not encouraged.  As 
Appendix 7 identifies, it was a systems engineering approach.   
The last part of this chapter summarizes what the thesis has added to the 
historiographies of the Berlin Airlift and air logistics in what has been described as 
'the first humanitarian airlift of the Cold War, and the largest in History'.
10
  It has 
applied a hybrid set of methodologies constructed from those of the historian and the 
logistician to a substantial amount of material about the Airlift and the British 
contribution in particular which as Chapter 1 showed has been inadequately covered 
previously.  It has shown how the British element of the Airlift worked and 
empirically - for the first time - that the RAF and Civil Lift aircraft were necessary 
for the logistical success of the total Anglo-American operation and would have 
continued to be so in the long-term commitment being planned.  The differences 
between American and British performance have been examined and low aircraft 
utilization, especially by the RAF, revealed as a cause additional to the explanation 
publicized at the time about the US task force having more and larger aircraft.  In 
part this was due to Government priorities before the Airlift and its politicians' 
aspirations to deliver tonnages beyond the capability of the post-war RAF.  The 
USA's capability to replace the British aircraft by deploying more aircraft has been 
explored and contemporary Foreign Office and RAF concerns about this occurring 
through natural expansion of the American capability have been shown to be unduly 
pessimistic.  Furthermore, the growth in tonnage delivered to Berlin that was 
anticipated at the time to result from positioning all of the US 1
st
 ALTF in the 
Northern Zone has been revealed to have been optimistic and less than would have 
_____________________________________________________________ 
10
  Daniel L. Haulman, [USAF Historian] Wings of Hope: The U.S. Air Force and 
Humanitarian Airlift Operations (Air Force History and Museums Program, Air Force 
Fiftieth Anniversary Commemorative Edition: 1997) p. 3. 
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been required to replace the British.  The thesis has also exposed the doubts in the 
Air Ministry, the [US] Department of the Air Force and HQ CALTF about the 
viability of the evolving plans for the long-term Anglo-American Airlift.  Finally, it 
has revealed how the Airlift's approach to the logistics - based on the rigorous 
application of carefully evolved standard procedures - differed fundamentally from 
that applied in hot wars.   
This research has been unable to establish with certainty why the Soviet leadership 
reacted to the Airlift in the way it did (Page 9 above).  A second gap is the absence of 
the Transport Command post-operation report (Page 16 above).  From the Air 
Ministry correspondence about it, this document may not have the significance that 
resolving the uncertainty about Soviet reactions would have, but it is a shortfall that 
research by Western historians is more likely to fill.  However, the principal area for 
future study arising from this thesis is to expand the historiographies of logistics and 
airpower to cover in depth from a supply aspect other specific historic uses of 
military aircraft in an air sustainment role.  The first example of this might be the 
1944 Siege of Imphal and the airlift thereafter in support of the advance into Burma 
which was one of the precedents in Chapter 3.
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APPENDIX 1 
THE SIEGE OF LENINGRAD 
The Soviets made strenuous efforts to deliver supplies during the Siege of Leningrad 
even when their prime objective was the defence of Moscow.  Although haulage was 
almost entirely by surface means, the siege could have served as a precedent for the 
Soviets when considering how the Americans might respond to the Berlin Blockade 
(see Chapter 3).  This Appendix summarizes salient points including the tonnages 
moved; the civilian population's rations, and conditions generally.  The civilian 
dimension also allows comparison with the Berlin Blockade albeit the German 
intention was to starve the Leningraders whilst the Soviets offered the opportunity 
for western Berliners to register for rations in the eastern sector (see Chapter 4 
above).  The Appendix includes references to Pavlov's Leningrad v Blockade as its 
statistics appear realistic and not propaganda.  Even so, because of the conditions 
pertaining during the siege, figures cited below should be treated as indicative.
1 
 
Between September 1941 and January 1943 the Germans and Finns laid siege to 
Leningrad, its environs, and territory to the south of the Neva River and Lake 
Ladoga. 2,850 square kilometres came under "siege" including a corridor to Lake 
Ladoga via basic roads and the single track, 55 kilometre-long, poorly equipped 
Irinovskii railway and from there to the rest of the unoccupied Soviet Union across 
the lake.
2
  Appendix 2 is a map of the routes used during the siege and a visual 
appreciation of the effort needed to breach the blockade.  
_____________________________________________________________ 
1
  Dmitri Vasilievich Pavlov, trans. John C. Adams, Leningrad 1941: The Blockade 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965) pp. vii, xiii, xvii-xviii, xxiii-xxiv, 48-49; Harrison 
E. Salisbury, The Siege of Leningrad (London: Secker and Warburg, 1969) p. 294.  First 
edition of Dmitri Vasilievich Pavlov's monograph was released in 1958, with a second 
edition published in 1961.  The J. C. Adams translation is cited in the thesis.  Pavlov was a 
civil servant, a specialist in food production, who was despatched to Leningrad on 8 
September 1941 to deal with both military and civilian food supply. 
2
  John Erickson, Road to Stalingrad (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977) pp.  170, 
191, 195; David M. Glantz, Leningrad: City under Siege 1941-1944, (Rochester: Grange 
Books, 2005) pp. 33, 68-69, 75, 116 125, 166, 190; David M. Glantz, The Battle for 
Leningrad 1941-1944 (Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002, BCA edn., 2004) 
pp. 15-16, 124, 136, 234, 260-262; David M. Glantz, Before Stalingrad: Barbarossa - 
Hitler's Invasion of Russia 1941 (Stroud: Tempus, 2003) pp. 102, 108; Michael Jones, 
Leningrad: State of Siege (London: John Murray, 2009) pp. xvii, 41, 113; Pavlov, pp. 15-16, 
18, 31-32, 58, 155-156; Salisbury, pp. 16, 309-315, 330-331, 345, 409, 420. 
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Port facilities on the lake's western shores verged on the non-existent and those at 
Novaya Ladoga were poor.
3
  Most of the Lake's barges and tugs had been trapped in 
the River Neva and fragile river barges had to be used in declining autumn weather 
of 1941.
4
  Infrastructure, shipping and ice routes were under attack.
5
  Consignments 
had to be reloaded four times between the railhead at Gostinopolye and Leningrad.
6
  
The Lake was impassable while winter ice was forming or thawing.  Water transport 
across Lake Ladoga ended on 30 November 1941 when naval warships made the last 
deliveries.
7
  Horse drawn sledges had started to move on 20 November 1941
8
 and the 
first motor convoy reached the western shore on the evening of 22 November 1941
9
.   
In November 1941 the Germans occupied Tikhvin (cutting the last Moscow-Ladoga 
railway line), the port of Gostinopolye, and the outskirts of Volkhov and 
Voibokalo.
10
  A 320 kilometre forest and ice road was built from Zaborye railway 
station to Osinovets via Novaya Ladoga and Lednevo on Lake Ladoga.  The 200 
kilometre forest portion was completed on 6 December 1941.  The road, which took 
14 days for the return trip from Zaborye to Novaya Ladoga, was abandoned on 25 
December 1941 after the Germans were forced back from Volkhov and Voibokalo.
11
  
Initially thereafter freight moved by road and ice road between Tikhvin and 
Osinovets via Kabona, a distance of 190 kilometres with the return trip taking at least 
two days.
12
  After the Germans retreated from Zhikharevso there was a combined 
road-rail route from Tikhvin to Osinovets via Kolchanova Station and either 
_____________________________________________________________ 
3
  Pavlov, pp. 96-97; Salisbury, p. 408. 
4
  Pavlov, p. 99. 
5
  Pavlov, pp. 97, 99-102, 160-161, 165; Salisbury, pp. 380-382, 413. 
6
  Pavlov, pp. 50, 96-99; Salisbury, pp. 294, 380. 
7
  Glantz, City under Siege, pp. 69-70; Pavlov, pp. 115-117, 137-138. 
8
  Pavlov p. 137. 
9
  Pavlov, p. 137; Salisbury, p. 412. 
10
  Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, pp. 254-255; Glantz, City under Siege, pp. 45, 49-51, 53-
54; Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, pp. 90, 100-101; Pavlov pp. 107-109, 113-114, 138; 
Salisbury, pp. 386-387, 412-414. 
11
  Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, pp. 255, 262-264; Glantz, City under Siege, pp. 50, 53-54, 
76; Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, p. 108; Pavlov, pp. 103, 114-116, 138-140, 145; Salisbury, 
pp. 381, 405-406, 412-414. 
12
  Pavlov, p. 151. 
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Voibokalo or Zhikharevso.
13
  On 1 January 1942 the first through train ran from 
Tikhvin to Voibokalo.
14
  On 10 February 1942 a 34 kilometre railway opened 
between Voibokalo Station and the Lake shore at Kabona.
15
  By the season's end 
there were six ice roads in use.
16
  The last cargoes via the ice road arrived on 24 
April 1942.
17
 
Shipping restarted on Lake Ladoga on 22 May 1942.
18
  On 18 June 1942 a welded 
fuel pipe was completed under the Lake to deliver liquid fuels at 295 tonnes per 
day
19
 and in September 1942, the City started to receive electrical power transmitted 
across the lake from Volkhov by underwater cable
20
.  The first ice road convoy in the 
winter of 1942-1943 arrived on the western shores on 20 December 1942 and the ice 
road ended on 30 March 1943.
21
  At the start of the 1942-1943 ice season work had 
begun building a railway across the Lake.
22
  On the 18 January 1943 Leningrad was 
reconnected by land to the rest of the unoccupied Soviet Union along the recaptured 
10-12km wide Schluesselburg corridor beside the southern shore of Lake Ladoga and 
a railway was quickly constructed
23
.  This was augmented later by a second railway 
line further from the new frontline.
24
  Railway deliveries began on 6 February 1943 
with cargoes initially concentrating on coal for the power stations and thus electricity 
for the City's residual industry.
25
  After September 1943 the importance of the Lake 
_____________________________________________________________ 
13
  Pavlov, p. 151. 
14
  Pavlov pp. 151-152. 
15
  Pavlov, pp. 162-163. 
16
  Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, p. 141 - Map 10; Pavlov, pp. 153- 160; Salisbury, p. 504 - in 
winter temperatures reached minus 40°C and blizzards were severe. 
17
  Salisbury, p. 513.  
18
  Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, p. 141 Map 10; Salisbury, pp. 526-527.  
19
  John Erickson, The Road to Berlin (London: Cassell Military Paperbacks, 2003) pp. 61, 
167; Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad, p. 243; Jones, p. xx; Salisbury, p. 526.  19 June also 
cited as the start date for pipeline deliveries. 
20
  Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, p. 243; Jones, p. 271. 
21
  Glantz, City under Siege, pp. 119-120, 189. 
22
  Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, pp. 246-247. 
23
  Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, pp. 246-247. 
24
  Glantz, City under Siege, p. 119. 
25
  Erickson, Road to Berlin, pp. 61, 167; Glantz, City under Siege, pp. 118, 136, 139; 
Salisbury, pp. 548, 550-551. 
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Ladoga supply routes diminished as the capacity of the recaptured corridor grew.
26
 
As mentioned above, figures are indicative and sources differ.  The ones cited here 
are intended to give an example of what was achieved and not to formulate definitive 
statistics.  51,000 tons were delivered to the Leningrad shore between the start of the 
siege and the end of the 1941 shipping season of which 25,000 tons was food.
27
  The 
daily target for the 1941-1942 ice road was set at 2,000 tonnes which was not 
achieved regularly until February 1942 when the average became 3,000 tons.
28
  It 
reached 3,700 in March and dropped to 2,900 in April as the thaw approached.  In 
total the 1941-1942 ice road had delivered 356,000 tons of freight (2,300 tons per 
day) including 271,000 tons of food.
29
  The 1942 shipping season delivered 703,000 
tons of cargo (3,700 tons per day)
30
; the 1942-1943 ice road 215,000 tons
31
, and the 
1943 shipping season 148,000 tons
32
.  Railway deliveries via the corridor became the 
principal means of supply and by the end of 1943, 4,500,000 tons had been delivered 
(7,600 tons/day).
33
  For comparison, in August 1948, the second complete month of 
the Berlin Airlift, the daily average was 3,839 short tons.
34
  
Leningrad, including its garrison, started its siege with nearly 2,887,000 civilians to 
feed and so had a bigger population than western Berlin's 2,118,631.
35
  Between 
_____________________________________________________________ 
26
  Glantz, City under Siege, pp. 119-120, 189. 
27
  Pavlov, pp. 103-104, 162; Salisbury, pp. 380-382.  Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, p. 133 
gave a larger figure totalling 60,000 tons. 
28
  Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, p. 140. 
29
  Salisbury, pp. 493, 513.  Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, p. 144 - Glantz figures differed 
from Salisbury's being 361,109 tons in total including 262,419 tons of food plus 2,000 tons 
of special foods; 34,717 tons of fuels and lubricants, and 22,818 tons of coal.  
30
  Salisbury, pp. 526-527.  Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, p. 243-244 - Glantz cited a longer 
period and larger figures: 779,586 tons in total with half being food and 310,000 
reinforcements. 
31
  Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, p. 247; Glantz, City under Siege, p. 189. 
32
  Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, p. 248. 
33
  Erickson, Road to Berlin, pp. 61, 167; Glantz, City under Siege, pp. 118, 136, 139; 
Salisbury, pp. 278, 548, 550-551. 
34
  HQ BAFO, AP3257 A Report on Operation PLAINFARE (The Berlin Airlift) 25
th
 June 
1948 - 6
th
 October 1949 (Bielefeld: Control Commission, 1950) App. R. 
35
  Control Commission for Germany (British Element), Notes on the Blockade of Berlin 
1948: from a British viewpoint in Berlin (Berlin: Printing and Service Control Commission 
for Germany (BE), 1949) p. 17; Salisbury, pp. 294-295.  Salisbury estimated the Leningrad 
Footnote continues on next page. 
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August 1941 and the end of 1943 about 1,000,000 Leningrad civilians were 
evacuated to the unoccupied Soviet Union, substantially more than from western 
Berlin during its blockade.  The decline in the City's civilian population, including 
through death, is shown in Table 1.A.
36
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Table 1.A:  Leningrad Civilian Population 
Food rationing was introduced based on military function and work status.  Glantz 
cited seven fundamental norms but it is apparent that there were several other groups 
who received higher rations, substantially more in some cases.  Bread was not the 
only ration but for many it was the main food and for periods the sole one.
37
  The 
                                                                                                                           
garrison at approximately 500,000. 
AP3257, p. 279 - 2,250,000 'living in a city'. 
36
  Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, p. 241; Salisbury, pp. 492, 515, 575. 
37
  Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, p. 133; Darra Goldstein, 'Women under Siege: Leningrad 
1941-1942' (Williams College), in From Betty Crocker to Feminist Food Studies: Critical 
Perspectives on Women and Food, ed. by Barbara Haber and Arlene Avakian (Amherst, 
MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005); Jones, pp. xxi-xxii, 193, 195, 196-197, 217, 
288; Pavlov, pp. 52-53, 67, 77, 79, 118, 132, 149, 160; Anna Reid, Leningrad: Tragedy of a 
City Under Siege, 1941-44 (London: Bloomsbury, 2011) pp. 166, 263-265 - food used for 
reward and coercion; Salisbury, pp. 388, 390, 403, 492, 499, 503. 
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three principal civilian norms for autumn and winter 1941-1942 are given in Table 
1.B.
38
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Table 1.B:  Principal Leningrad Bread Norms  
Civilian rations included entitlement substitutions, for example powdered egg in lieu 
of meat.
39
  Factory workers who became unemployed when factories closed during 
the winter of 1941-1942 were reassigned to a dependant's rations with potentially 
serious implications.
40
  During the Berlin Blockade foods were substituted but 
unemployment did not result in starvation rations.
41
  In Leningrad entitlements were 
not always met in full and the civilian population received little but bread through 
November, December and January.
42
  Bread supplies were intermittent during 
January 1942 and towards the end of the month there may have been a complete 
_____________________________________________________________ 
38
  Jones, p. xxii - courtesy of the Museum of the Blockade, St Petersburg; Pavlov, pp. 52-53, 
77, 79 118, 149, 160. 
39
  Pavlov, pp. 74-75, 77, 79, 117. 
40
  Glantz, City under Siege, p. 75; Jones, pp. 4, 93, 175, 181, 208, 214; Pavlov, pp. xvii, 54-
55, 74-80, 122; Salisbury, pp. 292, 296, 367-368, 377. 
41
  Walter Phillips Davison, The Berlin Blockade (New York: Arno Press, 1980) pp.-313-
314.  See thesis Chap. 4. 
42
  Pavlov, pp. 76, 78, 120-121, 144; Reid, pp. 282, 298-299. 
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collapse in the distribution system with some citizens unable to obtain any food for a 
week.
43
   
Table 1.C displays in two parts the daily theoretical calorific values of the citizens' 
rations in December 1941.
44
  It is based on the assumption that a full entitlement was 
received which was most unlikely.  It is theoretical because of the adulteration of 
food.  Modern research points to the dependant's 466 calorie figure being closer to 
300.
45
  The calorific values for the western Berlin rations in December 1948 are also 
shown to emphasize how substantially greater they were.
46
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Table 1.C.1:  Calorific intake Leningrad and Western Berlin - Graphical 
Summary  
_____________________________________________________________ 
43
  Jones, pp. XXI, 159, 195, 202, 204-205, 208-209, 215; Salisbury, p. 455. 
44
  Control Commission, Notes, p. 18; Jones, p. xxi; Pavlov, p. 122. 
45
  Reid, p. 168.  In late November 1941 bread adulteration was: 10% edible cellulose, 10% 
cottonseed cake, 2% chaff, 2% meal dust, 3% corn flour, leaving 73% rye flour but bread 
was sold by weight, and when baked the rye weight fell to 59.5% - Goldstein, pp. 5-6; 
Pavlov, p. xvii. 
46
  Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, pp. 262-263; Glantz, City under Siege, pp. 71-72; Glantz, 
Battle for Leningrad, p. 138; Goldstein; Jones, pp. 142-143; Pavlov, pp. 58, 60-65; 
Salisbury, pp. 370, 389. 
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Leningrad 1941 western Berlin 1948 
Category Calories/day Category Calories/day 
    Heavy workers 2609 
Factory workers 1087 Workers 2202 
Office workers 581 White collar workers  1882 
Dependents 466 Non-workers 1882 
Children 684 Children: 0-1 1786 
   Children: 1-6 1653 
   Children: 6-9 1633 
   Children: 9-14 1834 
 
Table 1.C.2:  Calorific intake Leningrad and western Berlin - Detail  
When lack of fuel caused power stations to stop, the piped water supplies and sewers 
froze; the public baths and laundries closed; trams stopped; factories fell idle, and 
hospitals lost their heating and their electricity.
 47
  In midwinter houses were without 
light, hot water and heating other than that which could be provided by scavenged 
wood, firewood and peat collected from wrecked buildings, the suburbs and the 
unoccupied northeast but it was never enough.
 48
  Increased quantities of food at last 
started to reach the shops in the second half of February 1942.
49
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
47
  Glantz, City under Siege, pp. 72, 112; Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, pp. 135, 239; Jones, 
pp. 164, 207-208; Pavlov, pp. 33, 41; Salisbury, pp. 456-458, 507. 
48
  Glantz, City under Siege, pp. 72 75-76; Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, pp. 135-138; Jones, 
p. 205; Pavlov, pp. 132-133; Salisbury, pp. 456-458. 
Goldstein: only five hours of twilight and -34°F temperatures. 
49
  Jones, pp. 229; Pavlov, p. 179. 
  273 
APPENDIX 2 
SIEGE OF LENINGRAD 1941-1944 - MAP OF PLACES AND TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Siege of Leningrad - Map of Places and Transport Infrastructure
1
_____________________________________________________________ 
1
  Dmitri V. Pavlov, trans. John C. Adams, Leningrad 1941: The Blockade (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965) Maps 4, 5, 6, 7. 
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APPENDIX 3 
COMPARISON OF AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION DATA FOR JUNE 1949 
Appendix 3 uses the C-54s based at RAF Fassberg and RAF Celle and RAF Yorks at 
RAF Wunstorf to show the range of figures that were recorded for June 1949 by 
different organizations for the same or apparently similar statistics.  The results of 
Charlesby's smoothing exercise are then included for comparison.  These adjusted for 
the different ways that the nations counted aircraft assigned/on strength.  For 
example American figures included those on 200 hour inspections whilst RAF assets 
on 100 hour ones were not. 
CALTF Records:
1
   
 RAF Fassberg RAF Celle 
Average Assigned 45.94 41.06 
Average in Commission 26.42 26.66 
Daily Trips per assigned aircraft  3.6 4 
 
USAF Statistical Digest Jan 1949 - Jun 1950:
2
 
 RAF Fassberg RAF Celle 
Average Assigned 48.3 44.6 
Average in Commission 25.6 26.5 
Daily Trips per assigned aircraft that 
landed in Berlin  
3.5 3 
_____________________________________________________________ 
1
  AFHRA, IRISNUM 241489, CALTF Statistical Summary. 
2
  Department of the Air Force, Operations Statistics Division, United States Air Force 
Statistical Digest Jan 1949 - Jun 1950 Fifth Edition (Washington DC: US Government, 
1951). 
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A USAFE Summary:  The bar charts indicated about 58% of RAF Fassberg's C-54s 
were in commission and about 62% of RAF Celle's.
3
 
BAFO Form STATS 120
4
: 
 RAF Fassberg 
and RAF Celle 
RAF Wunstorf 
Average Strength 86.7 37.9 
Average used daily 74 29.5 
Daily Trips per on-strength aircraft  3.6 2 
 
Charlesby's Smoothing Exercise:
5
 
 RAF 
Fassberg  
RAF 
Celle 
RAF Wunstorf 
Average Assigned 45.9 41.1 64.9 (37.9 in 
BAFO and 27 
in UK) 
Daily Trips per Assigned Aircraft  3.6 3.6 1.2 
 
Table 3A summarizes these comparisons graphically. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
3
  HQ USAFE, Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, 26 June 1948-30 September 1949 (HQ 
Ramstein AFB: USAFE reproduction Centre, undated, circa 1950) p. 98.  Note the caution in 
source about disparity between USAFE sources.  This is the higher figure. 
4
  TNA, AIR 55/110, Monthly Form STATS 120 records. 
5
  TNA, AIR 55/102, Charlesby 21 July 1949. 
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Table 3A: Comparison of Aircraft Utilization Data for June 1949 
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APPENDIX 4 
AIRCREW AND AIRCRAFT RESOURCES PLANNED FOR JUNE 1949 - 
APRIL 1950 
Table 4.A is a précis of Transport Command's planning figures for June 1949 
through April 1950.  The need to meet the requirements in the Table and the rotation 
plans from April 1949 to the end of December 1949 was expected to require an 
additional 130 pilots, 124 Navigators 172 signallers and 98 engineers.
1
  
_____________________________________________________________ 
1
  TNA, AIR 2/10064, Es:251-260 Mackworth 6 April 1949 with Appendixes. 
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 Monthly Average  
 Trips/day Crews in 
Germany 
Total crews Aircraft in 
Germany 
Total Aircraft Short tons/day 
Hastings       
June- December 1949 54.3 54.3 74.3 27.4 40.9 500.4 
January-April 1950 68.5 68.5 114.0 34.5 52.0 634.5 
York       
June- December 1949 66.3 59.9 102.9 30.7 52.3 563.4 
January-April 1950 60.0 54.0 89.0 28.0 48.0 510.0 
Dakota
1
       
June- December 1949 84.1 76.7 73.7 42.9 67.7 293.7 
January-April 1950 76.0 69.0 61.3 38.0 60.0 266.0 
 
Table 4.A:  Aircrew and Aircraft Resources Planned for June 1949 - April 1950 
_____________________________________________________________ 
1
  Included RAAF, RNZAF, SAAF contingents totalling 33 aircrews.  TNA, AIR 28/978, ORB RAF Bassingbourn recorded RAAF, RNZAF and SAAF 
strengths. 
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APPENDIX 5 
BERLIN AIRLIFT - MAP OF AIRFIELD LOCATIONS 
 
 
Berlin Airlift - Map of Airfield Locations  
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APPENDIX 6 
STATISTICAL DISPARITY 
The example tonnages in Table 6.A are taken from the manuscript daily log of the 
Air Ministry Central Statistics Branch, the BAFO F STATS 120, and the Berlin 
ALREPS for the period 1 May 1949 and 14 May 1949.  They display for the sample 
fortnight persistent differences in the tonnages with the Air Ministry figures always 
being higher than those recorded in Berlin.
1
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Table 6.A:  Example Statistical Disparity
_____________________________________________________________ 
1
  TNA: AIR 19/621; AIR 20/7285; AIR 55/110. 
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APPENDIX 7 
APPLICATION OF AIRLIFT LOGISTICS 
Martin Van Creveld's Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton
1
 
evaluated the impact of supply in hot wars.  The thesis is not a critique of Supplying 
War nor is it an exploration of subsequent material that supported, extended or 
opposed his conclusions.  The book provides a basis against which this appendix 
identifies fundamental differences in the application of logistics in hot wars up until 
the end of the Second World War and the Airlift's Cold War sustainment mission.  
The appendix, moreover, addresses the airbridge as a whole and not just the British 
component.   
Van Creveld studied offensive land-based campaigns, not sieges nor blockades.  The 
Airlift was a defensive activity targeted at supporting mainly German civilians.  
Offensive operations require supply to reach mobile forces over increasing distances 
whereas the Airlift operated between static bases.  In Van Creveld's examples, supply 
was delivered almost entirely by surface means and mainly by land.  In Operations 
VITTLES and PLAINFARE, supply was by air.  In hot wars, the enemy usually 
interfered with the lines of communication.
2
  Harassment of the Airlift may have 
occurred but nothing more serious took place and on the ground the Soviets 
continued to supply electricity to RAF Gatow. 
An advancing army may be able to pillage and to use captured stores (for example, 
France 1940, North Africa 1940-1942).
3
  In Berlin 4% of the civil population of the 
western sectors opted for Soviet Zone ration cards; the blockade was porous, and 
there were limited Soviet stocks stored in western sectors that were "borrowed".  
Stockpiles of essential commodities had been built up between the Little Lift and the 
_____________________________________________________________ 
1
  Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, 2
nd
 edn. (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, [1
st
 edn. published 1977]). 
2
  Ian R. Gooderson, 'Allied Close Air Support 1942-1945' (doctoral thesis, London 
University, 1994); Richard Keen, 'The Development of the Fighter-Bomber by the Western 
Desert Air Force between 14 October 1941 and 30 June 1942' (master's thesis, Buckingham 
University, 2010). 
3
  Van Creveld, pp. 146-147, Chap. 6. 
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Blockade.
4
  The supply chain supporting a Second World War army's advance 
consumed its own seed corn, for example fuel for vehicles, rations for the drivers and 
mechanics, spares for maintenance.  In the Airlift, aircraft were refuelled in western 
zones and whenever possible, "unserviceable" aircraft were flown back to the 
western zones for rectification.  Increases to garrisons in western Berlin were 
minimized by making maximum use of local labour.
5
   
Van Creveld recognized that armies appear to prepare 'as best they could on an ad 
hoc basis, making great, if uncoordinated, efforts to gather together the largest 
possible number of tactical vehicles, trucks of all descriptions, railway troops, etc., 
while giving little, if any, thought to the "ideal" combination which, in theory, would 
have carried them the furthest.'
6
  The British miscellany of aircraft and the 
involvement of the Civil Lift reflected that but it would be wrong to conclude that 
after the initial phases of the Airlift either country's efforts were 'uncoordinated' or 
that the British were unaware that theirs was not the 'ideal combination'.
7
 
The sieges in the "Precedent Chapter"
8
 revealed a very visible need for supply 
support to troops whose prime function was to defend a position and if possible, to 
counterattack.  With Berlin, there was no armed conflict.  To maintain their position, 
the Western Occupation Powers had to sustain themselves and the western Berliners 
during the Blockade.  In Van Creveld's scenarios the supply and transport staffs were 
part of the "admin tail" and subordinate to the "teeth arm" generals.  In the Airlift, 
logistics
9
 became the "sharp end" and the transport aircraft - and thus their 
commanders and aircrews - a development of Napoleon's carts.
10
   
The differences between the Airlift and Van Creveld's case studies indicates that 
different logistic models applied because of the different objectives and 
_____________________________________________________________ 
4
  Thesis Chaps. 2, 5, 6. 
5
  Thesis Chaps. 4-6. 
6
  Van Creveld, p. 236. 
7
  Thesis Chaps. 5-6. 
8
  Thesis Chap. 3. 
9
  Defined as the 'timely delivery of what is needed' - see Logistics in the Glossary of Terms. 
10
  Van Creveld, Chap. 2. 
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circumstances.  Indeed, because of its size, nature, and the priority allocated to it by 
the American and British Governments, the Berlin Airlift may have been the sole 
occasion where supply was truly the dominant objective throughout a whole 
campaign.   
Antoine-Henri Jomini considered that logistics was the practical art of moving 
armies.
11
  NATO calls it a science and AP3150 described movements as a science.
 12
  
Art implies that there is creativity in every work with even copies of works of art 
having differences and this may be a valid view in the turmoil of offensive 
operations.  Science, on the other hand, is based on the premise that the same 
reaction will repeat itself perpetually providing the conditions remain the same.   
William Tunner wrote 'the efficient operation of an airlift is a science'.
13
   However, 
strictly, 'The application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes' is 
technology.
14
  The case for technology can be supported by the close involvement of 
the Scientific Adviser to the Air Ministry and the work studies by the US Army and 
the British Army Operational Research Group.
15
  It was reflected in the analytical 
approach to cargoes which included the formulation of lightweight nutritious diets 
that recognized the lack of power in Berlin to prepare food;
16
 more thermally 
_____________________________________________________________ 
11
  I. B. Holley Jr., Ideas and Weapons (New York: Yale University Press, 1953 [Reprint Air 
Force History and Museums Program, 1997]) p. 12; Van Creveld, p. 1. 
12
  MOD, AP3000 British Air and Space Power Doctrine <www.raf.mod.uk/ 
rafcms/mediafiles/374E9EFB_1143_EC82_2EC09693E342D3C7.pdf> [accessed 29 June 
2013] (Chap. 10, and 2.10.2); MOD, AP3150: Royal Air Force Manual of Movements, 3
rd
 
edn, Section 1, Leaflet A3. 
13
  William H. Tunner, Over the Hump (Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 
1985) pp. 175-178, 321. 
14
  Anon, Oxford Dictionaries Online <oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/ 
technology> [accessed 20 December 2012]. 
15
  AM, 'Operation Plainfare', RAF Air Clues, Vol. 3, No. 12, August 1949; Dudley Barker, 
Berlin Airlift: An account of the British Contribution (London: HMSO, 1949) p. 14; HQ 
BAFO, AP3257 A Report on Operation PLAINFARE (The Berlin Airlift) 25
th
 June 1948 - 6
th
 
October 1949 (Bielefeld: Control Commission, 1950), App. K; Elizabeth S. Lay, Historical 
Division, Headquarters European Command, 'The Berlin Airlift: Part 2: 1 January-30 
September 1949', Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1948 -1949, (Karlsruhe: 1952) pp. 
32-33; TNA, WO 32/12671, Army Operational Research Group, Time and Motion Study of 
Air Supply (Operation Plainfare).  
16
  Barker, p. 9; Tunner, pp. 182, 205. 
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efficient petroleum products replacing coal;
17
 packaging being designed to reduce 
weight, cost and leakage including minimization of dust in aircraft,
18
 and container 
design assessing factors such as product lives, ease of replacement, and the need for 
manual handling and easy onboard stowage.
19
   
Moreover, a technological methodology was applied to the logistical procedures.  
The Loading practices and movement of aircraft in transit within corridors and in the 
Berlin Air Safety Zone were modelled resulting in firmly imposed standard operating 
procedures [SOPs] aimed at delivering to Berlin the maximum tonnage per day.
20
  
SOPs were developed - coupled with associated training and equipment - to allow the 
Airlift to continue under most weather conditions with only a minimum reduction in 
performance.  Examples were the bespoke US aircrew training at Great Falls before 
posting to the Airlift and the deployment of the [aircraft] Ground Controlled 
Approach (GCA) system.  Standard aircraft loads were introduced - as far as 
practicable - to ensure correlation of aircraft types and cargoes; to permit loads to be 
pre-prepared; to allow aircraft to be loaded, trimmed and lashed down by semi-
skilled personnel; and commodities in mixed cargoes to be blended to avoid 
premature weighting or bulking out of aircraft.
21
   
SOPs ensured everyone did their job the same way.  This was reflected in AATO 
'fixed drills' as well as in the air.  There were many maxims associated with William 
Tunner and the approach adopted including: 'inflexibly systematic as a metronome', 
'There could be no variations, no displays of individual temperament', 'Functioned 
with machine-like efficiency', and 'Aircraft maintenance teams, aircrews, supply 
personnel, and thousands of lesser-known activities were sharply regimented.  All 
_____________________________________________________________ 
17
  Barker, pp. 10, 37-38. 
18
  AP3257, pp. 301; 521; Barker, pp. 37-38; TNA, FO 1077/4, CAATO Notes on 
Conference 27 April 1949 and 25 May 1949. 
19
  AP3257, pp. 66, 175; TNA: WO 291/1056, Report No. 8/48; WO 291/1101, Report No. 
28/49. 
20
  AP3257, pp. 20-23 28-29; HQ USAFE, Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, 26 June 1948-
30 September 1949 (HQ Ramstein AFB: USAFE reproduction Centre, undated, circa 1950) 
pp. 22-25. 
21
  AP3257, pp. 68-69; Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, p. 29. 
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jobs were performed according to strict directives and tracked on statistical charts 
and tables.'
22
   
Van Creveld wrote about Operation OVERLORD that 'In the final account, it was 
the willingness - or lack of it - to override the plans, to improvise and take risks, that 
determined the outcome.'
23
  The culture and the often quickly changing conditions of 
hot wars fostered quick thinking - "initiative" - and flexibility.  The different 
circumstances of the Airlift allowed a measured approach where logistic systems 
were analysed, processes designed and then "staffed", before controlled application 
to achieve standard methods; essentially, it was systems engineering.  
_____________________________________________________________ 
22
  AFHRA: IRISNUM 1093673, Roger D. Launius and Coy F. Cross II, MAC and The 
Legacy of the Berlin Airlift (Scott AFB IL: Military Airlift Command Office of History 
Monograph, 1989) p. 33; Billy J. Hoppe, Lt Col, 'Lieutenant General William H. Tunner in 
the China-Burma-India "Hump" and Berlin Airlifts: a Case Study in Leadership in 
Development of Airlift Doctrine' (Air University Maxwell AFB, in fulfilment of the 
curriculum requirement of the Air War College, 1995) p. 17; Tunner, pp. xi, 162, 174; 
USAF, 'Lieutenant General William H. Tunner', Biographies, <www.af.mil/information 
/bios/bio.asp?bioID=7431> [accessed 21 December 2012] citing an excerpt from Clayton 
Knight's book, Lifeline in the Sky. 
23
  Van Creveld, pp. 236. 
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APPENDIX 8 
CHRONOLOGY OF THE BERLIN BLOCKADE AND AIRLIFT 
Two sources have been used primarily to build the following chronology: AP3257 and The Berlin Blockade
1
.  Additional footnotes identify 
where other sources have been employed either to enhance the list or the detail about a particular occurrence. 
Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
1948    
1 April    Soviet rail and road restrictions on traffic 
from western zones to Berlin resulted in 
a small airbridge to supply the western 
occupation forces in Berlin. 
10 April  Clay statement: 'After Berlin will come 
Western Germany'
 2
. 
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
1
  Walter Phillips Davison, The Berlin Blockade: A Study in Cold War Politics (New York: Arno Press, 1980) pp. 387-389; HQ BAFO, AP3257 A Report on 
Operation PLAINFARE (The Berlin Airlift) 25
th
 June 1948 - 6
th
 October 1949 (Bielefeld: Control Commission, 1950) pp. 146-149, 215-216, 528, 551-552. 
2
  Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin - Foreign Secretary 1945-1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) p. 547. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
11 June    Rail movement between Berlin and 
western Germany stopped temporarily. 
12 June    Road movement between Berlin and 
western Germany harassed because the 
Soviet Military Administration [SMA] 
closed a bridge for 'repairs'. 
16 June   Col Yelisarov (Deputy Soviet 
Commandant of Berlin) walked out of 
Allied Kommandatura meeting.  (Soviet 
Commandant, Gen Kotikov, was ill).
3
 
  
_____________________________________________________________ 
3
  Ann and John Tusa, The Berlin Airlift (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1998) pp. 136-137. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
17 June   European Recovery Program bill 
approved by Congress.   
French Assembly approved the London 
Agreements on the future of western 
Germany
4
. 
 The planning of Operation KNICKER to 
supply the British garrison in Berlin by 
air was completed. 
18 June   Currency reform in western Germany 
(but not Berlin) announced.   
 
23 June  Warsaw Conference involving the 
Soviet Union and satellite countries. 
SMA ordered currency reform in 
eastern Germany including Berlin.  
Western powers countered by currency 
reform in western Berlin.   
A crowd, abetted by SMA controlled 
police, attacked the Berlin City 
Assembly. 
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
4
  Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: the origins of the cold war and the national security state (London: Deutsch, 1978) p. 376. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
24 June   70-80,000 demonstrated at Hertha 
Stadium in French Sector in support of 
Magistrat and City Assembly
5
. 
SMA imposed full blockade.   
SMA refused to supply food to western 
sectors of Berlin
6
.   
25 June    First Douglas Dakotas arrived at RAF 
Wunstorf.  6½ tons hauled.
7
  
26 June    "Official" start of Berlin Airlift and the 
start of US Operation VITTLES.
8
   
_____________________________________________________________ 
5
  Davison, pp. 100-101; Tusas, p. 142. 
6
  Davison, p. 99; TNA, AIR 8/2611, AHQ BAFO signal AOX 709 24 June 1948 requested initiation of Operation 'KNICKER' 'on a limited scale'. 
7
  AP3257, pp. 117, 129. 
8
  HQ USAFE, Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, 26 June 1948-30 September 1949 (HQ Ramstein AFB: USAFE reproduction Centre, undated, circa 1950) 
p. 185; Davison, p. 388; Daniel L. Haulman, The United States Air Force and Humanitarian Airlift Operations 1947–1994, Air Force History and Museums 
Program (Washington DC: AFHRA, 1998) p. 234; Roger G. Miller, To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948-1949 (College Station, TX: Texas A&M 
University Press, 2000) p. 39. 
According to Elizabeth S. Lay, Historical Division, Headquarters European Command, 'The Berlin Airlift: Part 1: 21 June-31 December 1948', Occupation 
Forces in Europe Series 1948 -1949, (Karlsruhe: 1952) pp. 1 and 10-11, US Transportation Corps records indicated that the 82 tons lifted on that date was 
military cargo and the first civilian cargo received at Tempelhof was 223 tons on 28 June. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
27 June    Group Captain N. C. Hyde became 
officer commanding RAF Transport 
Force
9
. 
28 June  Truman's statement: 'We are going to 
stay. Period'
 10
 
Bevin's retort to Draper '[1500 tons per 
day] was not enough and he was sure 
the USA could do better'
11
. 
 Operation KNICKER started; 44 tons 
delivered to RAF Gatow from RAF 
Wunstorf.  
HQ Army Air Transport Organisation 
[HQ AATO] formed. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
9
  AP3257, pp. 7-9, 117-128. 
10
  Bullock, p. 577; Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence MO, 'The Berlin Crisis, Research Project No. 17, Rough Draft, Department of State, 
1948 [continues to 23 May 1949], President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers' <www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop 
/study_collections/berlin_airlift/large/documents/index.php? > [accessed 6 July 2011]. 
11
  Bullock, pp. 576-577.  William H. Draper, [US] Under Secretary for the Army. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
29 June    Operation widened in scope to include 
western Berlin's civil population.  
Renamed CARTER PATERSON
12
. 
Brig Gen Joseph Smith, base commander 
Wiesbaden, appointed in temporary 
charge of [American] Berlin Airlift Task 
Force
13
. 
30 June Bevin in House of Commons: 'HM 
Government and our Western Allies can 
see no alternative between that and 
surrender, and none of us can accept 
surrender'
 14
. 
  
_____________________________________________________________ 
12
  HQ No. 46 Gp. Diary of Events gave date for renaming as 30
th
 - AP3257, p. 146. 
13
  Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, p. 186; Lay, 'The Berlin Airlift: Part 1', p. 13 and Miller, pp. 57-58.  Tunner records Smith knew of his appointment on 
27
th
 - William H. Tunner, Over the Hump (Washington DC, US Government, 1985) p. 159.  
14
  Bullock, p. 578. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
1 July. Col Kalinin (Soviet Chief of Staff at 
Kommandatura) terminated 
quadrilateral Kommandatura.   
 Avro Yorks arrive at RAF Wunstorf.   
Douglas C-54s arrived at Rhein-Main 
AFB
15
 
3 July    Operation renamed PLAINFARE; (HQ 
No. 46 Gp. Diary of Events gave date for 
renaming as 19
th
).  First York sortie into 
RAF Gatow. 
5 July  The National Health Service introduced 
in Great Britain
16
.   
 First [four-engine flying boat] Short 
Sunderland sortie from Finkenwerder to 
the Lake Havel. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
15
  Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, p. 186; clarified by Miller, p. 58. 
16
  Hansard, 'National Health Service', HC Deb 09 February 1948 Vol. 447 cc35-160. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
10 July    HQ AATO moved to Schloss Buckeburg 
with its Rear Airfield Support 
Organization and Forward Airfield 
Support Organization elements at RAF 
Wunstorf and RAF Gatow respectively. 
16 July   America deployed B-29 bombers to 
British bases. 
 Concrete runway completed at RAF 
Gatow. 
19 July   Soviet offer to supply food to all of 
Berlin.   
Hyde ceased to be OC RAF Transport 
Force; period of confused command, 
control and coordination followed until 
the arrival at RAF Buckeburg
 
of the 
Advanced Operational HQ No. 46 
Group
17
.   
RAF Dakotas transferred from RAF 
Wunstorf to RAF Fassberg.   
_____________________________________________________________ 
17
  AP3257, pp. 7-9, 117-128. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
24 July  Bevin: 'the abandonment of Berlin 
would mean the loss of Western 
Europe'
18
. 
  
25 July   Details of the Soviet food offer 
announced
19
. 
 
26 July   Start of split of Berlin police into 
western and Eastern Zone forces
20
. 
 
27 July    Flight Refuelling flew first British Civil 
Airlift sortie from RAF Buckeburg to 
RAF Gatow. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
18
  Douglas to Washington quoted by Bullock, p. 588. 
19
  Davison, The Berlin Blockade, p. 165. 
20
  Davison, The Berlin Blockade, pp. 171-174. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
29 July    [American] Airlift Task Force 
(Provisional) established
21
. 
30 July    Letter appointing Major General William 
Tunner as Commander of the Airlift Task 
Force (Provisional) issued by HQ 
USAFE
 22
.   
2 August  Representatives of the three western 
powers met with Molotov and Stalin in 
Moscow.  Meetings continued 
throughout August.   
  
4 August    British Civil Airlift officially began with 
aircraft based at RAF Wunstorf, RAF 
Fassberg and Finkenwerder. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
21
  Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, p. 4. 
22
  Lay, 'The Berlin Airlift: Part 1', pp. 13 and 58. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
17 August    Highest daily tonnage by RAF of the 
whole Airlift, 1,735.6 short tons. 
20
 
August    RAF Dakotas started move from RAF 
Fassberg to RAF Lubeck. 
21 August    USAF C-54s deployed to RAF Fassberg, 
operating into RAF Gatow. 
26 August   Soviet supporters marched on the Berlin 
Stadthaus after which 30,000 pro-
democracy supporters demonstrated at 
the Reichstag
23
. 
 
27 August   Mob of 500-800 attacked the Stadthaus 
helped by SMA-controlled police
24
. 
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
23
  Davison, pp. 179-180. 
24
  Davison, pp. 180-181. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
28 August.  Civil Airlift aircraft at RAF Fassberg 
moved to RAF Lubeck 
 
30 August  Moscow Agreement published.   
6 September   Stadthaus attacked again
25
.  
1-7 September    Four military governors met in an 
unsuccessful attempt to implement 
Moscow Agreement. 
  
9 September   Estimated 250,000 held a pro-
democracy demonstration outside the 
Reichstag
26
.   
The majority of the non-Socialist Unity 
Party of Germany Assembly members 
transferred to the British Sector
27
. 
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
25
  Davison, pp. 185-187. 
26
  Tusas, pp. 222-231. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
15 September    RAAF aircrews joined RAF Lubeck. 
18 September    USAF Air Force Day celebrated by 
delivery of 6,988.7 short tons
28
. 
22
 
September     No. 46 Group formed Advanced 
Operational HQ at RAF Buckeburg; Air 
Commodore John W. F. Merer, AOC No 
46 Group, positioned in Germany. 
29 September  Western powers referred dispute to the 
UN
29
. 
  
1 October    All USAF [twin-engine] Douglas C-47s 
withdrawn from Airlift
30
. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
27
  Bullock, p. 593. 
28
  Miller, pp. 161-162. 
29
  Davison, p. 241. 
30
  Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, p. 186. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
4-5 October  5 October UN Security Council agreed 
to place examination of Berlin dispute 
on its Agenda
31
. 
  
5
 
October    RAF Lubeck based British Civil Airlift 
twin-engine aircraft moved to 
Fuhlsbuttel. 
15
 
October    CALTF formed under Major General 
Tunner with Air Commodore Merer as 
Deputy Commander
32
.   
SAAF aircrews join RAF Lubeck. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
31
  Davison, pp. 242-243. 
32
  TNA, AIR 2/10063, Es:166-168 CALTF Directive. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
16 October   Lieutenant General John K. Cannon 
replaced Curtis E. LeMay as CG 
USAFE.
33
   
20 October  Western German Parliamentary Council 
met to draft a constitution for West 
Germany. 
  
25 October   Security Council's draft resolution for 
settling Berlin dispute vetoed by USSR. 
  
26
 
October    RNZAF aircrews arrived at RAF Lubeck. 
30
 
October    Air Marshal T. M. Williams replaced Air 
Marshal Sir Arthur Sanders as AOC-in-C 
BAFO. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
33
  Daniel F. Harrington, The Air Force Can Deliver Anything: A History of the Berlin Airlift (Ramstein AFB: USAFE History Office, 1998) p. 67; Tunner, 
Hump, pp. 188-189. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
1 November  Truman re-elected President of the 
USA
34
.   
"Average" ration for Berliner in 
American and British Sectors rose by 
12.3% to 1,998 calories
35
 
 
4 November    [American] 1
st
 Airlift Task Force 
established within CALTF
36
. 
8 November    First USN transport squadron (ex-
MATS) arrived at Rhein-Main AFB
37
. 
11
 
November     First Handley Page Hastings sortie from 
RAF Schleswigland. 
18 November    RAF Dakota landed at Tegel. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
34
  Bullock, p. 633. 
35
  Davison, pp. 313-314. 
36
  Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, p. 4. 
37
  Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, p. 186; Miller, pp. 164-165 gave the date as 9 November. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
25
 
November    Part of British Civil Airlift's four-engine 
fleet relocated to RAF Schleswigland. 
26 November    All Civil Airlift Dakotas and Vikings 
withdrawn
38
. 
30 November Security Council established a 
Technical Committee (of neutrals) to 
study Berlin currency problem. 
New government established in Soviet 
Sector of Berlin, 'Staatsoper' 
Magistrat
39
. 
 
1
 
December    Tegel formally opened. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
38
  AP3257, p. 243. 
39
  Tusas, pp. 293-294. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
5 December   Elections in the western sectors.  86.2% 
turnout; 64.85% for SPD, 19.4% for 
Christian Democratic Union.  Ernst 
Reuter became Oberbürgermeister of 
the western sectors.  Magistrat and 
Assembly based in the Rathaus 
Schöneberg.
40
. 
 
15
 
December    RAF Celle opened as a USAF C-54 base.   
Flying-boats withdrawn from Airlift. 
Christmas   Bob Hope's road show for the Airlift.
41
 
31
 
December    100,000
th
 Airlift sortie into Berlin. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
40
  Tusas, pp. 294-295, 299.  Bullock, p. 635 cited the slightly different figures.  Davison p. 229 gave: 83.9% for one of the four democratic parties, 2.4% 
invalid votes and 13.7% did not vote. 
41
  Morale booster once reorganized so that some Airlift personnel were able to attend.  Its real benefit logistically was that Hope was accompanied by W. 
Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air Force, who saw and subsequently had corrected rapidly some of the problems CALTF experienced because of its 
unsatisfactory reporting chain through USAFE - John Provan and R. E. G. Davies, Berlin Airlift: The Effort and the Aircraft (McLean VA: Paladwr Press, 
1998) p. 64; Tunner, pp. 194-197. 
 304 
Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
1949    
3 January  UN Technical Committee submitted its 
currency report to the four Powers. 
  
19 January    ¾ millionth ton delivered. 
31 January  Stalin stated his conditions for ending 
blockade without reference to currency 
problem. 
 171,960 short tons delivered by CALTF 
during January including 5,320 short tons 
by the Wet Lift. 
[By end of] 
January    . 
  225 Skymasters in Germany and a total 
of 319 assigned to the Airlift
42
. 
4 February   Western powers reported that Technical 
Committee's draft proposal was not 
feasible unless Berlin is reunified.   
 The Western Powers tightened the 
counter-blockade. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
42
  AP3257, p. 284; Miller, p. 163. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
11 February  UN Security Council informed that 
further work by the Committee of 
Neutrals to resolve the Berlin issues 
would not seem currently to be of use
43
. 
  
12 February    With withdrawal of last Bristol freighter, 
the Civil Airlift now operated only four-
engine aircraft. 
15 February  Start of informal Jessup-Malik talks on 
Berlin dispute. 
  
18 February    Millionth ton delivered. 
28 February    In February CALTF delivered 152,218.9 
short tons
44
 including 7,355 short tons by 
the Wet Lift. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
43
  Davison, pp. 248-249. 
44
  AP3257, p. 519. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
4-6 March   Clement R. Attlee visited Airlift
45
 
11 March    The 50,000
th
 passenger flown out of 
Berlin. 
15 March    HQ No. 46 Group moved from RAF 
Buckeburg to RAF Luneburg. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
45
  Anon, 'Attlee Praises Team Effort', The Task Force Times, 14 March 1949; 'Our political correspondent', 'Mr Attlee in Berlin', Manchester Guardian, 5 
March 1949.  Anecdotal story cited by Tunner, Hump, pp. 201-202 is that Attlee arrived in a C-54 because the crosswinds at RAF Gatow were too great for a 
British aircraft.  Assuming this is the Attlee official visit cited in TNA: AIR 20/6892, Rainsford February 1949 and AIR 28/1034, the RAF Gatow ORB stated 
he arrived and left in an Avro York, aircraft serial number MW100. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
19 March   The East German Volksrat approved the 
draft constitution for East German 
Government.  Approved by the 
Volkskongress in May 1949 but Soviet 
permission to proceed to a German 
Democratic Republic was not issued 
until 3 October 1949 after which the 
[unelected] provisional government was 
formed.
46
 
 
20 March   Western powers announced that west 
mark would be the legal tender in 
western Berlin. 
 
31 March    In March 196,160 short tons were hauled 
by CALTF, including 10,782 short tons 
by the Wet Lift. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
46
  Bullock, p. 698. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
1 April    No 46 Group transferred from Transport 
Command to BAFO.   
Civil Airlift Division (BEA) formed. 
4 April   North Atlantic Treaty signed
47
.   
6 April     United States Army Airlift Support 
Command formed
48
. 
12-19 April     Berlin garrison rotation, 1
st
 Norfolks by 
Royal Welch Fusiliers
49
. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
47
  By Belgium, Britain, Canada, Demark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and USA - Davison, p. 268. 
48
  Elizabeth S. Lay, Historical Division, Headquarters European Command, 'The Berlin Airlift: Part 2: 1 January-30 September 1949', Occupation Forces in 
Europe Series 1948 -1949, (Karlsruhe: 1952) pp. 4, 15.  
49
  AP3257, p. 526. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
16 April    'Easter Parade', highest ever Airlift day 
when 12,940 tons were hauled to 
Berlin
50
. 
30 April     In April 25 more C-54s assigned to the 
Airlift maintenance pool
51
.   
232,267 short tons delivered by CALTF 
during April, 10,782 short tons by the 
Wet Lift. 
1 May 1949     The Civil Airlift Division (BEA) 
relocated to RAF Luneburg. 
4 May  Four Powers announced agreement to 
end blockade. 
  
_____________________________________________________________ 
50
  Date is usually given as 16 April 1949 owing to statistical recording procedures but it started at 1200 hours on 15 April and ran for 24 hours - TNA, AIR 
25/1273, No. 46 Gp. ORB Appendices, App. 85, Milton 11 April 1949. 
51
  Miller, p. 163. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
8 May    The Western German Parliamentary 
Council passed the Federal Republic of 
Germany constitution
52
. 
 
11 May   In the evening supply of electricity from 
the Eastern Zone restarted
53
. 
12 May  Three western Military Governors and 
Konrad H. J. Adenauer attended the 
meeting of [western sectors] City 
Assembly.  200,000 gathered outside 
Schöneberg to hear Adenauer, Reuter 
and Carlo Schmid; former pledged 
western Germany's links with Berlin
54
 
 Blockade ended at 0001 hrs.  Airlift 
continued
55
. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
52
  Bullock, pp. 690-691. 
53
  Tusas, p. 355. 
54
  Tusas, p. 359. 
55
  TNA, AIR 2/10064, Es:188-189 BAFO AX654 7 May 1949. 
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12-17 May.   Rotation of 1
st
 Worcesters by 1
st
 Gordon 
Highlanders
56
 
13 May   The American, British and French 
Military Governors approved the 
Federal Republic of Germany 
constitution
57
. 
 
20 May   Berlin railway strike began
58
.  
22 May    Highest daily tonnage by British Civil 
Airlift at 1,009.6 short tons.   
_____________________________________________________________ 
56
  AP3257, p. 526. 
57
  Bullock, pp. 690-691. 
58
  TNA, AIR 2/10064, E146 FO (German Section) No. 2516 25 June 1949; Tusas, p. 362. 
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23 May   Promulgation of Federal Republic of 
Germany constitution.  Elections to 
Bundestag held on 14 August 1949 with 
first Chancellor, Adenauer, elected on 
15 September 1949
59
. 
 
23 May-20 June  Council of Foreign Ministers met but 
achieved nothing of significance with 
regard to Berlin or access to it
60
. 
  
31
 
May    CALTF's total for May 250,818 short 
tons with 12,642.3 short tons being by 
the Wet Lift. 
1 June    100,000th short ton of liquid fuel 
delivered by the British Civil Airlift. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
59
  Bullock, p. 698. 
60
  Tusas, pp. 354, 365-372. 
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30 June    In June the wet lift hauled 17,908.3 short 
tons.
61
. 
2 July    2,000,000
th
 short ton delivered. 
5 July    Highest daily tonnage by combined RAF 
and Civil airlifts at 2,314.5 short tons.   
12 July    Run-down of British Civil Airlift 
begins
62
. 
18 July    Cabinet approved proposals for 
discontinuing the Airlift
63
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
61
  TNA, AIR 2/10064, E.52 BAFO AX684 20 June 1949, E.144 BAFO AX691 30 June 1949. 
62
  TNA, AIR 2/10064, E.146 FO 2516 Basic 25 June 1949, Es:149-150 BAFO AOX 33 27 June 1949, Es:147-147A James 29 June 1949, E.148 James 29 
June 1949, E.145 Berlin 2169 Basic 28 June 1949, E.144 BAFO AX691 30 June 1949, E.140 BAFO AX694 1 July 1949. 
63
  TNA, AIR 2/10064, E.124 Hughes 19 July 1949 - CP 49 154.  
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29 July    Rhein/Main AFB became sole consignor 
for coal
64
. 
1 August    Run-down of military Airlift begins.  C-
54s left RAF Celle.   
15-16 August     Civil Airlift ended.  Operations from 
Fuhlsbuttel ceased.   
29 August   First atomic test by USSR
65
.  Operations from RAF Wunstorf ceased. 
1 September    HQ CALTF disbanded.   
C-54s left RAF Fassberg.  Operations 
into Tegel ended. 
18 September  Devaluation of sterling announced
66
.   
_____________________________________________________________ 
64
  Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, p. 189. 
65
  Donald P. Steury, CIA History Staff, How the CIA Missed Stalin's Bomb: Dissecting Soviet Analysis, 1946-50 <www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-
of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no1/html_files/stalins_bomb_3.html, posted 15 Apr 2007> [accessed 7 June 2012]. 
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Date International Dimension  German Dimension Blockade and Airlift 
21 September   Military government ended in western 
Germany (the Federal Republic of 
Germany)
67
. 
 
23 September    Operations from RAF Lubeck ceased. 
30 September 
1949,  
  Last C-54 Operation VITTLES 
delivery.
68
 1st Airlift Task Force stopped 
regular Airlift flights
69
. 
6 October    Operations from RAF Schleswigland 
ceased with departure of last Hastings. 
15 October    No. 46 Group returned to TC. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
66
  Peter Hennessy, Never Again Britain 1945-1951 (London: Penguin, 2006) p. 464. 
67
  Hennessy, Never Again, p. 464. 
68
  Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, p. 189. 
69
  Lay, 'The Berlin Airlift: Part 2', p. 108. 
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  Addendum - 2 
CALCULATION FORMULAE 
INTRODUCTION 
The thesis contains figures calculated from primary or contemporaneous data.  In 
most cases the calculations are simple and the source material evident.  There are a 
few instances, however, where readers may wish to understand more complex 
formulae and these are set out below correlated with the relevant page or pages in the 
parent thesis.  A separate addendum has been employed to avoid distracting the flow 
for people who do not seek this detail.   
CHAPTER 3: STALINGRAD 
Page 100, Issues with Morzik's figures: 
750 tons ÷ (2 tons/aircraft per delivery * ((30 ÷ 100) OR (35 ÷ 100) 
serviceability) = 1250 or 1071[rounded]. 
Page 101, using 300 tons per day target: 
300 tons ÷ (2 tons/aircraft per delivery * ((30 ÷ 100) OR (35 ÷ 100) 
serviceability)) = 500 or 429[rounded]. 
Page 101, Approximate time for Salsk to Pocket to Salsk by Ju-52: 
((350*2kms) ÷ 190kms/hour [cruising speed 211kms/hour; climb rate 3000 metres in 
17 minutes, rounded]) = 221 minutes (+ 4 hours ground time in Pocket). 
Page 102, hypothetical number of aircraft: 
750 tons ÷ ((2 tons * 2 trips) * ((35 ÷ 100 serviceability) OR (25 ÷ 100 
serviceability))*(70 ÷ 100 to allow for aborted deliveries)) = 765 or 1071 
[rounded]. 
  Addendum - 3 
CHAPTER 6: BERLIN AIRLIFT 
Pages 215-216, Estimate of trips per Skymaster hauling liquid fuel in bulk: 
Daily target for May 1949: 553 short tons  
 Diesel Gasoline Kerosene 
Tudor capability: 8.9 short tons 8.7 short tons 8.9 short tons 
Product split based on 
May 1949's actuals: 0.754 0.146 0.100 
Tonnage/sortie 
* product split: 8.9*0.754 8.7*0.146 8.9*0.100 
Overall average: 8.87 
Number of Skymaster trips/day: 550 ÷ 8.87=62 
Number of assigned Skymasters: 62 ÷ 3.5= 18 [rounded] 
 
Page 216, total Skymasters needed to replace the British: 
Assigned  
aircraft 
Pipeline and Overhaul At Great Falls AFB Total 
[rounded] 
@ extra 38 (92/201)*38 = 17.39 (19/201)*38= 3.59 59 
@ extra 56 (92/201)*56 = 25.63 (19/201)*56= 5.29 87 
@ extra 69 (92/201)*69 = 31.58 (19/201)*69= 6.52 108 
 
Page 221, C-54s not involved with Airlift: 
(441 in inventory - 40 leased) - (201 in 1
st
 ALTF + 92 in maintenance and 
inspection pipeline + 19 at Great Falls) = 89 
Page 222, R5D potential 1
st
 ALTF reinforcements: 
132 on inventory - (24 in 1
st
 ALTF + 8 in training [including 7 in VR-44] + 
15 in VR-3 + 10 on special missions + 8 USN Airlift maintenance and 
inspection pipeline) = 67.  
  Addendum - 4 
Page 223, Anderson Fleet: 
441 C-54s + 132 R5Ds = 573. 
Page 223, directly and indirectly involved with Airlift: 
(201 C-54s + 24 R5Ds in 1
st
 ALTF) + (8 R5Ds + 92 C-54s in maintenance 
pipeline)+19 at Great Falls + 7 in VR-44 + 15 in VR-3 = 366. 
Page 244, estimate of American increase in May 1949 if relocated to Northern Zone: 
  
May 1949   Per day Per assigned aircraft per 
day 
AFB Tons Trips Average 
assigned 
aircraft 
Tons Trips Tons Trips Tons per 
trip 
Fassberg 50871 5133 47.33 1641 165.581 34.671 3.498 9.911 
Celle  42935 4374 39.94 1385 141.097 34.677 3.533 9.816 
subtotal NZ 93806 9507 87.27 3026 306.677 34.674 3.514 9.867 
Rhein 77995 7732 87.15 2515.968 249.419 28.869 2.862 10.087 
Wiesbaden  20460 2127 26.49 660 68.613 24.915 2.590 9.619 
subtotal SZ 98455 9859 113.64 3175.968 318.032 27.948 2.799 9.978 
 
Either: 
(Estimated daily total tonnage for SZ average assigned aircraft of 113.64 
Skymasters operating at NZ average trips per day of 3.514 and SZ tons per 
trip of 9.978 [includes R5Ds]) - (daily total tonnage for SZ of 3175.968) = 
809. 
Or 
(Estimated daily total tonnage for SZ average assigned aircraft of 113.64 
Skymasters operating at NZ average trips per day of 3.514 and NZ tons per 
trip of 9.867) - (daily total tonnage for SZ of 3175.968) = 764. 
  Addendum - 5 
Page 262, extra Skymasters needed to replace RAF and British dry lift following 
relocation of all of 1
st
 ALTF to Northern Zone: 
Extra Skymasters needed to be operating with squadrons in Northern Zone 
clutch around RAF Fassberg in May 1949: daily British haul of 1,889 short 
tons - Wet Lift 578 tons - 1
st
 ALTF gain of 809 tons = 502 short tons ÷ 35 
tons per Skymaster per day + 4 Skymasters as allowance for niche tasks other 
than Wet Lift = 19 Skymasters (rounded). 
Page 262, total extra Skymasters to replace RAF and British dry lift following 
relocation: 
19 + allowance for Pipeline and Overhaul pool and Great Falls AFB training 
facility = 19*(111÷201) = 29 Skymasters (rounded) in total. 
